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Abstract
The thesis is located within the context of the democratic tradition of political 
theory, exploring its various articulations of ‘ethos’ since antiquity. The 
argument is that a conception of ethos sustains and infuses visions of 
democracy and mobilises individuals politically; it is omnipresent within 
democratic thinking and experience and therefore it requires the attention of 
political theorists. However, there is a failure, the thesis argues, to grasp 
ethos in the fluid and open way that best corresponds to the multifarious 
nature of democracy. The purpose of the thesis, then, is to fill in this gap in 
democratic theory.
In so doing, the thesis explores the persistent connection between ethos 
and morality in contemporary democratic thought and argues that this 
connection poses limitations on our understanding of democracy and our 
ability to act democratically. To sustain the argument pursued here, the thesis 
attends to democracy as a multiplicity with different variegations and 
discernible intensities and therefore as an ongoing process of creating, 
grasping and capitalising on possibilities for action in conditions of fluidity, 
plurality and ambiguity. Democracy entails a constant call for awareness of 
the specificity of the circumstances and for receptivity to the possibilities for 
interference they carry.
An ethos suitable to such a democratic vision is one that responds to the 
peculiarities of the occasion. The thesis envisions a democratic ethos that is 
not merely conceived in terms of a repertoire of dispositions but rather is 
infused by the mental virtue of metis. It is this latter that enables us to 
respond to democracy’s call for action and to affirm democratic ethos as a 
combination of sensibilities and the competency to seize the moment and 
exploit it in our favour on the terrain of the democratic agon. A democratic 
ethos is our dwelling in the moment of democratic action and therefore a 
dwelling temporally.
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Introduction
The thesis is located within the context of the democratic tradition of political 
theory, exploring its various articulations of ‘ethos’ since antiquity. The 
argument is that a conception of ethos sustains and infuses visions of 
democracy and mobilises individuals politically; it is omnipresent within 
democratic thinking and experience and therefore it requires the attention of 
political theorists. However, while the fruits of the articulation of democracy 
and ethos are available to us today, there is a failure, the thesis argues, to 
grasp ethos in the fluid and open way that best corresponds to the 
multifarious nature of democracy.
More specifically, the thesis argues that dem ocracy is inherently 
paradoxical and agonistic: the conditions that enable it are its very threats. In 
the thesis democracy is perceived as a multiplicity with different variegations 
and discernible intensities: a kaleidoscopic variation of the political that 
reformulates and is reformulated continuously. Democracy is itself an agon 
that takes place within and across the boundaries of established norms 
which, often, it seeks to transform. It is inherently agonistic because it is an 
ongoing process of creating, grasping and capitalising on possibilities for 
action in conditions of fluidity, plurality and ambiguity. Thus understood, 
democracy entails a constant call for awareness of the specificity of the 
circumstances and for receptivity to the possibilities for interference they 
carry.
An ethos suitable to such a democratic vision is one that is not prefixed 
and stable but, rather, one that responds to the peculiarities of the occasion. 
The intellectual category of m etis (which I draw out from its pre-Socratic 
sources) proves important to the specificity of the moment of political 
enactment, that is to the momentary dimension of democracy. The thesis 
envisions a democratic ethos that is not merely conceived in terms of a 
repertoire of dispositions but rather is infused by the intellectual virtue of 
metis. It is this latter that enables us to respond to dem ocracy’s call for action 
and to affirm democratic ethos as a combination of sensibilities with the 
competency to seize the moment and exploit it in our favour on the agonistic
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terrain. A democratic ethos is our dwelling in the moment of democratic 
action and therefore a dwelling temporally.
I. The Problematic of Democracy
Democracy is in fashion. It is the form of government preferred and promoted 
by powerful international agents such as the European Union, the 
government of The United States of America and the World Bank and a term 
which seems ever-present in political campaigns, discussions in conference 
panels and academic journals. The fall of the wall in Berlin in 1989 seemingly 
signaled the victory of democracy over other forms of governance, and its 
emergence as the indisputable political value, the only trustworthy and 
successful mode of political organisation. A new right was then born - the 
right to democratic governance.1 The terms “democratic transition” and 
“democratic consolidation” were dynamically re-introduced onto the political 
agenda to emphasise the need to establish democracy where previously it 
had been absent, and to name the process of guiding these societies to the 
political glade that only democracy provides. In the spirit of absolute 
predominance, great political actions have been undertaken in the name of 
“Democracy”, interventions into places considered as “problematic” or 
“unstable” - the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. At 
the same time, the academic cycles produce new journals that thematise 
democracy, and new books and articles on the topic, indicate the growing 
academic interest2: “We are all democrats now”.
In both political and academic discourse democracy is connected to ideals 
such as freedom, equality and justice, which, despite their meaning shifting 
and changing over time, attribute to democracy an absolutely positive status
1 Roland Axtmann, Democracy: Problems and Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), 95. The Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a 
Universal Declaration on Democracy in 1997, recognising democracy as “an ideal and mode 
of deal to be pursued and a mode of government to be applied according to modalities which 
reflect the diversity of experiences and cultural particularities without derogating from 
internationally recognised principles, norms and standards” (First Part, Article 2).
2 See for example the new Journal of Democracy (1990), as well as Constellations-An 
International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory (1994), and the less influential 
Democratization (1994).
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and demands that everyone confess their commitment to it. The political task 
is thus rendered as nothing other than to promote, protect, strengthen or 
sustain democracy. Anthony Giddens has even suggested that democracy 
needs to be “democratised”.3 This catholic appeal of democracy has resulted 
in the concept becoming overloaded and the plethora of words and deeds 
associated with it has brought not to clarification, but obscurantism and 
fragmentation. As Wendy Brown has put it, “in practice, democracy has never 
been more conceptually footloose, substantively thin, or sem iotica lly 
m anipulated for undem ocratic dom estic and foreign explo its” .4 The 
conceptual frameworks in the context of which democracy arises vary 
significantly, involving different aspects and raising different issues, while the 
term itself remains an essentially contested concept.5 Seemingly infinitely 
adjustable to the intended results of policies, speeches and deeds, 
democracy is each time filled in with a different meaning, articulated with 
varying terms. Yet, still, it is increasingly conceptualised as a homogenous 
system of institutions and practices. In some cases democracy is discussed 
as something already given, whereas in others it is the ultimate target but in 
both cases it is identified with a political system which satisfies the principles 
of equality and freedom for all its citizens, who are entitled through universal 
suffrage to elect, in multiparty elections, a constitutional government with 
executive power under control of an independent juridical mechanism.
It is usually assumed that institutions are a prerequisite of a long-standing 
political regime that not only respects individual freedoms and promotes 
justice, but also is home of a demos, not least because “rules frame 
behaviour” .6 Political developments in Eastern Europe have pushed things 
further in the direction of conceptualising democracy in terms of a narrow and 
limiting set of institutional rules and procedures that more frequently than not 
need to be imposed. At the same time, these very developments and the
3 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994).
4 Wendy Brown, “Editor’s introduction” Theory and Event 13, no. 2 (2010), lines 4-6.
5 The term was used by W.B.Gallie to describe concepts that cause dispute about their 
proper use by part of their users and was further elaborated by William E. Connolly, The 
Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 10-44.
6 Jan- Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Democracy: A Comparative Approach (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 125.
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need to fill the institutional gap created in the countries of the region by the 
collapse of the Communist regimes brought to the fore discussions over 
econom ic issues: the process of democratisation is now inextricably 
connected to economic liberalisation. In this context, the European Union 
officiated at the process of designing and implementing specific policies and 
projects aiming to establish democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, by 
exchanging the status of membership for compliance with specific political 
and economic conditions set by the bureaucratic institutions of the EU.7 
Thus, social and economic development have directly been connected to 
democratisation. The doctrine of laissez faire or a free market economy is 
now elevated to a strong pillar of liberal democratic regimes; the classical 
neoliberal views of Hayek and Nozick advocating the m inimalisation of the 
state (Nozick) and the restriction of democracy to its legislative form (Hayek), 
gain ground and become central.8 Democracy and market rules are 
considered as highly interrelated and interacted, but this has not been for the 
benefit of democracy.
Instead of being enriched by the multilateral interest, attention and trust it 
has attracted, democracy has depreciated into a mere form of administration. 
Despite its celebration after 1989, democracy today tends to appear as an 
empty symbol of Western culture, one full of pictures, synonyms and 
examples but still empty of meaning. Hence the paradoxical phenomenon of 
the accumulation of discourses on democracy and the simultaneous public 
disaffection with it, both in popular and political discourse. More specifically, 
democracy runs the gauntlet of various groups, such as neoconservatives, 
the New Right, or religious circles, according to which the problem is exactly 
that “too much dem ocracy” prevails today in the world.
According to these critics, democracy is to be blamed for limitlessness, 
that is for an inability to resist the loss of particularity and damage to national 
interests as well as for institutional inefficiency in tackling these issues. More
7 Between 1989 and 2003 the EU implemented three major programmes, Phare, ISPAand 
Sapard, providing € 3  billion a year, to help candidate countries in their pre-accession route 
towards membership. Building institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights is one of the basic criteria a country needs to satisfy in order to access the EU.
8 Friedrich August Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (New York: Routledge, 2001 (1944), Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). See also Steven Fish, 
“Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies” Journal of Democracy 17, no.1 (2000), 5-20.
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often than not, democracy is also presented as corrupted by democratic 
society, succumbing to claims of varied groups of individuals in the name of 
equality and respect for difference, failing thus to ensure its own survival.9 
Pertinent examples include the headscarf issue in France, the dialogue over 
“illegal” immigrants in the European Union and the debate over removal of 
religious signs from school classes in Greece. In each case, democracy is 
depicted as a pure type of order, framed by a pre-given and non- 
challengeable set of values and ways of political and social life. The plurality 
of ethical sources manifested in dem ocratic societies results in the 
fragmentation of the public sphere, the devaluation of the common — 
national, cultural or divine — and therefore threatens democracy itself. 
According to this argument, more attentiveness to unitary forms of collective 
expression is required and the looseness of democracy takes us in the wrong 
direction.
There is, then, a threefold paradox regarding democracy today: first of all, 
there is an excess of democracy, at least as far as the use of the term itself is 
concerned, for it is articulated and claimed to be of high value by too many 
people in too many places and occasions; second, and despite the first 
factor, it is under-theorised, tending to be treated as synonymous with an 
institutional arrangement that secures a standard of development and 
prosperity; and third, it has become the scapegoat of the far and wide anti­
democrats who make the case against it, sometimes in the name of cultural 
diversity and sometimes in the name of national interest. This threefold 
ambiguity indicates a problem inherent in democratic discourse, a problem 
with regard to the dichotomised way democracy is conceptualised. W hat is 
implied here is that democracy is connected to values and principles 
considered of the highest worth, whereas at the same time its functioning 
relies upon procedures, practices and institutions that are continuously 
scrutinised and pronounced inefficacious.
This thesis attends to this ambiguity and connects it to the content 
attributed to democracy by those engaged in the endeavour of theorising it. 
Not only does democracy need to be reconceptualised in terms that are more
9 Here I follow the line of thought drawn by Jacques Ranciere as explicated in his Hatred on 
Democracy {London: Verso, 2006), which discusses and analyses the issue.
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affirmative of its multifarious and kaleidoscopic nature; our mode of engaging 
theoretically with it also needs to be reformulated so that we resist the use of 
neat elaborated categories and disturb those binaries that appear to inhabit 
our political thinking. In order to do so, one does not need to renounce 
institutions, norms and principles that shape and organise political life; one 
only needs to become also attentive to non-institutional aspects of 
democratic being and thus to the ethotic dimension of democracy.
II. Theorising Democracy, Theorising Ethos: A Knotty Relation
In an article entitled “Democracy’s lack”, the American political theorist 
W endy Brown thematises democracy’s constitutive ambiguity, that is the fact 
that it allows space for the flourishing of multiple diverse common goods 
while at the same time lacks a principle of its own to which every member of 
a democratic society could attach themselves. She holds that this lack of 
democracy means that if democracy cannot bind a political society without 
reaching outside of itself, then there will always be some element of non­
democracy, and possibly even anti-democracy, within democracy. Brown 
finds that the task of democrats, then, is to work this tension so that they can 
“generate a political culture that supplements democratic aims in ways that 
these aims cannot themselves provide”. She concludes her analysis with a 
question: “What ground for hope is there that new ways of addressing 
dem ocracy’s ‘lack’ might today transpire in a collective democratic spirit, with 
collective democratic ambitions?”10 At the core of this thesis lies the 
assumption that if the lack that Brown identifies is to be filled in, then this 
would take the shape of an ethos that would necessarily be momentary and 
experiential. Neither exclusively individual nor collective, such an ethos 
would rather oscillate between these two poles, being the product of 
cultivation and work on the self but also of spontaneity; it would be infused 
with a mental category, that of metis, which would allow it to be responsive to 
the challenges of the democratic agonistic moment.
10 Wendy Brown, “Democracy’s lack” Public Culture 10, no 2 (1998), 429.
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The task undertaken in this thesis is to make the case for democracy as a 
form of ethic, that is dispositions and sensibilities, rather than a set of 
institutions. There are good reasons to attend to the ethotic and experiential 
dimension of democracy. Although normative principles are necessary to 
safeguard the existence of democracy, democracy is irreducible to them and 
these too need to be infused by a sense of democratic attitude, disposition or 
behaviour. That is, rather than democracy be governed by its norms, those 
norms are contained within an ethos of democracy. Were it not for the 
individuals who will engage with them, these rules, norms and procedures 
would remain void of any capability to produce outcomes. Far from being a 
mere set of rules for the election of governments and the administration of 
states, democracy is a complex and rich experience and ethos is what 
makes this experience accessible to us. Institutions, rules and procedures 
form the body of democracy; ethos is the blood that makes this body work 
and move. However, were an ethos to be democratic, it needs to be affirmed 
not as a set of rules one needs to follow but instead as acting within and 
upon the political moment. The thesis explores how the tradition of 
democratic theory, while transcending the idea of ethos as personal 
credibility, fails to envision ethos as something else than a set of rules of 
behaviour.
Attentiveness to ethos in late modernity is frequently discussed as being 
part of a distinct moment in political thought, a so called ethical turn, an 
awareness of ethical issues understood as indispensable to political life. This 
is a diverse rather than concrete approach to the tension between ethics and 
politics and different thinkers attend to it from diverse viewpoints. For some 
thinkers our ethical orientations define and dictate our political stances, 
actions and decisions. Consequently, the latter are subject to judgment with 
regard to their validity according to moral values and codes. In this case, 
ethos is a distinct moral code, a particular way of life which corresponds to 
the particular form of government that democracy represents. George Kateb, 
fo r  e x a m p le , a t tr ib u te s  to  re p re s e n ta t iv e  d e m o c ra c y  a ‘m o ra l 
distinctiveness’.11 He contends that modern democracy is characterised by a 
certain feeling or sentiment, that of individuality, and that citizens of modern
11 George Kateb, “The moral distinctiveness of representative democracy” Ethics 9, no. 3 
(1981), 357-374.
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democratic societies need to cultivate an ethos of democratic aestheticism 
that is unavoidably morally driven and intensively adherent to morality.12 
Ethos thus conceived does not deviate from the traditional conception of a 
standard to judge political behaviour and democracy becomes a moral 
category.
Other theorists are critical of this arguing that conceiving of modern 
democratic societies as organic wholes infused by a certain disposition 
(rather than as dynamic complexities with diverse moral sources and 
commitments) entails the moralisation of the field of politics, a tendency that 
needs to be resisted because of its hostility towards pluralism. These critical 
theorists affirm pluralism as dem ocracy’s integral part, one that not only 
needs to be preserved but indeed enhanced. They also contend that the 
formation of ethos is a political practice itself and they pay tribute to 
techniques of sensibility formation such as m icropolitics or work on the self, 
which honour the affective dimension of political action. Rather than morality, 
that is, sets of rules, values and codes that are recommended to individuals 
through established institutions, it is sensibilities and dispositions that 
participate in the creation and reproduction of political principles. Jane 
Bennett, for example, works on the impact that the formation of an ecological 
or greener sensibility can have towards a vital materialist theory of 
democracy, one that sheds light on the ambiguity of the tension between 
ethics and politics.13 Approaches of this kind affirm ethos as a field that can 
be politicised rather than as a pre-political category and therefore are of 
especial relevance to the task undertaken in this thesis - to offer a vision of 
ethos that is relevant to democracy and most specifically to the peculiarities 
of the democratic moment. However, as I will argue, this perspective needs 
further elaboration and enrichment.
12 George Kateb, “Aestheticism and morality: Their cooperation and hostility” Political 
Theory 28, no. 1 (2000), 34.
13 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010).
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III. Untying the Knot
The thesis attends to the knotty relation between democracy and ethos by 
way of comprehending the former as an action and the latter in its existential 
and momentary dimension, that is as an ethic, as a multiplicity of dispositions 
one shows in the occasion of the democratic moment and therefore an ethic 
that is pertinent to it. Such a conception of ethos entails four claims:
-firs t, that democracy is an agon, that is a field of contestation and 
resistance and at the same time of plurality and diversification;
- second, that ethos is reducible neither to its collective nor to its individual 
component, but, rather, oscillates between the two;
- third, that ethos is always specific to an occasion, a particular moment of 
action;
- fourth, ethos is informed by a mental category, that of metis.
To attend to democracy as an agon is to honour difference rather than 
identity, fluidity rather than fixity and dissensus rather than consensus. It is to 
disturb the confinement of democracy to established norms and to seek to 
rework rather than renounce what appears to be already settled and neatly 
defined. It is also to politicise questions of ethics, rather than seeking to 
marginalise them for the fear of being too partial, while at the same time 
resisting the tendency to draw the profile of the “ideal democrat” . As it is 
suggested in the thesis, the discussion of ethos in a political context from 
antiquity to late modernity reveals that ethos is better affirmed as an interplay 
between the collective and the individual: it is never reduced to either of 
these two components. Agonistic approaches to democracy draw our 
attention to this interplay not least because they allow space for perceiving 
the field of the democratic agon as one bursting with shifting challenges. The 
thesis discusses a variety of such approaches and explores ways in which 
agonistic theorists have explicitly touched on ethos and argued for the 
importance it plays in the ways we engage with democracy.
The reading of agonistic approaches enables me to extract fruitful ideas
on the kind of action and experience that democracy might be and the role
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that ethos has in perceptions of democracy that affirm its experiential 
dimension. At the same time, this very reading establishes an absence at the 
heart of these agonistic views: a failure fully to conceive of ethos. Agonistic 
approaches too often overlook the fluidity that characterises an ethos defined 
as dem ocratic and under-theorise the responsiveness of ethos towards the 
particularity of the political circumstances within, and in reference to which, it 
arises. The thesis, then, defines a democratic ethos as is one that 
corresponds to the specificity of the moment and the peculiarities it carries 
and to which one must synchronise. I argue that if this is to be achieved and 
in order to exploit the democratic moment, its challenges and opportunities, a 
democratic ethos needs to be infused by metis.
The main argument of the thesis is, then, that an intellectual virtue like 
metis proves important when working on/with the idea of a democratic ethos. 
The thesis does not seek to refute the argument made by those theorists 
who insist on the role of cultivating specific ethical dispositions, such as 
receptive generosity or forbearance; rather, it discusses some of the 
shortcomings of such elaborations in order to suggest that these can be 
overcome if we envision democracy as agon in its momentary and 
experiential dimension and a democratic ethos as one that is also supported 
by an intellectual category, a virtue or craft which belongs to the sphere of the 
intellect.
Underlying this suggestion is the assumption that ethical questions are 
embedded in our thinking and that therefore they are unavoidable in our 
political representations and negotiations. Nevertheless this does not entail 
that ethical issues are already political issues; rather, they can be politicised 
when, for example, we grasp them as defining the ways we place ourselves 
towards others and the different identities they carry. In the same pattern, 
even the formation of ethical sensibilities is a potentially political practice 
which involves affective, corporeal as well as intellectual dimensions. 
However, in contrast to deliberative theories which tend to elevate reason 
and reasoning to the ultimate source of our ethico-political decisions, the 
approach towards ethics followed here affirms thinking as only participating 
in such decisions, along with visceral and somatic functions. Therefore, while 
it recognises the impact of thinking on ethico-political commitments, at the
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same time it insists on the constitutive insufficiency of such intellectualism to 
ethics.14
Metis or cunning intelligence is a Greek term for the mental category that 
is relevant in terms of time and place. Originally it means a multifarious way 
of knowing, whereas it also is the name of a deity that embodies the ability of 
continuous metamorphoses, the wife of Zeus and mother of Athena. It 
implies a complex but coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual 
behaviour and it is applied to transient and shifting situations, in which exact 
calculation or rigorous logic are expected to be insufficient.15 Metis operates 
by oscillating between the two mutually exclusive spheres of reality, that is 
being, which represents the unchanging, the limited, and becoming, which is 
related to the unstable and multiple; hence its relevance to the changing 
reality.16
I find that metis corresponds to the agonistic and kaleidoscopic vision of 
democracy embraced here, and to its demand for the formation of creative 
responses to the challenges and pressures posed for democracy in late 
modernity. The relevance of metis lies in that it is a multiplicity: it is already 
plural in itself, for it does not represent any specific virtue but the multi­
dimensional ability to adapt to kairos, that is to the circumstances, to 
calculate them and to take the form most appropriate in order to exploit them, 
to make them favourable. In the field of the democratic agon, metis enables 
one to approach an adversary in a way that is irreducible, even antithetical to 
violence but still provides a weapon with which to confront her. The individual 
that exhibits or displays metis brings to the agonistic terrain “the most 
manifold art of style any man has ever had at his disposal” ;17 she carries the 
possibility of many different abilities, virtues, dispositions, in other words 
ethea, and she makes use of the most pertinent of them to act in and on the 
specificity of the fugitive occasion. She can then form coalitions that are
14 William Connolly makes this claim in his work Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 111.
15 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and 
Society (Hassocks: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978), 3-4.
16 Ibid., 5
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(London: Penguin, 1979), 44.
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fleeting and thus honour the tensions between diverse constituents of the 
democratic game. The thesis argues, then, that the fluidity that characterises 
a democratic ethos which is informed by metis, is its virtue and vice, for 
whereas it enables the generation of responses that are context specific and 
the opening of further challenges, it remains open to different elaborations 
and formulations; it is fragile and susceptible to the forces it seeks to 
confront.
IV. Terminological Clarifications and Methodological Approaches
A central claim in the thesis is that ethos does not necessarily pertain to 
morality: the latter is too fixed and established and for that reason it is 
insufficient for ethics, which also requires an embodied sensibility that 
generates the impetus to enact moral codes.18 Ethos is here conceived in the 
broader sense of an ethical disposition that exceeds moral principles and 
norms and involves diverse sensibilities formulated and engendered in 
different occasions.
In a certain sense, “the issue of ethos is unavoidable” :19 ethos is already 
embedded in theories, practices, institutions. But this claim alone can pose 
serious political questions, since it may well pertain to totalitarian ways of 
organising a political society. George Orwell’s dystopia in 1984 can be said to 
be organised and function with a certain ethos, one that is under continuous 
reworking and reimposition by the powers of Big Brother. This is why, if one is 
to offer a theorisation of a democratic ethos, she needs to define what it is 
that renders it democratic in a specific and profound manner.
Such an argument is offered in the thesis by way of affirming democratic 
ethos as suggesting not habituation but departure and detachment from 
one’s accustomed circumstances. This behaviour or comportment is dictated 
by the late modern condition, one characterised by the overwhelm ing mobility
18 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 131.
19 William E. Connolly, “The power of assemblages and the fragility of things” British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations 10, no. 2 (2008), 246.
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of bodies and ideas, the rapid transformation of the environments - natural, 
urban, social, political, economic - individuals find themselves in, the 
evolution of new modes of political engagement and the emergence of new 
constituents which are frequently the result of the previous developments. 
Late modern democrats, then, need to be flexible and adaptable to the 
challenges posed to them by the chain of events that affect and even 
threaten their existence. It is in these terms that a democratic ethos is 
inextricably connected to our responses to grievances or other challenges of 
late-modern political life, our participation in and performances of political 
actions, our reactions toward diverse encounters that fugitively join others in 
honouring different moral sources, values and public goods. A democratic 
ethos cannot be reduced to an individualised ethic, however, for its creation, 
production and reformulation happen always in the context of practices that 
take place in spaces and times already shared with others. Therefore, a 
democratic ethos is one that oscillates between two poles, the individual and 
the collective, and it is the interplay between those which renders it its 
democratic character.
In order to develop and sustain this argument across the thesis, a 
genealogical path is followed, one that aims at exposing the shifting nature of 
ethos, its ambiguity and its fugitiveness. That is, the thesis follows the 
appearances of ethos from antiquity to late modernity and discusses how the 
term arises in the context of political thinking, sometimes to denote a private 
trait that attributes special competencies to its holder and sometimes to 
designate a public virtue that characterises a political collective body. In 
examining the diverse appearances of ethos, the thesis shows that, although 
there appears to be a continuity in the discourse that generates the issue of 
ethos, and that the pattern of the interplay between the public and the private 
is evident in all its appearances examined here, a new element enters the 
discussion only in late-modernity and interrupts this sequence by creating 
new challenges and posing new dimensions: that of pluralism.
The path of genealogy taken here requires us to follow closely yet critically 
the texts selected as best representing the account of ethos pertinent to the 
argument. To be sure, and despite the fact that the texts are “chosen”, that is 
they are preferred to others for their contribution to the argument, their
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“reading” attempted here is not critical in the sense of condemnation. Rather, 
a more generous approach is chosen, one that poses the question: “Does 
the text work for me? And how?”.20 The purpose of selecting and using the 
specific texts, then, is not to interpret them or demand explanations from their 
writers on their “wrong” perceptions, for the purpose here is not to find a 
definition or ideal formulation of ethos and then move to judgm ents according 
to it. Instead, it is to scrutinise how these diverse articulations of ethos 
contribute to its continuous formulation in the context of democratic thought. 
The search for absolute criteria which can help in making secure judgements 
is not within the scope of the present thesis.
To resist the tendency to create criteria of judgment is to seek to rework 
categories that appear to be conveniently ready-cut for use in our political 
evaluations and decisions. Such is the case with the different binaries that 
reside in political theorists’ thinking for they provide neat ways of identifying 
with certain sides. Although the thesis accepts that we cannot get rid of 
dualisms altogether, it suggests that we can at least disturb them in order to 
allow the emergence of potentialities that can contribute towards the 
enrichment of our understanding of political phenomena such as democracy. 
Pervasive in the thesis is the attempt to rework the binary that inhabits ethos 
as an individual or collective trait and to take on other dichotom ies such 
those of the ordinary/extraordinary, passivity/activity and silence/noise in 
order to develop an argument for a more complex approach to the modalities 
that help us to shape our political understanding.
V. The Structure of the Thesis
The concept of ethos is ambiguous in that too many people have talked 
about it but no established agreement exists on its content. This problem is 
elaborated in Chapter One, which scrutinises different articulations of ethos 
from antiquity to modernity by reading the texts of five selected thinkers. The
20 This approach of “reading” is suggested by Gilles Deleuze in his “Letter to a harsh critic”, 
in G. Deleuze Negotiations (1972-1990), trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), 8.
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analysis shows the indeterminacy of the concept of ethos, its shifting nature, 
but at the same time also its ubiquity to political life. The discussion opens 
with Foucault since it is his critical elaborations of ethical subjectivity and 
what he calls an aesthetics of existence that brought the issue of ethos 
clearly onto the stage of political thought in late modernity. Foucault is 
important because he shows how an ethic that is formed through personal 
work on the self still is a public ethic that informs and is informed by our 
political engagements. He opens, thus, the problematic on the oscillating 
nature of ethos between two poles: the individual and the collective. 
However, this is not a new problematic: Foucault merely enacts and re- 
energises it, managing to place it in the context of the contemporary political 
conditions. Therefore, the thesis goes back into the tradition to excavate the 
ethotic vision that Foucault embraces.
Although already poets in the archaic years make use of the term ethos to 
designate an abode, the mores of a people or the specific character of an 
individual, it is only with Plato that the term is explicitly put in a political 
context. The parallel reading of P lato’s and Aristotle ’s work on ethos 
attempted in Chapter One introduces us to the interplay between the 
individual and the collective components of ethos, a binary that the thesis 
seeks to disturb. On the one hand, Plato offers a limited account of ethos, for 
it is a moralised one that invites individuals to adopt specific principles 
according to which their character, and hence also the character of the city, 
can be judged. On the other, Aristotle attends to both components of ethos 
and also introduces an infamous connection to rhetoric. However, it is argued 
here that his prioritisation of the com munity over the individual results in his 
envisioning an ethos which pre-exists the city, one that its citizens must 
embrace and accept as taken. The Aristotelian ethos cannot be a democratic 
one.
Nor can the Hegelian. Hegel appeals to ethos as the set of established 
practices that define the ethical behaviour of individuals qua members of a 
political com munity that bears a core of common beliefs and procedures. 
Individuals must conform with the principles, customs and mores inherited by 
them and there is no space for their creative elaboration and reformulation: 
ethos is pre-given and unchangeable. By contrast, Heidegger is attentive to
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the dynamic and shifting nature of ethos which is better understood as a way 
of relating, of putting the self in relation to others. The reading attempted here 
specifically connects this formulation with kairos , that is the appropriate time 
for action and so suggests that with Heidegger we come closer to an 
understanding of ethos in its temporal and experiential dimensions.
Chapter Two locates the thesis within the discipline of political theory by 
addressing some aspects of the endeavour of theorising democracy. It 
begins by recasting the relation between theory and practice, an investigation 
which reveals how two disparate modes of articulating democracy have 
emerged, the descriptive and the normative. Unlike those working in the 
context of the former, thinkers who have worked in the context of the latter 
mode have been attentive to the connections between democracy and ethos. 
After discussing how they conceptualise democracy as the quest of the 
common bond between the members of a polity and how they fashion this 
bond in the form of an ethos, the chapter turns to the break that the 
descriptive mode of theorising introduced in democratic thought. It is 
suggested that what is called “contemporary democratic theory” , with its strict 
separation between facts and values, creates a distance between the 
endeavour of theorising and its subject matter, that is democracy. This leap in 
the tension between democracy and theory can be reformulated as the gap 
that exists in descriptive theories of democracy, one that is the result of the 
failure of the latter to attend to any idea of a common good and specifically of 
an ethos. It is important to reformulate not only the relation between theory 
and practice, but also the content of democracy itself and our ways of 
envisioning it, if we are not only to respond to the challenges posed for 
democracy today, but also to create new openings and sites for its activation.
The endeavour that is suspended by descriptive theorists of democracy, 
that is the connection between ethos and democracy, is enacted by 
normative thinkers in late modernity. Chapter Three scrutinises the tension as 
it has been articulated by three normative thinkers in late modernity who, in 
contrast to descriptive theorists, envision the idea of a common good shared 
by the members of political societies. To be sure, the thesis takes on the 
assumption that ethos is present in the work of the theorists scrutinised here; 
that these theorists aspire to a common good, articulated in ethical terms, in
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order to sustain their visions of democracy. But whereas Rawls, Taylor and 
Young all find that a common good is not only attainable and desirable, but 
indeed indispensable to democracy, their reliance on an ethos articulated in 
moralised terms renders their work susceptible to criticism. For by articulating 
ethos as a moral code, as a set of principles that guide what is valued as 
ethical and thus as a means to safeguard the stability of the regime, they are 
obliged to depict ethos as the principle or code that should frame and even 
guide political life, to presuppose the singularity of the common good in 
dem ocratic societies and finally to neglect the dimension that characterises 
late modernity: pluralism.
These shortcomings, that is to say the subordination of politics to morality 
and inattentiveness to pluralism as constitutive of late modern democracy, 
are exactly what theorists of agonism seek to resist. For them, the essence 
of democracy lies in the different articulations of the common good embraced 
by individuals, as well as in allowing these to find a place in the public terrain 
where they can be pursued. W illiam Connolly, for example, whose work is 
scrutinised in Chapter Four, elaborates an ethico-political project that finds 
the cu ltiva tion of sens ib ilities  such as ‘critica l responsiveness’ and 
‘presumptive generosity’ to be indispensable for democratic life. The chapter 
offers a complementary reading of his work along with Chantal Mouffe’s, who 
also finds recourse to ethos to articulate her ethico-political vision. Such a 
reading not only reveals sim ilarities and differences in their approaches; it 
also allows the envisaging of a promising image with regard to the form that 
a democratic ethos can have, opening the way to critically think through other 
aspects of the tension between democracy and ethos.
Such an aspect is advanced by the theorists scrutinised in Chapter Five. 
The work of Sheldon Wolin and Jacques Ranciere help develop the 
argument defended in the thesis in that they both appreciate the temporal 
aspect of democracy. That is, they honour it in its fugitive and momentary 
dimension and they advocate the role of (in)equality in democratic enactment 
that takes the form of disruption. Both celebrate and theorise the importance 
of the fugitive moments of com monality that otherwise diverse individuals can 
experience. But whereas Wolin affirms the necessity of a shared civic ethic 
among citizens that draws them to the field of politics, calling at the same
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time for a “democratisation of the self”, attending thus to both components of 
ethos, Ranciere is suspicious of the unitary role that such an ethic might 
have. His failure to address the individual aspect of ethos separates his 
democratic vision from an important axis of political engagement.
Ranciere’s cautiousness with reference to ethos alerts us to the possible 
destructive results that an ethic which is too instructive and directive might 
have for democratic life. Chapter Six thus offers a vision of how a democratic 
ethos is attainable without falling for a fixed ethical category that would not 
be responsive to the peculiarities of the democratic agon. To engage in a 
theorisation of such an ethic requires attention to the forces of creativity as 
discussed in Chapter Two. It also demands that we perceive democratic 
politics not as the eruptive moment per se, but as the productive tension 
between such multiple moments and established practices of politics. The 
vision embraced here is one that pertains to ethos as attuned to the 
circumstances of the democratic agon, that is to the shifting and mutating 
occasions of encountering an adversary, a new constituency or a new identity 
that needs to be addressed with agonistic respect and generosity, but at the 
same time to be confronted. To do so, one needs to take advantage of the 
peculiarities of the moment. That is, one needs to make use of some kind of 
intellectual virtue, of a cunning intelligence that is intermeshed with the 
principles of respect and generosity and will enable her to win the day. Metis 
is such a virtue and it is the central claim of the chapter that to be attuned to 
the moment, and hence to be able to seize it, one needs to dwell in it.
Overall the thesis shows that attentiveness to ethos not only enables a 
deepening of our understanding of democracy and the possible forms of its 
enactment in late modernity; it also allows the political theorist to perceive 
those very ruptures that are democracy’s most decisive moments, thus 
contributing to its rejuvenation and survival. A characteristic of this ethos is 
that it shifts and changes over time and according to circumstances. That is, 
it is responsive to the claims of the occasion - and it is exactly this fluidity that 
renders it democratic. Such a democratic ethos encompasses all the different 
ethea (in plural, ways of dwelling) that democratic citizens carry with them 
while moving through spaces, time and situations. However, a democratic
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ethos thus defined cannot be merely reduced to their aggregate and it does 
not leave aside emotions, nor does it favour a rigid procedural approach to 
political deliberation. Rather, the democratic ethos encompasses moods, 
affects and corporeal reactions and allows a special place for them in the 
process of political communication as part of the response one reserves to 
the specific conditions one encounters. Thus, in this thesis, a strong claim is 
made that appealing to ethos does not necessarily entail adherence to a set 
of specific dispositions with moral resonance; rather, it pertains to a broader 
approach towards human conduct avoiding axiological references to highly 
specific or particular values, traits or qualities. Such a broader approach is 
vital for contemporary democratic theory and, it is hoped, this thesis is a 
contribution to its further clarification and development.
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Chapter 1
What We Talk About When We Talk About Ethos
Attentiveness to ethos is not solely a late-modern endeavour. Nor is it a task 
undertaken exclusively by political theorists. Poets, rhetoricians and 
philosophers of the ancient and modern world have all aspired to the creation 
of different sorts of ethos involving different goals under diverse 
circumstances. Only a genealogical examination of the emergence of the 
concept can reveal its multifaceted and dynamic character, exposing ethos 
as a highly pliant notion, assigned a variety of meanings that shift and 
change throughout the times and places in which it has been used. However, 
this chapter argues that, its indeterminacy notwithstanding, ethos is not a 
pliable supplement to “ordinary” politics. It is, and always has been, 
ubiquitous to political life and to democracy specifically, since it is exactly its 
fluidity that makes it relevant to democracy as a multifaceted action and 
experience. The chapter therefore opens the discussion for the main 
argument of the thesis: that a democratic ethos is a disposition or sensibility 
that attunes us with the circumstances we find ourselves in.
The aim of the chapter, then, is to clear the landscape around ethos 
enabling us to see both its historical variability but also its irreducible 
significance for democratic thinking. This is achieved through a reading of 
five thinkers whose approach to ethos has marked a key turning point in the 
evolution of the term within political thought. My engagement with these 
thinkers in pairs enables me to demonstrate that thinking about ethos takes 
place within a web of concepts that work as binaries such as inner/outer, 
individual/collective and temporal/spatial. Although I do not take on the issue 
of binaries until Chapter Six, here I argue that this logic downplays the 
tactical dimension of ethos which is connected to metis and is re-opened in 
late-modernity by Foucault.
This is why the discussion opens with a consideration of Foucault’s 
approach to ethos: his elaborations of the concept introduce a turn to ethos 
as central to late-modernity, forming, indeed, the decisive point of a re­
engagement with ethos. I argue that by actualising ethos in the sense of its 
tactical dimension Foucault not only manages to fashion an ethos of
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philosophical life as a political ethos, but also poses the problem of the 
tension between ethos and democracy. More specifically, Foucault’s views 
can provide us with an account of how ethical practices may function as 
catalysts to democracy, since they can be enacted in accordance with or in 
the occasion of collective democratic action. Even more importantly, 
Foucault’s efforts to generate an aesthetics of existence show the way 
towards the affirmation of ethos as the mediating moment between two 
poles: the inner (the relation to the self), and the outer (a relationship with 
community). As we shall see the role of ethos in this mediation is a vital 
concern for democratic theory.
Foucault’s recognition of the importance of the ethotic dimension derives 
from the fact that his genealogical excavation takes him back to antiquity. 
Accordingly Section II of this chapter examines the initial use of ethos by 
archaic poets. Here already, it appears to denote different meanings from the 
topological to one connected to personal character. The Chapter then 
continues with an attempt to localise ethos within the field of political thought. 
Section III turns to that tradition in order to assess how the concept and 
problematic of ethos evolved in the political thought of Plato and Aristotle. 
Reading their work in parallel I emphasise the dialectic between the two 
expressions of ethos in its private and public dimensions. It argues that Plato 
is the first to open up the problematic and to attempt to connect ethos with 
politics, by relating regime-types with the individual character of citizens. That 
is, Plato posits a reciprocal connection between the public organisation of a 
community and the possibility of some individuals cultivating their ‘soul’ in a 
virtuous way. However, Plato’s failure to establish a satisfactory relationship 
between political life and political thought results in an account of ethos that 
is simultaneously over-moralised and apolitical. I then show how Aristotle 
may be read as, at least in part, responding to Plato’s failure. He 
problematises Plato’s approach to ethos as that which belongs to the 
individual soul, by shifting emphasis to the collective and explicitly connecting 
ethos to the city. In this context the chapter establishes the importance of the 
connection established by Aristotle between ethos and rhetoric, arguing that 
it is in this latter relationship that the moment of political justification is to be 
found.
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Section IV follows the Aristotelian insistence on the collective aspect of the 
ethos as it is inherited in modern political thought by scrutinising how Hegel 
elaborates it in the development of an ethos considered suitable to modern 
political life. However, I argue, despite his intentions to offer an account of 
ethos pertinent to the peculiarities of modernity, and specifically the 
innovation of individual freedom, Hegel fails to offer a political account of 
ethos. I then turn to another theorist of modernity - Heidegger - and suggest 
that it is only with him that ethos is conceptualised as the combined blend of 
the individual and the collective. It is also with him that the moment of 
political justification, previously elaborated by Aristotle, is brought to the fore. 
Heidegger’s formulations thus prove vital for the argument put forward here, 
for they set the foundations for a temporally delimited account of ethos.
It is by taking on this genealogy of ethos and treating its indeterminacy in 
the form of an oscillation between inner and the outer, the private and the 
public, the individual and the collective, that the task undertaken in this 
Chapter paves the way for a crucial aspect of the main argument of the 
thesis: that the democratic ethos is irreducible to either a personal ethic or to 
a collective virtue. It is the combination of Heidegger and Foucault that offers 
an account of ethos that transcends the division between the inner and the 
outer, and which affirms the indispensability of ethos in political life. On the 
one hand, Heidegger is important for his account of kairos which draws our 
attention to the tactics we need to deploy in order to respond to the 
opportunities offered by the moment. On the other hand, Foucault’s 
significance lies in the way in which he helps us to see that there is 
something distinct about the ethos of democracy: the fact that it has a tactical 
dimension which is better affirmed as the interplay between the two 
components of ethos, the inner and outer. There is, then, a dual tactical 
dimension in ethos: it requires tactics on the self in order to develop and at 
the same time it is exposed through the tactics we perform on the proper 
time. It is metis that enables us, I suggest, to achieve this second tactical 
dimension of ethos.
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I. Foucault: The Ethos of Philosophical Life-An Ethos for Democracy
Michael Foucault’s work has contributed greatly to a “turn to ethics” not only 
in political thought but in late modern thought in general. In his later work 
especially Foucault turns to the relation to oneself, reflecting on ethics 
resistant to codes; ethics for him is the third axis of subjectification, the other 
two being power and knowledge which together constitute any matrix of 
experience while at the same time constraining the modern subject.1 In doing 
so he introduces the concept of ethos as pertinent for descriptions of the 
aesthetics of existence that corresponds to the disappearance of morality as 
obedience to a code of rules. Here Foucault is indebted to Nietzsche not only 
for his negation of morality as a set of codes that dictate human conduct but 
also for his methodology. Foucault characterises himself as a Nietzschean, 
one who uses Nietzsche’s texts with anti-Nietzschean theses which are 
nevertheless Nietzschean.2 For even though he admits that his philosophical 
evolution has been determined by his reading of Heidegger, at the same time 
he recognises that it is Nietzsche who brought him to Heidegger.3 That being 
the case, Nietzsche’s motivation to become who one is, and his insistence on 
the importance to “give style” to one’s character, are inherent and decisive in 
the formulation of the Foucauldian conceptualisation of ethos. The 
uniqueness of the Foucauldian ethos lies in the way in which it entails the 
development of exercises of the self upon the self, “techniques of the self” 
that contribute to the aesthetics of existence. These themes are derived from 
the classical conception of a “care for the self” (epimeleia heautou).
Foucault is in agreement with his spiritual mentor, Nietzsche, who held 
that morality understood as a code of rules would become irrelevant to the 
modern world, being unable to offer the modern subject a source for
1 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), 103.
2 Michael Foucault, “The return of morality”, in Lawrence Kritzman (ed.), Michel Foucault: 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture; Interviews and other writings 1977-1984 (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 251.
3 Cited in Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis, Ml: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
113.
32
inspiration to answer the philosophical question: “how one is to live”.4 
According to Foucault, a genealogy of ethics from Antiquity to Christianity 
reveals our passage “from a morality that was essentially the search for a 
personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system of rules”.5 But this 
“system of rules” lost its luster and attractiveness leaving a gap where there 
ought to be a source of ethical inspiration. The search for an aesthetics of 
existence, as he calls it, can perhaps make up for this lack. However, 
Foucault does not simply aspire to the substitution of a Greek Stoic ethic for 
Christian morality. He is well aware that the solution to a contemporary 
problem can never be found in a problem raised in a different era by different 
people.6 But he does believe that a certain element of Hellenic ethics, the 
care for the self, can acquire a meaning in the contemporary context and 
feed modern movements with an ethics founded not on scientific knowledge 
of the self, but on a techne of the self.
Foucault’s turn to the subject is unavoidable in the course of the evolution 
of his work. His critique of knowledge as liberation or emancipation and the 
revelation of its regulative and monitoring attributes, and his critique of the 
exhaustive analysis of power in its economic and juridico-political aspects, in 
favour of attending to its creative capacity and to the formation of new 
objects of knowledge, urged Foucault to turn his interest to the subject in his 
latter work. The modern subject, for Foucault, is a construct of domination of 
regimes of knowledge/power and its investigation calls on three possible 
domains of genealogy:
First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which 
we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical 
ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we 
constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical
4 “As the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness —there can be no doubt of that — 
morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for 
the next two centuries in Europe—the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the 
most hopeful of all spectacles”, Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Essay III 27, 161.
5 Michael Foucault, “An aesthetics of existence”, in Kritzman, Michel Foucault, 49.
6 Michael Foucault, “On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress”, in P. 
Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1984), 343.
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ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as 
moral agents.7
It is on these three axes that Foucault has deployed his work: the truth/ 
knowledge axis was studied in The Birth of Clinic and The Order of Things, 
the power axis in Discipline and Punish and the ethical axis in The History of 
Sexuality. As he admits in his very last interview, these three domains of 
experience can be understood only as dependent on each other, a clue that 
he did not manage to grasp until his last works.8 Yet, according to Deleuze, 
the third axis was perhaps already at work with the others as evidenced by 
the theme which seems to haunt Foucault: interiority as the mere fold of the 
outside. To make it more explicit, the relation to oneself, the inner, is already 
at the same time a relation with others, and so an exteriority transformed into 
a fold inwards: to be capable of regulating oneself entails that one is capable 
of regulating others in the context of the family, politics, and games.9
Foucault problematises the relevance of morality to modernity by way of 
denying the idea of ethics in a certain form that requires devotion and 
obligation. Therefore he turns to Greek and Roman ethics, a move that 
allows him to approach ethics as a process of self-formation of the ethical 
subject and thus as “the process in which the individual delimits that part of 
himself that will form the object of his moral practice”.10 The sustenance of 
ethics relies on the individual itself and is attainable not through aspiration to 
tradition or reason, but through acts on the self. Thus ethics becomes the 
kind of relation one ought to have with oneself (rapport a soi). This 
presupposes a process of “cultivation of the self”, wherein the relations of 
oneself to oneself are intensified and valorised, a process that is dominated 
by the principle that one must “take care of the self”.11 Such an activity “is not 
imposed on the individual by means of civil law or religious obligation, but is
7 Ibid., 351.
8 Michael Foucault, “The return of morality”, in Kritzman, Michel Foucault, 243.
9 Deleuze, Foucault, 100.
10 Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, trans. R. 
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 28.
11 Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume III: The Care of the Self, trans. R. 
Hurley(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 43.
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a choice about existence made by the individual”.12 More specifically, it is not 
a single act, but a set of occupations, and for this reason it presupposes 
askesis, that is exercising practices, such as silence, listening to others and 
writing.13 The creation of the ethical subject through such practices aims not 
to deny or constrain the self, but rather to free it of domination; it is “an 
attempt to affirm one’s liberty and to give to one’s own life a certain form...”.14 
Ethics is a form of care of the self and as such it is a practice of freedom, an 
ascetic practice that aims at self-formation.
Foucault thinks of his own philosophical practice as such a form of care, 
as an art of the self and he specifically highlights the value of critical thought 
as a way to relate oneself to modern reality, as an attitude and thus as an 
ethos. He suggests that a philosophical ethos which is characterised by 
permanent critique can actually point a way out of the condition that is 
already diagnosed by the philosopher, for example the impossibility of 
defining a source for a late modern ethic. A philosophical ethos of this kind is 
“one that simultaneously problematises man’s relation to the present, man’s 
historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous 
subject”.15 Foucault, despite identifying the Kantian approach to critique as 
the analysis and reflection upon limits, shifts the question from “what limits 
knowledge has to renounce transgressing” to the very questioning of that 
which is given as universal and necessary, but is contingent and the product 
of arbitrary constraints.16 Thus, Foucault departs from Kant, developing a 
completely different approach to limits as historically contingent and thus 
subject to change. The philosophical ethos of critique that allows such an 
attitude towards limits is one that is archaeological in its method, in that it 
treats thought and words as historical events, and genealogical in its design, 
in that it seeks to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom.17 That 
said, it is an ethos that can be characterised “as a historico-practical test of
12 Foucault, “On the genealogy of ethics”, 361.
12 Ibid., 364.
14 Foucault, “An aesthetics of existence”, 49.
15 Michael Foucault, “What is enlightenment?”, in Rabinow, The Foucault Reader, 42.
16 Ibid., 45.
17 Ibid., 46.
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the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves 
upon ourselves as free beings”.18 By suggesting that we “have to move 
beyond the outside-inside alternative”,19 and focus instead on the limits that 
define us, Foucault indeed motivates the ethical subject, the outcome of work 
of art of one on oneself, to keep the patient askesis that can lead to liberty. 
His philosophical task of working on the limits, his philosophical ethos, is 
itself a way for one to become free of oneself.
The impact of Foucault’s reflections on ethics upon conceptions of ethos 
within political thought is profound and not least because it indicates a way of 
bridging the personal with the public. I find his elaborations important not 
least because he utilises the Nietzschean theme that morality is unable to 
create a necessary connection between the subject and modernity, and 
develops it by putting it in the context of the power/knowledge regimes 
structuring modern subjectivity. In doing so, Foucault introduces the idea of 
an ethic that is at the same time personal (it is the product of an aesthetics of 
existence, of an individual work on and care of the self) and includes a public 
dimension (for it is exemplified in an ethos that is already “in direct contact 
with social and political realities”).20 There is a tactical dimension in ethos to 
which Foucault is attentive and he helps us to affirm. The Foucauldian ethos 
is formed as a relation to, as an attitude towards, the conditions that one 
finds oneself being: it is a way of placing oneself in the city or community in 
relationship to oneself and others.
Foucault’s work has inspired those thinkers who tend to criticise the 
established view that politics is inextricably connected to morality understood 
as a set of moral codes. These thinkers more specifically seek to give a 
cogent, yet non-authoritative response to questions concerning the 
justification of political institutions and the possible nature of the connection 
between individual and the state. That said, the Foucauldian approach to 
ethics, itself inspired by the Nietzschean account of an individual ethos 
formed through askesis apart from and above the herd, galvanised a distinct
18 Ibid., 47.
19 Ibid., 45.
20 Paul Rabinow, “Introduction”, in P. Rabinow (ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics-Subjectivity and 
Truth: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 1 (London and New York: 
Penguin Books, 1997), xxii.
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response to the predicament of democracy by certain thinkers, a response 
that places the issue of ethos in its core. Here I have in mind what is now 
called a tradition of post-Nietzschean democratic thinkers, that is a certain 
cluster of political theorists who, influenced as they are by Foucault, strive for 
a political theory which at the same time is also ethical.21 In Chapter Four I 
take on one of these thinkers, William Connolly, and I discuss in detail how 
his Nietzsche leads him to fold ethicality in his democratic vision. What is 
more pertinent to the purposes of the thesis, though, is Foucault’s decisive 
contribution to the introduction of the concept of ethos in late modern political 
thought, a concept which as will be discussed in the following sections 
denounces shifting interpretations in different times and places, a fact that 
signifies the importance of his ethical elaborations. In order to appreciate the 
impact of the introduction of the concept of ethos in this specifically 
Foucauldian way into late-modern political thought, we need to look back on 
the evolution of the term and assess how it became relevant to political life 
and thought. For it is through such a genealogical investigation that the 
dynamic of the concept, as well as the centrality it has in political thought, is 
revealed.
The chapter now turns to the appearances of ethos from antiquity to 
modernity in order to bring to the surface its shifting nature and more 
specifically to give prominence to the Foucauldian vision of ethos as the 
parallel attitude towards oneself and others. It is by taking on this excavation 
that I will show not only how the interplay between the two dimensions - the 
inner and the outer - of ethos is established, but also how political thinkers 
otherwise attentive to ethos fail to attend to this interplay celebrated by 
Foucault, as well as to its tactical dimension. It is my purpose here to show 
how these thinkers fail to consider the notion of metis and the way that it is 
relevant to the discussion of an ethic suitable for democracy.
21 Thinkers that can be characterised as post-Nietzschean include Wendy Brown, States of 
Injury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Judith Butler, Giving an Account of 
Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); William E. Connollly, Identity/ 
Difference: Democratic Negotiations of the Political Paradox (Minneapolis MN, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002 exp.edition); David Owen, “Nietzsche’s event: Genealogy and the 
death of God” Theory and Event 6, no. 3 (2002); and Micheal J. Shapiro, Violent 
Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
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II. Ethos in the Tradition of Political Thought
In this section I scrutinise earlier uses of the term ethos in the context of 
Greek ancient poetry, not least because these appearances are 
complementary to our discussion of the shifting nature of the concept. 
Indeed, already in these early works fluctuation of the term becomes evident. 
As I will demonstrate ethos designates in some places something inner and 
elsewhere something outer: on the one hand it is used to mean the spiritual 
and private and on the other hand that which is connected to the action 
performed in public context and evaluated by others. Moreover, it is from the 
sphere of poetry that I extract the idea of ethos as topos, an idea that I revisit 
in Chapter Five in my discussion of Ranciere’s approach to ethos as abode, 
and an idea I refute in Chapter Six in my elaboration on ethos, where I argue 
that such a topological usage of ethos can only have a temporal tone. Poets 
in the antiquity prove also useful here for their offering an account of ethos as 
disposition that is multidimensional, an interpretation that again I follow in 
Chapter Six.
I present a genealogy of the concept of ethos in order to reveal the 
multiplicity and ambiguity of its usage, since the term seems to oscillate 
between the stable and the fluid, the personal and the public, the inner and 
the outer. To be sure, the term ethos (r|0oc; in Greek) echoes back into the 
late archaic years when, at least initially, it was most commonly used in 
plural, as ethea. More specifically, it is Homer who uses it to refer to 
customary places of animals, such as stables and therefore to specify the 
places most appropriate to them in contrast to nomes, the pastures, which 
are fields of freedom.22 The Homeric ethea is the restricted topoi of safety 
and return for the domestic animals: ethos is synonymous with 
domestication. Hesiod offers a use that is most proper to humans, since with 
ethea he refers to men’s abode.23 Elsewhere he uses the term to allude to 
customary habits and therefore to the mores shared by specific people which 
are not inborn but can and indeed must be taught.24 Later, in the classical
22 Homer, Iliad, Book VI, 511 and Book XV, 268; Odyssey, Book, XIV, 411.
23 Hesiod, Works and Days, 167-8, 222, 524-5.
24 Ibid., 137, 699; Hesiod, Theogony, 66.
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age, the historian Herodotus uses the term in order to refer to the haunt or 
abode of the (Persian) army but also to the manners of life, the customs or 
social practices that are common to Hellenes (riBea to  opoTpona).25 In 
these early references, the ethea is the dwelling place, the accustomed 
abode, but also the set of religious habits common to a people and thus the 
predictable and normal.
A dramatic shift in the usage of the term is designated by the appearance 
of the singular form of the word in the poetry of Hesiod and Theognis. Hesiod 
uses the term ethos to refer to the specific disposition that Hermes gives to 
Pandora and, indeed, it is her more characteristic personal attribute: it is a 
deceitful disposition (eniKAonov n^o^)- Theognis also adopts the singular 
form to denote the thievish disposition hidden in all men and that can be 
revealed over tim e26 Elsewhere, he refers to ethos with the adjective 
multifaceted, variegated (noiKiXov), to denote that it is subject to alterations 
and modifications according to the circumstances.27 For Theognis, then, 
ethos is synonymous with the most inner characteristic of a human that, 
however, may reveal itself on the proper occasion or be observed by the 
attentive spectator.28 It is man’s distinctive manner that is adjustable and 
therefore ephemeral and observable. Already in the beginning, the concept of 
ethos oscillates between two different poles: the place of life, where one 
dwells, and so the outer pole, and the way of life, how one dwells, which is 
the inner pole.
It can be argued that the treatment of ethos by Hesiod and Theognis as an 
inner disposition elevates it to a location of individual traits, the hidden but 
characteristic part of a person - the place, as it were, to which one returns 
when one is really oneself29 Such an account, though, does not take into 
consideration the specific world view and way of life prevailing in the archaic 
(and classical) era in Greece. To be sure, it is a worldview that imposes a
25 Herodotus, The Histories, Book VIII, 100,101,144.
26 Theognis, Elegies, 963-970.
27 Ibid., 213-4.
28 Nancy Worman, The Cast of Character: Style in Greek Literature (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, 2002), 30.
29 This is the claim, for example, in Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Heidegger (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990), 144.
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very specific conception of privileges and duties and of how these determine 
people’s actions. As MacIntyre comments, in heroic societies “every 
individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and highly 
determined system of roles and statuses”,30 so that identity is the result of 
structures, the most important being kinship and the household. In this 
compact universe that assigns roles to each of its members, the linkage 
between action and personality is direct and virtues such as courage, 
sophrosyni and fidelity pertain to excellence and are considered as criteria 
for evaluating one’s character. Not only do these virtues indicate the quality 
of one’s character; they also define his position in the social order. Heroic 
ethos refers to the individual, is of an axiological nature and appeals to 
morality.
Given the social circumstances of the era, this ethos is only exhibited in 
public. More specifically, it is in the field of contest, of agon, which is a public 
field, that men are expected to project and in fact demonstrate the 
characteristics that define them. As one commentator has posed it, “Homeric 
man has no innerness...He has no hidden depths or secret motives”.31 All he 
is, is what he shows himself to others to be, the qualities and dispositions he 
brings with him in the agon. In the ancient Greek society, performance is 
decisive in proving one’s character, since it is actions that are used as criteria 
according to which one is judged by the community. Arete, the ultimate term 
to describe courage and goodness, is not something that one just possesses; 
rather, it is something that man has to prove he possess by performing 
virtuous actions either in the battlefield or in some other type of agon. Under 
these terms, “arete was thus not a telos, but rather a constant call to action 
that produced particular habits”.32 This is why the identification of ethos with 
an inner place appears problematic. It is performed, lived and experienced in 
public. Otherwise it has no meaning at all.
As this short review reveals, the term ethos dates back to the archaic era 
where its instability and multiple usage are already discernible. Far from
30 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981), 122.
31 James M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994 exp.), 21.
32 Debra Hawhee, “Agonism and arete” Philosophy and Rhetoric 35, no. 3 (2002), 187.
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being explicitly placed in a political context, the term is used by poets to 
denote a dwelling, a locus of security, peace and return to a customary place 
either for men or for animals. It is also used to describe the mores of a 
specific group, which are to be acquired through teaching, and therefore a 
social trait shared by the members of the group. Elsewhere, ethos is the 
inner characteristic of the individual, a trait that describes him/her in a distinct 
way and is observable by the others; hence its volatility. To be sure, the 
affirmation of ethos as a thievish, deceitful disposition, in that it is 
multifaceted and variegated, is close to the argument to be developed in this 
thesis that metis is a vital aspect of ethos. However, such a formulation is too 
restrictive: it is an ethos that can be politicised but it is insufficient to the calls 
for democratic acting. At last, ethos in tradition is also the code of practice 
that one has to follow, and prove that one follows, by performing specific 
actions that are desirable and acceptable by the community. This oscillation 
of the term between the inner and the outer, that which is spiritual and private 
and that which is affirmed as a social code and is then connected to external 
action, is definitive of the genealogy of ethos. For, as the discussion that 
follows reveals, this fluctuation accompanies the use of the term in the field 
of political theory. Even more importantly, it is the interaction between the 
public and the private character of ethos that ensures its prominent role in 
politics and, as will be argued, in democracy.
III. Ethos in Political Thought: Plato and Aristotle
The classical age indicates a shift in the use of the term ethos, a shift that is 
to be attributed not so much to its content, since it is still used to describe 
behaviours and attitudes of habitual nature, but mainly to its re- 
contextualisation. This is anything but irrelevant to the shift that occurs in 
philosophical thought with the turn from observation of the natural world to 
speculation about the human itself and which brings issues such as virtue, 
justice and the good to the forefront of philosophical inquiry, “disengaging the
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political from the natural order”.33 It is not only that now the mantle of ethical 
discourse embraces the term ethos, connecting it in a vulgar way to morality; 
the shift is mainly related to the new localisation of the term, since the 
discursive topos in which ethos is encountered now shifts from poetry to the 
field of political philosophy, in which it obtains a prominent place.
Plato is the first to offer us a discussion of ethos as related to political life, 
even if he does so in a specifically moral manner. It is through the mouth of 
his teacher Socrates that he introduces the idea that ethos, conceived as an 
individual moral quality, is connected with the political life of the city, an 
account related to his conceptions of citizenship, knowledge and virtue. Plato 
bridges his perception of ethos with political life when he introduces the idea 
that the exercise of politics is restricted to those who are of a higher moral 
quality: the political arts or the art of good citizenship may not be exercised 
by just any member of the polis. This is not irrelevant to his central doctrine, 
that is the absolute superiority of genuine knowledge and the denial of the 
possibility that virtue may be taught. In his dialogue Protagoras Plato follows 
a metaphysical grounding of knowledge with idealistic viewpoint in search of 
human well-being (eudaimonia) which leads him to create a world of 
perennial and imperishable ideas (ideae) or forms (eide).
This is further developed in his Republic, where Plato envisions a polity in 
which philosophers would reign and this would lead both society and its 
members to experience moral improvement.34 In the cave allegory, the world 
of human affairs is described as a rather harsh condition, which the 
philosopher escapes from to speculate on the bright, perennial world of eide. 
Plato expresses faith in philosophers’ ruling abilities since they, unlike 
rhetoricians or sophists, draw their skills from their access to the absolute 
knowledge, that of justice, the Good and city’s ends, and thus of happiness, 
a knowledge that renders them the sole human beings suitable to create 
order in societies. Political power and philosophy must coincide.35 This praise 
of absolute knowledge leads Plato to express disdain towards common
33 Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004 exp. edition), 29.
34 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 35.
35 Plato, Republic, Book V, 473d-e.
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people’s skills in politics, an art that he believes belongs solely to the expert, 
the statesman (politikos), the one who possesses the knowledge of how to 
rule justly and well, that is to say, to the city’s best interest.36 Politics in Plato 
is the business only of those having access to a higher morality.
The rationale of this argument is deployed in Plato’s discussion of the 
regimes or types of government and the way they are connected to the souls 
of their citizens, a discussion which is held in the context of Plato’s enquiries 
on morality. Thus, already in Book II of Republic he introduces the idea that 
justice lies in a man as in a city and so by examining the issue of justice in 
the larger part, where it is more discernible, and then in the smaller part, the 
individual, it is possible to come up with a productive comparison and thus a 
conclusion as to the nature of justice.37 This idea is further explored in Book 
VIII, where Plato introduces an analogy according to which not only is the 
quality of the city analogous to the quality of its citizens, but also each of the 
regimes that are recognised as the five possible constitutions of human 
societies are informed by the dispositions, the character or ethos located in 
the souls of the individuals that inhabit and govern it.38 As he puts it, states 
are made of the ethe of their citizens, of ethe of those who live in the city (ek 
ton ethon ton en tais polesin). The states are as men are; they grow out of 
human characters. The individual ethos shapes and determines the 
constitution of the polis.
It is for this reason that Plato claims that by examining first the ethe of the 
city and then the ethos of the individual citizen a connection between them is 
established, so that it becomes possible to see where justice lies and how it 
is connected to happiness. Apart from his ideal imaginary state, the 
aristocracy, that he has already discussed extensively, as well as the 
individual counterpart to it, Plato discerns four other types of regime and their 
corresponding individual: timocracy and the timocratic man and in a parallel 
way oligarchy, democracy and the ultimate political disease, tyranny. As Plato 
characteristically puts it, this relation cannot but exist, since regimes cannot
36 John M. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1997), 294.
37 Plato, Republic, Book II, 368e-369a.
38 Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 543c-544e.
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spring from “oak and stone”; rather, they grow from their very citizens. It is 
exactly for this reason that it is the very citizens that are to be blamed for the 
failure of each of these regimes: whereas the timocratic city is inhabited by 
ambitious and supercilious men, the oligarchic is inhabited by mercenary 
people, who only care about money. In the case of democracy, on the other, 
the democratic man who lives in a regime of freedom and parrhesia, is ready 
to ignore the pursuits that make a statesman credible and trustworthy and to 
honour anyone who happens to claim that he is a friend and protector of the 
people.39 It is citizens’ individual ethos that is to be blamed for the fall of each 
of the regimes.
According to this line of critique, people are incapable of exercising 
political ruling, a capacity available only to the philosopher, to the holder of 
true knowledge. Political philosophy is pointing out the exit from the darkness 
and the distorted reality of the cave, whereas politics itself is a source of 
trouble for human society. As Wolin has put it, for Plato “politics was evil, and 
hence the task of philosophy and of ruling was to rid the community of 
politics”.40 Paradoxically, even his ideal regime, aristocracy, is doomed to 
failure since even the excellent education provided to the guardians will not 
prevent the “mixing up of iron with silver, of copper with gold”; antagonism 
and hostility are inherent in human societies41 But this is contrary to the end 
of any community which, according to Plato, is to eliminate internal strife in 
order to gain harmony and stability; the only solution Plato sees is to 
eliminate the citizenry from public life. Not only does Plato estrange a 
science from its subject matter, “those phenomena [...] that made such an art 
and science meaningful and necessary” but, through his city-soul analogy, he 
also drains democracy from its own soul, that is its citizen, by devaluing him 
to a “character motley and monifold, like democratic regime itself”.42 Plato by 
analysing morality and moral behaviour as justice and as the trait of the just 
man, and by having individual ethos inform the regime of the city, aspires to 
elevate morality at the collective level and thus to offer a generalised account
39 Ibid., 558b.
40 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 39.
41 Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 546a-547a.
42 Plato, Republic, 561 e.
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of it. But despite his aspiration, Plato fails to provide a public account of 
ethos since his analysis restricts it to a single form of moral character, to an 
individual inner trait, to a personality that is judged in the public field for its 
success or failure to achieve specific moral standards and behaviours. Plato 
not only confuses the inner and the outer poles of ethos, failing to honour the 
interplay between them but also, by restricting the idea of ethos to a moral 
category which belongs to only some people, he falls for an elitism that 
depoliticises his work. His is a moralised approach to ethos that fails to 
explicate its political character.
Aristotle, originally a student in Plato’ s Academy, is the first thinker who 
manages to actually put ethos in a political context and articulate an account 
of it proper to the politics of the city. Aristotle re-contextualises what Plato 
says and he differentiates himself from his mentor, not only on the issue of 
recognising a central role for the citizens of a city, that is the individuals who 
comprise it and are capable of sharing in the administration of justice and in 
offices.43 He also elaborates on Plato’s account of the moral character to 
offer us a more detailed analysis of virtues and of political participation. 
Aristotle abstains from adopting a conception of ethos that is detached from 
the ancient Greek public life and what takes place in it, that is from politics, 
offering thus an extended, enriched and indeed political account of ethos. 
However, as I discuss in this next section, the Aristotelian civic ethos is 
necessarily a fixed one, an account resulting from his view of the state. In the 
end, Aristotle is not very different from Plato by means of aspiring to an ideal, 
a polis that dictates its citizens’ behaviours and actions. The section, 
however, argues that Aristotle is an important contributor to the discussion 
about ethos for he succeeds to connecting it to the specific moment of 
political justification.
In contrast to Plato, Aristotle does not see morality as a solely personal 
concern. As Ingemar During, one of the most wide-read analysts and 
commentators of Aristotle’s work has argued, Aristotle’s philosophy is one of 
human co-existence and his understanding of ethics has a meaning only in a 
public context: there is no single connotation in any of his works that he 
separated between ethics (as a personal ethics) and politics (as social
43 Aristotle, Politics, 1275a19.
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ethics).44 In his main ethical work, the -Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle aspires 
to determine the content of human excellence, of arete and he suggests that 
it is of a twofold nature, the intellectual and the ethical.45 Whereas the first 
can be created and developed through learning, the second can only be the 
result of a process of habituation, of performing virtuous actions repeatedly 
and patiently, that is through hexis.46 The virtues that are highly valued are 
not engendered in us by nature: their acquisition demands customary 
practice and exercise. Aristotle explicitly states that hexis has a meaning only 
in the context of public life, since it is by performing those actions which 
occur in our intercourse with other men that we acquire and expose virtues 
such as justice or courage, mildness or wrath47 By performing virtuous 
actions, says Aristotle following Plato, we form a virtuous character or, what 
he refers to as an ethos. Ethos, then, is achieved through guided 
development and habituation and is highly connected to the performance of 
actions and, more specifically, interactions. As such, it cannot exist in 
isolation; by definition it requires possible or actual others.48 Moreover, and 
since according to Aristotle no moral virtue is engendered in us by nature, 
ethos cannot be read as a person’s property or as something stable and 
unchangeable. It has an experiential and shifting nature.
This shifting nature becomes evident in Aristotle’s work in another aspect, 
perhaps less evident but definitely equally crucial, for he does not constrain 
himself to the individualistic approach to ethos: elsewhere he provides a 
collective aspect. Aristotle is guided there by his account of ethos as 
character, but this time he attends to ethos as a quality that refers not to the 
individual, like Plato had done before him, but to the community of the city as
44 Ingemar During, Aristoteles: Presentation and Interpretation of his Thought (Athens:
1994), Vol. II, 206.
45 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1103a.
46 Aristotle was not the first to suggest that ethos is related to hexis, since his teacher Plato 
had already stated this both in his Republic (518e) and his Laws (792e). However, it is in 
Aristotle that ethos acquires an absolute and deep relation to hexis, see Arthur Miller, 
"Aristotle on habit (qOoq) and character (eGoq ): Implications for the rhetoric" Speech 
Monographs 41(1974), 309-316.
47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1103b.
48 Karen Burke LeFevre, Invention as a Social Act {Carbodale: Southern Illinois, 1987), 45 
cited in Nedra Reynolds,“Ethos as location: New sites for understanding discursive authority” 
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a whole. In his Politics Aristotle makes a strong claim regarding the 
happiness of the individual, which according to him coincides with the 
happiness of the state,49 so that all its members, the citizens, will pursue 
what is good for the city, since this would result in their own benefit. Men 
become good and sound citizens due to two different yet related factors: 
habituation and education. And here is also where the task of political 
science enters, since its paramount target, its teios, is to form the characters 
of the citizens, so that they are disposed to perform noble actions.50 This 
combination of education and praxis resulting from habituation is for Aristotle 
the key to the spontaneous participation of the good citizen in politics, for the 
formation of the ethos of the polis. Contra Plato, it is not the city that acquires 
its content from its citizens; instead, it is the citizens’ character that is formed 
through the established practices of the city. The polis is prior to its citizens, it 
is natural and it holds a specific ethos that it infuses into its citizens. 
However, it is not merely that Aristotle reverses Plato by transferring the 
weight from the individual to the community; he also introduces a third axis 
that connects ethos to the moment of political justification.
This is to be found in his Rhetoric and in the connection he establishes 
between ethos and the task of the rhetorician. In this text Aristotle seems to 
offer a handbook on the craft of rhetoric but, unlike those who have 
attempted the same enterprise before him, Aristotle develops an account of 
enthymemes, that is rhetorical syllogisms, and of the importance for 
persuasion of metaphors and analogies. To achieve his goal, the speaker has 
three sources of conviction: ethos, that is his personal character, pathos, that 
is the emotional state of his audience, and logos, that is the argument itself.51 
Aristotle justifies the importance he places on the personal character of the 
rhetor following the reasoning that people believe good men more fully and 
more readily than others. When we think that someone is a good person, that 
is of a good character, we tend to think him credible. But credibility in 
Aristotle, in contrast to, let’s say, Isocrates, does not refer to the already 
shaped and given opinion of the audience about the orator’s character;
49 Aristotle, Politics, Book VII, 1324a5.
50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1,1099b30-32.
51 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, 2 , 1356a.
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rather, it must be combined with logos, the argument at the exact time of its 
articulation and is thus highly connected to the orator’s rhetorical 
competence. However, credibility is not adequate in itself and the notion of 
ethos in Aristotle is not exhausted in it, since one equally important factor is 
the speaker’s ability to understand human character, that is to be able to 
comprehend and appreciate the disposition of the hearers. By doing so he 
becomes capable of selecting and using those references and parts of the 
discourse, those enthymemes, that will contribute to convincing his audience. 
In this account, ethos is intimately bound up with the moment of political 
justification.
In summary, Aristotle offers a conception of ethos such that is suitable to 
social life and politics, by placing emphasis on “the conventional rather that 
the idiosyncratic, the public rather than the private”.52 Pertinent here is the 
interpretation of ethos as the dwelling place known from the archaic era; for if 
this account is combined with the compact worldview prevailing in Greek 
archaic and classical societies, then Aristotle’s ethos is the character that is 
most proper to the values of the community. That being the case, although on 
a first reading ethos for Aristotle refers to the character of the speaker, and 
thus can be interpreted as credibility, a closer reading reveals that this 
character is not a strictly individual trait; rather, it is incidental to the virtues, 
experiences and habits of the community or culture that envelops and forms 
this character. It is derived from the polis and hence it already has a public 
character. In these terms, ethos is also the sensibility that the speaker shows 
towards the characters of his audience, towards the specific values they 
share and honour and he displays this sensibility by using enthymemes that 
address both their hearts and minds. To state it in other words, the 
Aristotelian ethos refers to the certain qualities that citizens espouse and 
acquire qua citizens of the specific polis they live in. It is this ethos that 
renders them capable of performing noble actions, which in the Aristotelian 
philosophy translates to actions that contribute to the good of the city. Ethos 
here can be interpreted as a non-spontaneous, shared trait, that each 
member of the good city has attained through education but also through 
performance of actions which are required by him as a sound member of the
52 Michael S. Halloran, “Aristotle’s concept of ethos, or if not his somebody else’s” Rhetoric 
Review 1, no. 1 (1982), 60.
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city. Thus stated, ethos refers to our concrete ways of Being-there in the 
polis,53 in the place where we live with one another, in a koinonia with 
common ends. The city has a decisive role in the formation of the citizen’s 
character. In Aristotle, there is a complex interaction between the public and 
the private: ethos is the character, but it is not an inner character but public. 
As such, it belongs to the individual, but it stems from the community. 
Aristotle sees ethos as being intrinsically public.
To schematize the trajectory of ethos in the tradition, it can be stated that 
there is an intricate interplay between the inner and the outer, the public and 
the individual, with the one informing and redefining the other. A term which is 
originally used by poets to describe the habitual place for animals and 
armies, but also the customs of a people, is later connected with the 
personality of the heroic individual who has to demonstrate his ethos through 
the performance of actions on the field of the agon. It is with this connotation 
that the term is transfered to the field of political thought, where it oscillates 
between two different accounts, the private and the public. Plato, who 
advocates the idea of a higher moral character, connects ethos to personality 
and treats it as a trait of the politically incapable individual. It is the ethos of 
citizen that nourishes and informs the quality of the regime and it is thus to 
be blamed for the unavoidable failure of every and any political constitution. 
By failing to connect citizenship with meaningful participation, Plato not only 
puts a science at odds with its subject matter; rather, he also equates ethos 
to morality, and indeed a decadent one, ostracising it from public life and 
failing thus to accommodate it in a political context.
Aristotle reverses the terms, places citizen at the centre of his vision of 
political life and he considers ethos as something public, that already belongs 
to the polis. He then moves a step further by way of discussing ethos as the 
interplay between the public and the private, for he thus attends to ethos as 
something that the citizen endorses in order to contribute towards his and 
therefore the city’s end. Moreover, in an innovative way Aristotle introduces 
one challenging interpretation of the relationship between ethos and politics, 
the one produced through rhetoric. By equating ethos with the character of 
the orator, which at the same time is informed by the character of the
53 William McNeil, The Time of a Life (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2006), 80.
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audience, Aristotle succeeds in connecting ethos to the moment of political 
justification.
Plato and Aristotle attend to ethos to deploy their arguments about political 
life, the ideal constitution and the role of citizen in it. But whereas the first 
completely abolishes the participation of citizen in politics, the latter places 
them at the centre of his enquiries, not least because man is by nature a 
political animal. Hence Plato offers an account of ethos that is highly 
moralised and indeed apolitical, whereas Aristotle appreciates the ambiguity 
of ethos and the interplay between the public and the private incorporated in 
it. However, his granting of precedence to the polis over man entails the 
(pre)existence of a city ethos that is a posteriori endorsed by its citizens. Not 
only do the citizens abstain from the creation of the ethos; they are expected 
to embrace it as fixed. Beyond the fact that such an account supposes that 
the city is capable of forming and bearing its own ethos, it also annuls the 
participation of the citizens in the process of forming their political life. 
Aristotle, by putting the ethos on the public level and acknowledging the 
interplay between the latter and the private is able to suggest the existence 
of a political ethos, but his formulations are insufficient to the democratic call 
for multiple public goods that are fugitively shared by individuals.
The chapter now turns to two modern thinkers who have been inspired by 
Aristotle and who attend to his work by way of discussing the issue of ethos. 
Hegel, who follows the Aristotelian idea of the state as formulator of citizens’ 
attitudes, offers an account of political ethos that is restricted to a specific 
category of citizens, failing thus to provide inspiration for our discussion of a 
democratic ethos. Heidegger proves to be more useful for the argument of 
the thesis, since not only does he affirm the importance of the fact that 
individuals are ‘thrown’ in human communities, but in doing so he introduces 
the idea of elasticity of ethos in terms of it being adjustable to the 
circumstances.
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IV. Ethos in Modern Political Thought: Hegel and Heidegger
Aristotle’s emphasis on the impact of the city on individual’s character is 
embraced by G. W. Hegel, a key figure in political thought who developed an 
approach to ethos attending to its collective aspect by introducing the idea of 
Sittlichkeit, that is ethical life or order, in contradistinction to abstract right and 
to morality (Moralitat).54 By doing so, Hegel intended to provide a theory of 
modern ethical life which would avoid the hitch of abstraction on which a 
normative understanding of ethics and thus Kant’s theory of morality had 
been caught. However, Hegel did not wish to abandon the latter’s ideal of 
free selfhood and for that reason his theory combines the “objective system 
of principles and duties” that form true conscience with the crucial issue of 
modern individual freedom, which constitutes the essence of the human spirit 
and subsequently the ultimate purpose of Hegel’s teleology.55 In other words, 
and in contrast to while at the same time with Kant, Hegel’s proposal on 
ethos “represents a form of practical reason that, through self-reflection, is to 
raise the normative content and logic of inherited institutions and traditions to 
a universal level”.56 These institutions and traditions are part of a larger 
repository, that of ethical life.
Despite the fact that in his earlier work Hegel expresses his admiration for 
the ideal of the ancient Greek and Roman republics, exaggerating their 
harmonious and glorious ethical life,57 his mature references to ethos clearly 
concern the modern state, with its unique characteristics of civil society and 
individual freedom. The latter is actualised only in ethical life understood both 
as the system of rational institutions (and so “objective” ethical life) and as an 
individual disposition to the institution’s requirements. Ethical life, then, is the
54 For the purposes of the current analysis I have used the notion of Sittlichkeit as it appears 
in the Philosophy of Right. Despite the fact that the term had already appeared in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, there is a clear shift in the use of the term in his latter work. For an 
overview of the possible interpretations for this shift, see Will Dudley, “Ethical life, morality, 
and the role of spirit”, in D. Moyar and M. Quante (eds.), Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A 
Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 130-149.
55 Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991), §137,164.
56 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (New Baskerville: MIT 
Press, 1994), 93.
57 Georg W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), 444-476.
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locus of harmonisation of the subjective with the universal will. Hegel justifies 
the direct link he establishes between ethical life and freedom in the 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, where he argues that “ethical life is the 
concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the nature of 
self-consciousness”.58 That said, there is a concrete ethos, a Sittlichkeit, 
consisting of customs, relations and duties, that determines individuals’ 
practical reasoning and through which they become a free agent. Ethical life 
mediates between the universal and the particular, that is the system of laws 
and institutions that are regulated by rationality on the one hand and the 
subjective dispositions, the “actual living principle of self-consciousness” that 
bind individual will to the institution’s rational requirements. This web of 
institutions and rules, though, is not constraining since rationality is the 
means to liberate oneself from “mere natural drives and from the burden [...] 
as a particular subject in his moral reflections on obligation and desire” and 
“from that indeterminate subjectivity which does not attain existence [...] but 
remains within itself and has no actuality”.59 Ethical life embodies the highest 
and most complex level of human consciousness, not only by combining 
abstract right and civil society, but by surpassing this combination.
Hegel was the first to argue that modernity is characterised by the 
existence of civil society (burgerliche Gesellschaft), conceived as the space 
that intervenes between the family and the state and the realm where 
individuals develop economic relationships. Freedom in the modern world, he 
argues, is crystallised and actualised in the set of institutions that comprise 
this space, that despite depending on the state and its institutions for its 
function, still is separated from it. In this interspace, each individual is free to 
pursue his welfare and his own particular end, so that civil society is the field 
where the Idea of freedom is realised.60 Even though each individual attains 
his basic ethical principles upon birth and whilst member of a family, the latter 
itself cannot exhaustively cover the needs of the individual. This can only be 
achieved through one’s participation in civil society, which offers the context 
for individuals to be educated into a more universal ethical life, as parts of a
58 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §142, 189.
59 Ibid., §149, 192.
60 Ibid., §184, 221.
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chain or a continuum, so that their private interests, skills and ends attain a 
social character.61 Individuals need other free individuals, for the realisation 
of self-sufficiency requires the other particulars as well, such that “the 
subsistence and welfare of the individual and his rightful existence are 
interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, welfare, and rights of 
all...”.62 It is their participation in this communal life that provides individuals 
with rights and duties which preexist them and go beyond human 
contingency. By attributing to civil society this role in shaping social ethics, 
“Hegel takes the bold step of predicating rationality not of individuals and 
their actions, but of the institutions and cultural context that makes action 
possible”.63 Everyday practical reasoning occurs to citizens and allows their 
coexistence through, and because of, their belonging to a common ethical 
community.
At the same time civil society, with its conflictual individual and collective 
interests, embodies both the principle of particularity and that of universality, 
but the latter exists only in embryonic stage, being itself insufficient for the 
realisation of ethical life. The locus where the ethical spirit per se is 
actualised is the state, the form of political association that represents 
objective spirit and the ultimate human end.64 Hegel clarifies that when 
examining the state he actually considers the Idea or Spirit of the state and 
thus no particular state; however, he avoids abstraction by acknowledging 
that the state “is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and hence in the 
sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behaviour may 
disfigure it in many respects”.65 What binds individuals to this body is political 
disposition, patriotism, meaning “not only a willingness to perform 
extraordinary sacrifices and actions” but “that disposition which, in the normal 
conditions and circumstances of life, habitually knows that the community is
61 Ibid., §187, 224-6.
62 Ibid., §183, 221.
63 Steven B. Smith, “Hegel’s critique of liberalism” American Political Science Review 80, no.
1 (1986), 134.
64 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §258, 275.
65 Ibid., §258, 279.
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the substantial basis and end”.66 The bureaucrats form the backbone of the 
modern state. According to Hegel, these civil officials, with their ability to 
stand above their self-interest and to apply universal norms, form a universal 
class since their activities aim at the realization of universal interests.67 The 
purpose of the state is to infuse its citizens with a consciousness of 
objectivity and universality, a consciousness that comes to enhance and 
complete the communal spirit that the antagonistic realm of civil society 
bears. The Hegelian ethos is a collective trait, a common disposition shared 
by every free person as member of a specific community, being that civil 
society or the state.
Hegel’s account of ethical life as the field of realisation of freedom is 
challenging, but there is an ambiguous side in his analysis which renders his 
paradigm disadvantageous to an approach to ethos that aims to have a 
political dimension. This seems to be also the essence of Marx’s (in)famous 
critique of Hegel’s dialectical account of the relationship between the state 
and civil society. This critique stems from the different articulations of the 
relation between freedom and the material nature of civil society provided by 
the two thinkers.68 Marx claims that the distinction between two spheres of 
ethical life, the sphere of civil society and that of political state, results in 
different accounts of the individual, the pursuer of the private interest in the 
first instance and the political participant in the second. Moreover, the fact 
that not every member of the social order participates in the political state, 
since “civil society would abandon itself as such if all its member were 
legislators”,69 results in a dual approach to citizenship, thus excluding some 
from the quality of political citizenship. Marx is worried that the modern state 
is not so neutral as Hegel had it; that, in fact, the supposed subordination of 
the state to society’s Sittlichkeit is only a covert subordination of Sittlichkeit to 
the state, so that it is not the general needs and interests that are promoted 
and satisfied, but that of the bureaucracy, of a specific class that “is the
66 Ibid., §268, 288-9.
67 Ibid., §205.
68 David Duquette, “Marx’s idealist critique of Hegel’s theory of society and politics” The 
Review of Politics 51, no. 2 (1989), 218-240.
69 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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imaginary state alongside the real state”.70 That is to say, the Hegelian claim 
that bureaucracy constitutes a “universal class” and that the state is capable 
of realising human universality is actually an illusory one; instead of 
incorporating the particular in the universal interests, in fact it only promotes 
the interests of a single class of individuals. Marx’s answer is to eliminate 
civil society and to fold individuality into communal life.
Hegel concurs with Aristotle that one becomes good as the citizen of a 
state with good laws; by doing so he acknowledges that it is the social 
environment that shapes and determines our moral and political attitudes and 
therefore he acknowledges the pre-existence of a public ethos. He appeals 
to this ethos not as something that belongs to individuals but as the set of 
established and customary practices that guide the ethical behaviour of 
individuals qua members of a political community that bears a core of 
common beliefs and procedures. Additionally, though, the Aristotelian ethos 
incorporates an individual dimension as well, one that takes into 
consideration the dispositions and stances, that is the character, of a specific 
person and the ways in which this character is the product of self-cultivation 
and instruction. Both thinkers appeal to ethos in their attempt to investigate 
and explain the possible interrelations between inner values, judgments and 
ethical commitments on the one hand and the social norms and attitudes that 
allow and even characterise the life of a political community, on the other. To 
be sure, neither Aristotle- as has already been discussed- nor Hegel were 
democrats. The latter explicitly considered constitutional monarchy the best 
regime. More importantly, Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit is problematic, not 
least because of its authoritative nature, since it recognises the higher 
authority of the social laws that the individual must conform with.71 It is 
introduced as an unquestionable set of customs, mores and laws inherited by 
the individual. As such, it gives the individual no standards or principles 
outside of those that are given to him by ethical life.72 He has no choice but 
to assent to the laws of the community. Most importantly, the Hegelian 
articulation of Sittlichkeit allows limited room for an actual political
70 Ibid., 47.
71 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §146, 190.
72 Frederick Breisler, Hegel (New York, Routledge, 2005), 237.
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interpretation of ethos: his “politics of inclusive community”73 celebrates 
individuality while it folds it into a complex totality, a state or an ethical 
community with a concrete and distinct shape. Political participation is 
actually saved only for a certain number of its citizens, those who embrace a 
specific ethos which allows them to move beyond and above self interest. 
Despite his admiration for Aristotle, Hegel, with his absolute priority of the 
community over the individual is perhaps closer to Plato.
Hegel develops his account of ethos to sustain his particular vision of the 
modern state, that is a vision of an organic state with a pluralistic structure in 
so far as it is a state with intermediate groups that actually contribute to its 
stability74 Such a modern state is distinct from the ancient Greek and Roman 
republics not only in the idea of individual freedom that it introduces but 
mainly because of the mediating role it attributes to the market-based civil 
society as the space between the family and the state. Thus, the modern 
state not only is the embodiment of concrete freedom, allowing and indeed 
requesting the individual flourishing; it is also the community of free agents 
who recognise and accept one another as such. Its citizens are identified 
with it through a habitual attunement to its codes and values, acknowledging 
that this satisfies their particular interests and by doing so in the context of 
the concrete state they succeed in overcoming the danger of alienation. The 
state is for Hegel the site of realisation of the Spirit in history. The Hegelian 
individual is not only bound up with the state: his purpose of life is actually 
informed by the latter. With Plato and Aristotle, Hegel sees the ultimate value 
of life achieved only in the context of the state. Most importantly, the latter 
now has the form of the nation state, “the absolute power on earth”: the state 
is the nation’s spirit and this is the reason that each nation has a constitution 
suitable to it.75 The modern state has a distinct ethos, a concrete way of life 
and therefore its own character that gives meaning to the otherwise 
undefined life of the individual. It is only as a citizen of this state and thus by 
espousing its Sittlichkeit that the individual acquires access to freedom.
731 borrow the term from William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd, 1988), 86.
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Such an organic account of the state did not go without criticism from 
intellectuals in Europe who saw in the claim that there is an intrinsic purpose 
in life that is imposed on the individual by a certain kind of community a 
threat to individual autonomy and existence. For them, the historically 
specific destiny that the community must realise, and with which the 
individual is bound, is an ideal that drains him from his freedom. Nietzsche, 
for example, opposed the view that the highest goal of mankind is the state 
and thus that the highest goal of man is a duty to serve the state.76 To him, 
the function of the organic state aspires to the annihilation of the individual, 
who is destined to be improved into a useful organ of the community.77 
Hence Zarathustra’s denunciation of the nation state, this “new idol”, as the 
coldest of all cold monsters: where real men still exist the state, with its lie 
that it embodies the people, cannot be understood.78 But, perhaps not 
surprisingly, Nietzsche’s views were completely untimely, out of joint for his 
times, during which the nation state and the romantic folk images it was 
connected with overtook the whole Continent.
This is the setting within which the work of one of the most prominent 
European thinkers evolved; a thinker whose writings are partly inspired by 
those of Nietzsche, and maintain attentiveness to the temporal and 
topological specificity of human existence which, we saw, was important in 
Hegel. For Martin Heidegger the man that poses questions about being, the 
Dasein, does not exist isolated; rather, he is always historically and spatially 
delimited in a totality, a community. It is his account of the world, and more 
specifically of the human being as Being-in-the-world, that shapes and 
defines Heidegger’s political thought and the role of ethos in it. His 
meditations are important for he is able to provide us with an account of 
ethos that highlights the importance of the situations in which we find 
ourselves qua citizens of a specific community. For the Heideggerian Being 
gains its quality only as already existing in the world; the latter is not
76 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 148.
77 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), § 473, 173.
78 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus spoke Zarathustra”, in W. Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable 
Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 160-1.
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“beheld”, it is dwelled in.79 Into this world the Heideggerian being is ‘thrown’ 
and exists already with others, hence it is a “with-world” (Mitweli).80 Although 
some might contest Heidegger’s contribution to political theory,81 his 
existential analytic of Dasein engages in a task of political significance and 
impact, as the analysis of his account of ethos reveals.
Heidegger by way of developing his ideas on the question that persistently 
concerned him, that is the essence of being, offers us an individualised 
account of ethos which is significantly based on his reading of Aristotle and, 
specifically, on the latter’s analysis of the interconnections between logos, 
praxis, time and ethos, on the one hand, and among these and the regime, 
on the other. The Heideggerian interpretation departs from a strong embrace 
of the community’s shared elements as a source of individuals’ character, 
without, however, completely renouncing its impact, while at the same time 
appreciating the dimension of time. Heidegger offers a fundamentally 
different understanding of the human community from Aristotle, for central to 
his theorisation is the notion of “destiny” as that which defines a community’s 
distinctiveness and particularity.82 Heidegger in his original reading of 
Aristotle concurs with the latter’s account of human being as a zoon politikon 
and the fact that this quality emanates from his ability to speak, to use logos 
(zoon logon echon). As he comments,
[i]mplicit in this determination is an entirely peculiar, fundamental mode 
of the being of human beings characterised as “being-with-one-
79 Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 121.
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New York Press, 1996), §118, 111.
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Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) and 
Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), some authors 
claim that since Heidegger never developed a political philosophy, his political thought 
remains too abstract or limited. See for example Leo Strauss’ claim that “there is no room for 
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another”, ko ivco v lo . These beings who speak with the world are, as 
such, through being-with-others83
Thus, like Aristotle, Heidegger places human beings in a community where 
they live miteinander in a common world with shared ends because their 
ability to speak attributes to them the aptitude for perceiving and 
distinguishing between what is good and evil. But the importance of the 
Heideggerian concept of the Dasein is not that it reaffirms the political and 
rational Aristotelian animal but, rather, that it shows how Being is determined 
by the potentiality of discourse.84 Indeed, Heidegger’s phenomenological 
investigations of Dasein as finite and temporal urge him to take a distance 
from Aristotle when it comes to appreciating not only the individual, but also 
community’s exclusive capacity to guide individual’s actions. For Heidegger, 
not every virtuous action aims at satisfying a common end.
Heidegger justifies this in his exegesis of how being-in-the-world is 
achieved through logos, so that it is the result of being part of a speech 
community, of possessing and being possessed by language.85 He 
demonstrates how certain values are not necessarily bound to a common 
end and in order to do so he uses the example of offering a gift to a friend. 
This action intends the friend’s satisfaction and, considering this, it cannot be 
placed within the wider context of established human attitude and be 
interpreted as a human habit. It is an action with a strict aim, that of serving 
the virtue of friendship by offering satisfaction to the friend. As Heidegger 
puts it, “there is no deliberating about the end; it is fixed from the outset”.86 
What is subject to deliberation is the means to achieve or provide the desired 
satisfaction. That said, what guides decisions and actions bound with some 
virtues, such as friendship or eupraxia, is the particularities pertinent to the 
specific circumstances under which the action is to be taken. As McNeil 
comments in his analysis of Heidegger’s work, “our deliberation cannot be
83 Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. R.D. Metcalf and M.B. 
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governed solely or primarily by the common norms that regulate the ethos of 
a given community and of a particular world”.87 Ethos is not prefixed; there is 
an element of elasticity in ethos that allows it to adjust to circumstances and 
be receptive to them. Our response to the situations in which we find 
ourselves as specific subjects, for example as friends or as democratic 
citizens, is of high importance in becoming ourselves, in approaching what 
Heidegger calls the “authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself” 
and so its own possibilities are decisive in its conduct.88 Discovering one’s 
authentic self is, for Heidegger, a possibility of existence (the other one being 
inauthenticity) that is attained only when one realises who one is and what 
his destiny is.
Connected to the problematic of authentic self is one more point where 
Heidegger’s departure from Aristotle regarding the exclusive impact of 
community in defining human conduct is apparent and this point is — once 
again — connected with the Heideggerian analytic of Dasein. The latter’s 
ability to be authentic (eigentliche) results from its intrinsic possibility towards 
death, finitude, and therefore from the temporally and historically delimited 
character of its existence. However, authenticity does not prevail as a 
potentiality that is to be actualised, since “that would have to mean bringing 
about one’s own demise”.89 Rather, the potentiality to be expected is that of 
death and so the latter must be understood as an anticipation of this 
possibility (being-toward-death), which allows “Dasein to disclose itself to 
itself with regard to its most extreme possibility”,90 reaching thus closer to 
authentic existence, to being-itself, to being the most-proper-being. However, 
given the fact that Dasein’s mode of being entails its being absorbed by its 
world,91 in its movement towards authentic existence the Self is obliged to 
engage in a struggle with this world,
87 McNeil, The Time of a Life, 83.
88 Heidegger, Being and Time, §129,121.
88 Ibid., 241.
90 Ibid., 242.
91 Ibid.,107.
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with its normal world in which it has its possible roles and identities set 
for it. To be a proper, self-authenticating self, an individual must take its 
fundamental cues for living from its being, not from the standards of 
communal normalcy.92
Being authentic entails being open to contingency and the opening of new 
possibilities and therefore being willing to abandon the comforts of 
everydayness.
Heidegger refers to the community as the common space shared by the 
individuals that decisively shapes their understanding of themselves and 
others. It is the fact of the Dasein being already with others, among others, 
being in history, that places it in the context of a community within which its 
destiny is to be fulfilled: “...if fateful Dasein essentially exists as being-in-the- 
world in being-with-others, its occurrence is an occurrence of the community, 
of a people...” (Volk in German).93 Community perceived as Volk needs a 
state to secure its historical duration: “The State is the historical being of the 
Volk\ 94 But this state is not, for Heidegger, the nation-state, this modern form 
of political organisation that reveals itself as the unquestionable, the 
unconditional site of the political; rather, it is the polis as the place in which 
man comes to dwell in a historical-ontological manner.95 In this sense, 
Heidegger’s poiis is pre-political: it is the linguistic community that produces a 
logos that is the enabling means of co-existence. Dasein, as being there, in 
this particular time and place, entails not only the embrace of one’s fate as 
an individual: it also requires that one recognises one’s essential, 
unavoidable involvement in the destiny of one’s people.
In discussing the political implications of Heidegger’s elaborations it is 
important to examine the relationship he establishes between praxis and 
time, a relationship that is boiled down to the expression of Augenblick, the 
fitting moment of action, or the Greek kairos. It is his analysis of kairos that 
urges Heidegger to elaborate a concept of ethos that functions as a bridge
92 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 102.
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, §385, 352.
94 Martin Heidegger, Logic As the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, trans.
W.T. Gregory and Y. Unna (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009), 136.
95 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998 ,118.
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between the specific time of action and the general conduct one 
demonstrates as a member of a specific community. Heidegger interprets the 
concept of time as discussed in Aristotle’s Physics in terms of a sequence of 
nows, where the three dimensions (ecstases) —past, present and future— 
are represented and translated in terms of now. Heidegger defines this 
approach as the vulgar or common understanding of time and criticises it for 
its emphasis on the present.96 Rather, in accord with his existential analysis, 
Dasein is bound to the future, and while heading towards it, Dasein comes 
closer to itself. Heidegger suggests that if we are to understand and 
conceptually comprehend the meaning of being, we still need to turn to time, 
but now appreciating it as authentic temporality. The term that he chooses to 
describe his suggested account of time is Augenblick, moment: “The 
phenomenon of the Moment can in principle not be clarified in terms of the 
now. The now is a temporal phenomenon that belongs to time as within-time- 
ness [...] In the Moment nothing can happen, but as an authentic present it 
lets us encounter for the first time what can be “in a time” as something at 
hand or objectively present [...] Every present makes present, but not every 
present is “in the moment”...97
An important aspect of the appropriate moment of action, the time of 
authentic action, Heidegger’s Augenblick, is that it is informed by phronesis, 
the intellectual virtue that in Aristotle refers to one’s ability to make proper 
judgements on specific issues and is usually translated as practical wisdom. 
For Aristotle, phronesis - as contrasted to sophia - is always pertinent to 
issues that are changeable and thus is a virtue that is related to action, 
whereas sophia informs thinking on what is general and universal.98 
Heidegger is indebted to the Aristotelian phronesis but he succeeds in going 
further than Aristotle by connecting the analysis of phronesis with the idea of 
temporality of action and claiming that “phronesis makes the situation 
accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action”.99
96 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology trans. A. Hofstadter 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982), 256.
97 Heidegger, Being and Time, 311.
98 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1141b.
99 Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist, trans. R.Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 20.
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Heidegger thus insists on the role played by the specificity of the situation in 
which Dasein finds itself at any time: that situation may vary and it is decisive 
in specifying the proper action that needs to be taken. However, it is not the 
case that phronesis is an external factor that influences and specifies action, 
in the sense that it is a study of the situation in which Dasein finds itself. 
Rather, it “belongs intrinsically to the acting. In every step of the action, 
phronesis is co-constitutive”.100 By being so much connected to the transient 
situation, phronesis “is a look of an eye in the blink of an eye, a momentary 
look at what is momentarily concrete”.101 Moment and the action that takes 
place in it is always informed by phronesis.
For Heidegger, “the path on which phronesis discloses the situation of the 
action”, the means through which phronesis is carried out is deliberation, 
thorough discussion and thus logos, that takes place in the common space 
shared by human beings. This concrete way of living while being-with-one- 
another, is itself a knowing-a-way-around; it is a techne, which entails that 
the human being is capable of opening itself to and dealing with the world in 
which it is exposed: This standing-out [in being-with-one-another] of the 
human being, this “comporting-oneself” in the world, this “comportment”, is 
t o  r]0oq.’102 Elsewhere he defines ethos as “man’s essential abode”, as “the 
open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what 
pertains to man’s essence...”.103 Thus outlined, ethos refers to the way 
human being places itself in the world in relation to others. Ethos, then, for 
Heidegger, is twofold: in one aspect, it is our general and concrete behaviour 
as social beings; but on another, it is also temporally specific. It refers to a 
combination of our manner of response to the peculiar circumstances we 
encounter at the moment of action and our more general way of conduct as 
human beings, which is the result of our presence in a specific community. I 
believe that MacNeil’s reading of the Heideggerian account of ethos as
1°0 Ibid., 101.
131 Ibid., 120.
102 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 48.
103 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on humanism”, in M. Heidegger and D. F. Krell, Basic Writings: 
From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978), 233.
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dwelling formulates this twofold nature of ethos in a successful and 
constructive way:
ethos for Heidegger means our dwelling, understood temporally as a 
way of Being, yet such dwelling must be understood, on the one 
hand, in terms of our stance and conduct in the moment of action - 
the way in which we are held and hold ourselves, and thus “dwell”, in 
the presence of the moment - and on the other hand, in terms of our 
more enduring way of being that is brought about temporally in and 
throughout the unfolding of human experience.104
Ethos thus conceived is not a stable and unchangeable trait of human being; 
rather, it is subject to diverse modification through logos. It has a dynamic 
and multiple nature, since it relates to phenomena such as character, space 
and time. Importantly, it is an ethos that is neither exclusively individual nor 
public: it is the result of a blending of the two dimensions.
Inspiring as I find Heidegger’s association of ethos with the moment of 
action, there is a point where my formulation of a democratic ethos departs 
from him. Most specifically, I find the Aristotelian concept of phronesis that 
Heidegger analyses and uses to construct his argumentation to be too stark 
a concept to inform the democratic ethos suggested here. In other words, 
despite honouring the occasion and the opportunity raised within it, the 
Aristotelian/Heideggerian phronesis is too stable and regular to serve the 
argument developed here. As a matter of fact, phronesis gains its stability by 
the fact that it is informed by episteme, that is by the principles that Aristotle, 
but also Heidegger, affirm as guiding practical reason. At the same time, 
however, it is also regulated through the experience gained through 
habituation. Democracy as discussed for the argument of the thesis is 
attentive to established principles, perceptions and regulation, but also to 
change, to the unpredictable encounters that participate in the democratic 
complex and which render it fluid and hence susceptible to the peculiarities 
of the occasion. It is for this reason that, as I will suggest in more detail in 
Chapter Six, if a democratic ethos is to be informed by an intellectual virtue 
this could be metis rather than phronesis.
104 McNeil, The Time of a Life, xi.
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In providing this analysis of Heidegger’s aspiration to ethos, it is not only 
suggested that his work contains tools that help us to understand and 
describe political life; it is also the case that he offers an important exegesis 
of the political moment par excellence. It is the Heideggerian moment as the 
moment where the tension between the individual and the communal is 
disrupted, and despite its disruption - or, rather, because of it, - gives rise to 
the appropriate time and provides the definition of the constitutive political 
moment. This is not to downplay the fact that Heidegger, even for a very 
short period, openly expressed his support to the National Socialist Party; 
however, this choice can at least be understood considering the historical 
context within which Heidegger developed his ideas on community and state. 
The Volk has a spiritual historical mission to fulfill: it has to survive and 
bequeath its spiritual world, which Heidegger envisioned as “the forces that 
are rooted in the soil and blood of a Volk, the power to arouse most inwardly 
and to shake most extensively the Volk’s existence”.105 Hegel is discernible 
here for, before Heidegger, he already explained how the effacement of 
ancient states was the result of a lack of infinite strength implied in a unity.106 
This seems to have been the fear of Heidegger: that the German people, and 
with it the German state, would disappear under the pressures of the 
technological and social transformations that modernity brings with it, 
disassociating people from their communities, unless unity was achieved. 
The idealised vision of a Volk served as the proper way of being-with-others, 
as the originary dwelling place of human beings and hence as the way to 
achieve the proper existence. This parameter limits the possibilities of using 
the Heideggerian account of ethos with reference to democracy, since it 
entails presupposing an ideal and appropriate mode of comportment. As I will 
suggest in the final chapter of the thesis, this limitation can be overcome if 
we substitute commonalities for the community defined by Heidegger in 
terms of homogeneity. Still, the fact that Heidegger’s ontological and 
philosophical choices have been connected to a certain politics only opens a
105 Martin Heidegger, “The self-asssertion of the German university” (The Rektoratsrede), in 
Richard Wolin (ed.), The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1993), 33-34.
106 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §185,156.
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question as to whether there is a unique pathway to connect theoria and 
praxis.
V. From Ethos as Place to Ethos as Dwelling Temporally
The investigation of the trajectory of the concept of ethos from antiquity to 
late modernity taken on in this chapter has shown that the term has always 
been closely connected to morality. Following a primarily topological usage 
during the archaic years, where it indicated a dwelling place, ethos, came to 
be used to signify the individual way of conduct, explicated in the public field 
and with the occasion of the agon, having thus an axiological nature. It is an 
individual trait but one that is played out in the public field. Its introduction in 
the political sphere coincided with the philosophical turn from the natural 
world to the human itself, and thus to the examination of the qualities that the 
virtuous subject must bear.
Although he connects it to political life by affirming it as the personal 
character that informs the state, Plato refuses to attribute a real political 
meaning to ethos: it refers to the character of the ordinary man, who ought 
not to have any role in the polis if the latter is to flourish. Political virtue is 
something to be sought by philosophers, living isolated in the abstract world 
of Ideas.
Aristotle, in a problematic way, offers three different accounts of ethos and 
he views it as expressing both the individual and the collective aspect, that is, 
as being both a personal disposition and a collective trait. To have ethos is to 
manifest the virtues most valued by the community. Elsewhere, ethos refers 
to the ability of the orator to choose the correct rhetorical devices, those 
appropriate to the moment of speaking, that will allow him to convince his 
audience. It, therefore, entails the elem ent of adjustability and 
synchronisation.
The concept of ethos in its collective dimension was revived in the political 
thought of Hegel who finds ethos, or what he calls ethical life, to be fully 
realised only in the context of the state. Hegel is in agreement with Aristotle 
that one becomes a good person as a citizen of a state with good laws: it is
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the social environment that shapes and determines our political and moral 
attitudes. However, his localisation of ethos within a certain space drains it of 
its political essence, not only because ethos is perceived by Hegel as 
preexisting man, and thus as guiding him through duties and rights, but also 
because his analysis presupposes that the virtues of Sittlichkeit are part of 
the mores, customs and laws of the society. Political virtue is saved only for 
those working in and for the state mechanism, that is the bureaucrats: they 
are the only cast expected to exhibit a certain political value. The Hegelian 
ethos is not only pre-political, an inherited and therefore unquestionable 
general mode of conduct but apolitical as well.
It is suggested here that it is in the insights of Heidegger that the sources 
for a political ethos can be detected. Writing during the collapse of the great 
empires and the triumph of the nation state, Heidegger envisions the human 
being as dwelling in a concrete community defined not in Aristotelian terms 
as polis, but for its particularity and distinct “destiny”. It is in the context of 
such a community that the human being exhibits its specific comportment, its 
ethos or the specific place it occupies, it dwells in the world and which 
pertains to its essence. Such an ethos is not merely the general way of 
conduct one adopts as member of the specific community; rather, it is a 
response, a timely rejoinder to the particular circumstances one encounters. 
Heidegger enables us to envision an ethos as our dwelling in the specific 
moment of action as we place our being in relation to others and the world. 
Still, political though it is, his ethos is barely a democratic one. The specificity 
of the context in which he places Being, that is a community with specific 
traits and destiny, renders his account of ethos too restrained. I discuss these 
limitations in the final chapter of the thesis, where I also turn to Deleuze to 
come up with a possible solution to avoid the Heideggerian reliance on 
community in the specific dimension in which he embraces it.
Foucault, on the other hand, as was discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, offers a more open, creative and assertive idea of ethos, one that 
bridges the personal with the public in no definitive way. Whereas Heidegger, 
inspired by Aristotle, shows the way towards the affirmation of the importance 
of an ethos attuned to circumstances, it is Foucault who poses the issue of 
developing (by way of cultivating) an ethos as a mode of placing ourselves in
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a community. I draw from them my understanding of a democratic ethos as 
having a tactical nature in a double sense: not only does it require tactics to 
be cultivated, but it also is always relevant to the occasion, kairos, and this is 
exposed through the undertaking of tactics, of actions that are moment- 
specific.
In this chapter I have discussed the shifting nature of ethos from an inner 
characteristic to a collective trait. In doing so, I have shown that the relation 
of ethos to politics is characterised by ambiguity, not least because thinkers 
from antiquity to modernity aspire to it, sometimes to condemn it, but without 
being able to escape from it. To be sure, it is Heidegger’s account of ethos as 
attuning to the circumstances together with Foucault’s elaborations on ethical 
tactics that have inspired the vision for a democratic ethos embraced in the 
thesis, that is the idea of ethos as dwelling temporally and so as dwelling in 
the moment. However, to seek to elaborate such a vision entails that one 
engages into process of theorising democracy. The next chapter takes on a 
discussion of the theorising endeavour and on the endeavour of theorising 
democracy more specifically. In doing so, it attempts to relate the thesis to 
the discipline of political theory, to scrutinise the discourses that have 
determined democracy as an object of inquiry and to identify the leap that 
exists in the tension between democracy and the endeavour of theorising 
and which, as we shall see, is related to the issue of ethos.
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Chapter 2
Theorising Democracy
Ethos confounds much contemporary democratic theory. Viewed from one 
angle ethos appears as a practice, embedded in the particular and everyday, 
far removed from the universal realms of normative theory. Yet, viewed from 
another angle ethos appears too abstract for empirical political theories to 
grasp, pulling away from the particular to the generality of conduct. This 
chapter attends to the ambiguity of ethos by way of discussing how classical 
democratic theorists attend to democracy as the question of the common, 
and to how this question is interconnected with ethos. The chapter then turns 
to contemporary democratic theory to show how the persistence of a binary, 
that is the development of too stark a division between normative and 
descriptive, theory and practice, in democratic theory, has blinded us to the 
importance of ethos. That importance in part consists precisely of the way in 
which it combines reflection on democracy as an ideal with its practice as a 
way of life and of orienting oneself to the world.
Although theorising democracy has been a labour of political theorists 
since antiquity, it is only in the 20th century that this endeavour has come to 
be perceived in terms of a stark dichotomy between ‘normative’ and 
‘descriptive’ theories of democracy. Sheldon Wolin has described the issue in 
a characteristically sharp way, using the idea of ‘vision’. Theorists, he 
suggests, ‘look’ at the world using two related senses of vision: in the first 
sense, ‘vision’, in the manner of scientific observation, produces a descriptive 
report about an object or an event; in the second sense, ‘vision’ contains an 
imaginative element that allows the theorist to understand what she couldn’t 
in a direct way.1 This division of theoretical styles and procedures, on the one 
hand the scientific specification of how a given democracy is thought to work, 
and on the other the abstracted normative specification of how any 
democracy ought to work has produced a vacuum at the heart of democratic 
discourse; one closely related to the failure to articulate a conception of 
democratic ethos.
1 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 17-20.
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Over the last 50 years or so democratic theory has been significantly and 
increasingly devoted to the construction of models based on observation of 
particular cases or more general conditions (close to the first sense of vision 
Wolin refers to). One might say that these efforts seem to overcome the 
classical prioritization of theory, in favour of more practical aspects of 
analysis. However, as this chapter will argue, this way of envisaging 
democracy has had a profoundly negative impact on the subject matter itself. 
It is vital that democratic theory be released from “the spectre of the correct 
theory” which haunts it, urging it to continue with a continuous, and always 
fruitless, hunt for the ideal democratic model, one that can save late modern 
societies from the political quagmire into which they have fallen.2 What it 
takes to refresh democratic theory is a struggle from within, a re-articulation 
not only of the theory/practice relation, but also of what is perceived as 
theory and, most importantly, of what is conceived as democracy.
Reading democratic thought through the prism of ethos can lead towards 
that direction, since it reveals how ethos is inherent to democratic theorising, 
although not in a uniform manner. This is the task attempted in the thesis and 
this chapter explores the ambiguity of ethos in the context of various 
articulations of theorising democracy. As I will demonstrate, political theorists 
by attending to ethos can approach democracy from the aspect not only of 
institutions, rules and laws, but also of dispositions and attitudes. This is all 
important not least because it enriches our understanding of democracy as a 
task performed by individuals who are involved in politics not because of their 
profession but because they are tempted to do so whenever the 
circumstances allow or inspire them to; in other words, when their ethos 
guides them towards the direction of taking action, broadly defined. A 
democratic ethos, then, is neither a theoretical tool used to explain 
behaviour, nor a daily practice that cannot be grasped in normative terms. 
This is why neither descriptive political theory, as I will discuss in this chapter, 
nor normative political theory, as I demonstrate in the next chapter, can alone 
grasp the meaning and essence of a democratic ethos. We need to be more 
creative if we are to affirm the role of ethos.
2 1 borrow the phrase from Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory (Cambridge:
Polity, 1988), 10.
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Section I of this chapter attends to the tension within political thought, from 
antiquity to modernity, between theory and practice or norm and description. 
The purpose here is to open the discussion on the persistence of this rigid 
distinction and to show how this dualism is overcome only by Nietzsche, who 
introduces a third dimension, that of creativity. I want to suggest that this 
dimension must be incorporated into our attempts to theorise democracy, an 
endeavour undertaken by theories of agonism in Chapters Four and Five, but 
which I also undertake in Chapter Six.
Section II argues that there is a distinct ‘classical’ democratic discourse 
which has bequeathed to us concepts and ideas that persist in our 
contemporary democratic thinking, such as the idea of a common good, the 
principles of equality and freedom, as well as the issue of pluralism. As the 
thesis evolves, it will become evident that it is specifically around these 
concepts that democracy in late modernity unfolds and that especially 
pluralism proves to be a challenging issue of negotiation for democratic 
thinkers. I find that their differences notwithstanding, Pericles, Protagoras, 
Aristotle, Rousseau and Madison all conceive democracy as the quest of the 
common in a political society. Although not explicitly articulated, this common 
is envisioned as an ethos that inspires and unites citizens. These thinkers, I 
want to suggest, prove important for democracy because they manage to 
attend to it while transcending the distinction between theory and practice.
The attentiveness to the common, I argue, is suspended by the scientific 
mode of theorising that has predominated in the field of democratic thought 
during the last 50 years. Section III discusses how post-war ‘scientific’ 
political thought, with its stark separation between analysis and norm, has 
resulted in the estrangement of academic discourse from democracy and the 
impoverishment of political enquiry. It is argued that this division between 
facts and values is problematic for the object of democratic theory, that is 
democracy itself, since it brings about a distinction between two modes of 
theorising democracy which appear to be unbridgeable. Furthermore, the 
very same distinction creates a distance between democracy as something 
open to many interpretations and connectable to various values and 
principles, and theory as the endeavour that dictates the necessary contents 
of democracy. In advancing a critique of this strict division, the chapter is also
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advancing a critique of the specific mode of theorisation that it represents, in 
order to propose an alternative, a creative and imaginative endeavour which 
is more pertinent to democracy.
I. Recasting the Theory/ Practice Relation in the Tradition
Today ‘theorising’ is synonymous with something like intentional and 
systematic reflection upon a specific subject, model or hypothesis in a way 
that needs to be verified (thus adding to ‘theorising’ connotations of 
normalisation, generalisation and even canonisation). This is anything but 
irrelevant to the original meaning of theoria, which semantically is related to 
“seeing” - to observation or contemplation, pertaining thus to vision. Theoroi, 
to be sure, were the emissaries of the city-states t o  oracles, who also carried 
the message for cease-fires before important games {agones)’, their 
presence in these games and other cultural rituals was shrouded in solemnity 
since they were attributed the status of official spectators, watching the event 
from distinguished places in the stadium. In other words, they were the 
distanced spectators of an action that was taking place and in which they did 
not participate. Theoria, thus, is connected to speculation of matters of higher 
importance and is distinct from praxis.
In the Platonic dialogues the person who is entrusted with the high duty of 
contemplating, counseling and deciding on the crucial issues of the poiis is 
the philosopher. According to Plato, the man who lives the contemplative life, 
the philosopher, having access to the world of ideas and thus to agathon, is 
the one who can introduce the best laws and therefore is the most suitable 
person to rule. In his own words, unless there is a conjunction of political 
power and philosophic intelligence, there can be no cessation of troubles for 
the states of the human race.3 Plato, thus, attributes political and social traits 
to theoria —although under very specific and limited circumstances— and he 
places politics at the level of the prerequisite for its safeguarding.
Aristotle shares his mentor’s opinion that theoria concerns the eternal and 
universal and he adds that, for this reason, only those who have already
3 Plato, Republic, 473d-e.
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attained wisdom are able to exercise it; theoria is always connected to the 
absolute good, which according to him is eudaimonia.4 But unlike in Platonic 
thought, in Aristotle theoria is the alternative of and superior to action and 
thus two separated forms of life are discernible, the political life (bios 
politikos) and the contemplative life (bios theoretikos), the first exercised by 
the statesman and the second by the philosopher.5 The superiority of the 
latter stems from the fact that it is the result of nous, the best part of human 
psyche; its quality is even divine and such is contemplative life itself.6 
Theoria, concerning the constant and unchangeable, unlike praxis, does not 
produce anything beyond itself.7 It is an end in itself.
The ancient Greek distinction between speculative and practical life, with 
the former given the highest evaluation as that which gives access to true 
knowledge, persisted through the ages and was only challenged  
systematically with the scientific revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
British empiricists like Hume, for example, develop arguments that favour the 
role of the senses and thus experience in our attainment of knowledge. 
Hegel is among the first to propose an account that attempts to create a 
productive tension between theory and practice, by suggesting their 
dialectical unity. According to Hegel, the separation between theoretical and 
practical attitudes, that is between thought and will, is not as stark as thinkers 
before him had claimed. In fact, “the theoretical is essentially contained 
within the practical; [...] for one cannot have a will without intelligence”. They 
are distinct attitudes, but inseparable: “they are one and the same thing, and 
both moments can be found in every activity, of thinking and willing alike”.8 
Marx, however, is skeptical about Hegel’s treatment of the relation between 
theory and practice. He famously states that philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways, whereas the point is to change it.9 He
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b.
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b, Politics, 1324a.
6 Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b.
7 Ibid., 1177b. Praxis (action) differs also from poiesis (production, craftmanship) in that the 
latter results to the birth of a product, Ibid., 1140a.
8 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §4, 35-6.
9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Theses on Feuerbach” in The German Ideology (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1998).
74
problematises the idea of ‘the cunning of reason’ which, according to Hegel, 
results in the realisation of the idea of reason in history, rejects the Hegelian 
idea that praxis itself cannot produce truth and proposes a concept of 
practice as the struggle of the working class. He does not, though, abolish 
theory. Rather, he sees the two moments as united in a relationship bound 
with the (material) interest of the working class: “Theory will be realised in a 
people only in so far as it is the realisation of their needs. [...] It is not enough 
for thought to strive to actualise itself; actuality must itself strive toward 
thought”.10 But as Hannah Arendt has critically noted, despite the fact that 
Marx breaks with the traditional prioritisation of theory over practice, his 
thesis on the philosophers’ role as interpreters of the world entails that it is 
only because of this very interpretation and only after it, that change is made 
visible and possible.11 But perhaps all Marx wanted to suggest is that if 
change is to be achieved, the philosopher must be pioneer in this effort; the 
philosopher is a worker and a first-worker indeed.
Nietzsche, like Marx, also seeks to break with tradition by adopting its 
framework while at the same time rejecting its authority.12 He also 
understands theory as inseparable from practice and he blames the man 
who claims to live a contemplative life, because he cannot shake off a 
delusion:
he fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed 
before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life; he calls his 
own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself is really the 
poet who keeps creating his life. [...] he certainly has vis contemplativa 
and the ability to look back upon his work, but he also has vis 
creativa...13
Creativity as a mode of being is central to Nietzsche’s work, which aims to 
challenge the persistency of Platonism - in the form of Christianity - and the 
illusions it has bequeathed to modern society: for instance, the existence of
10 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ , 138.
11 Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken, 2005), 77.
Ibid., 73.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W.Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974), 241.
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an objective rational order and the stripping of humans from their instincts 
and passions. Instead, Nietzsche calls for a life-affirming attitude that 
embraces these suppressed instincts and passions and that elevates 
creativity to the position of the ultimate value, making possible the pursuit of 
a better and even happier life. Moreover, he suggests that we need to fold 
our personal experiences in our search for knowledge and to elevate these 
experiences to the level of data of a scientific experiment.14 Elsewhere, he 
urges people to approach “life as a means to knowledge”, instead of a duty, 
calamity or trickery,15 to demonstrate the possibility of forming a self more 
suitable to one’s own self, using one’s creativity to define one’s own 
standards. Nietzsche considers it possible that any attempt to separate 
theory from practice can be proved fateful and even dangerous for the 
endeavour of searching for knowledge. His “psychology of the philosopher” 
reveals that behind every theoretician, as he calls him, there is always an 
instinct that guides him to the quest of a specific knowledge, to the hunt of 
his own personal truth.16 He declares: “Not to live with two different 
standards! Not to separate theory and practice!”,17 since this would mean the 
failure to transcend the common, the traditional, the expected and thus the 
failure to become who we really are.
Where the ancients attended to theory as a superior activity, moderns 
renounced this attitude and sought to re-establish the relation between 
theory and practice either to favour the latter (like the British empiricists did) 
or to avoid exaggeration of the importance of either against the other (Hegel 
and Marx). But it is Nietzsche who not only considers them inseparable, but 
also introduces a third axis in the discussion, that of creativity, suggesting 
that beyond the spectator and the actor, there is another possible form, that 
of the creator. Humans have the ability to fashion something that had not 
been there before and this is their real value. It is this dimension of human 
ability that has been most neglected by those engaged in the endeavour of
14 Ibid., 253.
15 Ibid., 255.
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1968), 227.
17 Ibid., 252.
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democracy, who seem to remain trapped in the norm-description dualism. 
The following section explores the roots of democratic theory by following 
five thinkers who are today accepted as classical. This opens the discussion 
regarding the sharp separation between theory and practice in democratic 
thought, the separation between two modes of theorising democracy, the 
normative and the descriptive, and the effect that this distinction has on 
political thinkers’ attentiveness to ethos.
II. Democracy: Five Classical Considerations
Without any doubt, the study of democracy is not an exclusively late-modern 
endeavour; political theory has a long history and democracy has been a 
focal point of it since its very beginning. However, that history has not led to 
convergence and consensus. A large body of knowledge of democracy has 
been accumulated, so disparate and rich, but there is little agreement over 
the best way to study it. To be sure, already the Greek philosophers of the 
fourth century B.C. were engaged in systematic analyses and discussions 
concerning this way of organization of the political life, of politeuesthai, so 
that in searching the roots of the word itself we need to go back to ancient 
Greece.18 Considering that democracy, according to its etymology, refers to 
the rule of the demos, that is of the people, and taking into account all the 
relevant information regarding the practical realisation of this rule, perhaps it 
would not be too much to say that democracy, at least in its ancient context, 
was more like an amalgam of practical attitudes than a political regime.19 
Thus Plato describes democracy as resembling a grocery, the place where a 
plentitude of moral values and characters can be found and where anyone 
can choose between those that he prefers.20 Democracy was an integral
18 According to Herodotus, some early forms of democratic life can be tracked back in 
several Hellenic cities of the beginning of the 5th century B.C., but democracy actually was 
crystallized in Cleisthenes’s Athens (508-7 B.C.) and was culminated in Demosthenes’s days 
(355-322 B.C.), in Janet Coleman, A History of Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to 
Early Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000), 21.
19 Periklis Vallianos, Editor’s Preface, in the Hellenic edition of Janet Coleman, A History of 
Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity (Athens: Kritiki, 2005), 64.
20 Plato, Republic, 557d.
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aspect of people’s daily life, since anyone who was entitled with the status of 
citizen used to spend his day time in the market, discussing and making 
judgements on political and juridical issues. Today any regime characterised 
as a democracy bears a great difference from what was perceived as a 
democratic way of life in the Greek ancient poleis and this has little to do with 
the effacement of these city-states.
The study of the evolution of democratic thought is essential not only in 
order to grasp the general terms which have shaped contemporary 
discussion in the field, but also to reveal the development of the relationship 
between theorising democracy and democratic practice (and thus also the 
ways in which ethos has slipped in and out of conscious consideration). A 
political thought that has ex posteriori been characterised as classical 
democratic theory is said to cover the period from classical Athens to the 
years that the Europeans challenged absolutism and Americans fought for an 
independent state.
As will be discussed later in the chapter, political thinkers sometimes 
consider the texts of this period to form a concrete body of knowledge, where 
others challenge its consistency and even the very idea that there exists a 
classical democratic theory. To be sure, some of these texts are at the 
boundaries of what can be considered as theorising. They are highly 
heterogenous, some of them being full of thick descriptions, written in relation 
to specific political occasions, whereas others are abstract reflections on 
desirable and possible situations. But whatever the intentions behind them, 
their reading can provide insights upon which modern democratic theory has 
been developed as a field of political enquiry. As the analysis that follows will 
show, heterogeneity has been a characteristic trait of the field and a plurality 
of different democratic theories — not only of the past but of the present — is 
the rule, not the exception. In this respect it would be more accurate, and 
productive, to think of these as separate and distinct, to speak of democratic 
theories in the plural instead of a single democratic theory.
Of course, it is neither possible nor necessary, in the confined contexts of 
the present thesis, to present a comprehensive reflection on the history of 
political thought. Rather, the intention here is to consider some of the 
moments in that history which have come to exercise the greatest influence
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upon the way in which we arrange our concepts of democracy and to indicate 
the sometimes paradoxical effects this has upon thinking of ethos. Pericles’ 
famous funeral oration is foundational in this respect. It depicts the ideal of 
democracy both as an administration and as a way of being that it is worth 
celebrating and defending. It is an example of an approach to democracy 
understood as a way of life, a mode of political being. After Pericles we will 
consider a thinker who is a most ambiguous figure in political theory. 
Protagoras, so-called sophist, is presented here as the first theorist of 
democracy, since he attributes to arete a political value attainable by each 
and every individual. Aristotle, on the other hand, is a well-established figure 
in political thought, who engages in a philosophical discussion of democracy 
as one possible form of government. The Politics, as we shall see, can be 
read as a treatise on political life, among others, whereas the body of his 
work sets the foundations for a democratic thought developed through the 
ages from Rome to 18th century Europe. Rousseau’s ideas of democracy, for 
example, draw on Aristotle’s, in that he is also critical of democracy and more 
eager to describe a possible ideal form of government suitable to human 
societies. James Madison follows the same path, condemning democracy 
and proposing instead a ruling system able to manage interest groups.
As is evident, the thinkers scrutinised here are not chosen because of their 
strong support for democracy; indeed only the first two preferred democracy 
to other regimes, whereas the remaining three condemned it. What is most 
important here is not the way in which Aristotle, Rousseau and Madison 
condemn democracy. Rather, I wish to show how their formulation of the 
ideal democratic regime involves an aspiration to what is to be common in an 
already given political community, while also blending normative ideas with 
practical considerations of the political reality they experience. This section of 
the chapter, then, shows how the idea of the common is embedded in 
traditional democratic thought; how, indeed, the question of the common is 
the essence of democracy itself and how a conception of ethos is already 
embedded in this question.
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Pericles and Protagoras on the Ethos of Athenian Democracy
It has been argued that the Greeks did not actually produce a democratic 
theory. Finley, for example, writes:
The Greeks themselves did not develop a theory of democracy. There 
were notions, maxims, generalities, but these do not add up to a 
systematic theory. The philosophers attacked democracy; the 
committed democrats responded by ignoring them, by going about the 
business of government and politics in a democratic way, without writing 
treatises on the subject.21
This is highly contestable. Certainly it presumes too much about what one 
should understand to be the enterprise of theory. It is true, for example, that 
Pericles did not engage in a systematic reflection on democracy. However, it 
is equally true that he was one of the most competent and inspired leaders of 
the city, who managed to transform a funeral oration intended to honour the 
citizens who fell in the war against Sparta into an encomiastic address on 
democracy. It is his specific speech that is scrutinised here, rather than his 
overall activity as a democratic leader or thinker. That speech matters in part 
because it has itself become an historically effective landmark for those 
orienting themselves towards democracy. This is so because his speech is a 
praise of democracy interpreting it as a way of life that inspires citizens and 
motivates them to take action at multiple levels.
Pericles was a citizen, general and politician of Athens, but his oration 
reveals that he was also an enlightened political thinker and a fervent 
supporter of democracy, the one who Thucydides acclaims as “the first 
citizen of Athens”.22 To be sure, his politics have not gone without criticism, 
not only for his management of the public Athenian money, but also for his 
questionable ability to control the masses and the aristocratic authority that 
this entailed.23 Yet, in the process of praising the originality of the Athenian 
democracy, with its positive effects on the citizens themselves, Pericles
21 Moses I. Finley, Democracy: Ancient and Modern (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1996, exp. edition), 28.
22 Thucydides, “Pericles’ Funeral Oration” in The Peloponnesian War, 2.65.
23 Mortimer H. Chambers, ‘Thucydides and Pericles” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 
62(1957), 82.
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provides a thorough insight into what a democratic way of life could be 
thought to consist in. Democracy is defined as the administration that favours 
the many instead of the few and that is characterised by freedom and 
equality, which prevail both in public life and in citizens’ private life as well. 
Although these two domains of life are separate, the latter becomes 
meaningful only as a result of the first since Athenians do not say that a man 
who takes no interest in politics is unambitious, but that he is useless.24 
Pericles aims to prove that Athenians are not called to defend a mere land; 
they are urged to defend a specific way of life, the democratic, one shared by 
every citizen, the free and active participatory member of the city. This way of 
life is not limited to the field of politics, and so has not only to do with 
procedures and decision-making; rather, as Pericles says, it is directly 
connected to citizens’ character, psychology and behaviour. As such, it is 
depicted also in their attitude in the battlefield, where they prove to be 
courageous not because of the dictate of the law, but exactly because of their 
democratic way of life.
For Pericles, then, the polis is a collective entity, which means that its 
survival, function and prosperity is not the mere sum of the individual well­
being of its citizens; rather, it has its own character, the democratic one. This 
is the reason that he exhorts the Athenians to realise the power of Athens 
and by doing so feed their eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills 
their hearts25 Pericles’ funeral oration is important to democratic thought, not 
only because it describes a political system of freedom, harmony and justice. 
It is important also because it interprets this system as an ideal form of being 
not only for the poiis but also for its very citizens, who live lives of courage, 
creativity, internal discipline and felicity for which they are rewarded and 
praised. When Pericles reflects on democracy, he reflects on the character of 
the polis and its citizens. He reflects on their ethos. What is most pertinent to 
the argument of the thesis, though, is the way that Pericles utilises this ethos, 
the way he capitalises upon it, in order to achieve his goal of justifying the 
long-lasting war with Sparta. For this is indicative of the function that metis 
can have in a polity: the democrat grasps the opportunity provided by the
24 Thucydides, 2.40.
25 Ibid., 2.43.
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moment in order to sustain a case that he finds that will safeguard 
democracy. Pericles dwells in the moment, exploits it and makes it a moment 
of celebration of democracy. And he does so while using the ideal of the 
collective Athenian ethos.
This emphasis on the ethos of democratic life is also found in recorded 
sayings of the sophist Protagoras. To follow Protagoras’s political thought we 
need to place him within the context of his political and social environment. 
To belong to the sophistic cast could involve various interpretations, since the 
term is used to refer to a wide range of men admired for their wisdom, from 
poets like Homer and Hesiod, to musicians and rhapsodes, to diviners and 
seers, as well as to the so called Presocratic philosophers.26 What all these 
individuals share is the identity of the nomad intellectual, the enlightened 
person that moves between several places discussing, debating, teaching 
and generally displaying his innovative approaches to traditional ways of 
speaking and thinking27 Although there is a general agreement on the 
impossibility of considering sophists as a distinct school of philosophy still, 
according to Guthrie, there are some common traits among them .28 They 
shared a certain skepticism and they were advocates of the subjective basis 
of human concerns, declaring that it is impossible to conclusively establish a 
concrete system of ethical codes which would regulate human conduct. 
Rather, based on their fundamental premise that laws and moral codes are 
not divine in origin but man-made and imperfect, they argued for the relativity 
of ethical values and for the absence of absolute values and standards. For 
the Sophists, experience is the only source of human action and thus the 
only source of judgment when it comes to defining the content of virtues and 
values. The founder of the sophistic movement, and the most prominent 
among its representatives, was Protagoras, who Plato has described -
26 George Briscoe Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 24.
27 Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the 
Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), xx.
28 William Keith Chambers Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle 
(Harper Perennial, 1960), 71.
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although not without a certain amount of Socratic irony - as “the wisest man 
alive”.29
Protagoras was an outsider, a stranger to the city of Athens, but his 
multifarious character (he had a wide range of interests, extending to ethics, 
politics, theology, education, cultural history, literary criticism, linguistic 
studies and rhetoric)30 attracted the interest and trust of prominent Athenians, 
Pericles among them. According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras was the 
first to institute contests in debating (logon agonas),31 thus creating a space 
where arete could be performed and revealed. For Protagoras pronounced 
that the content of arete cannot be known in advance, rather, it is context- 
dependent and subject to different interpretations and usages. He held that 
all opinions are true and he is also known for his belief that “man is the 
measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are 
not that they are not”, an opening aphorism for one of his works.32 No 
absolute knowledge is possible, since knowledge is always related to the 
knower. Experience, then, is projected by Protagoras as the source of any 
and every judgement. This acceptance of relativism in judgements guided 
also his rhetorical method, which was based on the assumption that for each 
question there are two sides opposed to each other, two logoi to be 
acclaimed for every issue (dissoi logoi). His proposal to solve the dilemma of 
which answer would then be the most valid was that the rhetor is responsible 
for determining which argument most closely achieves orthon in terms of 
having the greater probability of truth within a community of listeners.33 He 
thus introduced the idea of considering kairos or the opportune time in 
debating,34 a suggestion congruent with his teaching that our perception of 
things alters in accordance with our age or situation.
29 Plato, Protagoras, 309d.
30 Rosamond Kent Sprague (ed.), The Older Sophists (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2001), 3.
31 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger 
Publishing, 2006), IX.52.
32 Ibid, IX.51. See also Plato, Theatetus, 152a.
33 Michael Carter, “Stasis and kairos: Principles of social construction in classical rhetoric” 
Rhetoric Review7, no. 1 (1988), 103.
34 We learn from Diogenes Laertius that “he was the first to emphasize the importance of 
seizing the right moment”, IX.52.
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The Protagorean valuation of opinions was considered by Socrates as 
dangerous and he was the first who, according to Guthrie “sought to make 
ethics and politics the subject of a scientific inquiry which should reveal 
universal laws or truths, in opposition to the skepticism and relativism that 
had turned all things into matters of opinion and left men’s minds at the 
mercy of the persuader with the smoothest tongue”.35 Socrates taught that, if 
justice, prudence and any other virtue are to have a meaning so as to be 
considered as “the right”, then there must be a common core, a common 
quality that renders all of them right and which constitutes the nature of 
rightness. The Platonic dialogue Protagoras is revealing for it represents this 
contest between two different approaches and worldviews. What is at stake 
in this dialogue is the teachability of arete and Protagoras, who values 
opinions, has a positive perspective on the issue whereas Socrates, who 
values knowledge, a negative one. By making a strong claim in favour of the 
teachability of arete, Protagoras actually makes a strong political claim in 
favour of democracy. More specifically, he claims that he teaches his student 
politike techne or “how he can best manage his own household and, 
concerning the affairs of the city, how he might be the most powerful in 
carrying out and speaking about the city’s affairs”.36 That is, refuting 
Socrates, he teaches a person how he can be a good citizen. By using the 
Promethean mythos, and affirming the distribution among all human beings 
of two basic competences, that is dike and aidos, Protagoras makes a robust 
case for the possibility of democracy: men share some fundamental qualities 
and more specifically they are able to display civic qualities.
This view is further enhanced with the use of a logos, of an argument: if 
there are any cities to exist at all, then there must be some common trait 
shared by their members 37 This shared quality is the Protagorean arete: it is 
the virtue of the good citizen which is not inherited but accessible to 
everybody and anybody. He finds a civic ethos lying in each and every citizen 
- acknowledging thus that every man is a political animal - an ethos that is an
35 William Keith Chambers Guthrie, Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971), 425.
36 Plato, Protagoras, 319a.
37 Ibid., 324e.
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achievement of the combination of social interaction among citizens and 
education. For Protagoras, ethos is the political disposition available to each 
citizen and that needs to be combined with political participation in order for 
man to fulfill his role in the polis. At the same time, the polis provides the web 
within which this civic ethos can be developed and acquire meaning.
It is because of the content and the quality of his political account of arete 
as presented in his Great Speech in the Platonic dialogue named after him, 
that Protagoras is considered as the first democratic theorist and as one who 
provides “an account of human nature and the nature of politics founded on 
the way in which actually man experienced his life in society”.38 It is for the 
same reason that he is considered the thinker who has “produced for the first 
time in human history a theoretical basis for participatory democracy”.39 His 
ideas about the validity of every and any opinion, about political excellence 
being attainable by every and any person and about the right to speak 
attributed to every and any citizen justify these characterisations. Protagoras 
claimed that this was made possible by the participation in any form of public 
debate, of agon, where at stake was not persuasion in order to reach 
consensus, but the discursive practice per se, the fact that each argument is 
contestable (dissoi logoi) and thus subject to valuation. But in this process 
every citizen had a — at least potential — value to contribute to debates 
concerning moral and political questions.40
This profoundly democratic reading of the capacity of any citizen to be, as 
echon logon, and of the multiplicity of opinions (doxai) available to the public, 
their contestable nature notwithstanding, advances a conception of a 
democratic ethos that is both individualised and yet also always placed in the 
context of and in interaction with the polis. In Chapter Five I will discuss how 
Ranciere, despite also attributing political virtue to any and every speaking 
being, fails to grasp ethos in its private dimension and focuses instead only 
on the encompassing and domesticating nature of the collective aspect of 
ethos. As Farrar has put it, Protagoras has a strong belief “in the beneficent
38 Cynthia Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical 
Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 77.
39 Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 144.
40 Ibid., 147.
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socialising effect of polis life and democratic political action”.41 Man is prior to 
the city but he participates in polis and this experience makes him a citizen. It 
is the way in which man experiences his life as member of the Athenian 
democratic society and how this experience leads him to specific judgments 
about its prevailing values that are, according to Protagoras, the definitive 
factors in shaping a civil democratic ethos.
Protagoras proves important for the argument of the thesis because he 
transcends a bold dichotomy between the inner and outer dimension of 
ethos: it is not only that humans are capable of a civic ethos or that the polis 
carries a specific political character; it is also that these are in interaction and 
participate in the reformulation of the one by the other. His man-measure 
doctrine prompts us to guess that he valued practice more than theory. At the 
same time, Protagoras seems to introduce the idea of pluralism, for he 
values the existence of multiple opinions available to the public life and 
affirms the existence of different views in diverse places. More importantly, 
he affirms these opinions as being fluctuating and relevant to the kairos, to 
the circumstances, allowing us to interpret his idea in relation to metis. This is 
an argument that I revisit in the last chapter of the thesis. Pericles, as we 
have seen, provides us with a paradigm of kairotic action; whether this action 
was really undertaken in favour of democracy or this was merely a pretense 
is left to history to judge.
Aristotie on Democracy
Aristotle ventures a radically different approach to that of Protagoras and 
Pericles. In Politics he is engaged in a study of democracy as a way of 
searching for the best form of government, that is a government that would 
satisfy the criterion of mean, since moderation is the means to eudaimonia42 
Although Aristotle concurs with Pericles on the precedence of the polis over 
individuals, its necessity as the environment in which citizens develop and 
achieve prosperity, he is also interested in analysing in a systematic way 
every known political regime, in order to decide which one provides the best
41 Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking, 76.
42 Aristotle, Politics, 1295a-b.
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circumstances under which the individual can come to habitually perform 
ethical practices. That said, Aristotle’s political thought does not begin and 
end with democracy; rather, he encounters it as one possible form of 
government among others. More specifically, he distinguishes between the 
true forms of government, that is those in which the one, or the few, or the 
many, govern with a view to the common interest, and their perversions, 
where governments rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the 
one or of the few or of the many.43 Whereas royalty, aristocracy and 
constitutional government are considered true regimes, tyranny, oligarchy 
and democracy are their respective perversions. Democracy, then, in 
Aristotle’s political thought is a degenerated type of regime.
This axiological degradation of democracy is related to the ultimate telos 
that this regime has: the satisfaction of the interests of the poor, which leads 
it to depart from the satisfaction of the general interest of the political 
community, which is Aristotle’s prerequisite for a true regime. Aristotle 
describes in detail the elements common to the four different types of 
democracy he recognises, from the election of officers by and among all 
citizens by lot, to the ephemerality of all magistracies, and above all to the 
equal count of each member of the demos 44 Freedom, interpreted on two 
levels, is the defining principle of democracy: on the first, everyone rules and 
is ruled in turn and on the second level everyone is able to live as he 
wishes.45 Thus, the underlying principle for freedom is equality, but Aristotle is 
worried that the pursuit of equality might cause conflict and thus instability. 
This leads to the exclusion of poor citizens from possessing the highest 
offices: their role ought to be confined to participation in the assembly and to 
serve in the courts.46 Equality is only possible among those who are similar 
to each other, that is among the members of the middle class, a class 
missing or at least lacking in number in a democracy.
In contrast to Pericles and Protagoras, Aristotle takes the side of theory, 
offering in a normative way an alternative type of political organisation that
« Ibid., 1279a.
44 Ibid., 1317b.
45 Ibid., 1317a-b.
46 Ibid., 1281 b-1282a.
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will avoid the grievances he attributes to the Athenian democracy. His mode 
of reflecting on democracy, that is from a strictly normative point of view, 
does not prevent him from developing a nuanced conception of a political 
ethos, as I have already discussed in the previous chapter. It remains to be 
seen in a following chapter how modern normative thinkers have attended to 
the topic and whether they have equally succeeded to remain sensitive to the 
need for involving ethos in their theorisations of democracy.
Participation and Virtue: Rousseau on Democracy
Reflecting on democracy in a normative way is a path taken also by Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, who, like Aristotle, is also critical of democracy, since he 
believes that it allows private interests to enter public affairs, and, he argues, 
is liable to civil wars and internal disturbance.47 Rousseau considers the 
exercise of both the executive and the legislative power from the same body 
as dangerous and unproductive. In fact, he considers democracy as being so 
perfect a government, that he finds it suitable only for a divine society, if such 
a society were to exist48 However, it would be unfair to treat Rousseau’s 
ideas as undemocratic: his commitment to individual freedom (or, better, to 
interpersonal dependency), his trust of human nature, its values and abilities, 
and the way that their reflection in governmental institutions can positively 
effect it, and above all the precedence he gave to a community attached to a 
common good, paved the way for a participatory democratic theory.49
In his most famous work, The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau examines 
the formation of the political community describing it as the result of a 
contract between equal and free individuals who decide to exit the state of 
nature, that is a primitive state prior to society and its conventions, in order to 
confront impediments that endanger their survival. Upon their decision to exit 
this condition of freedom and equality, a problem emerges: how this 
association will protect the life and the property of all its members, while the
47 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Ch.4.
48 Ibid.
49 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970).
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latter will remain as free as before.50 The question becomes even more 
crucial considering the fact that the health and smooth-running of the 
association demands that each person abolishes his individual rights and 
that he bestows them on the republic. The social contract is exactly the 
answer to this crucial issue for it gives birth to a new entity, a new moral and 
collective body, the body politic, called republic when passive, sovereign 
when active and power when compared with similar bodies. Citizens live 
close to each other, behaving in a virtuous way and with solidarity and being 
dependent on the totality of the political community. The republic’s size is 
necessarily such “that it be neither too large to enable it to be well-governed, 
nor too small to enable it to maintain itself by itself”,51 an idea that Rousseau 
seems to have taken from Machiavelli. The republic of Rousseau is founded 
on the idea of existence of a common good and in order for it to be preserved 
decision-making requires citizens’ participation and is thus guided solely by 
the general will, people’s own collective will, which is the only authority they 
are bound to, preventing then dependency upon individual others. The 
function of Rousseau’s republic entails the existence of a specific collective 
ethos that is bestowed upon its citizens, of a common will that binds them 
and directs their decisions; this collective will is not just the sum of the 
separate persons’ wills, but an infallible will that exists as a collective 
conscience.
In Rousseau’s republic, political conflicts are to be minimised, so that 
every political process evolves harmoniously and unanimously. Even though 
strife is removed from the public field it is not totally erased; instead, it is 
moved in the individual himself, who now is able to become free from his 
natural inclinations and thus virtuous. As Connolly’s insightful analysis of the 
Social Contract suggests, with Rousseau politics is interiorised and the self 
now becomes the field where the conflict between the forces of good and evil 
takes place: “Rousseau withdraws politics from the general will and relocates 
it quietly inside the selves which will these general laws”.52 It can be argued 
that Rousseau, by way of seeking the harmony between the virtuous self -
50 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Ch. 6.
51 Ibid., Book II, Ch. 9.
52 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 58.
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and so an individual account of ethos - and the collective will of the law­
making authority - a collective ethos - suppresses the issue of pluralism. This 
struggle for harmonisation inclines him to suggest that ideally in the republic 
there is no place for associations, factions and interest groups, for their 
separate wills and the struggle to impose it is in contrast to the unity of the 
general will and even puts its very existence in hazard.53 Rousseau treats 
pluralism as a problem for his ideal republic: “there should be no factions in 
the State”.54 Even though he clearly affirms the role that diversity can play 
against inequality by stating that “if there are factions, it is necessary to 
multiply their number and prevent inequality...”,55 Rousseau is not willing to 
allow factions any political role. For he makes it clear that factions should not 
participate in the formation of the general will: their private interests can be 
harmful to the common good of the small sized, homogenous republic he 
aspires to by deceiving people and rendering the General Will a mere 
combination of opinions. Political participation in Rousseau’s republic is 
limited to its individual virtuous citizens.
Rousseau’s classical account of the ideal republic contributes to the 
corpus of democratic theory by drawing the line for a participatory 
democracy, the function of which depends on the virtuous behaviour of its 
citizens. It is the ethos of solidarity and dependency they explicate that 
conditions the preservation of the common good. Rousseau utilises a 
theoretical condition in order to make specific political suggestions. Although 
his treatment of the community as homogenous leaves little space for 
celebration of difference, his elaborations indicate the persistence in political 
life of the issue of ethos and its connection to the idea of a common good.
Madison: The Role of Pluralism in Modern Political Societies
The treatment of pluralism has been central in modern political thinkers. 
Some years after Rousseau what is considered as a pluralistic turn in 
democratic theory was articulated in the United States of America by James
53 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book II, Ch. 3.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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Madison, one of its founding fathers and a principal author of the 
Constitution. Madison was a politician eager to provide a convincing solution 
regarding the best government suitable to a new extended American state. 
He explicates his ideas in a series of papers included in The Federalist, 
intended to make the case for the adoption of a Constitution and co-written 
with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. More specifically, the problem to 
which his inquiries are directed is that of how to combine the preservation of 
the spirit and form of popular government, at the same time as securing the 
public good and private rights against any faction that would threaten them in 
order to satisfy its own interests and passions. According to Madison, public 
administrations in America laboured under a “factious spirit”, where faction is 
defined as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community”.56 What Madison 
called “popular government”, or elsewhere a “pure democracy” was, he 
argued, unable to manage the misfortunes caused by an enhanced faction. 
The characteristics of such a regime, that is, the small number of citizens, 
facilitation of communication, as well as the fact that they actively participate 
to the decision making processes, are likely to enhance the development of 
common interests and passions among its members; however, the 
satisfaction of those interests may entail the sacrifice of a weak party or 
individual.57
Sensibility towards the issue of factions, and therefore also to pluralism, 
leads Madison to suggest another type of government in the place of a “pure 
democracy”. For Madison, “[t]he latent causes of faction are (...) sown in the 
nature of man”,58 which translates to the natural presence and thus 
inevitability of factions in human societies, despite their possible negative 
effects in case of them acquiring too much power. The best solution to 
confront the latter is, according to Madison, the establishment of a political
56 James Madison, ‘The Federalist No. 10” in A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay, The 
Federalist Papers (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49.
57 Ibid., 52.
58 Ibid., 50.
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system which in function and extension will encourage the multiplication of 
interests and passions and thus of factions. That being the case, an elected 
government with members drawn from a large bank of candidates is less 
likely to sacrifice the interest of the country to temporary or partial issues. 
Two are the innovative clues here that are thought to lead to a non- 
oppressive ruling system: the size of the “extended republic” and the 
representative form of power exercise. With Madison, the foundations for the 
establishment of democracy in nation-states governed by an elected minority 
are well set.
Madison is a practical thinker, that is, one who bridges theory with 
practice. He is not concerned with models and imaginative conditions, but he 
is urged to find a solution to a predicament of the newly founded American 
state: that of pluralism. I treat his elaboration of democracy as classical here, 
because I believe that he makes available to us a discussion of democracy 
that is suitable to the modern circumstances, while at the same time treats 
one of the most pertinent issues of modernity, that of pluralism, with 
generosity: by actually asking for more pluralism. By doing so, Madison 
understands that modern political societies are bound by a common good 
that consists in the pluralisation of the interests of their citizens. It is the quest 
of this common good that transforms individuals into citizens.
The five thinkers examined in this section are considered as classical 
because their ideas about democracy and the terms they have used to 
describe it have shaped democratic discourse and practice until today. 
However, it would be inaccurate to claim that their texts form a single 
democratic theory, for each one of them has been the precursor of a distinct 
democratic tradition. For example, whereas in Pericles direct democracy is 
explicated as the absolute mode of political organisation, in Aristotle and 
Madison this model receives severe criticism. Also, Aristotle due to his 
insistence on the issue of equality as the necessary condition for the 
successful form of political organisation, is said to reflect the first socialist 
ideas.59 Rousseau offers a formulation of a participatory model of democracy
59 Such is the treatment of Aristole by Hayek in F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of 
Socialism (The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek), ed. W.W. Bartley (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989).
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that is suitable to the modern social condition, since he puts on the agenda 
the issue of pluralism, even though he discusses it as a problem. With 
Madison two significant shifts occur: first, the democratic regime is assessed 
and transformed so that it might be appropriate for a nation state that is much 
larger than a city and so the model of representative democracy emerges; 
and second the idea of pluralism as a solution to the problem of 
fragmentation is introduced in the democratic discourse.
It is Protagoras who, over one thousand years before Madison, enunciates 
the doctrine of dissoi logoi, and hence introduces the idea of distinctiveness 
of each community, of each city and of each culture. Hence, he is the first to 
introduce pluralism and difference as something to be respected and yet 
confronted. He is also the first who succeeds in providing an alternative 
account of the relation of ethos to politics, introducing the idea of a civil 
democratic ethos that already refers to the very moment of political 
justification since it is connected with the citizen as echon logon and 
therefore as being in a specific way. His ethos oscillates between the public 
and the private poles, without being reducible to one of them. It is for this 
reason that the Protagorean account of ethos can be considered as the 
democratic account par excellence.
The important thing with these classical thinkers, I believe, is that they 
manage to transcend the rigid distinction between theory and practice. 
Despite they seem to suggest normative theses for the improvement of 
democracy, they do so inspired by the reality they experience. That is, I see 
them as blending the theoretical with the practical. Moreover, while they do 
so they conceive democracy as the quest of the common in a political 
society. This common is the ethos of democracy, the shared point of 
inspiration for every citizen. In their works, classical democratic theorists do 
not separate political reality from their reflections on the ideal form of political 
organisation; they use the former to inform and indeed improve the latter.
Thinkers in the post-war era neglected this mode of reflecting of democracy 
that seeks to bridge normative and practical ideas. As Sheldon Wolin has 
argued, the problem with the ideas of thinkers belonging in the classical 
period is not that they were too parochial to meet the needs of the extended
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modern nation-state; rather, the real issue was that they were “strongly 
political”.60 For what these thinkers actually did was to challenge and 
appraise the very limits of the terms that framed their investigations, such as 
citizen, participation, common will, public life, common good and equality. 
Reflecting on democracy for these thinkers meant very diverse things, from 
searching for ways to enhance a given political condition, as in the case of 
Pericles, to arguing in favor of a political transformation that ought to take 
place. Whatever the case, all these voices were informed by public concern, 
being in a way a response to a crisis, containing thus radical critiques of 
specific cases.61 However, what remains contestable, is the extent to which 
these changes to the discourse of democratic theory have led to its 
revitalisation or given to it yet more drawbacks. This is the question that the 
following section treats by way of turning to a mode of theorising democracy 
that has emerged during the 20th century.
III. Democracy as Ideology
In the twentieth-century political thought had to contend with the horror of 
totalitarianism and the destruction of politics. Political thinkers, in their vast 
majority, declaring themselves committed to liberal regimes, found 
themselves struggling to explain the dark events they were experiencing and 
to provide the optimum answer on what form can best serve the needs of 
modern political societies. Among the results that skepticism of this period 
has produced has been an immense yet heterogenous body of discourse 
regarding democracy. Political thinkers contributing to its production looked 
back to classical democratic theory, using it as a source of political terms and 
inspiration but mostly for condemnation, giving different interpretations of 
how democracy is to be understood and explained in relevance to social and 
economic factors. An attempt to give a solid answer to these problems was 
ventured by theorists who decided to use the comforts of modern social
60 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 63.
61 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Political theory as a vocation” The American Political Science Review 
63, no. 4 (1969), 1078-1080.
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science to reveal the laws that govern the function of political societies. 
These theories show a definite tendency to separate analysis from norm, 
advancing the first while abandoning the latter, claiming to be value- neutral 
and considering democracy as an ideal position from which political analysis 
is to be held.
Carole Pateman has referred to this mode of engaging with democracy as 
the “contemporary theory of democracy”. It is the theory that “focuses on the 
operation of the democratic political system as a whole and is grounded in 
the facts of present-day political attitudes and behaviour as revealed by 
sociological investigation”.62 Danilo Zolo prefers to call it the “neo-classical 
doctrine of democracy”, to show how it is concerned ‘with accrediting as 
“purely descriptive” an image of the Western democracies which is 
essentially based on the desire to confirm the absolute superiority of that 
system’.63 As such, the political system can be judged against a set of 
criteria, which ought to define whether the system is actually a democratic 
one. Most commonly accepted and used, though, is the term “revisionism”, a 
term coined to describe the distinct version of democratic theory that intends 
to challenge and revise the classical democratic doctrine inherited from the 
18th and 19th centuries. Crawford Macpherson in his Essay on Revisionist 
Liberaiism enunciates such a characterization for empirical theories which, 
despite claiming to be explanatory only are in effect justificatory as well.64 
Diverse in their approach and denomination of the phenomenon as these 
three thinkers may be, there is a common point they share: they all concur 
that it is the work of Joseph Schumpeter that paved the way for this new way 
of thinking of democracy.65
Schumpeter’s classic work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) is 
the product of its time. Placed in an exceptional political and economic 
environment it is, among other things, a response to the crisis of the
62 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 13-14.
63 Danilo Zolo, Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1992), 55.
64 Crawford Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1973), 77.
65 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 3-6, Zolo, Democracy and Complexity, 89, 
Macpherson, Democratic Theory, 78.
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representational model of democracy advocated by those working in what he 
calls the classical doctrine of democracy. Schumpeter seeks to replace it with 
“another theory” of democracy that can constitute a realistic description of 
actual political life. Under the label of the former he places the work of the 
eighteenth-century philosophers, who appeal to democracy as “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the 
common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election 
of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will”.66 Schumpeter 
challenges the descriptive accuracy of classical democratic theory and 
unleashes a twofold critique against it, calling into question the very 
possibility of existence of a common good agreed upon by all people, on the 
one hand, and attacking the idea of the will of the people and therefore 
individuals’ nature as rational and responsible agent, on the other.
As far as the first line of critique is concerned, Schumpeter challenges the 
possibility of ever attaining a common good unanimously agreed upon by 
rational argumentation.67 And even if an acceptable common good proved to 
be acceptable to all, it would never provide definite answers to individual 
cases. Therefore, he concludes, a common will or volonte generale that 
would realise the common good is unattainable. Schumpeter reinforces his 
conclusion by considering as insubstantial the hypothesis of rationality and 
effective volition of the individual, expressing pessimism over the abilities of 
the people: “the electoral mass is incapable of any action other than a 
stampede”68. This assertion refers both to the private concerns of the family 
and business and to national and international issues. Since their sense of 
reality is reduced, Schumpeter claims, people have a reduced sense of 
responsibility and they are unable to formulate any judgement in matters of 
domestic and foreign policy.69 And he concludes: “Thus the typical citizen 
drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the
66 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy {London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1976, 250.
67 Ibid., 251
68 Ibid., 283
69 Ibid., 261.
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political field [...] He becomes a primitive again”.70 Politics is none of the 
business of the ordinary citizen.
However, the absence of effective volition among the people is only the 
one side of the coin called the crisis of representation. For this lack, along 
with the reduced sense of responsibility, is connected with the actual impact 
of democracy on people’s everyday lives. Schumpeter does not merely 
criticise the ignorant masses of citizens: he also stresses the inability of 
representative democracy itself to prescribe to its citizens in a specific and 
clear way what they should demand from their representatives. This 
abstraction, the argument has it, confuses citizens and renders their 
participation and even interest obscure. Despite plentiful information, 
representational dem ocracy is unable to function because the  
communication between the political system and its citizen is poor.
Schumpeter’s suggestion of how to overcome the crisis of representation 
is to conceive of democracy as a mere method for arriving at decisions and 
therefore as “a steam engine or a disinfectant” instead of confusing it with its 
ends.71 To achieve this he suggests that the production of government is 
placed at the heart of democracy so that the latter is now to be conceived as 
“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote” (emphasis added)72 The specificity of Schumpeter’s 
democratic theory, then, lies in that he reverses the primacy of people’s role, 
from holding a definite and rational opinion about every issue to the election 
of the government. In doing so, Schumpeter emphasises competition for 
representation and thus he manages to suggest an alternative approach to 
democracy where (potential) continuous public contestation is at the heart of 
political life.
Another aspect of Schumpeter’s democratic theory is his economic 
interpretation of democracy. Schumpeter is considered the initiator of a whole 
new approach to democratic theory, based on his redefinition of democracy 
as having the form of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote, rendering
70 Ibid., 262.
71 Ibid., 266.
72 Ibid., 269.
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the behaviour of politicians similar to the competition of entrepreneurs for 
consumers’ preference. This interpretation of democracy in terms of 
economic activity, aiming to “make it immune to mass movements and 
excessive popular participation, which are destructive forces any democracy 
ought to curb rather than encourage”,73 is today perceived as economic or 
elitist democratic theory. Not only does this theory deny a role to the 
individual citizen, by pronouncing her incapable of joining others in forming a 
common will, but it also forecloses the question of the common good in the 
political society. Along with it, it also remains blind to the ethotic dimension of 
democracy, since it insists on conceiving the latter from the point of economic 
interests rather than that of dispositions.
Following Schumpeter, many political theorists in the post-war United 
States accepted the critique of classical democratic theory and of the ideal of 
a summum bonum more specifically, sharing with him a pessimism over the 
capacity and accuracy of the classical doctrine of democracy and seeking 
instead to study democracy using scientific tools. What they found 
particularly problematic was the normative nature of the classical doctrine 
and they were instead committed to providing thorough empirical analyses of 
how things actually are. This mode of theorising flourished particularly during 
the decades of nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties and has had a great 
impact on the study of democracy, cultivating a growing interest on behalf of 
political scientists in research into human behaviour, political events and 
democratic processes in an empirical way. It has promised, as William 
Connolly has put it, ‘to offer rigorous explanations with predictive power, 
anchored in observable facts in order to resolve differences between 
contending explanations and to avoid metaphysical speculations and the 
murky, “subjective” domain of value judgements’.74 This was marked by a 
shift in the discourse used in the field, from terms such as state of nature, 
common good, sovereignty, natural law to decision-making, political system 
analysis, interest groups. A zealot of this approach justifies both its difference
73 Emily Hauptmann, Putting Choice Before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice 
Theory (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 10.
74 William E. Connolly, “Then and now: Participant- observation in political theory”, in J. S. 
Dryzek, B. Honig, A. Phillips (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 827.
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from classical political theory and its description as behavioural in the 
following compact argument:
Unlike the great traditional theories of past political thought, new theory 
tends to be analytic, not substantive, explanatory rather than ethical, 
more general and less particular. [...It] thereby links political science to 
broader behavioural tendencies in the social sciences; hence, its 
description as political behaviour.75
Those who embrace the behavioural approach exorcise from their analyses 
concerns about how people ought to act. However they are not willing to 
completely leave aside the study of values, as “obviously important 
determinants of people’s behaviour” 76 Still, they are dedicated to providing 
analyses of political facts which would be relevant to real political events, 
seeking to do so by “codify[ing] the operating characteristics of the 
democratic polity itself’.77 What this approach introduces is the idea that 
democracy, in contrast with the classical doctrine, is already given in the form 
of a web of institutions, organisations and rules in which facts are taking 
place. The task of those studying politics, then, becomes the neutral 
observation of democratic life so as not to in any way interrupt it. Post-war 
“scientific” democratic theory, by separating norms and analysis closes the 
question of democracy and leaves the idea of the common good outside of 
democratic life.
Empirical researchers show little trust in the active participation of citizens 
in the democratic process, adopting Schumpeter’s assumption of the 
indifference (“apathy”) and/or ignorance of the people, their failure to deal 
effectively with political issues. They even conceive it as a factor that could 
lead the political system to instability, using examples from real political life
75 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1965), 22.
76 David Truman, “The implications of political behaviour research”, Items, Social Research 
Council, 1951, 37-39, cited in Robert Alan Dahl, “The behavioral approach in political 
science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest” The American Political Science 
Review 55, no. 4 (1961), 768.
77 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963), 5 quoted in Quentin Skinner, “Empirical theorists of democracy and their 
critics: A plague on both their houses” Political Theory 1, no. 3 (1973), 295.
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as evidence for their case.78 The lack created in political life from the limited 
participation of the people, restricted to exercising their voting right, 
demonstrates the need for a well-qualified body of specialists, or elites, 
backed-up by strong institutions, who ought to deal with the realm of politics 
and the exercise of democracy. Giovanni Sartori, for example, has been 
rather reluctant to acknowledge active participation of the people as a vital 
characteristic of democracy, since it can threaten democracy itself by 
allowing undemocratic counter-elites to take power.79 The fact that elites and 
not the ignorant masses compete for a place in leadership has resulted in 
this theory being called also the elitist theory of democracy.
This is exemplified in the work of Robert Dahl, who is often represented as 
one of the most influential, promising and formidable theorists of democracy, 
for advancing a participatory model of “polyarchal democracy” where 
government is exercised not by a majority or a minority but by a plurality of 
minorities. In his Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), Dahl appreciates the 
effectiveness of empirical study in democratic theory as “concerned with 
processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control 
over leaders”.80 Although Dahl believes that “theory tells us nothing about the 
real world”,81 he is reluctant to completely renounce it, since he recognises 
that it can help us not to get “totally lost in meaningless facts and trivial 
empiricism”.82 In this context, he chooses to offer an empirical theory of how 
a democracy - or polyarchy as he prefers to call it - can be established, 
backed up with a normative theory to preserve it. After engaging in a revision 
of two traditions of classical democratic theory, Madisonian and populist, he 
concludes that the method of setting a criterion which is then to be 
maximized is a mode of theorising that leads to utopianism and he proposes, 
instead, a descriptive method. According to the latter, he establishes eight
78 A similar approach is taken by Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory and is further 
developed in Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Wayne State University,
1962).
79 Sartori, Democratic Theory, 119.
80 Robert Alan Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago,: Chicago University Press, 
2006 (1956), expanded edition), 3.
81 Ibid., 64.
82 Ibid., 84.
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conditions that characterise a polyarchy, but rather than viewing them as 
goals to be realised, he uses them as constants against which real 
democratic conditions can be measured.83
Following Dahl’s line of thought, that is, by classifying and studying a 
considerable number of real world organisations, it is possible to specify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and flourishing of a 
polyarchy. And even though only a limited number of citizens participate in 
political procedures, the pluralist system is a reality and its existence is 
secured by the fact that diverse minorities representing different social 
groupings express a consensus over the policies followed in elections: 
“minorities rule”.84 The presentation of democracy as a polyarchical system, 
that is, as a system in which multiple minorities struggle for attaining power, 
paved the way for another mode of thinking democracy in the context of 
descriptive theory, that of pluralism, which aspires to remedy Schumpeter’s 
vacuum between the individual citizen and the elected leadership.85 With 
Dahl, competition of interests comes to the fore of democratic theory and the 
contest between competing groups is elevated to the prime element of the 
democratic system.
Descriptive approaches to democratic theory claim to be innovative as a 
way of avoiding the abstraction and generalisation of normative approaches. 
This “mood”, as Dahl describes it, is shared by those who have a sympathy 
toward “scientific” modes of investigation and analysis,86 a trend that has 
given rise to the idea that democracy ought to be studied and tested like any 
other phenomenon examined by social sciences like sociology and 
psychology and thus by borrowing concepts and methods from them, in order 
to achieve the coveted objectivity. In the context of this neo-empiricism,
83 Ibid., 84.
84 Ibid., 132-3.
85 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008 (3rd edition), 158.
86 Ibid., 766. Beyond characterising it as a mood, a harsh debate has been taking place 
regarding the characterization of behaviouralism as a revolution, see for example James 
Farr, “Remembering the revolution: Behaviouralism in American political science”, in J. Farr,
J. Dryzek, S. Leonard (eds.), Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political 
Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 198-224, Wolin, “Political theory 
as a vocation”, Skinner, “Empirical theorists of democracy and their critics”, John Gunnell, 
“The real revolution in political science” PS: Political Science and Politics 37, no. 1 (2004),
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political theorists87 have developed - or rather borrowed from other sciences - 
methods of examining democracy as an empirically testable phenomenon, 
aspiring to describe “what democracies really are in the real world”,88 that is 
by providing precise descriptions of specific aspects of the political activity 
developed by the responsible rational agent. Among the most popular 
descriptive approaches are system theories, the public choice school, 
decision-making theory and the economic theories of politics. These focus on 
the study of the voting behaviour of legislatures, public opinion 
measurement, party competition and calculation of election outcomes. 
Scholars driven by scientific aspirations do not abandon normative concepts, 
but for the fear of them being too opaque, abstract and puzzling, they restrict 
their use to mere reference without clarification, while preference is shown 
for finding the way to give precedence to democratic institutions and electoral 
processes.89 The common denominator of these political theorists is that 
intrinsic values can be objective and universal thus they can be somehow 
measured and verified.
As early as the 1960s such empiricism became the target of attack from 
various sides, not to mention the disentanglement from it of some of its major 
previous supporters.90 A commonly repeated argument developed in the 
context of this attack is one with two branches: on the one hand, that even 
these inquiries have normative implications and, on the other, that behind
87 During this period many behaviouralists considered themselves as political theorists, for 
example see Emily Hauptmann, “A local history of the political” Political Theory 32, no.1 
(2004), 40. Carole Pateman refers to them as “political sociologists wearing the hat of a 
political theorist”, in Participation and Democratic Theory, 3.
88 Gianni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited Part I: The Contemporary Debate 
(Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), xii.
89 See for example David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political 
Science (New York: Knopf, 1963), Antony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1957), Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer (eds), Empirical 
Democratic Theory {Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), Melvin Hinich and 
Michael Munger (eds), Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999), Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 
Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Electoral Systems and Democracy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). For a critical detailed review of neo-empiricism see 
also Danilo Zolo, Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1992), 19-45.
90 See for example Roberl Alan Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982).
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their pseudo-scientism they hide a profound conservatism.91 Practitioners of 
descriptive accounts of democratic theory claim to achieve an analysis that 
unlike the classical democratic doctrine is much closer to political reality; it 
does so, they claim, by avoiding to aspire to an ideal polity and by invoking, 
instead, questions concerning the best way to ensure stability and cohesion 
of the democratic system. This, however, entails a serious shift in theory’s 
normative foundations: by revising theory to bring it closer to reality, these 
theorists have transformed democracy from a radical political doctrine based 
on popular participation into a conservative one.92 Democracy is now justified 
in an ideological spirit, which more specifically is painted with the colour of 
conservatism.
According to another line of critique, this time targeting the much 
celebrated neutrality of descriptive theory, it is suggested that the attempt at 
objectivity presupposes the existence of an external viewer, a contemplator 
who stands out and above of the phenomena and does not participate in 
them. But this presumption overlooks the fact that the behaviouralist is 
always working within a perspective forced upon him by the need to defend 
his economic or cultural interests93 Another argument suggests that the idea 
implicit in the “scientific” approach to politics that the political field is clearly 
separated from the social, the economic and the aesthetic and thus can be 
explained using scientific methods and models, is oversimplifying.
Furthermore, even more worrying is the assumption that behaviouralism, 
by showing distrust of citizens qua human beings, in fact does not provide 
legitimation for democracy at all. This suspicion is enhanced considering the 
approach of democracy as a mere method, a way for a political system to be. 
A specific conception of choice is at the core of the work of theorists in the 
school of thought that Schumpeter inaugurated. More specifically, these 
theorists elevate the chance to choose into a central element of democracy 
as they seek to redefine it, celebrating individual choice as the ultimate 
democratic moment. This entails the confinement of participation to the
91 For a presentation and refutation of these arguments see Skinner, “Empirical theorists of 
democracy and their critics”.
92 Jack L. Walker, “A critique of the elitist theory of democracy” The American Political 
Science Review60, no. 2 (1966), 288.
93 Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, 12.
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moment of election, with choice functioning at the same time as a value 
realised by democracy and as something that can potentially be distorted by 
it. However, the fact of the shift of interest from broad participation to choice 
and the alteration of the language used to describe the value of democracy, 
results in the need of justifying it anew - that is to provide a justification of 
what is valuable about a democratic system, even one deflated to a mere 
method. But, as Emily Hauptmann shows in her analysis of Athenian 
democracy, the value of individual choice is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a justification of democracy.94 Furthermore, the notion of choice as 
elaborated by those espousing a descriptive account of democracy, is too 
broad and paradoxical to “support the weight of both a critique and a 
justification of democracy by itself’.95 And she concludes: “the critical 
standards rational choice theorists use to recast democratic politics contain 
no basic commitment to democracy. The value of democracy cannot be 
reduced to the value of honouring individual choice”.96
If these critiques of behaviouralism are defensible and vital, then an issue 
arises with regard to how to response to this mode of theorising, so that 
democracy is neither deflated nor confused with its values. A certain type of 
response is offered by those who come to the aid of classical democratic 
theory like Leo Strauss, a committed scholar of political philosophy. Strauss 
has been rather ironic with the “scientific” political science that “conceives of 
itself as the way towards genuine knowledge of political things”.97 He has 
bitterly criticized positivism in social sciences, both by insisting on the 
impossibility of a “value-free” political science and by rejecting the 
depreciation of scientific knowledge that the latter implies and he has 
accused it of conformism and philistinism.98 To the charges of behaviouralists 
against political philosophy for being value-laden and thus inefficient when it 
comes to producing objective, scientific knowledge, Strauss declared that the
94 Emily Hauptmann, Putting Choice Before Democracy, Ch. 3
99 Ibid., 91.
99 Ibid., 94.
97 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 13.
99 Ibid., 20.
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aim of political philosophy is to “replace opinions about the political 
fundamentals by knowledge regarding them”.99 However, complete 
renunciation of empiricism denudes democratic theory from a promising ally 
in the battle against those who blame democracy for all kinds of misfortunes. 
What is needed, is a more moderate approach that can possibly combine the 
benefits of classical democratic ideas with the comforts of description, a 
thesis that I will try to develop in the remainder of the chapter.
To start with, Sheldon Wolin has offered such a voice, by arguing in favour 
of a more responsive and generous frame of critique against it, aspiring to 
exploit the most from it.100 Wolin is more receptive to the changes brought to 
the field by positivist approaches and he recognizes that whatever one’s 
assessment of the “behavioural revolution”, it clearly has succeeded in 
transforming political science.101 Wolin himself claims to be more anxious 
about the fact that behaviouralism assumes that something is political, rather 
than struggling to define it, and thus he has been more interested in 
revealing the slippages of what, in his classic article “Political theory as a 
vocation”, he defines as “methodism”. In this context, he has criticised the 
vita methodica that empirical political science entails, for fostering the 
specific “regularities that reflect the main patterns of behaviour which society 
is seeking to promote and maintain”,102 favouring instead the idea of bios 
theoretikos. For Wolin, behaviouralism has never been a revolutionary 
approach, being deficient in terms of innovation compared to the task of the 
“epic theorist”. In celebrating the uniqueness of political theory as a mode of 
inquiry, Wolin gives prominence to the generosity of spirit.
Wolin’s article appeared in a period when empiricism in political studies 
had already started to fade, with some of its most fervent supporters 
envisaging a new revolution, this time a post-behavioural one, that would 
challenge the conversion of politics into the subject matter of a scientific
99 Ibid., 12.
100 John H. Schaar and Sheldon S. Wolin, “Review: Essays on the scientific study of politics:
A critique" American Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963), 125-150. Connolly even 
refers to a “bracketed behaviouralism” on behalf of Wolin, see William E. Connolly, “Politics 
and vision” in A. Botwinick and W. E. Connolly (eds.), Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin 
and the Vicissitudes of the Political {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 9.
i°1 Wolin, 1062.
102 Ibid., 1064.
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method. David Easton, who introduced this new “movement and intellectual 
tendency” with an article in the influential American Political Science Review, 
expressed his disappointment with regard to behaviouralism’s drift “to 
convert the study of politics into a more rigorously scientific discipline 
modeled on the methodology of natural sciences”.103 Easton hoped that post- 
behaviouralism would respond better to the need felt by some theorists of the 
time for translating tacit political knowledge into action. In his own words, 
aiming to give “immediate answers to immediate problems”, “[t]his kind of 
shift in disciplinary focus will call urgently for the systematic examination of 
the tasks involved in transforming our limited knowledge today into a form far 
more consumable for purposes of political action”.104
Notwithstanding the different points of departure and dispositions of their 
writers, these articles share an agony regarding the actual relationship 
between political knowledge and political reality, the role and impact that the 
discipline can or ought to have in political life. For Sheldon Wolin, the world is 
impervious to theory and facts could never prove the validity of a true theory, 
since they are “less close to truth than [is] thought”.105 However Wolin, as I 
read him, concurs with Easton on the importance of bringing to the fore the 
issue of the relationship of theory to practice, a position recapitulated and 
epitomised in his article’s title, which aims to raise a voice of “warning and 
pain” in favour of the task of the theorist, who is nonetheless always already 
positioned against the facts in a particular way.
From another angle, William Connolly chose a different way to question 
the neutral, instrumental or value-free accounts which empiricists claim to 
offer. He challenged the very dichotomy between descriptive and normative 
concepts, arguing that concepts that are of paramount significance in the 
study of politics are constructed from a normative point of view.106 Normative 
concepts are supposed to combine specific actions, such as commending, 
with a descriptive content that may vary (for example “good”), whereas
103 David Easton, “The new revolution in political science” American Political Science Review 
63, no.4 (1969), 1051.
104 Ibid., 1056.
105 Wolin, “Political theory as a vocation”, 1081.
106 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse.
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descriptive ones are understood to combine variable functions with a single 
criterion or a small set of criteria (for example “yellow”). According to 
Connolly, this dichotomy cannot be sustained due to the fact that even 
though many concepts are formed through normative considerations, limiting 
our attention to them would entail a loss as to how to clarify or redefine their 
boundaries when new and unforeseen situations arose.107 If we are to have a 
clear understanding of political concepts, such as democracy, we need to 
appreciate the relation between their normative point and the criteria of 
describing these concepts as such and not as another thing; that is, we need 
to attend to the complexity of the normative-descriptive scheme.
In view of these criticisms and suggestions, a question becomes pertinent 
here: what has the theorising endeavour - and under which circumstances - 
to offer to democracy? To rephrase this, does democracy need the theorising 
endeavour? Despite the fact that there is no definite answer to this question, 
it can be argued that an approach that aspires only to provide a realistic 
description of political life is too narrow to offer anything to democracy. Dahl, 
for example, puts the elections at the centre of the democratic process, and 
then he theorises the latter as a polyarchal system with internal stable rules 
that can be objectively examined by an external analyst, who then can 
determine a quantitative model which can provide information about the past 
and predictions about the future. Democracy, then, is an observable 
phenomenon which does not need any external intervention to work; in 
addition, this view does not necessarily associate an increase in participation 
with positive developments. In this mode of theorising-as-objectifying 
democracy, the latter becomes understandable only as a method, a 
mechanism that makes the political field conceivable in ways that are 
measurable and assessable. It is a mode that lacks complexity and 
inclusiveness and thus it is doomed to overlook other important questions, 
like what is the very essence of democracy for the thinkers who seek to 
theorise it, how democracy is connected with subjectivity and procedures of 
subjectivisation, and most importantly, what is the connection between 
democracy and the enterprise of theorising. Moreover, it fails to grasp any 
aspect of democracy that is related to the individual and the dispositions that
1°7 Ibid., 29.
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she carries as a creator and bearer of democratic practices; that is, it fails to 
grasp the ethotic dimension of democracy that is connected to mobilisation 
and motivation of citizens. But mainly, the view that chooses to strictly 
separate norms from and analysis and to exclude the former from the 
process of studying political life, in fact closes the question of democracy. It 
adopts it as an ideological construction that can be used to measure and 
analyse political life and it therefore abandons the importance of the question 
of the common good that traditional democratic thinkers have already 
grasped.
On the other hand, yet equally inadequate, is an approach that sets at the 
heart of democracy a moral purpose. Classical democratic theory, but also 
current normative theory as will be discussed in Chapter Three, is of this 
kind, in that it prescribes a higher aim for democracy, that is the full moral 
development of individual’s capacities qua the educated citizen, so that a 
free genuine community can be formed. It also sets the general strategy for 
the fulfillment of this aim, which is political activity through the pursuit of the 
common good.108 In this view, it becomes susceptible to much of elitist 
theorists’ criticicms. That is, it becomes an ethical goal that is dubious and 
subject to challenge and opposition. However, considering normative theory’s 
irreducible value in transcending political reality and imagining a better 
possible condition, it would be a mistake to renounce it in favour of a plain 
descriptive approach. If description deflates democracy to a mere procedure, 
and explanation reduces it to a moral claim, then both should be only taken 
as a means to facilitate democratic strategy and not as a criterion of 
judgement.109 The separation between the idea and its application, the norm 
and its description, theory and practice, does not offer anything to 
democracy: each of these constituents is in tension with the other. The 
question is how this tension is better maintained.
108 Lane Davis/The cost of realism: Contemporary restatements of democracy” The Western 
Political Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1964), 43-44.
109 Ibid., 41.
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IV. Interlude: Which Theory for Democracy?
A main goal of this thesis is to bring this question to the fore. And a main 
argument is that this might be possible by looking at the connections 
between democracy and ethos. In this chapter I have tried to set the 
foundations to this argument by scrutinising how the endeavour of theorising 
democracy entails an investigation into ethos. More specifically, I have 
discussed how the bold separation between norm and description in 
democratic theory has rendered the latter blind to the issue of ethos. I have 
opened the discussion by attending to five classical thinkers of democracy. 
Since I find that in their elaborations they do not treat political reality as 
separate from or external to their reflections on political life, I have suggested 
that they all view democracy as concerned with what is common to 
individuals in a political community, inspiring and mobilising them, and thus 
elevating them to citizens. To be sure, I have introduced the argument that 
the common to which classical democratic thinkers aspire is a kind of 
disposition, an ethos of democracy. I have, then, turned to modern 
descriptive democratic thought and explicated why it is unable to grasp this 
question of the common.
By way of introducing my analysis, I have already examined the tension 
between theory and practice in the tradition, suggesting that while the 
ancients favoured the former, in modernity two different approaches took 
place: the precedence of practice and the effort to reconcile these two 
components. Last, I have argued that it is only with Nietzsche that this 
reconciliation is attained, for he is the one who calls us to see that they are 
indeed inseparable. This is the stance that I also endorse in the thesis.
I agree with William Connolly that, despite their ambitions, empirical 
democratic theorists are unable to provide a democratic model free from 
normative considerations, since these are already present when defining the 
questions asked in empirical inquiry. Moreover, I share Carole Pateman’s 
agony that an elitist approach overlooks the importance of ordinary citizens’ 
participation in democracy. I concur, at last, with Sheldon Wolin who behind 
the highly defended neutrality of behaviouralism describes a fear of 
fundamental change, and thus a conservatism, and a lack of commitment.
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What I want to add to these anxieties, fears and observations is what I find 
also problematic with this kind of democratic theory: a jejune and one­
dimensional theorisation of democracy. The failure to provide a view of 
democracy other than as a method, leads these theorists to overlook the 
possible edifying procedures of the theorising endevour for democracy itself. 
Moreover, and despite the fact that behaviouralists try hard to provide us with 
a well-informed and specific relation between theory and practice, I believe 
that their anxiety to avoid what they consider the fallacies of classical 
democratic theory leads them to defend a sterilised notion of democracy, one 
in which there is no space for any passion, emotion or creative action on 
behalf of individuals.
Without intending to exaggerate the possible role of theory, and thus 
avoiding what Connolly calls “the hubris of theory”, I want to argue in favour 
of a more active role for theory in the shaping of democracy, which is 
considered as something more than a set of procedures. Connolly worries 
about the importance placed on theory - but on explanation and interpretation 
as well - and their ability to certainty and sufficiency and he suggests that 
perhaps we could engage in theory in a more open manner, since what is 
presented as unambiguous and clear-cut, absolute and sufficient, well- 
defined and thus finalized by theory, in fact is just a choice of the theorist who 
decides to close the subject against any new possibilities for its evolution. 
The reason that this openness could be a possible approach is that, in his 
own distinctive terminology, “[the] world is too complexly intermeshed to fit 
the strictures of either law-like explanation or deep interpretation”.110 It is 
characteristic that in parallel with the detachment of former advocates of 
behaviouralism from it, voices have been raised calling for less meta- 
theoretical reflections and more political theory in practice, that is “attention 
to the political realm” and “to the realities, actual and developing”.111 I believe 
this is indicative of the trend for recent political theorists to become more 
reluctant to renounce completely empiricism and they have stressed the
110 Connolly, Neuropolitics, 16. Connolly himself aims to suggest a modesty that each 
theorists should show for other theorists’ approaches.
111 Here I have in mind Tracy Strong’ s note as an editor in one of the most important 
journals of political theory, Political Theory 18, no.1 (1990), 4-5.
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importance of appreciating the productive outcome of the inescapable fusion 
of empirical with normative presuppositions.112
Wendy Brown offers such an approach of openness in theory when she 
makes a statement on a pressure that is exercised on theory today, a 
pressure which must be resisted.113 This pressure, which demands for theory 
to be accurate and applicable, to solve problems and to unmask the truth, 
distorts theory itself and needs to be resisted. Brown prefers to see theory as 
a meaning-making enterprise instead of the contemplation of the supposed 
real and true, as a mechanism of production of new representations and not 
as accurate description of an existing reality. As she puts it, “insofar as theory 
imbues contingent or unconscious events, phenomena, or formations with 
meaning and with location in a world of theoretical meaning, theory is a 
sense-making enterprise of that which often makes no sense, of that which 
may be inchoate, unsystematized, inarticulate.”114 Contra Aristotle, theory is 
not the end.
This is the kind of theory that I want to demonstrate in the thesis, a theory 
that opens up the space for dispositions and sensibilities and thus the 
element of ethos. Such a democratic theory is not just a theory of 
democracy: it is itself in effect democratic and so engaging democratic theory 
entails thinking in democratic ways, being subject to challenge from 
argument and from evidence. It is a theory that appreciates but does not 
evaluate, the theory that is part of the world and does not stand above it and 
which world it does not wish to decipher but to rearrange, in order to allow 
space for every possibility to reveal itself. It is thus a theory that opens what 
Brown calls “a breathing space between the world of common meanings and 
the world of alternative ones”.115 As early as 1969, Wolin had summarised 
this by saying that the task of theorist is not just to change “men’s views of 
the world”, but the world itself.116 I believe this is both pertinent and desirable
112 Ian Shapiro, “Problems, methods and theories in the study of politics, or what’s wrong 
with political science and what to do about it” Political Theory 30, no. 4 (2002), 599.
113 Wendy Brown, “At the Edge” Political Theory 30, no 4. (2002), 573.
114 Ibid, 574.
115 Ibid, 574.
116 Wolin, “Political theory as a vocation”, 1080.
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today since, as another thinker has put it, the ideal, the theoretical is always 
present in empirical work.117 This is why it is a theory of creativity and 
imagination.
This chapter explored various articulations of theorising democracy. In the 
beginning, we saw how political thought is characterised by a persistent 
binary between norm and description. It is part of the argument of the thesis 
that such a binary is not suitable when theorising democracy, for it obscures 
the way in which the tension between theory and practice can inform our 
understanding of democracy. In Section II I scrutinised five democratic 
thinkers who I see as examples of overcoming this binary; I suggested that 
they all achieve to discuss democracy without contending that they are on a 
normative standpoint and while they take practical issues into consideration. 
At the same time, these thinkers attend to democracy as addressing the 
quest of the common between the members of a polity, showing how the 
question of ethos is embedded in it. I continued by arguing that descriptive 
democratic thought fails to grasp these questions (of the common and 
ethos), because it understands democracy only as a method. I concluded 
that creativity is inextricably connected with the task of theorising democracy. 
Having suggested that taking the stand of description blinds us with regard to 
ethos and the essence of democracy, I now turn to three thinkers who take 
the stand of norm. As my discussion in the next chapter reveals, despite 
these thinkers unavoidably need ethos to fill in the gap in their theories (a 
gap created by the need to suggest what is the bond that unites the citizens 
of the polities they envision), it is an ethos that is pre-political because it is 
argued for from a moral point of view. This is why in Chapters Four and Five I 
turn to agonism and see how its effort to transcend moral questions results to 
a more successful articulation of ethos and of the common good.
117 Anne Norton, 95 Theses on Politics, Culture and Method (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 136.
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Chapter 3
Normative Responses in Democratic Theory
Normative responses to post-war “scientific” democratic theory were 
beginning to be articulated in the late 1960s. However, the autocracy of the 
revisionist model was not seriously challenged until 1971, when John Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice appeared, signaling the return of a paradigm that, since 
the nineteenth-century, seemed to have sunk into lethargy. Since then the 
corpus of knowledge of democracy has been significantly enriched with new 
approaches, methods and criticisms, resulting in the emergence of a debate 
that is commonly said to take place between advocates of liberal and 
communitarian accounts of democracy, some aspects of which are critically 
assessed in the present chapter. Although this debate does not explicitly treat 
the question of ethos, in this chapter I present a reading which shows how 
key participants in that debate in fact rely upon a conception of ethos in their 
discussion of democracy. But their failure to theorise ethos directly, explicitly 
and comprehensively, I argue, leads also to their failure to grasp democracy 
as anything other than as a regime and therefore an inability to understand 
and assess it in its experiential dimension. Although these thinkers aspire to 
a kind of ethos they, ultimately, connect democracy only to morality.
To begin with, for some commentators, the debate between Liberals and 
Communitarians has been structured around rationality and the possibility of 
democracy being geared toward achieving the general will that reflects the 
common good. The literature developed by those skeptical about this 
possibility may be characterised as ‘aggregationist’, represented by those in 
the descriptivist mode of democratic theorising; the approach of those for 
whom we may trust deliberation as a means to get people to converge on the 
common good is characterised as ‘deliberative’.1 An alternative perspective, 
suggests the characterisations ‘aggregationist’ and ‘accommodationist’. 
Where the first of these emphasises the rational and independent character 
of moral agents in making decisions and choices, favouring thus liberal 
constitutional democracy as the regime that best allows the effective
1 Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003).
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aggregation of individual interests, the second refuses to regard persons as 
being independent from the particular communities in which they are 
embedded. Since these communities are considered as highly important to 
individuals’ orientation in life, accommodationist conceptions of democracy 
advocate a state that does not privilege any particular stance over others.2
Political theory is not biology and theories do not belong to taxonomies as 
species do. Boundaries between models are blurred and classifications can 
only be used as compasses and under no circumstances as ultimate 
matrices; this is exactly what makes political theory an interesting field of 
enquiry. There certainly are trends, currents and orientations in democratic 
theory, but they are not exhaustive of the relevant literature. As theorists alter 
their minds and views of the world, ideas are transformed and theories move 
from one quarter to the other. John Rawls, for example, might be considered 
as an aggregationist, but not after his deliberative turn in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, there are theorists that fit into neither of the models/ categories 
described above, since their work introduces more radical ideas that 
challenge the terms under which these debates are conducted.
The argument that this chapter introduces is that the three thinkers chosen 
to be discussed here, John Rawls, Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young, all 
respond to the theorists of the aggregative mode, aiming to prove the 
shortcomings of this mode and to restore the moral dimension of Liberalism. 
They do so by replicating an issue suspended in the form of denial by post­
war descriptive theorists - the question of the common good and its role in 
democracy.
The chapter argues that these theorists respond to the proponents of the 
aggregative model by first of all giving an affirmative answer to the question 
of the attainability of a common good. The way these normative thinkers 
revive the idea of a common good is crucial for the way that they address the 
issue of pluralism - each of them in a different yet, I shall argue, non-political 
way. Furthermore, they all raise as implicit in the discussion around and 
about democracy the issue of ethos, despite using disparate terms to 
articulate it. More specifically, the chapter argues that terms such as ‘sense
2 Here I follow the categorisation and generally the rationale outlined in Alan Finlayson, 
“Rhetoric and radical democratic political theory”, in Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd (eds.), The 
Politics of Radical Democracy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 15-16.
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of justice’, ‘civic patriotism’ or ‘differentiated solidarity’ coined by Rawls, 
Taylor and Young respectively, are used in order to describe the common 
bond among the citizens of a modern pluralist state that safeguards the 
polity’s democratic function. Each of these thinkers, then, appeals to ethos to 
respond to the descriptive critique of the idea of the common good and to 
offer an account of the bond that keeps the citizens of a polity together. I will 
explore the evolution of these terms in the work of each theorist, highlighting 
the role it has in their conception of democracy. I will also critically discuss 
how these conceptualisations of ethos fail to provide an adequate 
understanding of democratic life, since they are based on a moral rather than 
political approach of the bond that unites citizens.
Overall, the chapter argues that by appealing to a moralised conception of 
ethos, the three theorists discussed here fail to provide a political negotiation 
of the issue of pluralism and they eventually treat political life as grounded in 
a higher direction. As such, not only do Rawls, Taylor and Young fall for a 
moralisation of political life but they also fail to attend to the tactical 
dimension of ethos and give precedence to only one or the other of its 
components, that is either the private, or the public. As I argue in the thesis, 
though, a democratic ethos can be conceived only when it is affirmed as the 
interplay of these two poles, so that its dual tactical dimension (as something 
that needs to be cultivated through tactics and at the same time as 
something performed through tactics on the moment of democratic action) is 
exposed.
I. The Democratic Thought of John Rawls: The Ethos of Justice
When John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice appeared in 1971 it was welcomed 
as the prime mover for the turn from scientific to normative philosophy; but 
perhaps even more importantly it signaled a moment for revival for a 
discipline that until then seemed unable to escape the powerful 
predominance of empirical oriented modes of research. The wide positive 
reception of this work is attributed to its combination of ‘a normative and 
“principled” system of thought using the highly technical methods of
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analytical philosophy, a contractualist reading of the Anglo-American tradition 
of liberal thought and a “progressive” justification of egalitarian social 
justice’.3 By succeeding in adopting the logical rigour and the technically 
sophisticated style of analytical philosophers without, though, overlooking the 
idea that questions about what is just and unjust have a substantive 
character and thus require ‘thick’ answers, Rawls managed to move away 
from skepticism about rationality in ethics, and therefore in politics.4 Another 
commentator stresses the fact that Rawls’s analysis does not just depend on 
social sciences, but it also holds the promise of cross-fertilising and enriching 
them.5 Importantly, Rawls revived political philosophy as a discipline by 
enabling it “to stop seeing [itself] as purely (or at least primarily) descriptive 
approach; [it] could now claim an active role in the discussion and resolution 
of public problems”.6 Since then, each work produced by Rawls has been 
received as classic, including his Political Liberalism, as well as numerous 
articles in some of the most well-established academic journals.7
His indisputable contribution to the field of political theory and to liberalism 
more particularly notwithstanding, there is considerable controversy over 
attributing to Rawls the status of a theorist of democracy. More specifically, 
numerous thinkers find that Rawls fails exactly when the issue of democracy 
is at stake and this is highly relevant to his understanding of politics. Sheldon 
Wolin, for example, problematises Rawls’s approach to politics as a 
‘settlement’, arguing that “Rawlsian democracy might be likened to a 
hermetically sealed condition of deliberation that allows rationality to rule by 
suppressing certain topics and historical grievances and excluding diverse
3 Cecile Laborde, “The reception of John Rawls in Europe” European Journal of Political 
Theory 1, no 2 (2002), 135.
4 Stuart Hampshire, “A special supplement: A new philosophy of the just society” New York 
Review of Books 18, no 3, (1972). Retrieved from http://www.nvbooks.com/articles/10296.
5 Norman Daniels, “Introduction”, in Norman Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies 
on Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), xxxiii.
6 Alexander Nehamas, “Trends in recent american philosophy” Daedalus 126, no 1, (1997), 
217.
7 See for example John Rawls, “Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (1985); John Rawls, “The idea of an overlapping consensus” 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 1 (1987); John Rawls, “The priority of right and ideas 
of good” Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, no. 4 (1988).
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languages of protest from public councils”.8 Chantal Mouffe expresses 
worries that Rawls’ s Kantian liberalism fails to recognise the nature of the 
political, overloads the field of politics with morality and despite his efforts to 
reconcile democracy and liberalism, at the end he privileges the latter over 
the former.9 For Bonnie Honig, Rawls engages in a virtue political theory that 
favours a formulation of a political economy untroubled by politics where it is 
possible and desirable to exclude remainders, a formulation that entails 
“antidemocratic resonances, if by democracy one means a set of 
arrangements that perpetually generates popular (both local and global) 
political action as well as generating practices that legitimate democratic 
institutions”.10 Rawls’s democracy is perceived by his colleagues as being 
too narrow, sterilised or overflowed by the liberal ideal.
For others, though, Rawls despite not addressing democracy directly, at 
least in the Theory of Justice, actually contributes to democratic thought. 
Joshua Cohen, for example, argues that Rawls’ s use of a democratic 
constitutional regime and a democratic society as the basis of his work re­
introduces the crucial element of justice to democratic theory. In doing so he 
recognises that “[tjhough justice as fairness is not a theory of democracy and 
says little about the processes of democratic politics, it is a contribution to 
democratic thought.”11 In a similar vein, Amy Gutmann reads Rawls’s as 
identifying democracy with equal democratic liberty, managing to bridge 
liberalism and democracy in an intimate marriage.12 Both Cohen and 
Gutmann concur that Rawls makes a significant contribution to democratic 
thought, by suggesting not specific procedures and processes but the 
normative framework in which democratic institutions are justified.
8 Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘The liberal/ democratic divide: On Rawls’ s Political Liberalism” Political 
Theory 24, no. 1, (1996), 102.
9 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 80-105.
10 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (New York, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 5.
11 Joshua Cohen, “For a democratic society”, in Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 87.
12 Amy Gutmann, “Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy”, Samuel 
Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 168-199
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The present section attends to Rawls’s original intention and thus reads 
his work as aspiring to move within the field of democratic theory. To be sure, 
Rawls himself expressed the hope “that justice as fairness will seem 
reasonable and useful [...] in a wide range of thoughtful political opinions and 
thereby express an essential part of the common core of the democratic 
tradition”.13 The section, then, offers an affirmative reading of Rawls’s political 
philosophy and particularly of his account of democracy, and it suggests that 
his enquiries offer a certain vision of democracy, that is a specific democratic 
theory by way of deploying his theory of public political culture. More 
specifically, the section argues that Rawls deploys the theory of public 
political culture to suggest that the common good for a democratic society is 
the product of its citizens. The following analysis shows how Rawls relies on 
his theory of public political culture in order to reach a conception of justice 
that is suitable for securing social cooperation between citizens who are free 
and equal, yet divided due to having adopted different comprehensive 
doctrines. With the issue of pluralism being inherent in his democratic theory, 
Rawls needs an ethos to treat the problem of common good in his political 
society. The section suggests that it is exactly his reliance on ethos — with 
the specific traits he attributes to it — that renders Rawls’s democratic theory 
susceptible to criticisms such as those previously presented. Despite his 
intentions, Rawls does not provide an account of an ethos that is both 
collective and individual, neglects ethos’s tactical dimension and attributes to 
it a too restricted content for it to be considered a democratic ethos.
The ‘Basic Structure’ and the ‘Sense of Justice’
Rawls originally intends to generalise and carry “to a higher order of 
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract” as represented by 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.14 He chooses to move within the tradition of 
contractarianism, aspiring to offer an alternative to utilitarianism, and he 
places at the centre of his theory the ideal of justice, conceived as an intuitive
13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, expanded 
edition), xi.
14 Ibid., 10.
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characteristic of free and rational persons. Rawls concentrates on defining a 
set of principles of social justice that would be accepted by everyone in a 
democratic society, despite their conflicting interests, in order to choose the 
social arrangements that would secure the proper distributive shares. The 
primary subject of these principles is what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure of 
society’, or more specifically, “the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation”.15 Since this structure is definitive of 
individuals’ life from its beginning, because it introduces unavoidable and 
deep inequalities, principles of justice are to be chosen in order to address 
exactly the structure itself. But justice and what is just should not be defined 
by random factors such as those which the basic structure imposes on 
people’s lives a priori; justice constitutes the fundamental charter of a well- 
ordered human association. In a Kantian way, Rawls hopes to give two 
principles that are not reduced at the level of the collective or the individual 
but successfully inform and are informed by both.
Rawls proposes that since rational agents when making decisions are 
expected to use as their sole criterion their self-interest, when it comes to 
setting up the procedure under which principles of justice will be chosen they 
should be stripped of the features of their personality and any particular aims 
and attachments. This is the point at which classic contract theory proves 
crucial to Rawls’s endeavour, for it offers the idea of original position, that is a 
purely hypothetical initial status from which fair decisions can be reached, a 
condition in which parties involved assume their situation behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’.16 With the parties having no information on their social position, 
and thus being ignorant of their conception of the good, Rawls argues, it is 
possible to secure a fair procedure in deciding and achieving a conception of 
justice he calls ‘justice as fairness’.
It is in this early stage of his theory that Rawls already introduces the idea 
of an ethos of justice shared by the individual members of the society. The 
term he uses for this ethos is ‘sense of justice’ and in order for it to be 
properly defined it is not adequate to define “a list of the judgments on
15 Ibid., 6.
16 Ibid., 102-123.
120
institutions and actions that we are prepared to render, accompanied with 
supporting reasons when these are offered”, but rather to define “a 
formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined with our beliefs and 
knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgements 
with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles 
conscientiously and intelligently”.17 In other words, it is assumed that our 
moral sensibilities are just when they comply with its principles. Again, Rawls 
hopes that there is an identification of the inner and the outer components of 
the ethos he finds pertinent to his theory of justice.
Individuals in the original position, then, would agree on a set of principles 
such that would secure personal and political liberty and would aim to 
minimise economic inequality. Rawls establishes two such principles: the 
principle of greatest equal liberty and the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, to be completed by the difference principle. It is only after the 
first principle is satisfied that the second is to be introduced, according to 
which unavoidable inequalities are to be attached to positions and offices 
open to all and they are also to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of the society.18
Rawls recognises that the above mentioned principles are insufficient 
when it comes to the individual choices and decisions and thus he proposes 
that there must also be an agreement on the moral rules that govern 
individuals’ conduct as well as the conduct of states.19 This agreement on 
moral rules renders a society ‘well-ordered’, that is one in which not only 
everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of 
justice, but also one in which the basic social institutions satisfy and are 
known to satisfy these principles. A modern democratic society that is well- 
ordered bears a specific public political culture which is distinct from what 
Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ of civil society. Whereas the former 
“comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public 
traditions of their interpretation [...], as well as historic texts and documents 
that are common knowledge”, the latter refers to comprehensive doctrines of
17 Ibid., 41.
19 Ibid., 53-56.
19 Ibid., 95.
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all kinds and thus to the domain of the social, not the political.20 This 
separation, as will be discussed, is crucial to Rawls’s formulation of a political 
conception of justice.
Such a society can also be described, according to Rawls, as ‘a social 
union of social unions’, that is, as a union consisting of various parties that all 
share the aim of achieving just institutions and in which the relation between 
human flourishing and justice is two-way: the collective activity of justice is 
the preeminent form of human flourishing, whereas at the same time “just 
institutions allow for and encourage the diverse internal life of associations in 
which individuals realise their more particular aims.”21 Individuals are bearers 
of moral virtues, that is excellences, which are displayed in the public life of 
the society and cause other people’s appreciation. Since persons are 
allowed to express their excellent nature whereas just institutions encourage 
the realisation of more particular ends in the internal life of associations, the 
public realisation of justice is a value of community. Social unity is Rawls’s 
conception of political community, where a public conception of justice is the 
shared moral belief of all members, a trait that secures stability and 
homogeneity and is feasible and endured through time. It is the motif that, as 
I have already discussed, Rousseau uses in his envisioning of the ideal 
republic; Rawls is in fact a Rousseauian.
This idea of stability of the conception of justice as fairness shifts 
significantly in the various essays Rawls’s has published after the Theory, to 
focus more on other issues. He does so in his second major work, Political 
Liberalism (1993), which originally was intended as both a complement and a 
corrective for the Theory of Justice. In his own words, “Theory and Political 
Liberalism try to sketch what the more reasonable conceptions of justice for a 
democratic regime are and to present a candidate for the most reasonable”.22 
As in his previous essays, democracy in Political Liberalism is already 
present at the outset in the form of constitutional democracy, being the 
canvas on which the best account of justice is to be drawn. However, at least
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13-14.
21 Ibid., 463.
22 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, expanded 
edition), Ix.
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two serious shifts that are of our interest here enter Rawls’s work since 
Theory and they both have an impact on his account of stability.23 The first 
regards the close attention he now pays to “the fact of pluralism”, an idea 
already introduced in 1987 and since then directed to his reworking of the 
idea of justice 24 The second shift is related to the clarification that Rawls 
feels obliged to make regarding the political nature of his conception of 
justice as fairness, amidst criticism that it involves metaphysical accounts of 
the moral person.25
Introducing Justice-Tackling the Problem of Pluralism
The fact of reasonable pluralism is accepted by Rawls not just as an 
historical event, but as a permanent feature of democratic public culture and 
therefore as an event that brings to the fore and challenges the issue of 
establishing and preserving the unity and stability of society.26 When 
reflecting on pluralism, Rawls refers to the existence of numerous reasonable 
but incompatible comprehensive doctrines of philosophical, moral or religious 
nature that are likely to persist and gain support over time. The reasonable 
character of the doctrines available in the world poses a problem for 
democratic society and to sort it out Rawls uses the idea of the overlapping 
consensus that he had already introduced in the Theory, but which now is 
further elaborated, refined and elevated to the central element in the process 
of finding a consensus on justice. The idea of such a consensus is based on 
the postulation that citizens seen as free and equal share a common trait, 
that of reasonableness, and that they appeal to this trait when they deliberate 
publicly to decide on issues of justice. Rawls clarifies that such a consensus 
differs from a modus vivendi in that the latter is an agreement between 
competing parties complying with certain arrangements reached for the sake
23 For a presentation of more shifts in Rawls’ s thought, William A. Galston, “Pluralism and 
social unity” Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989), 711-726; also Rawls, “Justice as fairness: Political not 
metaphysical”, 224, n.2.
24 Rawls, ‘The idea of an overlapping consensus”, 1 -25.
25 For example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 93-95. -
26 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36.
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of self or group interests.27 Moreover, overlapping consensus differs in that 
its object is a political conception of justice, that is itself a moral conception 
which includes principles of justice and an account of the political virtues 
through which those principles are embodied in human character and 
expressed in public life.28 This agreement on a political conception of justice, 
thus, “tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the 
political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public 
traditions of their interpretation”.29
Whereas consensus or even convergence of opinions on the concept of 
justice in the background culture is unattainable, it is possible to achieve a 
conception of justice in the the public political culture, through a process of 
deliberation. Despite them both being moral conceptions of justice, a political 
conception of justice, in contrast to a comprehensive doctrine, (a) is worked 
out for a specific subject, i.e. the basic structure of a constitutional 
democracy (b) its acceptance does not presuppose acceptance of a 
particular comprehensive doctrine and (c) is formulated in terms of intuitive 
ideas latent in the public political culture.30 The means through which 
deliberation that establishes the political conception of justice takes place is 
public reason, which aims to specify “at the deepest level the basic moral 
and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic 
government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another”.31 But 
whereas public reason is relevant in what Rawls considers political 
discussions - a tripartite public political forum involving judges, government 
officials and candidates for public office - it does not apply to discussions 
related to the background culture.
Rawls in this way excludes any and every comprehensive doctrine from 
public dialogue as irrelevant and dangerous, since its presence might 
jeopardise the impartiality needed when deliberating on issues of justice. His 
conception of political justice dictates the use of the public political culture of
27 Ibid., 147.
23 Ibid., 147.
29 John Rawls, “Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical”, 225.
30 Rawls, “The priority of right and ideas of good”, 252.
31 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 441-2.
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a democratic society as the pool from which various implicit fundamental 
ideas will be drawn in the search of consensus. The formation of a political 
conception of justice, one upon which an overlapping consensus is reached, 
is Rawls’ way out from the troubles that the fact of pluralism brings in a 
democratic society, in order to achieve the desired stability of social unity. 
Most importantly, the political conception of justice is not — at least not 
necessarily — an original creation, since it is based on already existing ideas 
and principles, although it can combine them in ways previously unexplored. 
It is a collection and combination, a reproduction, of the familiar ideas shared 
by the members of a democratic society on an intuitive basis.
Having discussed the main parameters of Rawls’ democratic theory as a 
theory of the public political culture, we now proceed with discussing how 
Rawls treats what other political thinkers before him did not, mainly how his 
liberalism manages to incorporate an idea of the common good, contra to the 
general liberal reluctance to define it. By doing so, Rawls not only defends 
liberalism from the charge that there is no common good implicit in it, 
responding at the same time to the descriptivists’ claim of its unattainability; 
he also relies on a conceptualisation of ethos in order to achieve his 
definition of that common. Rawls’ democratic theory of the public political 
culture thus offers us a theory of the ethos of liberal constitutional 
democracy.32
The Ethos of Justice
The foundation of Rawls’ political liberalism is the complex of the familiar 
ideas implicit in the public political culture of the democratic society, a culture 
that appears to be the locus from where the fundamental ideas for the 
expression of a political conception of justice can be drawn. That said, Rawls 
takes as given the existence of some commonly accepted premises, which 
result from what he calls a ‘tradition of democratic thought’ that is implicit in 
any and every democratic society and that is expected to be intelligible to the
32 For a different approach, see Martin Rhonheimer, “The political ethos of constitutional 
democracy and the place of natural law in public reason: Rawls’ Political Liberalism revisited” 
The American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (2005), 1 -70.
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educated common sense of citizens.33 Rawls, reworking these fundamental 
ideas, has formulated a family of terms upon which political liberalism is to be 
understood: the idea of political justice itself, the conception of society as a 
fair system of social cooperation over time and two companion ideas, the 
political conception of the person as free and equal and the conception of a 
well-ordered society.34 In way of his enquiries towards the elaboration of a 
political conception of justice, that is a conception of justice suitable to the 
basic structure of a constitutional democracy, Rawls needs to appeal to a 
good that is common to the members of the political society.
The idea of a common good shared by the members of a liberal society 
may appear paradoxical. However, as Rawls’s work shows, a common good 
may well be realised by the citizens of a liberal constitutional democracy, 
both as individuals and as a corporate body. To be sure, the fact of pluralism 
excludes a conceptualisation of the political community as a concrete body of 
pursuers of a common end. Still, according to Rawls, there is room for a 
common good in a pluralist liberal constitutional democracy, even though 
“justice as fairness does indeed abandon the ideal of political community if by 
that ideal is meant a political society united on one (partially or fully) 
comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine”35 A democratic 
society as defined by Rawls is not ordered by a comprehensive doctrine but 
by a political conception of justice. The citizens of a well-ordered society of 
justice as fairness, then, have a final end in common, one that indeed is 
political: “namely, the end of supporting just institutions and of giving one 
another justice accordingly”.36 They all work to ensure that every citizen has 
justice in the distribution of opportunities for each person to pursue their 
particular good. Crucially, they all endorse an ethos of justice, a sense of 
justice, that is “an effective desire to comply with the existing rules and to 
give one another that to which they are entitled”,37 an ethos that ensures the
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14.
34 Ibid., 43.
35 Rawls, “The priority of right and ideas of good”, 269.
36 Ibid., 269.
37 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 274-5.
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endurance of the democratic society they live in. But such an ethos is 
anything but democratic.
The Limits of Rawlsian Liberalism
The well-ordered constitutional democracy, or deliberative democracy, that is 
a democratic regime in which citizens deliberate on what they consider as 
the most reasonable political conception of justice bearing a distinct and 
endurable public political culture, forms the basis of Rawls’ theory of 
democracy.38 The principles of justice have a regulatory force and they are 
given after elaboration of ideas already embedded in the society — while 
others are excluded or veiled — in order to secure the fair function of the 
political system. Rawls’ democratic theory introduces and supports a “soft” 
version of democracy, where politics is exhausted in choosing and setting 
into work the best principles of justice, so that the state machine can work 
fairly and eternally.
It is this static image of Rawls’ democracy that renders his democratic 
theory vulnerable to Wolin’s critical argument of “constructivism”. According 
to the latter, a mechanism (which allows the selection of principles that 
regulate the basic structure of society) is assigned precedence over politics. 
The advantage of constructivism is that it allows us to reach an agreement, 
even before there is actual consensus.39 In this scheme, justice is an intuitive 
sense that all human beings carry because it is already embedded in their 
nature and it is expressed in the ethico-political realm in the conventional 
form of an overlapping consensus. It is an ideal justice played out in the 
institutional sphere, “which is meant to provide a critical lever or standard by 
which to measure the real institutional arrangements of contemporary 
democratic societies and political cultures”.40 Rawls’ image of democracy is 
similar to that of a well-functioning machine.
To these criticisms regarding the quality of democracy in Rawls’ 
democratic theory, this thesis aims to add a criticism regarding the quality of
38 Ibid., 448-450.
39 Wolin, “The liberal/ democratic divide”, 99.
40 Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 126.
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the ethos he proposes. Not only does Rawls consider democracy a 
settlement that secures the smooth functioning of the society, restricting it to 
a procedural or institutional level, and propose the existence of a public 
political culture that is stable and fixed a priori - he also accepts a specific 
ethos, that of justice, as already embedded in the moral subjects of his 
democratic theory. This has significant implications for the democratic 
subjects he admires. For Rawls’s democratic subject presupposes that a 
specified model of rational individual is already accepted as ‘normal’ and that 
political behaviour is to be judged according to the criterion set by the 
acceptance of this model. The ethos of justice that Rawls envisions 
presupposes a fixed identity and applies to the bearers of this identity.
In the spirit of this ethos, citizens of the Rawlsian constitutional democracy 
share a common end, that of securing justice for their fellow-citizens and 
themselves, but this common bond that unites them in a political community, 
this ethos of justice, is claimed to be a political one in terms of being non­
social (religious, philosophical or moral). Rawls, in seeking to build a 
coherent political conception of justice, immunises the political space against 
incompatible differences brought in by the fact of pluralism, differences which 
he ostracises to what he calls ‘the social’. His political field is so restricted, 
that it ends up soulless, synonymous with the juridical and thus inhospitable 
to any expressive political action. This isolation of the political life from 
comprehensive doctrines causes Rawls to treat pluralism as a problem for 
democracy that needs to be solved through denial. When he states that “in a 
constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, so far as 
possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious 
doctrines”.41 Rawls in fact denies recognition of the existence of pluralism in 
the public life. The vacant place created by the ostracism of pluralism from 
public life, he seeks to fill with a monism that is manageable and 
encompassed: a set of rules of justice that imposes a specific order that 
needs to be followed, not only as far as the field of politics but also the 
individual is concerned. This individual is not flexible and adaptable, in terms 
of being attuned to the circumstances that arise, but has a fixed, predictable 
behaviour according to which she is accepted as citizen. The ethos of justice
41 Rawls, “Justice as fairness”, 1.
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is an ethos that appeals to the collective level and as such it is imposed on 
the citizens of Rawls’s liberal constitutional democracy.
Rawls’s approach to the political subject, the existence of a political culture 
and of politics altogether came under strong criticism from the so-called 
communitarians, who argued for a more substantive role for culture: 
individuals are already embedded in communities which influence and direct 
their choices and decisions, so that democratic life cannot be perceived 
without taking these communities into consideration. The following section 
discusses how a representative of this strand, Charles Taylor, by way of 
attempting to amplify this argument, fails to offer an account of a democratic 
ethos.
II. Charles Taylor: Democracy and the Ethos of Patriotism
John Rawls is not the only one who has tried to articulate a response to the 
challenge posed by descriptive theorists regarding the attainability of a 
common good in a democratic political society. But what makes his case 
peculiar is the fact that his ideal of a moral based consensus generated a 
whole chain of responses, and not always in line with his own. The most 
notable critique has come from a number of political theorists who find 
problematic not just Rawls’s effective exclusion from public life of debates 
over the good but also his very conception of the moral person. These 
theorists are usually referred to as communitarians, leading to a years- 
lasting debate between them and advocates of Rawlsian liberalism.42
The focus of the debate can be schematised on a trifold basis: the level of 
ontology, that is claims about the nature of the subject; the level of 
methodology, regarding the importance of tradition and social context for 
political reasoning; the normative level, assessing the possible political
42 It is interesting that some of the theorists most commonly identified with communitarianism 
have explicitly denied this characterization. Michael Sandel, for example, has expressed 
“some unease with the communitarian label” (in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, ix and 
186), since he does not always find himself on that side. Alasdair MacIntyre has denounced 
the characterisation stating that he is rather pessimistic about the possibility of creation of 
“worthwhile types of political community” Letter to The Responsive Community 1, no. 3 
(1991), 91.
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implications of communal life.43 The three levels are highly intertwined and 
discussion of each of them results in engaging the others as well.
Theorists such as Michael Sandel and Benjamin Barber reject the 
Rawlsian idea of the free moral subject that is independent of its aims and 
desires, and which is used as the pre-conceptual framework that provides 
the foundation for the prioritisation of the right over the good. Perhaps the 
most famous critique at this point is the one that Sandel provides of the 
‘unencumbered self’ of Rawlsian liberalism. Sandel rejects the possibility of 
separating ourselves from the communities we are members of, since “[t]o 
imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not 
to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly 
without character, without moral depth”44 The importance of community as 
the source for people’s reasoning is vital in the communitarian thesis, since it 
is acknowledged that it is only in the context of communities that justice and 
ethical life are meaningful and thus possible.
Even though no single democratic theory can be derived from the work of 
people that have been characterised as communitarians, due to their many 
internal differences, there are some points of convergence to be identified 
among the ideas that these theorists have introduced into the field. An 
enhanced sense of community, which can even take the form of patriotism 
and a preference for a kind of “strong democracy”, are among these points. 
The idea of such a democracy is fully developed by Barber in his book of that 
name, in which the author rejects any idea of political process that does not 
involve citizens and explains how liberty and equality are not rights to be 
merely attributed but to be acquired through participation.45 Walzer also 
makes a claim for this type of democracy, setting it as one of the basic 
requirements of distributive justice and thus of a community life that does not
43 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
13-14.
44 Michael Sandel, “The procedural republic and the unencumbered self” Political Theory\2, 
no.1 (1984), 90. Amitai Etzioni presents a moderate approach in his “A moderate 
communitarian proposal” Political Theory 24, no. 2 (1996), 155-171.
45 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics fora New Age (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).
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lead to oppression and injuries.46 What makes specific the argument for a 
strong democracy is its prioritisation of a participatory model over a 
representative one (what can be called “thin democracy”): “The taste for 
participation is whetted by participation: democracy breeds democracy”.47 
Both theorists not only are affirmative concerning the question of the 
attainability of a common good, but they adhere to it as the primary end of 
political life.
Charles Taylor is one of the theorists usually referred to as a 
communitarian or a civic republican, since his work on identity/difference, 
recognition and multicultural politics raises issues in a similar way to theorists 
bearing the label of communitarian like Walzer and Barber48 Taylor himself 
claims to be “unhappy” with the use of the term “communitarian”, not least 
because the exaltation of community over everything sounds to him “as 
though the critics of this liberalism wanted to substitute some other all- 
embracing principle”, probably here having in mind nation and nationalism.49 
Instead, Taylor proposes that in order to avoid confusion one should use the 
terms “atomists” and “holists”, when issues of ontology are at stake, and 
“individualists” and “collectivists” for advocacy issues. Despite the fact that 
these two congeries of issues are distinct, they by no means are 
independent: for there exist atomist individualists (Nozick is an example 
here), but holist individualists (Humboldt) and atomist collectivists (B.F. 
Skinner) as well.50
Taylor’s intention here is to bring back to the debate over justice issues of 
identity and community that the so-called procedural liberal theories that 
prioritise the right over the good have sought to banish by excluding a
46 Michael Walzer, “Justice here and now”, in Michael Walzer and David Miller, Thinking 
Politically: Essays in Political Theory (Binghamton, NY: Vail Ballou Press, 2007), pp. 68-80.
47 Barber, Strong Democracy, 265.
48 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 1992), Beau Breslin, The Communitarian Constitution (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2002), Nicholas A. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
49 James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in 
Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 250.
50 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1995),181 -185.
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socially endorsed conception of the good, while focusing on the procedures 
of decision. Restricting the debate either to issues of right or to issues of the 
social goods is to be blind to the complexities of the political life. Under these 
terms, Taylor attacks the much-celebrated neutrality of a Rawlsian-type 
procedural democracy, for according to his view it fails to promote what he 
considers to be the necessary element for every modern democratic society. 
That is, by supporting the idea that society must be neutral on the question of 
common good, theorists of procedural democracy lose sight of the essential 
bond that bonds citizens into a shared political sphere.
In this next section, then, Taylor’s perception of democracy will be 
scrutinised. I will argue that his vision of democracy is sustained by a 
particular ethos; that Taylor’s promotion of collectivity over individuality, and 
his view of the common good as embedded in the social world, dictate a 
specific democratic vision, one that aspires to treat difference in such a way 
that it does not hinder public exchange and, in fact, becomes an essential 
part of it. In order to do so, Taylor needs to appeal to a particular ethos that 
enables individuals who, despite honouring different values, identify with a 
community and its ends. In my analysis I suggest that Taylor, despite opting 
for an ethos to sustain his civic republican vision, fails to honour the inner 
component of this ethos. I also argue that Taylor, by giving credence to the 
attainability of an encompassing community, opts for the idea that there 
exists a pre-political ethos, a pre-understanding among individuals, which 
can prevent the fragmentation that pluralism necessarily entails. He therefore 
falls for a moralisation of the political and thus for an image of democracy as 
the harmonious decision-making process governing the political life of a 
community that succeeds in assimilating any and every difference.
Taylor’s Philosophic Anthropology
In order to appreciate Taylor’s political theory and his view of democracy 
more specifically, one has to take into consideration issues of ontology, 
epistemology and the conception of the moral subject as these arise in his 
work. His “philosophic anthropology”, by which he means “the study of the
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basic categories in which man and his behaviour is to be described and 
explained”,51 involves a serious critique of both naturalistic and atomistic 
accounts of the human nature which interprets individuals as free and self- 
sufficient agents whose relation to society is exhausted in that it helps them 
to achieve their particular ends. That said, Taylor challenges the idea that any 
collectivity is only to be understood as the sum of its individuals and he 
supports a more intersubjective, holistic and non anthropocentric approach in 
understanding moral motivation. He attacks atomism and the modern view of 
what he calls “the disengaged self”, that is the ideal of a self “capable of 
objectifying not only the surrounding world but also his own emotions and 
inclinations, fears and compulsions and achieving thereby a kind of distance 
and self possession which allows him to act ‘rationally’”.52 Taylor contrasts 
this “understanding of the individual as metaphysically independent of 
society”53 and he seeks to feature the constitutive role of community in the 
formation of the individual, a view that atomism fails to grasp, along with the 
very idea that this much-celebrated free individual,
is himself only possible within a certain kind of civilization; that it took a 
long development of certain institutions and practices, of the rule of law, 
of rules of equal respect, of habits of common deliberation, of common 
association, of cultural self-development, and so on, to produce the 
modern individual; and that without these the very sense of oneself as 
an individual in the modern meaning of the term would atrophy.54
In political theory, Taylor identifies atomism with the contractarian theories of 
Hobbes and Locke, but also with those of utilitarianism and John Rawls, all 
in contrast to the civic humanist tradition in which he places himself.
Theorists moving within the boundaries of this latter tradition, like 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville, praise the participation 
of individuals in rule, celebrating it as a good in itself. The fact of
51 Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge, 1964), 8.
52 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 21.
53 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 8.
54 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 309.
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participation, far from being seen instrumental^, that is as a means for the 
realisation of other goals, is considered an essential component of human 
dignity. Moreover, in this tradition the notion of freedom is not the modern 
negative one; rather, it is used as the antonym for “despotic”, in terms of 
participation, to highlight the source of legitimacy of state power.55 According 
to the reasoning of this tradition, if compliance with the laws of the political 
society is not to come from coercion and thus is not a matter of imposition, 
then what is required in order for this society to stay together is a sense of 
political identification with the polis on behalf of the citizens, a sense of 
solidarity with their fellow-citizens, a certain type of patriotism. Taylor places 
himself within this tradition, concluding that republican patriotism is a force 
which provides explanatory validity to certain responses and reactions that 
expressions of atomism such as egoism or altruism do not.
Patriotism and Tayior’s Democratic Vision
Patriotism is also at the core of Taylor’s vision of democracy. This is so 
because in his political thought democracy, seen as a mere set of institutions 
and procedures that set them into work, is itself a non-sustainable entity and 
therefore needs to be supplemented and supported by a corresponding civic 
culture. According to his reasoning, modern democratic states are common 
enterprises in self-rule and their high demands can be met only by a citizenry 
that is strongly identified with the state56 He, therefore, moves in the context 
of republican democratic theory, but he revitalises it and makes his own 
contribution to it by seeking to provide an alternative model in which the 
terms of the debate about the accommodation of difference in a constitutional 
democratic regime are set, without - in contrast to Rawls - aspiring to exclude 
or disguise it from public debates.
Taylor’s elaboration of democracy begins with the assertion that 
democracy entails a paradox: on the one hand, it is the rule of the people, by 
the people, for the people, and as such it involves the greatest number of 
participants than any other form of political rule; on the other hand, at the
55 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 187.
56 Charles Taylor, “Why democracy needs patriotism” Boston Review  19, no. 5 (1994).
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same time this very notion of the people produces a dynamic toward 
exclusion. In order for a democracy to function it needs a tightly formed 
demos, that is a deliberative unit constituted in such a way “that its members 
are capable of listening to one another and effectively do so” and that this 
listening will continue over the future to secure the state’s viability.57 
According to Taylor, what this form of the demos implies is a certain degree 
of cohesion, which he translates as “a strong collective identity” or a “mores 
of commitment”, a sense of reciprocal trust and understanding among the 
members of the modern democratic society and of each of them to the latter 
as a totality.58 Now, it is exactly this dire need for commonality in a modern 
democratic society, an essential feature of which is its deep diversity, that 
urges towards exclusion. In democracy, Taylor assesses, exclusion may 
target people that enter the state’s political sphere either from abroad or from 
a condition of previous inactivity. It may also be an inner exclusion, that is 
one which turns against alternative ways of experiencing modern citizenship, 
in the context of a regime which presses for a rigid form of political life. In 
either case, democratic exclusion poses a challenge to democracy itself, one 
that can be tackled by redefining political life.
Taylor seems to have grasped better than Rawls the fact that modern 
democracies face a challenge of constant ‘self-reinvention’, that is a process 
of “redefining their common understandings to include new groups of people, 
and revising their traditional political culture to accommodate varied 
identities, both homegrown and newly arrived”59 But he resists the tendency 
to respond to this challenge with the favouring of the kind of Liberalism that 
Sandel calls a “procedural republic” and that gives precedence to issues of 
individual rights and democratic and legal procedures over issues of self-rule. 
Despite the fact that this approach sounds effective and self-proving given 
the circumstances of rising fragmentation, it entails the concealment of 
individual differences in the name of the creation of a common terrain on 
which public deliberation and decision making can safely be played out. It
57 Charles Taylor, “A tension in modern democracy”, in A. Botwinick and W.E. Connolly (eds), 
Democracy and Vision, 80.
58 Ibid., 81.
59 Ibid., 87.
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thus gives rise to a model of citizenship in which questions of the good life 
are kept away from the public sphere, promoting a neutrality that functions to 
prevent a strong affiliation of citizens with the state. Taylor, whose work 
echoes Hegel in celebrating human subjectivity but at the same time 
prioritising community and the standards of legitimacy it provides to 
individuals, cannot settle with such a neutrality: the modern democratic state 
bears its own identity. Hegel, who as I have previously discussed honours the 
ethos in its collective dimension, as the set of common traits shared by the 
members of a community, is strongly present in Taylor’s elaboration. Like 
Hegel, Taylor also aspires to patriotism as the political disposition that binds 
individuals to the state. However, Taylor knows that in late modernity 
differences cannot just be ignored or suppressed.
The approach that Taylor counter-proposes is one that aims to bring 
issues of individual differences to the fore, one that does not demand from 
citizens that they abstract from their differences when deliberating on public 
issues, but instead aspires to their coming to see them as an essential 
element of their very commonality. According to the line of thought that this 
model introduces,
people can also bond not in spite of, but because of, difference. They 
can sense, that is, that the difference enriches each party, that their 
lives are narrower and less full alone than they are in association with 
each other. In this sense, the difference defines a complementarity.60
In contrast to the procedural republic, Taylor’s model of complementarity 
provides a strong incentive to learn about fellow-citizens’ outlooks. In fact, 
more than other-understanding, it provides a source of self-understanding. In 
highly complex modern democratic societies recognition, inclusion in 
participation of all constituent parties of the community are important factors 
for the function of democracy. In order for these conditions to be satisfied in a 
society comprised of bearers of different cultures, the claim for equal worth of 
all these cultures must be recognized. It is here that the concept of “other- 
understanding”, which is inspired by Gadamer’s hermeneutics, becomes 
particularly relevant to Taylor’s democratic project.
60 Ibid., 89.
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Tackling Difference, Aspiring to Ethos
The important matter with what Taylor calls a ‘comparative model’, is that it 
allows one to enlarge her understanding, not only in terms of recognising and 
elevating other parties’ convictions as equals to hers, but also to gain a 
critical perspective of herself.61 More specifically, Taylor favours a response 
to difference in which understanding of the other is attained “by altering and 
enlarging [understanding], remaking its forms and limits”.62 This form of 
response to difference has a certain impact on one’s self-understanding, 
because it makes one realise that her mode of being is just one possibility 
among many others. Taylor attributes this to what he perceives as a crucial 
feature of the human condition and constitutive of the realisation of human 
identity, that is its fundamentally dialogical character: “We become full human 
agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our 
identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.”63 
Responding to difference by changing our understanding of it entails also 
shifting the limits of what is intelligible to us, re-articulating these very limits in 
order to include previously excluded elements: “The sober and rational 
discourse which tries to understand other cultures has to become aware of 
itself as one among many possibilities in order properly to understand the 
others”.64
Taylor draws on Gadamer, who originally sought to present understanding 
as the fusion of the horizon of the past and that of the present, explaining 
that the horizon of the present is always in the process of on-going formation. 
For Gadamer, the past plays a decisive role in this process65 Taylor presents 
the process of other-understanding schematically as moving in a broader 
horizon, “within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the 
background to evaluation can be situated as one possibility alongside the
61 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 150.
62 Ibid., 149.
63 Charles Taylor, “The politics of recognition”, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32.
64 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 149.
65 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum Publishing Ltd, 1975 (2004 
ed.), 305.
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different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture.”66 Taylor accepts the 
charges that the logic of this process will always result in the creation of new 
limits and will always give rise to new distortions: every new broader horizon 
will always include one’s own home-understanding. This latter is inescapable, 
since we will always use our judgements of truth or validity in order to 
understand the others and to articulate this understanding. But Taylor is 
explicit: the aim of the process is not to escape horizons, but a fusion of 
horizons, where attentiveness to include all relevant parts should be shown.
This approach of difference here resembles the discussion of Protagoras 
in Chapter One. Taylor, by using the metaphor of horizons, seems to be 
suggesting that differences can be accommodated within culturally specific 
horizons which then participate into a process of exchange or fusion. 
Protagoras, we recall, with his man-measure doctrine, suggests that 
opinions, knowledge and truth are always relevant to the city-context in which 
they are produced. I have argued that this claim leads Protagoras to affirm 
the teachability of political knowledge, that is, that people can learn how to 
respond politically and comport themselves according to the rules of the city. 
And that it is this affirmation that leads him to transcend the dichotomy 
between the inner and outer dimension of ethos. Taylor, on the other hand, 
as I will shortly discuss, fails to do so.
Taylor’s goal here is to overcome ethnocentrism, but still achieve a 
functioning political society, a community united by a special bond that will be 
the product of difference. The political community Taylor envisions is an 
‘imagined community’ where people accept the law that defines it as the 
community of those whose freedom it realises and defends. That said, 
identification of the people with this community stems from the fact that their 
freedom as human beings is realised within its context, whereas at the same 
time it provides them with a horizon within which their specific common 
cultural and national affiliation finds expression 67 In fact, the very existence 
of this political community presupposes the existence of a “deeper patriotic
66 Taylor, “The politics of recognition”, 67.
67 Charles Taylor, “Democratic exclusion (and its remedies?) The John Ambrose Stack 
memorial lecture” in Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. 
Michelmann and David E. Smith (eds.), Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 268.
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identification” among its members, a bond of solidarity “based on a sense of 
shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value”.68 In this sense, civic 
relationships among the citizenry of a democracy resemble friendship and 
the commitments taken by friends based on trust69 and this trust is extended 
to processes of collective deliberation and decision-making, hence the 
importance of listening in Taylor’s account of the demos and the polity’s 
survival. According to this analysis, decision-making in democracies - a 
process that Taylor connects also to self-understanding - is subject to three 
conditions: (a) belonging to a community that shares common purposes and 
recognition that the other members share them too; (b) giving a genuine 
hearing to every group during the debate; and (c) safeguarding that decisions 
express the majority.70 But since satisfaction of one of these conditions can 
fail, fragmentation is always a possible outcome. To fight against this, Taylor 
turns to the wider social and cultural context.
Taylor’s work is characterised by an ambiguity. For whereas he accepts 
contingency as a characteristic element in the process of developing self- 
identity in modernity (since it is dependent on recognition by others),71 he is 
also convinced that modern democratic societies need to be bonded more 
powerfully than chance grouping.72 He finds adherence to a common aim 
inadequate in itself and he therefore proposes that a common identity is at 
stake, a bond of solidarity in the form of patriotism and more specifically a 
“deeper patriotic identification”. According to his vision of democracy, the 
process of democratic decision-making, if reliant only on political institutions, 
is doomed to failure: it needs to be expanded to a flourishing public sphere, 
in which cultural, religious and other differences are seriously taken into 
consideration in the discussion becoming an essential part of it. Under these 
circumstances, democratic institutions are not sustainable in themselves, but 
they become so when infused with the sense that their particular cultural and 
national identities find expression in these institutions. For Taylor, then,
68 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 192.
69 The idea is already familiar since Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII-IX.
70 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 276.
71 Taylor, “The politics of recognition”, 35.
72 Taylor, “Democratic exclusion (and its remedies?)”, 266.
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democracy alone cannot generate allegiance: it relies on an extra-political 
foundation, on an ethos that is pre-democratic and pre-political and which is 
the result of the process that he describes as other-understanding. This 
process, taking place under undefined circumstances, is not necessarily 
political; for as Taylor claims, “meeting foreign cultures” can well be an 
example of such a process. However, Taylor fails to address the issue of how 
one can move to a broader horizon and thus attain other-understanding, 
through an altered self-understanding. In other words, he fails to address to 
inner component of the ethotic dimension of democracy.
Taylor, in contrast to Rawls, seems to want pluralism as a part of political 
life. Moreover, he is suspicious of a private definition of the good: the 
individual good is actually the common good of a community bonded by an 
ethos of “deeper patriotic identification”. More significantly, he thematises a 
community of other-understanding as the ultimate ideal, as the community 
par excellence that enables the inclusion of every particular horizon. But 
such a vision necessarily leads to oppression, since the members of the 
community, as well as those who wish to become members, are obliged to 
espouse the common collective morality that Taylor envisions. They are 
urged by the vision of the perfect community to synchronise themselves, that 
is their particularities, with the normalising dictates of this community, in order 
to achieve the level of other and self-understanding that Taylor proposes. The 
individuals of this community are supposed to be developed according to the 
latter’s rules and for its sake; they are bound to the “Taylorite model of 
attunement to a higher purpose in being”.73 However, as I argue in the last 
chapter of the thesis, democratic individuals need only to be attuned to the 
circumstances they encounter, not to standard communities and their traits. 
In contrast to Taylor’s democratic subjects, who are the objects in a process 
of assimilation, the democratic subjects as envisioned here are continuously 
redefined through various processes of subjectification. The ethos that 
motivates and attracts them to this condition of detachment and re­
attachment is one that appeals to both the individual and the collective level. 
The ethos of “deeper patriotic identification” that Taylor appeals to in order to 
sustain his harmonious democratic community does not bridge the inner with
73 William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis and London: 
Minnesota University Press, 2002), 85.
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the outer dimensions of democracy, since it cannot project any political 
outcomes. It is an ethos that is neither as democratic nor as pluralistic he 
hopes.
III. Iris Marion Young: An Ethos for Communicative Democracy
Attendance to difference as a constitutive element of the public life in 
democratic societies is an inspiring source for theorists who seek to 
transcend the neutrality that liberals promote and celebrate, either by 
supporting a view of democracy as an open discussion where differences are 
brought in or by rendering diversity the organising theme in their theories. 
Political theorists choosing the first way thematise democracy as a public 
debate that aims to maximise the participation of every citizen; the second 
response to liberal neutrality forms a distinct yet multifarious approach both 
in political theory and political movements and is known as “identity politics”. 
Iris Marion Young’s work can be placed in the context of this scheme and can 
be interpreted as an attempt to bring difference to the fore of political life 
under certain conditions of communication while criticising essentialism, both 
in the form of liberalism and that of identity politics.
This section analyses Young’s elaboration of this idea of democracy and in 
particular considers her attempt to introduce a theory of citizenship that 
attends to the diversity of group identification that pluralism introduces in a 
democratic society. But far from attributing to citizenship the status of the only 
identity suitable to the public sphere, Young adopts what she sees as a 
radical democratic pluralism that places groups at the centre of political life 
and the norm of inclusion as the ultimate goal of democracy. She suggests a 
version of deliberative democracy that she calls communicative democracy 
envisioning a discursively mediated understanding between bearers of 
otherness which realises a more inclusive democratic society that produces 
just solutions for its members. In order to do that Young attends to a distinct 
ethos, that of differentiated solidarity, which once endorsed by the citizens of 
the unoppressive city she envisions, will sustain her inclusive democracy. 
However, the ethos that Young suggests is nothing but a common morality
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shared by citizens of the community she envisions; a community neatly 
ordered and highly inclusive; a community inhabited by rational agents who 
are willing to hear and understand each other, and therefore a community of 
normality and harmony. As I argue in the thesis, though, such a vision is 
insufficient to the internal strife and turbulence characterising a political 
community, due to the issues of inequality and pluralism inherent in it.
BricolageM Method for a Liberatory Politics
Young uses the approach of critical theory and she advances a politics of 
difference, that is a politics which construes difference not in terms of an 
obstacle, an unlucky event or an incident that necessarily leads to exclusion, 
but as an inevitable element of any pluralist democratic society and therefore 
as a politics that “provides experiential and critical resources for democratic 
communication that aims to promote justice”.74 She draws inspiration from 
Marcuse’s discussion on the production of universals (Young prefers the term 
“ideals”) from the experience of reality and she declares herself to be 
engaged in a “socially and historically situated normative analysis”.75 That 
said, Young draws images from the experience of actually existing 
democracy which she then elaborates in order to formulate ideals of inclusive 
democracy. These aim not to function as blueprints or descriptions, but as 
opportunities to criticise reality and envisage it in a different way. 
Furthermore, her work on justice poses a well-articulated challenge to the 
prevailing theory of Rawls, whose work she criticises and seeks to radicalise 
by interpreting justice in terms of inclusion rather than distribution and 
individuals as active participants rather than as consumer-oriented 
individualists. Young’s theory of justice aims to be one of enablement and 
empowerment.76 In general, her theoretical roots are a combination of 
Liberalism, Republicanism, Feminism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, 
Psychoanalysis, Critical Race Theory and Deconstruction. As she says, in
74 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 115.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 Ibid., 90-91. See also Iris Marion Young, “Taking the basic structure seriously”
Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (2006), 91-97.
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defence of this kind of approach that attends to so many theories at the same 
time, it “aim(s) to expose some of their failings and limitations as tools for 
illuminating or promoting a liberatory politics. This is the method Claude Levi- 
Strauss called ‘bricolage’” 77
Towards a More Inclusive Democracy
Inclusion is elevated to the central element of Young’s vision of democratic 
politics and she would thus concur with Taylor on the importance of the 
participation of every and any citizen in decision-making processes of a 
democratic polity, and the political impact of social groups both in defining 
individual identity and in securing a just public policy. Her work introduces the 
idea of ‘a group-differentiated citizenship’, which challenges both the 
generalising ideal of universal citizenship that transcends every particularity 
and the approach of social difference as identity per s e 78 Implicit in this 
repudiation of the ideal of universal citizenship is Young’s redefinition of the 
public sphere, away from something strictly civic and towards a more 
heterogenous public. Accordingly, Young moves from an account that 
accepts as the only identity valid for the public sphere that of citizen, to one 
that regards the public as that which acknowledges the irreducibility of 
difference. It is an Arendtian account where the public is not the comfortable 
place among those who share a common language, but “a place of 
appearance where actors stand before others and are subject to mutual 
scrutiny and judgement from a plurality of perspectives”.79 Young’s notion of 
the social group is inspired by Heidegger’s idea of ‘thrownness’: one finds 
oneself being thrown into a group, which is already there and will continue to 
be even after the individual is gone.80 That said, groups are prior to 
individuals and they play a significant role in the formation of the latter’s
77 Iris Marion Young, “Reply to Tebble” Political Theory 30, no. 2 (2002), 283.
78 Iris Marion Young, “Polity and group difference: A critique of the ideal of universal 
citizenship”, Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989), 250-274.
79 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 111.
80 Young, “Polity and group difference”, 260. According to Heidegger, “the expression 
‘thrownness’ [Gewofernheit] is meant to suggest the facticity of [Dasein’s] being delivered 
over’, Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
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identities. This makes social groups distinct from both aggregates and 
associations: the latter are formed on a voluntary basis and the former are so 
defined by external agents due to a set of attributes shared by their 
members. Instead, Young argues, members of social groups do not share a 
common nature; membership must be understood in relational terms:
a social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one 
other group by cultural forms, practices, or ways of life. Members of a 
group have a specific affinity with one another because their similar 
experience or way of life, which prompts them to associate with one 
another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a 
different way.81
Her treatment of groups and difference as focal points for modern pluralist 
democracies leads Young to endorse a radical democratic pluralism “which 
acknowledges and affirms the public and political significance of social group 
differences as a means of ensuring the participation and inclusion of 
everyone in social and political institutions”.82 Thus, the politics advanced by 
Young appreciates the fluidity of social groups, that is the porous nature of 
their borders and the internal differentiations within and across them. In 
contrast to identity politics, the politics that Young advances does not seek to 
attribute a unified identity to the members of the groups, nor does it consider 
the latter independent from the individuals constituting them. A pivotal role in 
this thematisation of identity and politics is attributed to recognition, the 
subject of which is the social group that struggles against the structural 
inequalities prevailing in modern democratic societies. Young’s democratic 
theory, then, is a theory of justice which seeks to accommodate the concerns 
of social justice movements, where justice is not conceived in terms of 
distributing benefits and duties, but as the elimination of oppression and 
domination, the two conditions of injustice which obscure self-development 
and self-determination.83 Young detects a double circularity implicit in the 
relation between democracy and justice: first, if democracy is to promote
81 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
43.
82 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 168.
83 Ibid., 33-38.
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justice, it must already be just; second, since modern democracies are torn 
by structural inequalities, any effort to promote justice will produce more 
injustice. To break this double circularity, Young suggests that we need to 
deepen democracy, to make it more inclusive. For this reason she aspires to 
the norms provided by deliberative democracy, in the context of which she 
places her work.
Young uses the norm of inclusion as the primary condition of democracy, 
an inclusion played out on the register of decision-making processes and she 
thus wishes to attribute to it an explicitly political meaning.84 Despite the fact 
that she considers the model of deliberative democracy as offering the most 
prominent account for an inclusive democracy, she does not endorse it 
without criticism. Rather, she introduces a broader and more inclusive model 
of communicative democracy in which “differences of social position and 
identity perspective function as a resource for public reason rather than as 
divisions that public reason transcends”.85 It is a model that seeks to 
overcome what she finds problematic in deliberative democratic theory, like 
the suggested idea that the latter is culturally neutral and universal. This 
presumption, she suggests, flows from privileging argument as the primary 
form of political communication. Young is concerned with the possible 
exclusion of the needs of groups that either do not fit in the shared 
understanding as expressed in public arguments or are not communicated 
due to limitations imposed to these groups by their lack of what she calls the 
norm ‘articulateness’.86 Furthermore, she assesses argument as being a 
dispassionate and disembodied form of communication that tends to 
presuppose an opposition between reason and emotion and that is too 
narrow and exclusive to exhaust the function of communication. Instead, she 
suggests that if communication is to be democratic and inclusive it must be 
responsive to an expanded conception of political communication. She 
therefore proposes three modes that enrich communication: greeting, or
84 Ibid., 13. She also acknowledges the importance of other secondary norms, such as 
political equality, reasonableness, and publicity, Ibid., 23-25.
85 Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy”, in 
Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 127.
86 Young, Democracy and Inclusion, 38.
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public acknowledgement, rhetoric, and narrative or situated knowledge.87 
The aim of adopting such an expanded perception of political communication 
is to achieve communication across wide differences of cultures and social 
position.
Another way that Young distances herself from theorists of deliberative 
democracy is by criticising their view of it as aiming to construct or discover a 
unity, meaning that they consider commonness as a condition of deliberation 
or as its goal. In the first case, shared understanding among the members of 
the polity is presumed to exist, an assumption that Young problematises 
given the circumstances in modern pluralist societies. Not least, this 
presumption obviates the need for transformations from self-regarding to 
enlarged thought, a highly-valued aspect of a discussion-based model of 
democracy:
If discussion succeeds primarily when it appeals to what the 
discussants all share, then none need revise their opinions or 
viewpoints in order to take account of perspectives and experiences 
beyond them. Even if they need the others to see what they all share, 
each finds in the other only a mirror for him or herself.88
On the other hand, those who theorise political discussion as aiming at 
commonness that transcends any difference tend to exaggerate consensus 
at the expense of disadvantaged groups and to the benefit of the privileged. 
At this point Young’s thought draws on the ideas of those endorsing an 
“agonistic” model of democratic process, where democratic debate is less a 
polite, orderly, dispassionate argument and more a “struggle”. Aspiring to 
bring passions, experiences and mainly difference to the fore of political 
discussion, Young gives precedence to “a process of communicative 
engagement of citizens with one another”.89
In her account of democratic politics as “a deliberation in a heterogenous 
public which affirms group differences and gives specific representation to
87 Ibid., 57-77.
88 Young, “Communication and the Other”, 125.
89 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 50.
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oppressed groups”,90 Young does not endorse the ideal of community as 
Taylor and the communitarians do. Rather, she proposes a different account 
of unity, a “minimal” one, where unity is translated to proximity. The rationale 
behind this argument is that it is proximity that produces politics: “A polity 
consists of people who live together, who are stuck with one another”.91 If a 
polity is to be a communicative democracy, something more is needed: an 
agreement on the rules of deliberation and decision-making as well as equal 
respect for each other. This much weaker unity in comparison to the one 
endorsed both by deliberative democrats and communitarians is exemplified 
in Young’s alternative to the latter’s ideal of community. Bringing together 
Derrida and his view that the ideal of community participates in the 
metaphysics of presence with Adorno who finds in the logic of community the 
logic of identity, and thus a metaphysics that denies difference,92 she 
counter-proposes the ideal of city life as most pertinent to the realities of 
modern pluralistic societies. This ideal of the unoppressive city, that “is not 
planned and coherent, which embodies difference and the being-together 
with strangers”,93 is Young’s vehicle towards a politics of difference. It is a 
political entity of strangers living close to each other and which is defined by 
its openness to unassimilated otherness.
These elaborations bring Young to a radical version of the deliberative 
model, one in which there is no common good neither as a starting point nor 
as the ultimate target of political communication. In its place there are the 
different stories and experiences that participants bring with them when they 
enter democratic decision-making processes, the different points from which 
they argue when articulating their needs and demands. But there is also a 
shared world in which they all dwell and when they communicate their 
different perspectives of that world to each other, “they collectively constitute 
an enlarged understanding of that world”94 Democracy, as theorised by
90 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 260.
91 Young, “Communication and the Other”, 126.
92 Iris Marion Young, “The ideal of community and the politics of difference”, in Colin Farrelly 
(ed.), Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader {London: Sage Pubications, 2004), 195.
99 Ibid., 201.
94 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 112.
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Young, can only function effectively - i.e. produce just solutions - when 
different situated participants realise and respect their condition as such and 
internalise a mediated understanding by listening across their differences.
Problematising the Ethos of Differentiated Solidarity
Young believes that a political entity functioning under these terms needs a 
certain disposition, a certain ethos that brings different situated participants 
together; she suggests that this is an ethos of differentiated solidarity. This 
exceeds processes such as assimilation in that it “allows for a certain degree 
of separation among people who seek each other out because of social or 
cultural affinities they have with one another that they do not share with 
others”.95 Thus it allows space for particularist self-affirmation and for the 
development of interest in solving common problems through deliberation, 
while maintaining differentiated positions.
Young’s theory of a more inclusive communicative democracy that is able 
to produce just results is sustained and indeed reinforced by the ethos of 
differentiated solidarity she proposes. By choosing the word “solidarity”, 
Young wishes to put emphasis on “a concept of mutual respect and caring 
that presumes distance”,96 being thus completely compatible with the 
conditions of living in modern societies where people are strangers and 
remain strangers to each other despite the moments of common experience 
they share. The basis of this ethos is neither the too weak conception of 
toleration nor the too strong feeling of communal identification. Rather, she 
argues, it is the very fact that people live together, their proximity that 
imposes similar circumstances, needs and problems on them and this 
obliges them to act collectively to promote justice for everyone. Implicit in this 
ethos is the idea of openness to unassimilated otherness, which goes hand 
in hand with a respectful distance:
To be open to unassimilated otherness means not only acknowledging
clear differences, but also affirming that persons have multiple
95 Ibid., 221.
96 Ibid., 222.
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memberships, and that some persons, either by choice or by accident, 
do not fit any characterisation.97
Such an ethos, suited as it is to the circumstances of city life, corresponds to 
the ideal of differentiated citizenship that Young finds most appropriate for her 
variation of deliberative democracy.
There is, however, a series of shortcomings with this ethos. I find that 
Young not only fails to address how her imagined solidarity among distanced 
but caring, as she says, individuals is cultivated if it is to be conducted 
through the processes of deliberation she theorises. I also find that her 
concept of proximity is all-too-encompassing, for it presupposes a 
commonality (of problems, needs and circumstances) that is too fixed. 
Despite recognising the fact of multiple memberships, Young fails to 
appreciate and include in her analysis their temporal and therefore fugitive 
character. This is why her democratic vision is based on a strong conception 
of polity, despite her intentions to the opposite. This polity is one that is kept 
vivid and productive — in terms of justice — only as long as it is regulated by 
the rules of deliberation and decision-making: city life has its own rules. It is a 
localised and protected polity, while its members are expected to be the 
bearers of a specific ethos if this universe is to function. This neatly ordered 
city life that Young thematises reminds us Walt Whitman’s poetry and his 
idea of social solidarity among strangers. Her city is a well-ordered society, 
where each differentiated group has its place and justice along with equality 
prevail, whereas oppression and suffering have vanished, thanks to the 
prevailing of the ethos of differentiated solidarity. Her polity is not that 
unoppressive as she wishes it to be.
To summarise, Young is committed to an inclusive model of communicative 
democracy in which differences are expected to function as a resource for 
public reason. Despite her intentions to abstain from a strong definition of the 
polity that would seek to enforce homogeneity and would thus lead to 
exclusion, Young at the end falls for a vision of a community that is too fixed 
and instructive. This is dictated by her vision of differentiated solidarity which
97 Ibid., 225.
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realises inclusion and the participation of everyone so as to ensure the just 
character of the city life. Young hopes that this solidarity gives rise to 
acceptance of otherness and therefore also to understanding among 
individuals who remain strangers to each other. But she does not explain 
how this solidarity is to thrive and that it is based on the assumption of a 
commonality of concerns, to which differentiated individuals correspond with 
respect and care to each other. That is, Young remains inattentive to the 
tactical dimension of democracy, failing to grasp the need for work on the self 
that her solidarity would demand. By completely overlooking the private 
component of ethos, Young seems to understand solidarity as a collective 
morality that ought to be shared by the citizens of the unoppressive city, so 
that this ideal is to be fulfilled.
Moreover, there is an ambiguity within Young’s democratic theory and it is 
connected to her strong and explicit rejection of the claim that there can and 
should be an attainable common good among the citizens of a democratic 
polity: “The ideal of a common good, a general will a shared public life leads 
to pressures for a homogeneous citizenry”.98 But what else is the disposition 
that she thematises as the ethos of differentiated solidarity and which is to 
sustain her vision of inclusive democracy, if not a conception of a common 
good shared by each and every member of her unoppressive city? Even 
though it is not a substantive one, the common ethos that Young aspires to is 
an integral part of her theorisation of the community: were it not for this vision 
of a common good her ideal of an inclusive polity would remain unfulfilled. 
Perhaps Young is more Hegelian than she wishes, in that she sees the 
community - the unoppressive city - as embodying its own Sittlichkeit, its own 
distinct way of life. Despite her intentions, Young cannot in fact avoid the 
presence of a common good in her democratic theory and she ends up with 
a moralised conception of a democratic ethos.
98 Young, "Polity and group difference”, 253.
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IV. Conclusion
The chapter has suggested that despite significant differences in their 
starting points, methodologies and modes of argumentation the three 
thinkers scrutinised here, Rawls, Taylor and Young, all appeal to ethos when 
developing their ideas on democracy. They do not do so explicitly. Each of 
them poses the issue in a different way, using his/her own distinct vocabulary 
to articulate it. But each eventually needs to appeal to an ethos to sustain the 
democratic vision which they propose, suggesting that the members of a 
democratic community need to share certain moral commitments, if this polity 
is to achieve its goal of justice, harmony or differentiated citizenship. They all, 
thus, end up with a moralised view of democracy and of politics in general, 
as well as with a sketch of an ideal polity that can be imagined to be concise, 
coherent and free from paradoxes. Furthermore, they all encounter pluralism 
as an issue that needs to be treated and, even more significantly, all of them 
respond to the challenge posed by descriptivist theorists of democracy who 
reject the attainability of a common good in a democratic polity. In fact, as the 
analysis has shown, a concept of a common good is unavoidable for 
theorists who engage with democracy and who appeal to an ethos to 
maintain their democratic vision. But it is, I believe, a common good too bold, 
fixed and stable to be one that corresponds to the differentiated allegations of 
individuals in late modern democracy. Rather, as I argue in the following 
chapters, the common good must be affirmed as fugitive and momentary.
Even a committed liberal like Rawls explicitly declares that the common 
good has a place in liberal theory and he thematises it when developing his 
theory of justice. The latter needs a concise and perpetuated public political 
culture recognised as already embedded in the moral subjects of the public 
sphere, in order to support the constitutional democracy that is the canvas of 
Rawls’s democratic theory. In his reading, the political culture of a democratic 
society is characterised by the diversity of the reasonable doctrines found in 
it, and it is exactly their trait of reasonableness that poses the problem with 
regard to pluralism, since it is due to this trait that these doctrines are 
incompatible. Rawls solution to the problem is the introduction of a 
comprehensive moral system which he hopes contains diversity and provides
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the neutrality that he believes that the field of politics needs. The system of 
justice he introduces is nothing else than a moral comprehensive doctrine, 
that seals off the public sphere, creating and maintaing the stability and 
orderliness that Rawlsian democracy needs to function. This doctrine is 
sustained by an ethos of justice that the Rawlsian individuals are expected to 
carry within themselves, an ethos that allows and enables decision-making 
under circumstances of neutrality. It is a bureaucratic but by no means 
democratic ethos.
The work of the two other theorists scrutinised in this chapter is a 
response to Rawls’s perception of democracy and pluralism by way of taking 
on the issue of difference. In the case of Charles Taylor ethos is again 
present, although in a very different form, since what is at issue in his theory 
has nothing to do with the search for a political conception of justice. Rather, 
Taylor is mainly concerned with finding the golden mean that will allow 
individuals who are bearers of different ideas to live in a harmonious 
community where they can better pursue the ultimate goal of their self- 
realisation. For this harmonious community to be achieved foreign cultures 
should become more accessible to us, a mission that, according to Taylor, 
can be accomplished through understanding others. Taylor claims that he 
does not wish to introduce a model that rejects difference and strives for 
uniformity in the name of any commonality. Rather, his anxiety is “how people 
can bond together in difference without abstracting from their differences”,99 
introducing for this reason the idea of complementarity of difference, that is 
the idea that differences add to the fullness of humanity through exchange 
and communion between them.100 His model of civic republicanism is based 
on this idea of understanding difference, in contrast to the procedural 
Rawlsian model which urges us to ignore it. But the ideal political community 
of inclusion of every horizon that Taylor envisions can be realised only 
through the identification of its diverse members with it. It is here that Taylor 
needs a deep patriotic ethos to infuse his democratic vision. This ethos is a 
common collective morality shared by the different constituencies of his 
community, if the latter is to satisfy its principle of harmony. Taylor’s
99 Taylor, ‘The dynamics of democratic exclusion”, 153.
100 Ibid., 153.
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democratic individuals are programmed to stay tuned with the common good 
of the harmonious community, enchained by an ethos that is neither 
democratic nor pluralistic.
Young offers an alternative both to the Rawlsian model of distributive 
justice and to the Taylorite ideal of the harmonious community. Unlike 
Rawls’s, her justice is achieved through political empowerment rather than 
redistribution or recognition, whereas her public realm, unlike Taylor’s, is not 
characterised by unity but by proximity and it therefore functions not despite 
but because of its heterogeneity. Young rejects critics who blame the politics 
of difference for endangering democracy by weakening public commitment to 
a common good. She rejects as misleading the identification of the politics of 
difference with identity politics, at the same time downplaying the role of 
‘common good’ when conflicts emanating from the existence of social group 
differences emerge. Rather, she suggests that it is more important to take 
account of the specificities of differentiated relations.101 This is so because 
difference perceived as a potential resource for democratic communication 
enables the preservation of the plurality of the diverse perspectives available 
in the democratic society.
Young advances a model of communicative democracy, where openness 
and willingness to listen to others’ mode of expression, is the only way for 
pursuing it: “[i]n democratic struggle citizens engage with others in the 
attempt to win their hearts and minds, that is, their assent. To do so they 
should be open and reasonable, and be prepared to challenge others 
through criticism and not merely the assertion of opposition”.102 The 
importance of ethos in Young’s theorisation of democracy is underlined by 
the fact that she envisions a citizenry of individuals who understand and join 
each other in making just decisions to solve real life problems while 
remaining divided by their differences. Young needs a disposition that brings 
this heterogenous bunch of individuals close (the proximity she refers to) at 
least as far as the recognition of the commonality of the problem is 
concerned. For if a differentiated polity is not motivated to begin with 
recognising a problem as common, then by no means can it ever get into a
101 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 81-87
102 Ibid., 51
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process of deliberation to solve it: Young seems unable to escape the 
paradox of founding inherent in every contract theory. Citizens in Young’s 
formulation of democracy are bound despite their difference, or better 
because of their differentiated citizenship, by an ethos of differentiated 
solidarity. Because of that, they are expected to carry specific traits, that is, to 
be reasonable and infused with an ethos of solidarity. Even though she 
claims to resist the idea of aspiring to a common good, Young in fact has to 
appeal to a unity in order to sustain her democratic vision. She wants to keep 
distance from both Rawls and Taylor and she claims to celebrate pluralism. In 
fact, she only gives nuances to their perception of pluralism, one that 
resembles the image of a mosaic, within which each difference has its place, 
as long as it keeps itself within that place, within the rules of the political 
game.
The revival of the idea of common good by normative theorists goes hand 
in hand with the effort to address the issue of pluralism, as well as with the 
articulation of a conception of ethos as the necessary element that unites or 
at least brings individuals closer in a modern democratic pluralist society. In 
their effort to do so, the democratic theorists discussed in this chapter end up 
with a moralised view of democracy, by aspiring to a view of the democratic 
polity as the harmonious immunised community which engages in a moral 
deliberation aided by a common morality and a common good, despite some 
intentions to avoid the latter.
This target — of avoiding the coil around a common good strictly defined and 
determined — is shared by theorists who are said to pursue an agonistic 
democratic vision. Iris Marion Young, despite claiming to be willing to follow 
this path, at the end fails to do so by substituting for political struggle entailed 
in an agonistic view of democracy with a moral truth. The next chapter 
discusses how theorists of agonism tackle the issue of pluralism by accepting 
the division in the common good or by suggesting a very thin version of it and 
looks at how their democratic theory is characterised not by the fact of a 
common ontology or epistemology shared by them, but by the introduction of 
ethos as the essence of democracy. At the same time, I will suggest that 
Connolly and Mouffe are more successful in appealing to an ethos to sustain
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their democratic visions, for they affirm democracy as an agon and they 
therefore honour the complexity and multidimensionality of democracy.
155
Chapter 4
Democracy as Ethos: The Agonistic Pluralism of Chantal Mouffe 
and William Connolly
During the 1990s, and partly as a result of criticism of the democratic 
theories of writers such as Taylor and Young, an alternative approach to 
theorising democracy emerged. This approach challenged both descriptive 
(or aggregative) and deliberative democratic theories, seeking to respond to 
their shortcomings through critical reflection while refusing to reduce 
democracy to either a method or a straightforwardly rational moral 
consensus. Thinkers who are engaged in the articulation of this alternative 
perspective worry that advocates of deliberation and description, by focusing 
on the need for consensus, propose in advance an account of democracy 
that is narrowly juridical, administrative and thus managerial or else 
overloaded with concealed, ‘pre-political’ moral images of thought. 
Consequently, they argue, mainstream theories of democracy confine politics 
to the task of stabilising moral and political subjects.1 As such the theory of 
democracy comes to rely on a kind of anti-political perspective which 
threatens the very existence of democracy. Such a sterilised view is 
incapable of mobilising citizens: instead, it renders them passive bearers of 
rights and simple spectactors of decisions made by experts. As a result, 
populists or demagogues of every kind find the political terrain ever more 
fruitful as they seek the support of those citizens who see themselves 
excluded from the political life.
Out of such criticism a distinct account of democracy has emerged. It seeks 
to correct the procedural liberalism espoused by Rawls, Taylor and Young 
challenging not only the idea that consensus in politics can be reached 
through rational deliberation and the bracketing of diverse doctrines, views 
and beliefs but also the very centrality afforded to ‘agreement’ in political life. 
Instead it calls for much greater attention to be paid to the role of conflict and 
agon in democratic politics.
1 Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 2.
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The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise the work of two of the most 
influential thinkers of this agonistic perspective and in particular to make 
clear the role they attribute to ethos in democracy. The chapter argues that in 
enquiring into the essence of democracy in late modern societies, theorists of 
agonistic democracy come to develop a concept of an ethos which infuses 
their visions of democracy. That ethos incorporates elements which agonists 
see as inextricable and characteristic of political life as such: pluralism, 
difference and struggle but also experimentation and performativity.
Section I of this chapter is a kind of “ground-clearing” exercise, presenting 
an overview of the specificities of the agonistic perspective on democratic 
theory and putting into context the work of two key thinkers: Chantal Mouffe 
and William Connnolly. It starts by giving a general account of the agonistic 
approach to politics and it then turns to the antecedents of agonism, 
Nietzsche and Arendt. It then sees how the work of these two thinkers has 
influenced the work of some contemporary thinkers. Sections II and III 
provide a parallel reading of the work of Chantal Mouffe and William 
Connolly, discussing how each theorist directly and indirectly articulates a 
concept of ethos specific to democratic thought. In so doing, both sections 
adopt the contexts, terminologies and definitions characteristic of the distinct 
style of each theorist, working within their framework, as a way of utilising 
their own suggestions on undecidability, contestability and politicisation. The 
overall aim of this reading is to show that both thinkers are on the same 
plane with regard to their view of democracy, placing contest at the center of 
their vision. Their important differences notwithstanding, both thinkers attend 
to pluralism not simply to tackle it as a problem but in order to utilise it in 
favour of democracy. That is, they do not only embrace pluralism for its own 
sake, nor do they stop at celebrating the contribution of contestation to 
democratic life. Rather, their critical endeavours are part of an active 
promotion of the democratic ‘way of life’ and as part of this they seek to 
formulate and promote a conception of ethos in its political dimension that is 
appropriate for the conditions of pluralism in late modern democracies.
The complementary reading attempted here leads me to the conclusion 
that it is because of their inclination to articulate democratic identifications as 
an ethos that both Mouffe and Connolly succeed in being more consistent
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and justified in their conception of ethos than those thinkers we examined in 
Chapter Three. However, as the discussion shows, they fail to attend to the 
interplay between the inner and outer dimension of a democratic ethos and 
this failure sets limitations on their democratic visions. Inevitably, they end up 
suggesting an ideal in the place of the one they seek to challenge, that is an 
ethical category that is too stable: their aspirations notwithstanding, neither of 
them manages to escape or resist the tendency to be instructive. I find that 
this proves crucial for their intention to explicate an agonistic form of 
democracy since, as I argue in the thesis, if we are to infuse such a 
democratic vision with an ethic and the shifting challenges of the democratic 
agon, we need to conceptualise an ethic that is more open to these 
challenges.
Section IV provides a summary of the parallel reading of Connolly and 
Mouffe and bridges the argument against their case with the next chapter. At 
the very end, these two thinkers fail to grasp the importance of a democratic 
ethos that is attuned to the peculiarities of the political moment. To be sure, a 
central claim of the chapter is that only by reading their work together and in 
a complementary fashion can we appreciate the virtues and shortcomings of 
their approach to ethos and so come up with a more productive conclusion 
that is pertinent to the circumstances in late modernity. This methodology of 
complementary reading I will follow also in Chapter Five, since I find that 
such a reading allows me to engage in the work of the theorists under 
scrutiny in a more creative way; it enables me to incorporate in the 
discussion my own views and thus come up with a distinct approach of their 
work. This is in line with what I have previously referred to as a “theory of 
creativity and imagination”, one that I find more pertinent to democracy, 
especially as envisaged in the thesis as multifaceted and kaleidoscopic. This 
approach is, again, inspired by Nietzsche’s evaluation of theory and practice 
as inseparable: here, I do not intend to stand above my object of enquiry, but 
to participate in it and blend my personal views with what Connolly and 
Mouffe (and later Wolin and Ranciere) say.
159
I. Theorising Democracy as Agon
The term “agonistic democracy” has been coined to describe the model of 
reflecting on and practicing democracy which maintains that politics is all 
about conflict, competition over power and resistance, and for which 
disagreement is endemic to democracy itself and an indispensable part of 
political life. The specificity of this approach, then, lies in the fact that, as 
Bonnie Honig puts it, “agonistic conflict is celebrated and the identification or 
conflation of politics with administration is charged with closing down the 
agon or with duplicitously participating in its contests while pretending to rise 
above them”.2 According to this line of thinking, differences in doctrines, 
beliefs and preferences cannot but be brought to the fore and disagreement 
plays the role of catalyst in the cultivation of agonistic relations among 
political agents. Pluralism, then, emerges as a central issue for theorists who 
seek to respond to the descriptive accounts of democracy without falling 
back on the security of a moral consensus. These theorists worry that the 
treatment that such accounts reserve for pluralism, that is as an unavoidable 
problem of late-modern societies that needs to be resolved, results in injuries 
and exclusions. They propose instead that pluralism is constitutive of late- 
modern democracy; that indeed it is the very essence of democracy and 
therefore needs not merely to be preserved, but further enriched and 
enhanced.
Attentiveness to elements of diversification rather than homogenisation is 
a crucial element in the democratic thought of agonistic theorists. They 
consider identities as not existing in isolation, but rather as being constructed 
relationally within a highly diverse social space. As already mentioned in 
Chapter One, Foucault sees the regimes of power and knowledge as 
participating in the construction of the modern subject; it is not only other 
subjects that participate in the shaping of one’s identity, but the heterogenous 
public space, as well. The plurality of ideas and beliefs that prevails in this 
space is further fostered within an agonistic process of political practice, 
because this latter allows the enhancement of diversity and communication 
among contrasting parties. Thus, contrary to proceduralists, these theorists
2 Ibid., 2.
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emphasise the need to contest ethical and cultural questions, instead of 
ostracising them from democratic discourse.3 Moreover, they do not 
completely renounce the possibility of consensus, but instead clarify that 
once achieved it will always be exclusionary and the result of coercion. For 
that reason they seek to disturb the naturalisation and fixation of norms and 
categories, and instead understand them as contingencies while seeking to 
problematise the exclusions caused by such classifications.
As a result, two different ontologies emerge in democratic theory, one of 
concord and one of discordance.4 Whereas for the former harmony is the 
ultimate goal of individual and collective subjects and is achievable through 
the suppression of otherness, for the latter attentiveness to the contingency 
of identity, and thus to the discordance that is already or will be lodged within 
any order, is crucial for democratic thinking and acting. Theorists working on 
this second plane are wary of the normalising effects brought into the political 
life by the over-appreciation of concordance and the idealisation of 
democracy as a condition of balance and harmony. Instead they seek to 
bring democracy’s ambiguity to the fore while appreciating the dynamics that 
contest brings in the political field. Among the most distinguished thinkers 
who endorse such an agonistic model of democracy are Romand Coles, 
William E. Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Chantal Mouffe, Aletta Norval, James 
Tully and others.5
As William Connolly suggests, the specificity of this mode of approaching 
democracy rests on the fact that, contrary to liberal “neutralist” models which 
seek to leave outside the public realm disagreements concerning the good, 
while giving primacy over the right, the agonistic mode tends to bring these
3 Aletta J. Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39.
4 William E. Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity (Madison, Wl: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987), 9-12.
5 Romand Coles, Beyond Gated Politics: Reflections for the Possibility of Democracy 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); William E. Connollly, Identity/ 
Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Minneapolis MN, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002 expedition); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); Aletta J. Norval, Aversive Democracy: 
Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Young explicitly joins this group (2000, 
49-51) and her contribution and its shortcomings are discussed in the previous chapter.
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very disagreements to the fore and make suggestions for tackling them. It 
also breaks with the democratic idealism of communitarianism through its 
refusal to equate concern for human dignity with a quest for rational 
consensus. Furthermore, it breaks with the political minimalism of democratic 
individualism that in the name of the protection of the individual confines 
politics to its “bare essentials”. Agonistic democracy, in contrast, appreciates 
the role of differences in the creation of political spaces in which these 
differences can flourish whilst in contestation with others. Finally, it aims at 
providing a democratic vision that transcends the boundaries of the territorial 
state, an account that can function not against but in complementarity with 
the institutional politics of territorial democracy.6
Agonistic democrats are inspired by a variety of different sources and earlier 
thinkers from Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt to Carl Schmitt and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. But they share in a celebration of the idea of the agon 
and in particular the Nietzschean interpretation of this ancient Greek practice 
which informs some of the most insightful agonistic accounts of democracy. 
Nietzsche’s admiration for the agon stems not merely from the fact that he 
considers it to embody a legitimate expression of power; it is also related to 
his perception of the agon as forming meaningful relations among people 
and thus as enabling the recognition of human possibilities. The agon helps 
people to affirm the possibilities of human beings and even when they do not 
participate in the agon themselves, it enables them to pursue those 
possibilities as their own.7 Nietzsche celebrates the agon for its contribution 
to the quest of self-development.
Nietzsche discusses the agon in an early work, “Homer’s Contest”, in 
which he praises the character of the ancient Greeks. He celebrates their 
embrace of their “natural” qualities along with their human characteristics, 
that is “a trait of cruelty, a tigerish lust to annihilate”.8 They embody, he 
declares, an “uncanny dual character”, since their practices are guided by the
6 Connollly, Identity/ Difference, x-xi.
7 Christa Davis Acampora, “Contesting Nietzsche” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002), 2.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Homer’s contest”, in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 32.
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double-faced goddess Eris: the evil Eris, that leads men into hostile fights of 
annihilation against one another, and the good Eris who spurs men to the 
activity of fights which are contests.9 It is this latter kind of activity that he 
finds pertinent to the world of artists, but also to the world of political life. For 
Nietzsche every talent must unfold itself in fighting; artists, that is people with 
creative talent, engage in contests with each other and they do so by 
attending to their opponent’s strong points. He therefore reclaims the 
relationship of contest with art: a cacophony as it may sound to moderns, to 
ancients the artist is only defined as someone who is engaged in a personal 
fight. This idea is summarised in Plato’s aphorism “Only the contest made me 
a poet, a sophist, an orator”.10 It is an idea that Nietzsche sees as 
condemned by the moderns, for whom nothing is to be more fearful in an 
artist than the emotion of any personal fight. To moderns, Nietzsche 
assumes, a work of art is valued and appreciated for its weakness.
The art of politics does not remain intact from this distortion, since 
moderns would refuse to see the positive face of Eris; to them, contest 
threatens the social cohesion and stability and it is thus a potentially 
dangerous factor that needs to be annihilated from the field of social life and 
politics. It is an important point that in Nietzsche the idea of agon is distinct 
from the lust to annihilate. His purpose is to enable the openness of the 
contest against closure. The agon is a place or moment in which the facts of 
difference and plurality are exposed and experienced, where the pathos of 
distance that allows both the persistence of difference and self-overcoming, 
is reproduced.11 Contest unfolds itself in political life in the practice of 
ostracism, an the institution introduced exactly to preserve the struggle and 
therefore the health of the state. For Nietzsche, exclusion of the best citizens 
safeguards the perpetuity of the contest, functioning less as a safety valve 
and more as a means of stimulation:
the individual who towers above the rest is eliminated so that the
contest of forces may reawaken [...] That is the core of the Hellenic
9 Ibid., 35.
10 Ibid., 38.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151 (section 257).
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notion of the contest: it abominates the rule of one and fears its 
dangers; it desires, as a protection against the genius, another 
genius.12
This institution is a mode of safeguarding in the political field what Nietzsche 
calls “an order of rank” and which he believes necessarily exists between 
people because of their difference. Agon in Nietzsche is an outcome of the 
inevitable difference, of the need to be different, to constantly demand “new 
expansions of distance” and to struggle for its preservation.
The interplay between agonism and difference appears in the work of 
another thinker who inspires proponents of an agonistic model of democracy. 
Although she departs from Nietzsche in several aspects, Hannah Arendt 
embraces his tendency to interpret action in terms of performance.13 It is this 
approach to political action as a performative form of politics, and the ideas 
of activism and resistibility that it echoes, which render Arendt’s work 
stimulating for agonistic democrats. For Arendt, political activity is action par 
excellence (and action is thus one of the most central of political concepts). 
She turns to ancient Greece to reclaim the idea of action not as a means 
towards an ultimate end, but as self-contained, that is, as an activity that 
possesses and makes apparent a specific greatness of its own: action is 
beginning.14 This equation is the actualisation of the human condition of 
‘natality’, of the fact that every new life that comes to the world adds 
something new, distinct and unique to it. At the same time, action is always 
bound to speech, not only because one always attributes meaning to one’s 
deeds through words, but also because one discloses one’s unique identity 
through speech. Like Nietzsche, Arendt finds that human plurality is inherent 
in the public realm.15
It is the combination of action and speech that conditions human plurality: 
“Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that
12 Nietzsche, “Homer’s contest”, 36-37.
13 For Arendt’s Nietzscheanism, as well as its limits, see Dana R. Villa, “Beyond good and 
evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the aestheticisation of political action” Political Theory 20, no. 2 
(1992), 274-308.
14 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 45-46.
15 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), 175.
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is, human in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who 
ever lived, lives or will live”.16 There is something uniquely distinct in human 
beings, we learn from Arendt: their paradoxical plurality, which is revealed 
through speech and action. I have already discussed how Young also attends 
to speech and plurality and places it at the center of her work. However, 
Young, with her overemphasis on the role of inclusion and therefore of the 
communicative framework within which politics takes place, simply cannot 
grasp the essence of natality to which political action is bound. Arendt’s 
political action is all about being able to disrupt a given order and begin 
something new; it is in this sense that it is inherently agonistic.
This reinvention of the agon as a source of self-development and as the 
striving to prevent stagnation has proved inspiring for thinkers who are 
uncomfortable with liberalism’s fixation on harmonious arrangements, and 
who seek a radical approach to political procedures, citizenship and 
democracy itself. For example, William Connolly embraces the Nietzschean 
idea of contestation as flowing from the fact of pluralism and he aspires to an 
agonistic respect among combatants in order to preserve it. For Bonnie 
Honig, the agonistic and performative impulse of Arendt’s politics and a 
radical reading of the latter in terms of resisting the dichotomy of public/ 
private that Arendt introduces, provides inspiration for “a feminist politics that 
seeks to contest (performatively and agonistically) the prevailing construction 
of sex and gender into binary and binding categories of identity...”.17 Despite 
their differences, both thinkers seek to challenge the limits of the political field 
and to expand them, calling for an unceasing struggle against stability and 
harmonious consensus. In the final chapter of the thesis, I give my personal 
account of agonistic democracy, a democracy thus defined for its constant 
call for awareness of the circumstances and the possibilities for action they 
provide.
It is this insistence on the role of disagreement and contestation on behalf 
of agonists that introduces a fundamental difference between agonistic 
theorists and those aspiring to reason and consensus as the definitive traits
16 Ibid, 8.
17 Bonnie Honig, “Toward an agonistic feminism: Hannah Arendt and the politics of identity”, 
in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the Political (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1992), 216.
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of late modern political life. Agonists call us to attend to the ambiguity which 
is inherent in democracy and which is created due to its simultaneous drive 
to appreciate individuality while at the same time urging enhancement of 
commonalities among subjects. This ambiguity is actually suppressed by 
those who seek to resolve it, be they individualists or communitarians. In 
contrast, theorists of agonism attend to this ambiguity, which they indeed 
consider inherent to democracy, not by urging a strong idea of the common 
good or by refuting its possibility altogether. Instead they accept the division 
within the common good (as William Connolly does) or propose a thin 
version of it (as is the case for Chantal Mouffe). It is this way of ‘being- 
together’ against descriptivists and proceduralists while at the same time 
disagreeing with each other that renders theorists of agonistic democracy so 
attentive to the challenge of pluralism and to the problem of how diverse 
subjects can still be the bearers of moments of political commonality.
Agonists are drawn to the struggle against those who want to confine 
democracy to regulations, administration and measurable opinions; but as 
the discussion in the following section suggests, they do not form a unified 
and concrete body of defenders of democracy. Chantal Mouffe and William 
Connolly take different positions within this battlefield. Still, it is the 
complementarity of their projects that renders them a challenging voice to the 
exigencies of the late modern condition.
II. Mouffe’s Agonistic Pluralism: Democratic Citizenship as an Ethos
Arguing that a shift in focus from consensus towards democracy’s 
adversarial dimension can contribute to the radicalisation and revitalisation of 
modern democracy by revealing and tackling the paradoxes inherent to it, 
Chantal Mouffe has emerged as a key figure among theorists of an agonistic 
account of democracy.
This section will discuss how Mouffe generates a democratic vision which 
she describes as “agonistic pluralism” and which she integrates into the
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wider theoretical context of radical democracy.18 This vision seeks to “re­
establish the lost connection between politics and ethics” by employing an 
immanent critique of the modern democratic tradition in its aggregative and 
deliberative articulations, in order to elaborate a more promising form of 
democratic citizenship suited to the conditions of late-modern pluralism which 
Mouffe sees as constitutive of democratic societies. It is a vision that aims to 
attribute a new role to the Left, as the force that will empower the “polyphony 
of voices, each of which constitutes its own irreducible discursive identity”.19 
The section argues that, by way of elaborating her vision, Mouffe attends to 
democratic citizenship as an ethos and more specifically as constitutive of 
the sense of belonging to or identifying with a specific political community, a 
societas, that is kept together by an ethico-political bond articulated in terms 
of a common code of conduct. The latter, Mouffe argues, allows those who 
participate in the community, the adversaries, to gather in a common 
symbolic space which they wish to organise in different ways and deliberate 
over without suppressing their passions in order not to persuade but to 
convert their adversary.20
For Mouffe, it is only by envisaging citizenship as an ethos, as a specific 
mode of ethico-political identification that modern liberal democracy can be 
articulated in political terms and democratic confrontation escape the limit of 
mere competition between irreconcilable moral views. However, as I argue, 
her civic republicanism poses serious limitations to her vision for a pluralistic 
democracy, not least because she fails to keep an open mind with regard to 
the limits of the pluralism she seeks to safeguard; because she delimits the 
capacity of democrat only to those who embrace liberalism; and because she 
fails to attend to the transformative moves which need to take place on the 
ethical register during the agon and were her democratic ethos to thrive. At 
the end Mouffe, does not differ from the liberal theorists discussed in the 
previous chapter in that she also attends to ethos as a frame of action, failing 
to pay attention to the action itself and to the moment of its occurrence.
18 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox {London: Verso, 2000), 101.
19 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 191.
20 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102.
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Reworking Marxism-Embracing Liberalism: Mouffe’s Theoretical Background
Mouffe’s work on democracy is deployed in the framework of the post-Marxist 
theory she developed with Ernesto Laclau in their book Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy. In this work the two theorists develop a post-Marxist and 
more specifically Gramscian conception of hegemony, affirmed as a specific 
form of political relation. They advance a critique of the idealised view of 
human sociability and emphasise instead the role of power in the formation 
of social objectivity, seeking to locate the Left in a project that aspires to the 
refashioning of democracy in a radical and plural direction. Mouffe’s 
democratic vision is a post-Marxist one, for it entails that the theorist now 
understands Marxism as being inadequate to provide the tools and the 
conceptions of subjectivity suited to the social and economic developments 
of late modern democracies. However, it should not be translated as anti- 
Marxism, as its rejection, but as “the other which Marxism must become 
(thereby ceasing to be itself) in order to remain true to itself’.21 Thus 
conceived, Mouffe’s work is placed within the post -Marxist tradition for she 
aspires to discursive formations which have been elaborated within Marxism, 
such as the Gramscian conception of hegemony and the emphasis on the 
element of antagonism. She attributes to both a constitutive role in any 
political order recognising them as ineradicable features of any society. But at 
the same time, hers is a post-Marxism in that she understands liberal 
democracy as “a political form of society that is defined exclusively at the 
level of the political, leaving aside its possible articulation with an economic 
system”.22 It is by placing her work in a post-Marxist tradition, that is by 
recognising Marxism’s limitations and historicality, that Mouffe aspires to 
“give to Marxism its theoretical dignity”23 while also enriching it with elements 
and methods drawn from diverse sources.
21 Warren Montag, “Politics: Transcendent or immanent? A response to Miguel Vatter’s 
‘Machiavelli after Marx’” Theory and Event 7, no.4 (2004), §3.
22 Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy, power, and the ‘political’”, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 245.
23 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without apologies” New Left Review 
166, (1987), 105.
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To begin with, the repertoire of her theoretical tools is an amalgam of 
schemes and insights such as the Wittgensteinian critique of the rationalist 
subject, Schmitt’s analysis of the tension between democracy and liberalism, 
Oakeshott’s reflections on civil association, but also Lacan’s ethics of 
psychoanalysis. What makes her work distinct is that Mouffe succeeds in 
developing a dialogue with conservative thinkers, such as Schmitt and 
Oakeshott, while still elaborating a democratic vision that is radical and 
provocative. These theorists, as she puts it, “can better shake our dogmatic 
assumptions than liberal apologists”.24
Mouffe follows a Wittgensteinian perspective that is strongly critical of the 
rationalist traditions of political theory, putting forward an anti-essentialist 
critique of the necessity for foundations on which political identities and 
movements are built. She contends that such an attitude is necessary if a 
theorist is to propose a radical approach to democracy and tackle the issue 
of pluralism satisfactorily, for
it is only in the context of a political theory that takes account of the 
critique of essentialism [...] that it is possible to formulate the aims of a 
radical democratic politics in a way that makes room for the 
contemporary proliferation of political spaces and the multiplicity of 
democratic demands25
In particular she directs her anti-essentialism at the assumption associated 
with liberal thinkers such as Rawls that the specific epistemological project of 
the Enlightenment is the precondition for the political project of modern 
democracy, and thus that the critique of the former actually jeopardises its 
own fundamentals and consequently modern democracy itself. According to 
Mouffe, overestimation of the rationalist aspect of human nature results in 
denial of the negativity inherent in sociability rendering “democratic theory 
unable to grasp the nature of the ‘political’ in its dimension of hostility and 
antagonism” 26 I consider this evaluation of antagonism-as-negativity as a 
point of major departure from Nietzsche, who celebrates the contest, but also
24 Mouffe, On the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 4.
25 Mouffe, “Democracy, power, and the ‘political’”, 245.
26 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 132.
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from Connolly, a departure that blinds Mouffe with reference to the inner 
aspect of ethos, since she does not honour the impact that the engagement 
in the agon has on the individual’s self-development.
Mouffe’s work is also rooted in Derridean deconstruction and in particular 
the concept of “undecidability”. According to Mouffe, deconstruction not only 
“reveals the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion”, it 
also “forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive”, since it “warns us 
against the illusion that Justice could ever be instantiated in the institutions of 
any society.”27 Deconstruction reveals the structural undecidability that 
conditions any decision and responsibility of an ethical or political nature.28 
Ernesto Laclau has further elaborated the concept of undecidability. As he 
puts it,
the hiding of the “ultimate” undecidability of any decision will never be 
complete and social coherence will only be achieved at the cost of 
repressing something that negates it. It is in this sense that any 
consensus, that any objective and differential system of rules implies, 
as its most essential possibility, a dimension of coercion.29
It is the presence of coercion which flows from attempts to suppress the 
destabilising effects that undecidability entails, along with the fact that it is 
unavoidable that informs Mouffe’s vision of an agonistic democracy.
Another idea that Mouffe draws from Derrida is that of the “constitutive 
outside” —a term originally coined by Henry Staten.30 This concept plays a 
crucial role in her argument with regard to identity, with the “outside” being 
incommensurable with but at the same time the condition for the emergence 
of the “inside”. This entails that the relation between the two is not one of 
“dialectical negation”; which means that Mouffe - unlike Taylor and Young 
who see identities as relational constructed and as based on practices of
27 Chantal Mouffe, “Deconstruction, pragmatism and the politics of democracy”, in Chantal 
Mouffe (ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Simon Critchley, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto 
Laclau & Richard Rorty (London: Routledge, 1996), 9.
28 Jacques Derrida, “Remarks on deconstruction and pragmatism”, in Mouffe (ed.), 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 87.
29 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time (London: Verso, 1990),
172.
30 Henry State, Wittgentein and Derrida (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), 16-17.
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recognition and negation - does not settle with the assumption that there is 
no “us” without “them”. Rather, she follows the deconstructive logic which 
holds that everything is constructed as difference, the latter construed as the 
very condition of possibility of being: something’s being is not a mere 
“presence” or “objectivity”, it is constructed as difference, so the “constitutive 
outside” is in fact always present within the inside. Thus “the ‘outside’ is not 
simply the outside of a concrete content, but something that puts into 
question ‘concreteness’ as such: the ‘them’ is not the constitutive opposite of 
a concrete ‘us’, but the symbol of what makes any ‘us’ impossible”.31 
According to this logic, the “them” represents the condition of possibility of 
the “us”. The “constitutive outside” is paradoxical: it operates as a defining 
principle for every social formation, while at the same time threatening it.
Another thinker that Mouffe draws on is Carl Schmitt. Mouffe uses his 
reflections on the notion of “the political” as something that can only be 
understood in the context of “friend/enemy” groupings: ’’the political” is 
always concerned with collective forms of identification; it has to do with 
conflict and antagonism, which she finds inherent within different types of 
social relations and which can take many forms.32 “The political” refers to the 
realm of decision, not free discussion and is an immanent and determinant 
ontological dimension of human societies.33
It is the identification of “the political” with antagonism that differentiates 
Mouffe from the theorists discussed in Chapter Three. All of them 
presuppose the existence of a kind of consensus (articulated in moral terms) 
among the members of their polities, aspiring to communities of justice and 
harmony. They see exclusion as a challenge inherent in democracy, but one 
that democracy needs to tackle. By contrast, Mouffe affirms exclusion as a 
prerequisite of democracy by its own constitution, a presumption that she 
again owes to Schmitt. From this line of thought stems Mouffe’s conception 
of the democratic society, not as a place of perfect harmonised social 
relations but as a field where each social actor deploys her power 
recognising that she will never achieve total conquest. The democratic
31 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 12-13.
32 Ibid., 101.
33 Mouffe, On the Political, 11.
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character of a society lies in the fact that no limited social actor can attribute 
to herself the representation of the totality: any social objectivity is political 
and thus is constituted through exclusion.34
According to Schmitt, the very logic of democracy implies a necessary 
moment of closure, a distinction between “us/them”, in order to define who 
belongs to the demos, which is democracy’s central concept, and 
consequently to allow the exercise of democratic rights. But liberalism’s 
universalistic rhetoric, which places “humanity” at the core of its imaginary, 
presupposes an equality of all individuals that belong to this totality, an 
equality which is non-political “because it lacks the correlate of a possible 
inequality from which every equality receives its specific meaning”.35 This 
liberal ideal of equality cannot form the basis for democracy, because it is 
unable to conceptualise the necessary frontier between “usTthem”. Liberal 
democracy entails a paradox and theories of democracy that try to bury it 
miss the specificity of “the political”, which lies exactly in its dimension of 
antagonism. “The political” is liberal democracy’s blind spot36
Despite placing her work in the context of post-structuralism, Mouffe draws 
a line of separation between her work and that strand of postmodern political 
thinkers who envisage democratic politics as an “endless conversation” with 
the Other.37 By adopting the language of ethics, she contends, these 
postmodern thinkers substantially eliminate the dimension of “the political”, 
which Mouffe considers so important for a democratic politics of agonism:
While the deliberative democrats, with their emphasis on impartiality 
and rational consensus, tend to formulate the ends of democratic 
politics in the vocabulary of Kantian moral reasoning, the second view 
[of these postmodern thinkers] eschews the language of universal 
morality and envisages democracy not as deontological but as an 
“ethical” enterprise, as the unending pursuit of the recognition of the 
Other.38
34 Mouffe, “Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?”, 752.
35 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 39.
36 Mouffe, On the Political, 12.
37 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 129. As Mouffe notes, she is referring to those who are
inspired by Levinas, Arendt, Heidegger and Nietzsche.
33 Ibid, 129.
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According to Mouffe, these postmodern approaches are problematic because 
they miss the moment of decision which characterises the field of politics. By 
assuming that it is possible to engage with other’s differences with the aim of 
reaching an understanding, these theorists celebrate a kind of pluralism that 
“implies the possibility of a plurality without antagonism, of a friend without an 
enemy, an agonism without antagonism”.39 Although she does not intend to 
disassociate ethics from politics, Mouffe does not share these theorists’ 
optimism that the ethical and the political can ever coincide.
I believe that this assumption also differentiates Mouffe from Taylor and 
Young who, as I have already discussed in Chapter Three, base their visions 
of democracy on, respectively, the assumption of other-understanding 
through a fusion of particular horizons and a discursively mediated 
understanding. I argued that their approaches lead to the moralisation of 
political issues, since they presume that the members of a polity ought to 
share certain moral commitments. For Mouffe, the language of ethics or 
morality not only is inadequate in order for the antagonistic dimension of 
human relations to be articulated; it is dangerous as well. When “the political” 
is placed on the moral register, the “us”/“them” relation that characterises it 
takes the form of “good”/“evil” and opponents are then presented as an 
enemy to be annihilated. To revitalise liberal democracy the “us”/“them” 
relation needs to be articulated in the language of “the political”: this is 
central to Mouffe’s democratic vision. However, I believe that despite her 
intentions Mouffe fails to attribute this political trait to relations of antagonism 
because she aspires to an ethos as a grammar of conduct and therefore as a 
code that aims to regulate these relations.
The Nature of Mouffe’s Agonistic Democracy
Mouffe’s democratic vision is structured around the embrace of an agonistic 
pluralism that is based on the reconstruction of the “we”/”they” discrimination 
in a way that is compatible with such a pluralism. Before analysing the 
specificity of her vision, it is useful to see how Mouffe elaborates a
39 Ibid., 134.
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radicalised form of liberal democracy, one in which passions are not excluded 
but indeed are welcome.
To begin with, Mouffe suggests that democracy ought to be understood as 
a political form of society, as a regime, in order for the dimension of “the 
political” to be grasped. As she puts it:
Conceptualising it as a regime, democracy concerns the symbolic 
ordering of social relations and is much more than a mere form of 
government’. It is a specific form of organising human coexistence 
politically that results from the articulation between two different 
traditions: on the one side, political liberalism (rule of law, separation of 
powers and individual rights) and, on the other side, the democratic 
tradition of popular sovereignty.40
That said, Mouffe does not envisage a revolution that will subvert liberal 
democracy, for she does not reject the ideals of freedom and equality 
embodied in it. Neither is she interested in radicalising these ideals, for she 
affirms that “it is not possible to find more radical principles for organising 
society”.41 Instead, she seeks to forge a different path for their 
implementation, postulating the development of new vocabularies that will 
enable the emergence of new understandings of both freedom and equality, 
two principles that within the liberal democratic tradition are incompatible:
We are facing a big deficit of these kinds of new vocabularies and we 
are at a moment in which the hegemony of neoliberal discourse is so 
strong that it seems as if there is no alternative [...] When I say 
‘vocabularies’, of course, I am not speaking only in terms of linguistics; 
it also means thinking about what kind of institutions, what kind of 
practices could be the ones in which new forms of citizenship exist and 
what form of grassroots democracy could be conductive to the 
establishment of this kind of radical democratic hegemony42
Mouffe’s democratic vision, then, is not a substitute for liberal democracy per
se, but rather the actual implementation of its already radical constitutive
40Mouffe, “Democracy, power, and the ‘political’”, 245-6.
41 Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic politics today”, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 1992), 1.
42 Lynn Worsham and Garry Olson, “Rethinking political community: Chantal Mouffe’s liberal 
socialism”, in Garry Olson and Lynn Worsham (eds), Race, Rhetoric and the Postcolonial 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 180-1.
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elements - liberty and equality. This requires a political terrain in which there 
is space for agonism and recognition of the pluralistic nature of contemporary 
democracies.
Another element of Mouffe’s adversarial model of democracy is that it 
aspires to galvanise people and their identities in ways that cause their 
metamorphosis: “To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical 
change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion than a process of 
rational persuasion”.43 The radical democratic vision that Mouffe advocates is 
one that aspires to attribute a political nature to the exchange between 
citizens with conflictual allegiances and identifications, with all the turbulence 
that this approach entails. She also wishes to attribute a political nature to 
the self-development of citizens, since it is affirmed as being the result of an 
adversarial exchange. However, as I demonstrate, Mouffe’s specific 
aspiration to ethos cancels her efforts and brings her closer to the theorists 
discussed in Chapter Three.
We can now see how Mouffe’s reformulation of liberal democracy is based 
on reading it as pluralist democracy, namely as a regime where the 
recognition of the centrality of pluralism is a core element. She reminds us 
that the difference between ancient and modern democracy is not the size 
but the nature of the regime: modern democracy’s specificity lies in that it 
acknowledges the pluralism of values, what Max Weber recognised as the 
“disenchantment of the world” and therefore allows room for conflict as 
unavoidable in it.44 Pluralism is constitutive of modern liberal democracy, it is 
its very heart and this should not be accepted just as “the fact of pluralism”, 
as Rawls claims. Mouffe bases the importance of pluralism not at the 
empirical level, that is to say on the fact that there is a diversity of the 
conceptions of the good in a liberal society, but at the symbolic level such 
that it becomes what she calls the axiological principle of pluralism: the 
recognition of pluralism implies a profound transformation in the symbolic 
ordering of social relations.45
43 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102.
44 Ibid, 103.
45 Mouffe, “ Democracy, power, and the ‘political’”, 246.
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The distinctiveness of Mouffe’s formulation of pluralism lies in the 
importance she places on power and antagonism. Against liberal pluralism, 
that seeks to minimise the importance of differences and isolate them in the 
sphere of citizens’ private lives, Mouffe makes pluralism an axiological 
principle, constitutive of modern democracy, its sine qua non. Seen in this 
way, pluralism is something that should be celebrated and enhanced, not 
suppressed and refused. It is for this reason that one of her basic concerns 
is not how to overcome, or moralise, the “us”/”them” discrimination, which is 
an always present constituent of human societies, but how to establish it in a 
way that is compatible with pluralist democracy.46
For Mouffe, as for Schmitt, the distinction between “us” and “them” is a 
constitutive element of a democratic regime. However, where Schmitt sees 
an unbridgeable gap between liberalism and democracy, one that renders 
liberal democracy a hybrid system doomed to failure,47 Mouffe detects a 
chance to remedy the liberal democratic formulation. The aim of democratic 
politics is not to overcome the “we”/”they” discrimination that informs all 
collective identities but to construct it in a way that energises the democratic 
confrontation.
In order to satisfy this concern, Mouffe advocates a Wittgensteinian 
theorisation of an agonistic pluralism, in which conflicts are unavoidable and 
take place between adversaries, not enemies, who all recognise the 
positions of the others as legitimate ones. An adversary is a “legitimate 
enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion to the 
ethico-political principles of democracy”.48 There is, then, a specific quality, 
disposition or ethos that characterises and informs the relation between 
adversaries, for they acknowledge the legitimacy of their opponent. The 
principle of legitimacy is related to the fact that the conflict between 
adversaries does not destroy the political association, but takes place in the 
context of democratic procedures which they accept, and is regulated by the 
values of liberty and equality. This is why Mouffe embraces a non extreme
46 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?” Social Research 66, no.
3 (1999), 755.
47 The thesis was formulated in Schmitt’s The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1926) and 
is analysed in Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 105-115.
48Mouffe, “Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?”, 755.
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pluralism, that is a pluralism with limits: it is imperative that democratic 
politics always sets limits to pluralism by denying recognition as legitimate 
adversaries to those who put into question its basic institutions.49 Although a 
total pluralism, that is a totally inclusive pluralism, may seem attractive and 
impressively close to “authentic” or “absolute” democracy, it loses sight of the 
dimension of the political, erasing relations of power and antagonism. It does 
so by valorising all difference and by overlooking the necessity of the 
construction of collective identities which can express a diverse sum of 
demands.50 Mouffe focuses on the importance of the political nature of these 
limits, instead of presenting them as requirements of morality or rationality. 
As she puts it, “[t]he agonistic approach does not pretend to encompass all 
differences and to overcome all forms of exclusion. But exclusions are 
envisaged in political and not in moral terms”.51 Limits thus articulated protect 
democracy by preventing the we/they relation from being articulated in moral 
terms and thus taking the antagonistic form of friend/enemy.
It is exactly because the drawing of limits between legitimate and 
illegitimate demands is based on political grounds that these limits are 
always open to contestation. In Mouffe’s model of a pluralist democratic 
society, “the normative dimension inscribed in political institutions [is] of an 
‘ethico-political’ nature, [since] it always refers to specific practices, 
depending on particular contexts and [...] it is not the expression of a 
universal morality”.52 Contrary to what rationalist advocates of democracy 
conclude, antagonisms do not disappear when they are minimised through 
the pursuit of consensus and their exclusion from the public sphere; they 
transform themselves into religious, ethnic or social fundamentalisms. This is 
the reason that Mouffe thinks we ought ‘to give them a political outlet within 
an “agonistic” pluralistic democratic system’.53 This system is not a sealed 
and protected area of political conduct; rather, it is one that allows the
49 Mouffe, On the Political, 120.
50 Mouffe, “Democracy, power, and the ‘political’”, 247.
51 Mouffe, On the Political, 120.
52 ibid, 121.
53 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 114.
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multiplication of “the institutions, the forms of life that foster identification with 
democratic values”.54 Hence its pluralistic and democratic character.
The crucial detail about this context, though, is that it is not perceived as 
immutable, but as susceptible to redefinition through hegemonic struggle.55 
The elaboration of the idea of the adversary becomes, therefore, Mouffe’s 
way into the schematisation of what she holds to be the aim of democratic 
politics, that is to transform the antagonism into agonism. Although they both 
are forms of antagonism, their differentia is that the first one takes place 
between enemies who aim at the other’s annihilation, while the second one 
takes place between adversaries, where the latter are “friendly enemies”: 
friendly in the sense that they share a common space; enemies in the sense 
that they want to organise this space differently.56 Mouffe’s model of agonistic 
pluralism aspires to be one that leaves space for the emergence of conflict 
and division as a legitimate part of political life, in which agonism is a “tamed” 
form of antagonistic relation.
What is important for the thesis though is the disposition underlying 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism; one that informs the relations between the 
adversaries that participate in this democratic shared space of conflict. I will 
now discuss this ethos, its constitution, its strong points, as well as its 
shortcomings.
The Ethos of Radical Democratic Citizenship
Mouffe’s radical democratic vision is based on the assumption that modern 
democracy faces the challenge of how diverse cultural, religious or linguistic 
identifications can be compatible with political identification, that is with 
identification with a political community. She affirms that since class 
identification can no longer support the aims of the Left, the latter needs to 
turn to citizenship as a common point of political identification.57 The project,
54 Ibid., 96.
55 Mouffe, On the Political, 33.
56 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 13.
57 Mouffe, “Democratic politics today”, 3.
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then, of a radical plural democracy necessarily entails the “rediscovery of 
citizenship”, that is envisaging “a form of commonality that respects diversity 
and m akes room for different forms of individuality”.58 In her 
reconceptualisation of citizenship, Mouffe relies on a certain ethos that 
democratic subjects share, one that is based on their acknowledging as 
legitimate adversaries those who adhere to the principles of liberty and 
equality.
By way of reworking citizenship, Mouffe combines the liberal tradition, that 
embrace the assertion that all individuals are free and equal, with the civic 
republican tradition which focuses on the idea of citizens’ participation in 
political processes. Such a combined approach to citizenship prevents its 
relegation to a merely legal status and seeks to value citizenship as a form of 
identification and thus to restore the link between social and political 
citizenship. Thus conceived, radical democratic citizenship makes room for 
dissensus over the common good by way of replacing the passive bearer of 
individual rights with a socially located self that is subject to continuous re­
identifications through different articulations.59 Such a radical approach to 
citizenship can only be conceived as meaningful and productive in the 
context of a political community that despite not being bounded by a strictly 
defined common good, still provides the necessary linkage among its 
participants, functioning both as a “social imaginary” and as a “grammar of 
conduct”. In other words, it needs an ethos. Since her democratic vision 
affirms confrontation as being ceaseless and as taking place among 
legitimate adversaries, Mouffe needs a common ground on which this 
continuous battle can be held. To define this common ground she relies on 
Oakeshott’s reflections on civil association and finds pertinent his usage of 
the term societas. According to Oakeshott, those who participate in an 
association of this type do not do so in order to pursue a common purpose or 
interest, for this is the case with a different association, a universitas; rather, 
they recognise themselves as members of the societas, that is as socius, 
because they feel that there is a bond that binds them with the association.
58 Chantal Mouffe, “Liberal socialism and pluralism: Which citizenship?”, in Judith Squires 
(ed.), Principled Positions (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1993), 81.
59 Worsham and Olson, “Rethinking political community: Chantal Mouffe’s liberal socialism”, 
178.
179
There is a certain type of loyalty they feel towards the other members of the 
association.60 As Mouffe observes, societas “is not a mode of relation, 
therefore, in terms of common action but a relation in which participants are 
related to one another in the acknowledgment of the authority of certain 
conditions in acting”.61 This is the type of association that Mouffe finds 
pertinent to conditions of radical democratic citizenship: an association 
characterised by a specific quality of the relation between its participants.
The adherence of the participants of societas is not the product of 
persuasion or rational argumentation, but a result of their sittlich relation to it. 
As she puts it:
The real issue is not to find arguments to justify the rationality or 
universality of liberal democracy that would be acceptable by every 
rational or reasonable person. [...]To secure allegiance and adhesion to 
those principles what is needed is the creation of a democratic ethos.62
Thus understood, citizenship is not merely a legal status: it is a form of 
identification with the principles of liberty and equality. The latter are not mere 
rights, but are ethical values that inspire the citizens. Hence the ethico- 
political quality of these principles. As a result, citizens have the sense of 
belonging to a political community, “a mode of political association which, 
although it does not postulate the existence of a substantive common good, 
nevertheless implies the idea of commonality [...], of a political community 
even if it is not in the strong sense”.63 Democratic citizenship is a sense of 
belonging to such a community and the identification with the rules of civil 
intercourse that characterise it; it is an ethos.
Mouffe needs to reformulate Oakeshott’s societas if it is to be compatible 
with her radical vision of democracy, since she conceives it as referring only 
to the “we” side neglecting the “they” side that a political relation always 
includes. Societas already provides the idea of an association that is created
60 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 201
61 Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic citizenship and the political community”, in Chantal Mouffe 
(ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 
1992), 232.
62 Mouffe, “Deconstruction, pragmatism and the politics of democracy”, 5-6.
63 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 66.
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not around the idea of a common good, but of an ethico-political bond. In 
Wittgensteinian terms, the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy 
constitute a “grammar” of political conduct.64 But whereas it inspires citizens 
qua adversaries to identify with them, at the same time this leaves room for 
dissensus. For while they all accept a set of institutions and practices as the 
necessary framework for the function of the regime, the citizens disagree on 
the articulation and interpretation of the democratic logic of equality and the 
liberal logic of liberty. Such a democratic political community must be 
understood as a “chain of equivalence” and therefore as “a community 
without a definite shape or a definite identity and in continuous re­
enactment”.65 Although there is a certain unity, this community will never be 
fully inclusive or unified, because it will always demand the presence of a 
“them”, of a constitutive outside, to secure its political character. According to 
Mouffe, though, this is a tension that cannot, and indeed shall not, be 
reconciled, for this irresolvable tension is the very condition for the 
preservation of the indeterminacy and undecidability which are constitutive of 
modern democracy, preventing a final closure and the negation of 
democracy.66 In Mouffe’s radical democratic project, ethos secures not only 
the maintenance of a vibrant and active participatory citizenship, but the 
‘ventilation’, as Connolly might put it67 and survival of liberal democracy itself.
Criticism and Limitations
Challenging and inspiring as it may be, Mouffe’s theorisation of agonistic 
democracy and the democratic ethos corresponding to it do not go without 
criticism.68 To begin with, I find Mouffe’s failure to address the inner
64 Mouffe, “Democratic citizenship and the political community”, 231.
es Ibid, 233.
66 Mouffe, “Democratic politics today”, 13.
67 Connolly, Identity/Difference, 218.
68 See, for example, Andrew Knops, “Debate: Agonism as deliberation - On Mouffe’s theory 
of democracy” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 1 (2007), 115-126; Andrew 
Robinson, “Accepting contingency or imposing authority? A reply to Thomassen” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 6, no. 4 (2004), 562-564; Stefan Rummens, 
“Democracy as a non-hegemonic struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic 
model of politics” Constellations 16, no. 3 (2009), 377-391.
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component of ethos highly problematic. Although she explicitly affirms the 
need for a quality that characterises the relations between adversaries, 
Mouffe fails to discuss the nature of such an ethic per se. At the same time, 
she also fails to address the transformative moves which need to take place 
on the ethical register if a radical pluralist democracy is to thrive. For if the 
importance of the agon as Nietzsche poses it is self-development, Mouffe 
does not provide any clues with regard to what is the impact on citizens’ 
identities of their engagement in democratic struggles, not only upon their 
entering them but after leaving the field of contest. Her civic republicanism 
draws her attention on the aspect of the collective: Mouffe focuses on 
societas and citizenship as collective identification and completely neglects 
the dimension of the individual (on which, as we shall see, Connolly 
concentrates).
Moreover, I find that her envisioning of ethos as a “grammar of political 
conduct” is too narrow and stingy to inspire the relations between conflicting 
identities, between adversaries and hence between “others”. Mouffe believes 
that a democratic ethos is a mode of identification with the principles of 
liberty and equality. Indeed, she thinks that these can be regulatory principles 
for the democratic community. There are, I think, three problems with this 
assumption. The first is that it is not obvious how an adherence to these two 
principles alone can itself inform conduct between competing constituencies 
in a way that secures a pluralistic democracy. I find that there are dispositions 
which Connolly (but also other thinkers, such as Honig or Coles) contribute to 
the discussion which are more pertinent to the exigencies brought to the field 
of the agon by the participants. This field, as I argue in Chapter Six, is too 
unpredictable and multidimensional to be regulated by two principles; a more 
open and affirmative attitude is needed, if pluralism and the continuation of 
the strife are to be safeguard. The metical ethos I argue for is open to the 
challenges that the moment of the democratic agon bears.
The second problem relates to the requirement of radical democrats to 
embrace liberalism. Mouffe’s embrace of liberal democracy prevents her from 
affirming the possibilities for democratic identification available to 
constituencies that do not espouse liberalism. Not only does Mouffe pre­
determine the reign of liberalism and the impossibility of challenging it; she
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also does not allow in her adversarial democracy space for those who would 
be willing to participate in the agonistic exchange while at the same time 
combating liberalism. Equality and liberty are not two principles that 
liberalism has coined; other resonances also embrace them but seek to 
discredit liberalism.69
The third problem regards the too suggestive nature of Mouffe’s “grammar 
of political conduct”. We have seen how she tries to articulate adversarial 
relations in political terms and she also attends to the impact that agonistic 
exchange has on individuals’ identities. However, she wishes this exchange 
to take place under specific rules - to be guided by an ethos understood as 
code. This also entails that she ends up offering her support to an idea of the 
democratic community which is too restrictive, given the fact that it is one that 
is imbued by specific rules of conduct. At the end, Mouffe is not very different 
from Taylor and Young (and Hegel) in supposing that the political community, 
her societas, has its own ethos. Individuals ought to stay attuned to it, if 
pluralistic democracy is to thrive.
Overall, I see Mouffe’s efforts to present the agonistic relations which she 
finds so essential to democracy as giving us important clues with regard to 
the form of democratic agon. At the same time, though, I am afraid that 
Mouffe pays too much attention to the frame that would justify the political 
character of the agonistic exchange, while neglecting the democratic action 
itself. However, as I argue in the thesis, we need to be more alert to the 
challenges and peculiarities that the moment bears, so that we can be 
responsive to them by undertaking kairotic action, that is by developing 
tactics that are always pertinent. Ethos has a tactical dimension and Mouffe 
seems unable to grasp it.
At the end, I find that Mouffe exchanges radicalism for a too strong 
commitment to liberalism. It is her affirmation of liberalism as the condition for 
pluralism that leads her to privilege a particular ethico-political form, a task 
that drains her project of an otherwise more generous approach to plurality. 
At the same time, her insistence on attributing the trait of the democrat only 
to liberals entails her failure to keep an open mind with regards to the limits
69 Anarchism would be an example here. See the work of Saul Newman, The Politics of 
Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).
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of the pluralism she seeks to safeguard. Not least, Mouffe fails to appreciate 
the complexity of the contemporary condition and incorporate relevant issues 
in her discussion of democracy. That is, she is not attentive to issues related 
on the pressures that capitalism, mass movements of populations or 
environmental changes pose on late modern democracy. I believe that 
William Connolly concurs with Mouffe at many points, while addressing 
others that she does not. Most significantly, he addresses these issues from 
a completely different ontological angle. I find his work more pertinent to the 
contemporary condition and to the type of democracy and ethos defended in 
this thesis. However there are, still significant aspects of is democratic vision 
that are justly subject to criticism. This is why I suggest that the works of the 
two thinkers can be read complementarily in a way that enables us to 
perceive their limits but also to move beyond them.
III. Connolly’s Liberal Agonism: The Ethos of Pluralisation
William Connolly has made an important and innovative contribution to the 
refashioning of the terms through which are articulated the theories of 
democracy, pluralism and political theory more generally.70 In seeking to 
rework the democratic imagination, he has introduced a whole new 
assemblage of concepts and has brought to fore themes developed by 
thinkers from fields as diverse as neuroscience, chemistry and complexity 
theory. Like Mouffe, he also embraces a liberal approach to politics detecting, 
however, a need for a new militant liberalism that “challenges forces that 
press for uniformity, pre-emptive wars, surveillance and inequality”. At the 
same time this militant liberalism “listens with sensitive ears to injuries, 
pressures, ideas and ideals struggling to attain presence in a crowded 
world”.71 It is in this context that he acknowledges agonism as indispensable 
to democracy and the latter as something more than a mere regime. It is also
70 See, for example the special collection of his essays under the superscription Routledge 
Innovators in Political Theory, Samuel A. Chambers and Terrel Carver, William E. Connolly: 
Democracy, Pluralism and Political Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
71 Samuel A. Chambers, “An interview with William Connolly”, in Chambers and Carver 
(eds.), William E. Connolly, 326.
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at this point that Connolly is more attentive to the contemporary condition 
than Mouffe. Connolly prefers the term “politics of agonistic respect” to 
“agonistic democracy”, for as he says “some ideals of agonistic democracy 
are at odds with the pursuit of deep multidimensional pluralism to the extent 
they reflect the spirit of Carl Schmitt more than that, say of Michael 
Foucault”.72 The difference between the two approaches, he says, lies in the 
ethos they bring into the field of politics. The “quality of ethos”73 is paramount 
in Connolly’s democratic vision and I hope that by taking on his work here in 
a complementary reading with Mouffe’s I will be able to show the difference 
in this quality between the two thinkers.
This section of the chapter follows the evolution of Connolly’s distinct 
vocabulary and analyses how his affirmation of a political life characterised 
by an ethicality which is not fixed but susceptible to renegotiations and 
redefinitions leads him to introduce a specific political ethos. The section 
suggests that articulating an ethos—“most often, a set of contending 
dispositions”—74 that is appropriate for the contemporary condition is at the 
centre of Connolly’s ethico-political project. The latter is so defined because it 
brings together the ethical and the political by aspiring to negotiate the 
tension between ethical orientation as inextricable from human life and a 
more general ethos pertinent to late modern democracies. Connolly weaves 
a vision of democracy based on the recognition of the paradox embedded in 
the relation between identity/difference and admiration for the fragility of 
things, as well as the ceaseless mobility and diversity of being that 
characterises this world. Democracy is inextricably bound to each of these 
and Connolly’s task is to refashion these tensions so that the pluralising 
possibilities of democracy are exposed and nourished.
For Connolly, politics is paradoxical, but this is not a matter of despair or 
pessimism. To define the political ethos appropriate to such a politics 
Connolly takes on an ethical project across two dimensions: agonistic
72 David Campbell and Morton Schoolman, “An interview with William Connolly”, in David 
Campbell and Morton Schoolman (eds.), The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the 
Contemporary Global Condition (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 315.
73 William E. Connolly, ‘The fragility of things”, The Contemporary Condition Blog, August,
16, 2010
http://contemporarycondition.bloaspot.com/2010/08/fraailitv-of-thinas.html.
74 Connolly, “The power of assemblages and the fragility of things”, 244.
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respect and critical responsiveness. In discussing these two virtues I argue 
that ethos is indispensable to the Connollian vision of a democracy that is not 
reduced to political representation; one which embraces an image inspired 
by complexity theory and thus appreciates the moments of disruption of this 
representation, the diversity of being and the inescapability of ethical 
orientation in every aspect of human life. The discussion also reveals how 
Connolly, contra Mouffe, succeeds in honouring the inner ethotic dimension 
of democracy. At the same time, though, I want to argue that Connolly pays 
inadequate attention to the collective aspect of ethos, a lack that places him 
on the same plane with thinkers such as Plato with reference to the aspect of 
ethos they honour. Even when he seems to affirm that ethos has a collective 
dimension as well, Connolly does so by seeing this as being in tune with the 
protean universe, but without paying attention to the specificity of the kairotic 
action which I argue that should be democrats’ concern. Inevitably, and 
despite affirming its contestable character, Connolly’s ethos of democracy is 
still a universalising and thus dictating one, since it does not abstain from 
projecting a code of conduct among participants in the field of the contest. 
Despite his intentions, Connolly falls in the same trap as Mouffe and offers an 
instructive account of ethos. Eventually, I conclude, both thinkers neglect the 
momentary aspect of the agon and the need to embrace an ethos pertinent 
to it.
Connolly’s Resources and Vocabularies
Connolly is theoretically indebted to a diverse cluster of thinkers, from 
Spinoza to William James and from Henri Bergson to Prigogine, but his 
strongest and deepest influences are Nietzsche -  for his affirmation of the 
abundance of life -  and Foucault -  for his care for the complex relations 
between identity and difference. Connolly’s ontopolitical theoretical frame is a 
post-Nietzschean one since, although advancing a perspective that resists 
certain familiar readings of Nietzsche’s work, Connolly stands in a relation of 
antagonistic indebtedness to him. He seeks in Nietzsche resources for a 
political theory that sustains democracy and pluralism, that is, one which, like 
Nietzsche, is sensitive to the complex relations between resentment and
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otherness, while at the same time exploring ways to encourage the struggle 
against resentment caused by the inevitability of finitude.75 Connolly’s radical 
reading of Nietzsche, contra those who find him little more than the 
philosopher of “the will to power” and of the “overman”, aims to make the 
most of the possibilities for affirmative ethical orientations folded in his work. 
It is in light of this understanding that Connolly advances his own post- 
Nietzscheanism to “press the spirit of liberalism into domains some liberals 
have yet to acknowledge to be pertinent” and to push “the politics of agonistic 
respect into corners that may seem unnecessary or excessive to liberal 
perspectives...”.76
At the same time, Connolly’s Nietzscheanism leads him to appreciate like 
his other mentor, Foucault, the importance of the dimension of ethics not as a 
code of rules but as ethicality, that is “the cultivation of care for the strife and 
interdependence of identity/difference”.77 Connolly finds that there is a 
paradox lying in the heart of ethicality, one that he formulates as such: 
“without a set of standards of identity and responsibility there is no possibility 
of ethical discrimination, but the application of any such set of historical 
constructions also does violence to those to whom it is applied”.78 Connolly’s 
aim, similar to that found in Nietzsche and Foucault, is not to suppress this 
paradox, to “bury it through a variety of onto-theological strategies” but rather 
to expose and cultivate it. He aspires to present an interpretation of the 
contemporary condition by considering the multidimensional relations 
between identity, life, faith, pluralism and politics. This interpretation involves 
two interventions towards detachment and disturbance: genealogy and 
deconstruction. Whereas Connolly finds that each of them alone is 
inadequate to support his aims, being unable to offer an affirmative 
interpretation of the possibilities related to the condition of pluralism relevant 
to late-modernity, he combines them hoping to provide a more pertinent 
response.
75 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 175.
76 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 29.
77 Connollly, Identity/ Difference, 181.
7® Ibid., 12.
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The first of the interventions that he resorts to is genealogy, which he 
affirms as being a necessary scheme of reflection and at the same time 
indispensable to ethicality, for it “cultivates a care for identity and difference 
already operative in life through accentuation of the experience of 
contingency”.79 What makes this approach pertinent to the condition of 
pluralism is the fact that it “breaks up with [the] inertia of presumption that 
constantly reinstates itself as Nature, God, Law, or Purpose; it scrambles the 
sense of ontological necessity implicit in contingent consolidations”.80 
Connolly chooses to deploy genealogy since this approach allows him to 
advance an ethic of cultivation rather than a morality of command or contract; 
an ethic in which the process of revealing the contingencies that form 
identities is combined with tactical work on the self, on the relationship 
individuals ought to have with themselves - what Foucault describes as 
rapport a soi. Connolly is a genealogist who strives for an ethic appropriate to 
a world with arising and changing forces, an ethic that espouses the force of 
politicising by way of problematising fixed constructions and their limitations. 
This is why I find that Connolly provides a good example of how reflecting on 
an ethos of democracy demands from us to take into consideration the inner 
dimension that ethos bears.
Connolly also alludes to deconstruction, but he explicitly refuses to pursue 
its strategies, even though he acknowledges that it is an ethical project which 
aims at disturbance and that his own interpretations are “eminently 
susceptible to it”. Although he sees in deconstruction a useful tool to unveil 
the ubiquity of undecidability and in difference “a fugitive source from which 
an ethos of respect for the protean diversity of being might grow”81, he moves 
beyond the concept of the latter to expose the dynamics of systems of 
identity and difference. Even though he recognises the importance that a 
work which criticises ontological projections from the inside entails, he 
nevertheless aims higher: at invoking contestation of every possible 
projection and interpretation, an idea drawn from Nietzsche’s appreciation of
79 Ibid., 182.
80 William E. Connolly, “Beyond good and evil: The ethical sensibility of Michel Foucault” 
Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993), 376.
81 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 99.
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the openness of the struggle. Mouffe, as I have discussed, also relies on 
deconstruction to safeguard this openness, as well as to reveal the 
impossibility of a consensus without exclusion and the structural 
undecidability that is inherent in any decision. By contrast to her optimism, 
though, Connolly finds that deconstruction alone cannot open this path: he 
needs a more positive approach that will enable him to articulate a positive 
account of a democratic ethos.
Genealogy and deconstruction, however necessary and relevant they 
might be for a democratic project that aims to detach from the terms and 
dispositions under which established debates are held, nevertheless prove to 
be insufficient to the endeavour. Connolly tries to develop a distinct 
interpretative strategy that borrows from the previous two but is reducible to 
neither of them and which he defines as a “positive ontopolitical 
interpretation”:
To practice this mode of interpretation, you project ontopolitical 
presumptions explicitly into detailed interpretations of actuality, 
acknowledging that your implicit projections surely exceed your explicit 
formulations of them and that your formulations exceed your capacity to 
demonstrate their truth. You challenge closure in the matrix by affirming 
the contestable character of your own projections, by offering readings 
of contemporary life that compete with alternative accounts, and by 
moving back and forth between these two levels.82
The ontology that Connolly adopts is decisive in the formation of this 
approach. Even though he refuses to understand the relation between 
ontology and politics in the classic sense of efficient causality, he contends 
that the former somehow filters into the latter and so it is ubiquitous to 
political life.83 His ontology is unique not merely because it combines 
elements from two different thinkers, Gilles Deleuze and William James, but 
for the way in which he conceives it as an ‘existential faith’, that is a 
“committed view of the world layered into the affective dispositions, habits
82 Ibid., 36.
83 William E. Connolly, “The left and ontopolitics”, in Carsten Strathausen (ed.), A Leftist 
Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009), x.
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and institutional priorities of its confessors”.84 Such a faith is definitive of our 
view of the world; and the field of politics is no exception to that, since it is 
present in our political decisions and choices through the ethos we infuse 
them with, I find that a point that differentiates Connolly’s work from Mouffe’s 
is exactly the ontology that permeates his vision of democracy. Whereas 
Mouffe relies on a logic of lack, in that she appreciates the unattainability of a 
final agreement on the content of the two principles she finds central to 
democracy, equality and freedom, Connolly aspires to abundance.85 It is her 
reliance on lack that leads her to value undecidability as the most important 
aspect of political life; subsequently, it is undecidability that urges her to 
articulate ethos as identification with the principles of freedom and equality, 
the content of which remains the object of controversy in the field of the 
contest. I will discuss how the celebration of abundance as a starting point 
has a significant impact on the element that Connolly honours as 
indispensable to his democracy, namely contestability. But before doing so, I 
will first give an overview of his ontology.
Connolly adopts the Deleuzian ontology of abundance, which entails the 
experience of the world as overflowing with materials, energies and 
processes of becoming too complex to be rationally divided into “subjects” 
and “objects”.86 This non-anthropocentric metaphysic forms Connolly’s 
ethical source, that is, a belief in the abundance of being that exceeds any 
specific identity: in his faith there is a visceral attachment to life and earth, 
while it is acknowledged that both exceed cultural articulations of them. It is 
also a non-theistic, immanent metaphysics for it does not attribute any role to 
divine or supernatural force in the survival of nature or human culture: the 
universe/nature alone is already diverse enough to cultivate a gratitude for 
being and an ethic of care that nourishes its survival.87 This existential faith of
84 William E. Connolly, “Method, problem, faith”, in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, Tarek E. 
Masaid (eds.), Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics (New York: Cambridge, 2004), 
333.
85 For a relevant discussion see the edited volume by Lars Tender and Lasse Thomassen, 
Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005) and especially the “Introduction”.
86 William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 88-89.
87 William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics, 84-86; also William E. Connolly, Capitalism and 
Christianity, American Style (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008),79-87.
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immanent naturalism which appreciates the excess of possible experiences 
of being is enough, Connolly contends, to infuse an ethical orientation with 
generosity, forbearance and receptivity. The ethic supported by an immanent 
naturalist is one “in which visceral attachment to life and the world provides 
the preliminary soil from which commitment to more generous identifications, 
responsibilities, and connections might be cultivated”.88 Thus it is an ethic 
that is cultivated, rather than ordered by a categorical imperative (as in Kant) 
or derived from argumentative deliberation (as in Rawls). It remains 
questionable, though, how such an ethical orientation towards life and the 
world can take a specifically political shape and become pertinent to the 
exigencies for and of democratic action.
Now, Connolly’s immanent naturalism is infused with the kind of 
contestability that he conceives of as an indispensable feature of any political 
concept, identity, idea or interpretation including his own and the 
presumptions by which they are infiltrated.89 That said, Connolly does not 
expect that everyone will accept his ontopolitical view of the world; neither 
does he want it to be so. Following the American pragmatist William James, 
he embraces the idea of contestability as embedded in any creed, 
philosophy, faith and doctrine and he seeks to forge a positive ethos of public 
engagement between alternative faiths on the basis of their very 
contestability, acknowledged not only in the eyes of the others, but also of 
oneself. This entails that one must come to terms viscerally and positively 
with the extent to which her existential faith might appear contestable to 
others’ hearts and minds.90
It is his endorsement of deep contestability that allows Connolly to 
precede a radical agonistic democracy that unfolds around the core of 
pluralism by exercising a critical mode of interpretation that is permeated by 
an affirmative sensibility towards the ceaseless mobility of things, the 
diversity of being and the unending possibilities of enhancing this plurality at
88 Connolly, Neuropolitics, 86.
89 I wouldn’t go thus far as Schoolman in acknowledging contestability as a distinct critical 
approach along with genealogy and deconstruction, since in my reading genealogy already 
folds in it the contestation of fixed concepts, see Morton Schoolman, “A pluralist mind: 
Agonistic respect and the problem of violence toward difference”, in Campbell and 
Schoolman (eds.), The New Pluralism, 17-61.
90 Connolly, Pluralism, 32.
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levels and dimensions so far unexplored. I find Connolly’s embrace of 
contestability illuminating for the kind of democracy that I support in the 
thesis: to accept the contestability of your views is to accept the multifaceted 
nature of democracy and of the democratic agon, as well as the multiple 
possibilities for taking action within its context. It is a scheme that we have 
already seen developed by Protagoras in Chapter Two: in the public field of 
the agon, each and every opinion is contestable. At the same time, though, I 
find that the element of undecidability honoured by Mouffe, an element to 
which she is drawn due to her affirmative stance towards the idea of lack, is 
equally important in helping one to identify with diverse struggles, a stance I 
find crucial with reference to the function of late modern democracy. The 
metical ethos I espouse in the thesis (see Chapter Six) is therefore open to 
both these elements.
Identity/Difference and Contingency in Connolly’s Work
The relation of identity to difference, what Connolly refers to as “the site of 
two problems of evil”, is at the core of his ethico-political vision since, as he 
contends, “identity, in some modality or other, is an indispensable feature of 
human life”.91 Despite its ubiquity in modern life, it entails a paradoxical logic, 
according to which a complex relation between identity and difference exists, 
a relation of conflict and at the same time interdependence, for “identity 
requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in 
order to secure its own self-certainty”.92 That is, unlike Mouffe’s assertion that 
identity is always-already difference, Connolly sees a more complex 
association between them, a systemic one, an account that I also endorse in 
my discussion in Chapter Six. Given the dual relation of ceaseless 
interchange and strife between the two, the possibility that this 
interdependence can take multifaceted forms, as well as the presumption 
that no identity can claim to be natural or true, power is always present in 
systems of identity/difference. There is no way to escape identities, be they 
personal or collective, but in order to justify these identities as true we need
91 Connolly, Identity and Difference, 158.
92 Ibid., 64.
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to step on differences which we convert into otherness and then otherness 
into scapegoats. Identity is relational, biocultural and collective and it 
struggles to marginalise or exclude the differences through which it is 
established, to make space for its fullness: “To establish an identity is to 
create social and conceptual space for it to be in ways that impinge on the 
spaces available to other possibilities”.93 However, this paradox entails a 
positivity in that it is something efficacious that exceeds conceptual reach. 
We need to compromise with this paradox, if we are to support a democratic 
politics that moves towards the acceptance of the importance of pluralism: 
“To come to terms affirmatively with the complexity of the connection 
between identity and difference (to confess a particular identity is also to 
belong to difference) is to support an ethos of identity and difference suitable 
to a democratic culture of deep pluralism”.94 Pluralism, if it is to be sustained 
and flourish, needs a specific ethical sensibility.
A distinct dimension of Connolly’s reading of identity is the trait of 
contingency that he attributes to it. Contrary to other political theorists who 
see contingency as an accidental and somehow unavoidable and negative 
event, Connolly’s Nietzschean approach enables him to conceive it as a 
positive evolution that has a focal position in his theoretical formations. He 
identifies the central problem of identity politics to be the demand, by some 
theorists, for unity and consensus:
Intensive pressure for unity, consensus, and normality manufactures 
new abnormalities, to which idealists of unity then respond by... 
demanding more unity. The way to loosen the boundaries of that circle 
is to render prevailing standards of identity more alert to incorrigible 
elements of difference, incompleteness and contingency within them.95
For Connolly identity is always contingent, since its constitution depends on 
various factors, to which it can be in harmony or conflict, with some of them 
having a more significant contribution to the formation of an identity. Although 
any identity entails the element of contingency, there are particularly
93 Ibid., 160.
94 Ibid., xiv.
95 Ibid., 172-3.
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problematic identities possessing branded or entrenched contingencies— 
those “that ha[ve] become instinctive”—which usually lead to the repression 
of difference, because we tend to either ethiciseAiniversalise them on the 
grounds that they flow from a true identity or purge them because they aren’t 
worth enough to be ethicised.96 Either way, treating entrenched 
contingencies with a tendency towards normalisation and moralisation is a 
decisive component of loathing difference and thus transforming it to 
otherness and finally to something that must be defeated or marginalised. 
We have seen how Mouffe, drawing on the Derridean idea of the constitutive 
outside, also affirms the contingency of every identity and the need to draw 
frontiers that safeguard democracy and pluralism. Such limits also preserve 
the agon for they prevent an agent from taking mastery of the foundation of 
society, which is the Nietzschean idea of the agon.
The paradoxical relation between identity/difference is prevalent in 
Connolly’s vision of democracy, the latter being folded around a paradox that 
he summarises as follows: “If democracy is a medium through which 
difference can establish space for itself as alter-identity, it is also a means by 
which the dogmatisation of identity can be politically legitimised”.97 For 
Connolly, as for Mouffe, democracy has an ambiguous character: it leaves 
space for exposure of the relational character of identity/ difference, and this 
is both its virtue and danger. While the danger lies in the always present 
possibility that a dogmatic identity will be able to gain hegemony and 
suppress the others, its virtue is that democracy is the only form of 
organisation that will also enable a counteraction.
Connolly’s democratic project is developed around the recognition of 
democracy’s paradoxical nature and it aims, on the one hand, to modify the 
terms of the current debate around democracy and democratic theory while, 
on the other, allowing the disclosure of under-appreciated virtues of 
democracy. That said, he introduces a political imaginary that responds to 
this paradox by embracing the indispensability of issues of identity and the 
good for politics and integrating them into the public dialogue, aiming thus at 
politicising instead of neutralising them.
96 Ibid., 177.
97 Ibid., x.
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Refashioning the Democratic Imaginary
Already in his early writings Connolly was critical not only of the aggregative 
mode of theorising democracy, but of democratic models in general, since he 
found them insufficient to grasp the tension between the diverse moments of 
paradoxical democratic politics. More specifically, he contends that the 
distinction between normative/descriptive statements is blind to the 
normative points of view already inherent in concepts underpinning the 
actions analysed. By contrast, he suggests, there is a more complex relation 
between a problem and the method used for it to be addressed, where the 
issue of existential faith is unavoidable.98 Theorists who attend to democracy 
instead of attempting to offer explanatory, descriptive or interpretative 
models, could benefit from the appreciation of a more loose-cannon 
articulation of the terms that describe their preferred methods, while at the 
same time valuing the ever presence of their faith in the performance of their 
academic tasks. It is only then that the reworking of democracy can be 
productive and effective.
Refashioning democracy entails also reconsidering its relation with the 
sovereign state and the territorial imaginary that this is bound with, especially 
when bearing in mind the challenge of globalisation and the suffocating 
pressures that the idea of a contiguous territory places on relations of 
identity/difference and thus on democracy. On this account, the alternative 
democratic vision that Connolly seeks to conceptualise is one “that 
distributes democratic energies and identifications across multiple sites, 
treating the state as one site of identification, allegiance, and action among 
others”.99 This cosmopolitan, multidimensional account notwithstanding, 
Connolly does not seek to depreciate the role of governance played by the 
state: his democratic vision is not indifferent towards the role of democratic 
institutions in mobilising possibilities for a more generous treatment of 
difference. Although he concurs with Foucault on the necessity of a 
democratic theory that criticises consensus both when absent and present,
98 Connolly, “Method, problem, faith” in Shapiro, Smith, Masoud (eds), Problems and 
Methods in the Study of Politics, 332-349
99 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 137.
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he breaks with the Foucauldian detachment from political action through the 
state, in fear of it becoming too representative of a single identity:
The risk of the state becoming a nation-state is always there [...]. But 
these risks must be run and resisted by those committed to a pluralizing 
democracy; we must include the state as one key site of political action 
among others”100 (emphasis added)
Consensus, then, is a constitutive element in Connolly’s democratic 
imaginary. However, it is a consensus on the ambiguity of democracy, a 
consensus about the “contestability of contending presumptions about the 
fundamental character of being”.101 Hence its ironic character.
Connolly’s interest in refashioning the pluralist imagination is inextricably 
connected to his ethical and thus to his democratic project. He problematises 
this imagination for being “still haunted by ghosts that it seeks to exorcise”, 
mainly for being “too stingy, cramped and defensive for the world we now 
inhabit”,102 but also for entailing the image of pluralism as a fundamental that 
must be protected. Connolly problematises this protectionism by affirming it 
as leading to conservatism through the exclusion of new drives, for they are 
considered as endangering pluralism, hindering thus its pluralisation. 
According to Connolly, this dissonant relation between pluralism and 
pluralisation is the constitutive tension of pluralist politics and his work is 
attentive to this tension seeking to renegotiate it. Connolly contends that the 
answer lies in a rhizomatic pluralism, since this “would generate a general 
ethos of generosity and forbearance among its elements from multiple 
sources rather than from a single, exclusionary taproot”.103 This distinct 
pluralist imaginary draws on the Deleuzian image of the rhizome, where the 
enhancement of diversity in one sector can expand in other levels of life, 
resulting in the creation of majority assemblages. These assemblages will be 
rhizomatic being “linked through multiple lines of connection, rather than 
unified by a central political idea or ethical principle which all participants
100 Ibid., 103.
101 Ibid., 104.
102 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, xii.
103 Ibid, 94.
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endorse together. Such [assemblages] support the expansion of 
plurality...”.104 Participation in these assemblages, then, is achieved for 
diverse reasons, so that they have not the form of a general consensus but a 
more dynamic one of a loose mobile constellation of constituencies which are 
held together for different reasons, without, though, aiming at a deep-rooted 
and necessarily continuous collaboration. Hence its rhizomatic instead of 
arboreal form. The terms that govern the gathering of these assemblages are 
subject to persistent renegotiation and therefore change; so that the success 
of rhizomatic pluralism rests on its constituencies’ willingness to come to 
terms with the paradoxical nature of the identity/difference relation.
The endeavour of pluralising pluralism does not imply a pluralism with no 
limits, for, as Connolly says, “no such beast is possible”.105 Like Mouffe, 
Connolly sees boundaries and exclusions as necessary in order “to ensure 
that an exclusionary, Unitarian movement does not take over an entire 
regime”.106 Concurrently, these limits demonstrate the fragility of pluralism 
itself: their absence can put it in danger, while their presence may drive it to 
defeat. Their necessity, though, is dictated by the possibility that any 
constituency may evolve into a fundamentalist, concentric regime. However, 
the most important feature of the limits posed on pluralism by its own 
defenders is their contestable character. Pluralists never set final limits and 
they always acknowledge the necessity of reconsidering already existing 
ones.
Connolly contends that politics pervades social life and thus the relation 
between identity and difference, but he questions the unchangeability of the 
element of power as ubiquitous in this relation. His democratic project, then, 
is founded upon the conviction that acknowledgement of identity’s 
contingency and contestability can somehow alter the ethical quality of 
political life. The latter is characterised by an ethicality which is not fixed and 
its content can be defined and redefined. As he puts it,
104 William E. Connolly, ‘The Ethos of democratization”, in Simon Critchley and Oliver 
Marchart (eds), Laciau.A Critical Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 168.
105 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 178.
106 Connolly, Pluralism, 42.
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it is necessary to find political means by which to expose the 
dependence of dogmatic identities upon the differences they vilify [...] 
Such a politicisation of dogmatic identities forms an essential prelude to 
the effort to devise creative ways through which a wider variety of 
identities can negotiate less violent terms of coexistence.107
For Connolly, to politicise is to disturb established norms, modes of 
identification and relations. He is driven to this idea by way of embracing an 
image of a world where speed, contingency, excess and mutation are 
appreciated as its indispensable elements and by embracing an 
understanding of time as durational instead of linear, that is a world of 
becoming. Pertinent to such a world of becoming he finds what he articulates 
as a politics of becoming: “that politics by which a constituency or agenda 
that had been ill-formed, scattered or impugned, finds leverage to push its 
way onto the scene of official contestation”.108 Thus it is also a politics of 
enactment. Such a politics is paradoxical, for
before success the new movement is likely to be judged [by 
authoritative constituencies] in those terms through which it is already 
depreciated, and after success a new identity emerges that exceeds the 
very energies and identifications that spurred it into being.109
Despite its fragility, while it struggles against the forces that resist its positive 
articulation, as well as the possibility of its generating a negative 
constituency, the politics of becoming upon its success manages “to shake 
up something in the established world” and “to propel a fork in political time” 
and also to throw “a wrench into the established code of obligation, 
goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy”.110 It is Connolly’s conviction 
that solely the perspective of disturbance and rearrangement deserves the 
effort. However, this is a point that Mouffe attacks in Connolly the most. For 
as she holds, disturbance as a method or technique is inadequate to the 
radicalisation of the prevailing liberal paradigm. Rather than engaging with
107 Ibid., 89-90.
108 William E. Connolly, “A world of becoming”, in Alan Finlayson (ed), Democracy and 
Pluralism: The Political Thought of William E. Connolly (Hew York: Routledge, 2010), 226.
109 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 192.
110 Connolly, Pluralism, 122.
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permanent disruption and decentering, like Connolly does, Mouffe contends 
that one needs to be attentive to the moment of exclusion that is necessary 
in order to draw the limits and thus protect pluralism and democracy.111 By 
contrast, she believes that her disassociative approach allows her to attend 
to exclusion as a necessary part of the political terrain and thus appreciate 
the moment of determination of political identification on which democratic 
ethos is brought to the fore.112 To be sure, Connolly develops a unique 
pathway towards introducing the pertinence of ethos to democracy. This is 
the object of analysis in what follows.
Agonistic Respect and Critical Responsiveness
Connolly’s liberalism is a vitalised one: it endorses and politicises elements 
that other liberalisms ignore. It is also a post-fundamentalist liberalism in the 
sense that it is willing to acknowledge the contestability of its own 
fundamentals, even those regarding its conceptions of morality. The issue 
that arises, though, upon the recognition of the significance and then of the 
complexity of the politics of becoming is the kind of political and more 
specifically civic virtues, the kind of ethos, appropriate to such a politics. The 
ethical project undertaken by Connolly in order to sustain this vision of 
democracy is one that does not intend to “take politics out of ethics”, or to 
“rise above politics”; rather, it is one that “lend[s] an ethical dimension to the 
experience of identity, the practice of faith, the promotion of self-interest, and 
the engagements of politics”.113 Unlike the theorists scrutinised in Chapter 
Three, then, Connolly aims to deploy the ethical dimension he finds pertinent 
to political issues, without falling into a moralisation of the political field. In so 
doing, Connolly develops this ethical project across two dimensions:
111 Chantal Mouffe, “Agonistic pluralism between politics and ethics” Lecture at the New 
School of Social Research, June, 4, 2007 http://www.discoursenotebook.com/audio/ 
CM04-06-2007.mp3.
112 The distinction between associative and disassociative thinkers is introduced by Oliver 
Marchart in his discussion of the political in Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political 
Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007), 38-44.
113 Ibid., 122.
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agonistic respect and a critical responsiveness to new drives to pluralisation. 
After introducing them, I will critically discuss them.
Agonistic respect, the first of the civic virtues forming a democratic ethos, 
“allows people to honour different final sources, to cultivate reciprocal respect 
across difference, and to negotiate larger assemblages to set general 
policies”.114 Agonistic respect and tolerance are kissing cousins, but not 
equivalent, since the latter presupposes a relation between a majority and a 
minority that is tolerated. By contrast, agonistic respect is a relation 
developed between interdependent partisans who contest the fundamentals 
of others’ faiths, but also appreciate the contestability of their own 
fundamentals. It is a kind of virtue that probably Protagoras would also 
embrace and find pertinent to the field of the agon. The common source out 
of which such a respect can flow is, according to Connolly, care for the 
protean diversity of life and nature, the acknowledgement that they both 
exceed cultural and creedal identifications and discourses motivated by 
human beings for their articulation. In forming agonistic respect, the element 
of agonism enters respect in a balanced relation in a dual sense: “you absorb 
the agony of having elements of your own faith called into question by others, 
and you fold agonistic contestation of others into the respect that you convey 
toward them”.115 Given its nature, in order for it to flourish, agonistic respect 
must be reciprocal. This mutuality does not flow from an agreement on 
common procedures or common sources of justice; rather, it flows from the 
belief that “the deepest wellsprings of human inspiration are to date 
susceptible to multiple interpretations”.116 And this gives to agonistic respect 
its public aspect.
Its crucial role in the engagem ent of partisan constituencies  
notwithstanding, agonistic respect cannot alone support the politics of 
becoming and the expansive forces of rhizomatic pluralism. While the 
process of pluralisation is still under way, also pertinent is the virtue of critical 
responsiveness. In Connolly’s words, while agonistic respect “speaks to 
relations between already crystallised constituencies”, critical responsiveness
114 Connolly, Identity/Difference, xxvi.
115 Connolly, Pluralism, 123-4.
"6 Ibid., 125.
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“speaks to the relation a crystallized constituency pursues to a disqualified 
minority struggling to migrate from an obscure or negated place below the 
register of legitimate identity to a place on that register”.117 This second 
political virtue is related, then, to the paradoxical nature of the politics of 
becoming and to our receptivity to new movements, identities, faiths and 
voices and it thus takes the form of careful listening and presumptive 
generosity.118 Most importantly, and unlike the virtues suggested by Rawls, 
Taylor and Young, critical responsiveness not only is never reduced to a 
code; it also seeks to form a response to such universalising codes of justice, 
harmony and differentiated citizenship. That said, critical responsiveness is a 
virtue that aims to be relevant to the ongoing changes taking place in a fast- 
paced world, instead of aiming to safeguard constituencies that are already 
there. It is for this reason that what characterizes the ethos of critical 
responsiveness is: anticipation, for it reacts to a new movement before it is 
consolidated into a positive identity; criticism, because it must foresee 
whether the new movement includes elements of fundamentalism; self­
revisionism, in that it is open to reconsideration in case the new movement 
finally crystallizes into a positive identity.119
In bearing these three traits, the ethos of critical responsiveness ensures 
that the limits that are put on pluralism are subject to a continuous 
reappraisal, so that they never crystallise into a general and accepted 
constant. Hence its importance for the politics of pluralisation, but also for the 
task undertaken in the thesis: if we are to form an idea of how a democratic 
ethos responsive to the peculiarities of the moment would look, then critical 
responsiveness must have a place in this vision.
Agonistic respect and critical responsiveness mediate the paradoxical 
relation between identity and difference and together form a democratic 
ethos appropriate to the accelerating politics of becoming. However, they 
both demand a twofold attention: not only do they need cultivation through 
tactical work on what Connolly defines as the visceral register; they also 
demand continuous public negotiation so that they remain sensitive and
117 Connolly, Identity/Difference, xxviii.
118 Connolly, Pluralism, 126.
119 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralizatlon, 184.
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receptive to the calls of a world of becoming. The work on the self that 
Connolly has in mind is not inspired by, say, the Epicureans, for it is not 
restricted to self-indulgence; rather, it is Nietzschean-inspired and contributes 
to a richer understanding of ethical sources. Moreover, such a democratic 
ethos of enactment with these traits in order to be cultivated and sustained 
needs a sense of reciprocity and more specifically of agonistic reciprocity, 
where,
agents of enactment would exercise a certain forbearance in pressing 
their claims, and agents of reception would exercise a reciprocal 
generosity in responding to productions that disturb what they are.120
Maintaining a certain respect for the adversary does not entail that one 
needs to reduce her own claims to those of the adversary, but that she needs 
to resist and challenge them. Agonism is vital for a democratic politics.
Criticism and Limitations
Connolly’s elaborations of democratic ethos do not go without criticism, 
though. His attentiveness to ethical orientation and work on the self has been 
accused of being characterised by “institutional deficit”, both in terms of its 
critiques of existing arrangements and in terms of their more positive 
alternatives.121 In fact, it is argued, his claim that an agonistic model of 
democracy could foster greater inclusion of diverse citizens and mutual 
respect between their communities remains an arbitrary one, at least as long 
as nothing about the functioning of agonistic institutions is specified.122 
Moreover, Connolly’s commitment to generosity as the source for an 
agonistic respect that will inform democratic politics is confronted for being 
too restricted, while alternatively the role played by negative affects such as 
resentment in fostering democratic struggles and in cultivating a democratic
12° Ibid., 193.
121 David Howarth, “Ethos, agonism and populism: William Connolly and the case for radical 
democracy” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10, no. 2 (2008), 189.
122 Monique Deveaux, “Agonism and pluralism” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no .4 
(1999), 14.
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ethos is stressed.123 In a stronger sense, he has been accused of favouring a 
“culturalist conception of democracy”, of “reducing the role of democracy to 
an ethos” and altogether of embracing an elitist account of democracy that in 
fact address only those who are already equal by belonging to a privileged 
class of liberals.124
Among the critiques of Connolly’s formulations one of the most prominent 
is the line of argument articulated by Stephen K. White. White follows 
Connolly in valuing political generosity as a crucial ethical value in the 
processes of dampening hostility to diversity and moderating of one’s 
normalising expectations. However, at the same time this is a significant 
point where White departs from Connolly. For even though he finds it relevant 
to late-modern developments, such as the expansion of the middle class and 
its susceptibility to fundamentalising appeals and resentment, and even 
though he affirms Connolly’s formulation of generosity as critical 
responsiveness as involving “aesthetic-affective dynamics” that other radical 
approaches to democracy fail to grasp;125 and even though he finds it being 
embedded in an agonistic portrait of life which he also understands as best 
depicting the process of becoming,126 he problematises the indiscriminate, as 
he characterises it, generosity that Connolly embraces. He suggests that the 
reliance of Connolly’s ethico-political project on the central ontological figure 
of abundance is problematic, since he finds this figure inadequate to ground 
the ethical qualities Connolly wants to assign to critical responsiveness.127 
That is, White problematises Connolly’s affirmation of abundance as an 
adequate ontological figuration that can sustain and indeed promote the 
politics of becoming, since no care for human being flows from a “protean 
care for the abundance of life” as Connolly embraces it. Rather, White wants
123 Moya Lloyd, “Hate, loathing and political theory: Thinking with and against William 
Connolly”, in A. Finlayson (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism, 114-128.
124 Antonio Y. Vazquez-Arroyo, “Agonized liberalism: The liberal theory of William E.
Connolly” Radical Philosophy 127 (2004), 8-19.
125 Stephen K. White, “Three conceptions of the political: The real world of late modern 
democracy” in A. Botwinick and W.E. Connolly (eds), Democracy and Vision, 181.
126 Stephen K. White, “Ethos and late-modern democracy” in A. Finlayson (ed.), Democracy 
and Pluralism, 49.
127 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 127.
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a more emphatic and more direct link between the ontological and the 
ethical-political, which is a more clear distinction between the sheer 
“abundance of human presencing per se and presencing that calls us to 
respect equal dignity”.128 This is the reason that White needs to go back to 
his own ontological figures and search for the crucial one that allows him to 
delineate human subjectivity and to draw this line of distinction he finds 
absent in Connolly.
The importance of these criticisms notwithstanding, I believe there is 
another line of discussion that can be developed across Connolly’s work on 
an ethos for democracy. This discussion is related to his honouring only one 
component of ethos, that is the individual, and which I believe creates 
serious shortcomings for his ethico-political project. Connolly advances a 
biocultural reading of identity by attending to the interchanges between 
natural sciences and cultural theory, two fields kept separate for various 
reasons but brought closer in the course of the development of complexity 
theory.129 Following the Nietzschean idea of “self-artistry” he attends to a 
series of techniques of working on the self which can signal the direction of a 
richer understanding of ethical sources. These techniques can be then 
collectivised and politicised through the Deleuzian idea of micropolitics, “that 
interplay between image, rhythm, words and perception on the media and 
elsewhere which plays an indispensable role in politics writ large”.130 
Micropolitics invades and pervades macropolitics by allowing the 
development of strategies that challenge and contest the latter. Agonism, 
then, is folded into the arts of both the self and micropolitics, for example in 
fighting against existential resentment.
I believe there are two problems here. Although I find that the appreciation 
of these techniques is indispensable to the development of a democratic 
ethos on the inner level, I believe that by relying exclusively on them for the 
cultivation of his two ethico-political virtues Connolly does not take into 
consideration the interplay between those techniques and the impact of 
community and thus ignores the mediating role that ethos has between the
123 Ibid., 129.
129 Connolly, “A world of becoming”, in A. Finlayson (ed), Democracy and Pluralism, 223.
130 Ibid., 224.
204
individual and the collective aspect of democracy. As White help us to see, 
then, Connolly is eager to explicate a democratic ethos that is tuned to the 
protean universe. This eagerness, despite giving a certain outer account to 
Connolly’s vision of ethos, does not enable him to attend to the importance of 
the very moment of enactment of ethos in course of the democratic action. 
That said, and unlike, let’s say, Foucault, Connolly does not provide an 
account of how his two virtues are enacted in accordance with or in the 
occasion of collective democratic action. Mouffe, with her attentiveness to the 
coercion that takes place through the process of agonistic engagement, 
proves helpful here. This is an aspect that I see as folded in my account of 
the metical democratic ethos, mainly the several tactics that one may need to 
employ in order to gain ground in the field of the agon.
The second problem is related to the cultivation of these dispositions. It 
appears to be more of something that one does on oneself for his one sake 
and benefit and that can take place in abstraction from common or shared 
concerns. That is, there does not seem to be an outer aspect of ethos that 
urges one to engage in the process of cultivation, so the relevance to 
democracy here remains questionable. At the same time the question is 
posed as to why one would bother to engage into a process of cultivation of 
these two specific sensibilities and prefer them to others, lets say to listening 
or corporeal traveling as theorised by Romand Coles.131 I find that Connolly, 
his embrace of contestability notwithstanding, ends up to offer a code of 
proper democratic conduct, exactly like Mouffe does. By contrast, I suggest 
that a democratic ethos is not exhausted to a set of principles or dispositions, 
but is characterised by fluidity and plasticity: it remains attuned only to the 
challenges of the moment of the democratic agon.
These critiques, while revealing the limits and weaknesses of Connolly’s 
work, are important because they have contributed significantly to the 
evolution of his ideas and have urged further elaborations of his critical 
project. For example, his recent turn to capitalist democracy and the complex 
ways that religion and political parties interact with neoliberal capitalist 
powers seeks not only to problematise but also indicate how to tackle the
131 Romand Coles, “Moving democracy: Industrial areas, foundation social movements and 
the political arts of listening, traveling, and tabling” Political Theory 32, no. 5 (2004), 678-705.
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issues arising from these interconnections; such a turn comes to remedy the 
critique of “institutional deficit” attributed to him.132 It is by way of response to 
his critics that Connolly was forced to push his ideas, elaborations and 
conceptualisations further and offer us today a rich and valuable source of 
thinking and acting against capitalist democracy and in favour of a different 
democracy. At the same time, he showed how regular institutions and 
“experts” are in several cases inadequate to respond to the turmoil, 
uncertainty and disarray caused by the complexity and fluidity of the world.133 
In any case, these critiques are valuable because, most importantly, they are 
indicative of the abundant nature of democracy, the countless possibilities of 
articulations regarding it and the ethos permeating its institutions and 
practices, as well as theory’s inefficacy to interpret events.
IV. Agonistic Democracy: For an Alternative Democratic Ethos
The purpose of this chapter was to show how theorists of democracy who 
embrace the virtues and challenges of the agon also, and necessarily, attend 
to ethos as a crucial aspect of their democratic imaginary: indeed as its very 
pillar. As I have shown, both Mouffe and Connolly rework the liberal 
democratic imaginary in ways that emphasise its adversarial aspect, seeking 
to bring to the fore the dynamics resulting from differences, and to advance a 
radical democratic agenda transforming antagonisms into agonisms and 
fusing an ethical factor with the democratic process. In so doing, they do not 
settle with a moralisation of the political in that manner of, as we saw in 
Chapter Three, Rawls, Taylor and Young. In fact, both Connolly and Mouffe 
severely criticise Liberals and Communitarians for this and try to avoid the 
trap of offering moral codes and modes of “appropriate” democratic conduct 
in their efforts to resist established norms and the articulation of ethos as 
morality.
132 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, William E. Connolly,‘The radical right, the extreme 
right and the republican party” The Contemporary Condition Blog, January, 13, 2011 
http://contemporarycondition.blogspot.com/2011701 /radical-riaht-extreme-riaht-and.html.
133 William E. Connolly, ‘The politics of the event” The Contemporary Condition Blog, April, 3, 
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However, as we have seen, both Mouffe and Connolly end up suggesting 
an account of ethos that is quite restricted. For Mouffe, a democratic ethos 
involves identification with (liberal) democratic citizenship, something that 
sets limitations on her account of the democratic subject. Connolly, on the 
other hand, identifies democratic ethos with two principles that form an ethic 
rooted in democrats’ visceral register. In both cases, despite their intentions, 
these formulations of an ethos of democracy are prescriptive. They conceive 
ethos in very stable terms and they fail to recognise its fluidity and 
adaptability elements that, as we shall see in Chapter Six, will prove 
beneficial with regard to the exploitation of the moment of the democratic 
agon. The approach I develop in the final chapter aims to provide exactly an 
account of democratic ethos that brings to the fore the importance of the 
attunement of the ethic to the temporal specificity of democratic action and 
thus to its dual tactical dimension.
I believe that despite their similarities, analysed above, Connolly and 
Mouffe articulate two different visions of democracy and democratic ethos 
due to the fact that they draw inspiration from two different sources, namely 
lack for Mouffe and abundance for Connolly. The espousal of the elements of 
undecidability and lack of a final ground brings Mouffe close, I think, to “a line 
of transcendence”. More specifically, it can be argued that Mouffe actually 
embraces what Laclau has described as “failed transcendence”, a 
transcendence with the form of the presence of an absence.134 Democracy 
fills in this lack through the creation of a chain of equivalence among 
democratic struggles, that is through the creation of a common political 
identity among democratic subjects, a common ethos of democratic 
citizenship. The formation of such an ethos is, according to Mouffe, the 
premise for the maintenance of liberal-democratic institutions and of a liberal- 
democratic logic of justice.135 In order for this goal to be attained we should 
focus not on the “fact of pluralism”, on how to cultivate tolerance among 
different constituencies and on how to succeed in achieving social harmony. 
Avoiding the moralisation of the political proffered by deliberative democrats 
and its ethicalisation sought by some post-modernists, Mouffe suggests the
134 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), 244.
135 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 69.
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mobilisation of passions that people already comply with. Contra Connolly, 
Mouffe does not engage in an elaboration of sensibilities that would then 
have to be proved relevant to democracy. Neither does she ask for more 
democracy: the very negation of its possibility is the key. Her vision lingers 
around a democracy where both liberty and equality cannot be perfectly 
realised. However this is not a reason for despair, but rather the very 
condition of possibility for a pluralist form of human coexistence in which 
rights can exist and be exercised, in which freedom and equality can 
somehow manage to coexist. The condition of radical democracy’s possibility 
is the impossibility of its perfect implementation.
Connolly, on the other hand, believes that the key to safeguarding liberal 
democracy is in pluralising its possibilities. That is, he understands 
democracy as being inherently and necessarily pluralistic, but not in the way 
that conventional pluralist theory does. Instead he tries to adapt the pluralist 
ideal to the political conditions, he affirms pluralism as too complicated and 
excessive, as multidimensional, and thus as being irreducible to any political 
interpretation. He is driven to this understanding by an ontology of immanent 
naturalism, that is, a non-theistic gratitude for the rich diversity of being and a 
care for the world we inhabit. This ethical source informs a democratic vision 
in which multidimensional pluralism coexists with the creation of majority 
assemblages that would work for a common purpose such as the reduction 
of economic inequalities and with the acknowledgement of numerous lines of 
affinity and interdependence between human beings and non-human 
nature.136 Connolly’s pluralist imagination is a political process where a loose 
constellation of constituencies which are hold together for different reasons, 
without, though, aiming at a deep-rooted and necessarily continuous 
collaboration, seek to cause disturbance in the prevailing order, but without 
disparaging or aiming at its extermination.
Connolly does not expect that his existential faith of non-theistic gratitude 
is going to seize political life by way of everyone affirming it. In his 
democratic imaginary it is enough that everyone affirms that there is a 
multiplicity of ethical sources in political life and that each one of those, 
including the one she embraces, carries the element of contestability. The
136 Connolly, “Immanence, abundance, democracy”, 253.
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dimension of agonism is crucial in this approach to democracy, since it opens 
political spaces for agonistic relations of adversarial respect. However, it is a 
democratic agonism that does not exhaust social space; it leaves room for 
other modalities of attachment and detachment through the cultivation of 
agonistic respect between interlocking and contending constituencies. The 
nomadic element is a crucial aspect of the democratic ethos that Connolly 
envisages for the late-modern condition. Such elements or movements
periodically interrupt centered cultural presumptions so that the element 
of power, artifice, and contingency in these all too readily naturalised 
norms becomes more palpable, so that voices defined as (interior, 
internal, external) Others in the established order of things can locate 
cultural space to contest some of these definitions, so that new 
combinations emerging out of these disturbances can develop agonistic 
respect for one another in changing contexts of interdependency.137
It is by affirming the role of nomadism in politics that a democratic ethos 
mediates between the dimension of statist democracy and the challenge of 
any constellations of identities that tend to be solidified. More than a form of 
governance, democracy is an ethic itself.
The parallel discussion of the work of Connolly and Mouffe attempted in this 
chapter reveals the significant differences in their democratic visions 
concerning issues of ontology, theoretical sources and the vocabularies they 
choose in order to articulate their imaginaries. To be sure, the two theorists 
stand in a constructive dialogue with each other, with Mouffe being more 
eager to differentiate herself from Connolly (and other agonists). As I have 
already discussed, she finds that Connolly is too concerned with preventing 
closure and keeping identities and practices open to challenges and 
disruption and that he spends too little time on the need for a moment of 
exclusion.138 She also condemns disturbance as a method or technique as 
being inadequate for the radicalisation of the prevailing liberal paradigm, 
which is the aim of her project. But I have suggested that Mouffe is also
137 Ibid., 179.
138 Chantal Mouffe, “Agonistic pluralism between politics and ethics” [Lecture at the New  
School of Social Research]. Retrieved from http://www.discoursenotebook.com/audio/ 
CM04-06-2007.mp3
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eager to safeguard the perpetuity of the contest. Connolly on his behalf 
suggests that Mouffe’s conceptualisation of ethos needs to be infused by a 
positive conception of ethics and more specifically by an ethic of positive 
engagement, if it is going to sustain pluralism as she hopes; that the 
conception of decisionism she adopts to support her vision necessarily 
emphasises more exclusion than openness; and, most importantly, that her 
ethos of democratic citizenship is grounded in already constituted practices 
which she hopes that we will adopt.139 At the very end, Mouffe exchanges the 
contestability of her political vision for an ethic too strongly supported.
This exchange between the two thinkers is informative. It indicates not 
their differences with regard to ethos but also the complementarity of their 
democratic endeavours. Neither provides justification for the view that their 
‘assemblage’ or ‘chain of equivalence’ would create a new hegemony that 
would be more preferable than the prevailing one. That is, there is no 
evidence as to why a constituency formed between otherwise diverse 
constituencies that find a fugitive moment of commonality would establish a 
new political condition that would be necessarily successful in articulating 
democratic claims. Connolly is, I believe, more attentive to the specific ways 
in which an ethos suitable for democracy can be cultivated and permeate 
political structures; he relies on techniques of the self and micropolitics and 
he even explores neuroscience to show how political ideas and motivations 
are layered and subject to personal work on the visceral register. In Connolly, 
contrary to Mouffe, there is no need “to roll back into the strategies of 
conquest, conversion, community or tolerance”,140 without this move entailing 
that he wants to eliminate them as possible forms of human relations. 
Connolly is attentive to the dual nature of the tactical dimension of ethos: it 
both needs tactical work if it is to thrive, like Foucault argues, but at the same 
time it also needs to be sustained by tactics such as conversion. Only that 
Mouffe is more alert on the importance of conversion in late-modern 
democracy, a dimension that my approach of a metical democratic ethos also 
embraces. Mouffe, on the other hand, fails to address the transformative
139 William E. Connolly, ‘Twilight of the idols” Philosophy and Social Criticism 21, no 3 
(1995), 127-138.
140 Connolly, Identity/ Difference, 179.
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moves which need to take place on the ethical level if a radical pluralist 
democracy is to thrive. Although she affirms the indispensability of the 
dimension of an ethic in democracy, her commitment to liberalism as the 
condition for pluralism leads her to privilege a particular ethico-political form, 
a task that drains her project from a more generous approach to plurality. 
Still, Mouffe with her civic republicanism is closer in appreciating the 
collective dimension of an ethos that is supposed to be democratic.
It is in these terms that I have suggested that the projects of the two 
thinkers can be more productively read in a complementary way. Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism and the space for democratic citizenship that it creates 
needs to be infused with principles such as those endorsed by Connolly, 
namely agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, in order for her vision 
of radical democratic citizenship to be sustained. If democratic struggles are 
to have the form of a “chain of equivalence” or “assemblage”, then mere 
adherence to the principles of equality and liberty is insufficient to regulate 
the type of relations among participants in these struggles. A more generous 
and responsive ethic is required so that the relations between the different 
constituencies forming them be infused with agonism.
The two democratic visions scrutinised in this chapter run the risk of 
becoming an ideal in the place of the ideals they seek to challenge. However, 
their complementary reading allows the formulation of a promising image 
regarding the form of a democratic ethic. Connolly envisages as appropriate 
to democracy an ethos that indeed has a civic character: one that is forged 
by the renegotiation of virtues by diverse faiths and that subsequently “must 
become embedded in numerous institutional practices for a positive ethos of 
pluralism to be”.141 A democratic citizenry connected on certain occasions 
through action, in the way envisioned by Mouffe, yet also permeated by 
principles of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness as suggested by 
Connolly, could have a pivotal role in late modernity. An agonistic approach to 
democracy can help us better construe the dynamics of pluralism and 
envisage an ethos that is attainable by and indispensable to democratic life. 
Even more illuminating of the political condition in our late modern world can
141 Connolly, Pluralism, 65.
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be the re-capturing of democracy in its specificity at the moment of acting. 
Such is the perspective of radical thinkers who pertain to democracy in its 
fugitive, temporary and hence experiential dimension. This is the context 
within which the two theorists scrutinised in the next chapter proceed and 
develop their democratic visions.
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Chapter 5
The Radical Democracy of Sheldon Wolin and Jacques Ranciere: 
An Encounter
As we have seen, the turn towards radical articulations of democracy is the 
outcome of a critique of the consensual democratic systems that are 
synonymous with liberal democracy in the contemporary world. However, 
whereas thinkers such as Mouffe and Connolly emphasise the agonistic/ 
agonised dimension of politics, other theorists of radical democracy centre 
their efforts on conceptualising the temporal and spatial dimensions of 
democracy. This shift in emphasis has important effects. Because of the 
prominence they give to the inescapability of pluralised contestation Mouffe 
and Connolly are driven to theorise the ethos through which people 
accommodate themselves to this condition. But when temporal and spatial 
specificity becomes the centre of attention theories of radical democracy 
instead emphasise how people act democratically. I find that it is this second 
form of radical democratic theory that is most pertinent to my vision of a 
metical democratic ethos, that is one that is attuned to the temporal 
summons of the democratic agon.
The two thinkers explored in this chapter exemplify this second category of 
radical democrat for whom the foundation of a liberal democratic state is also 
the suppression of possibilities for the mobilisation of ordinary people in 
defence of equality. To be sure, Sheldon S. Wolin and Jacques Ranciere are 
two thinkers with very different backgrounds: the first is a well-established 
American political philosopher writing in the context of, and against, “the 
oldest democracy in the world”; the second is a Continental thinker who 
moves easily between different disciplines (cinema, theatre, historiography 
as well as political theory) and does not place his work in any specific 
geographical context. Their language varies significantly, from the more 
pragmatic depiction of the American economic-political environment found in 
Wolin to the philosophico-aesthetic discourse mobilised by Ranciere. The 
present chapter brings these radical thinkers together despite their different 
styles and approaches - or rather because of it. As we will see each shares in
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the effort to explore and affirm the importance of the temporal and 
experiential aspect of democracy.
There is a certain agony that Wolin and Ranciere share, concerning the 
present status of democracy in the corporate (Wolin) or consensual 
(Ranciere) state. People living in liberal democratic societies today, their 
argument goes, do not experience democracy, because the political 
environment into which they are thrown is not meant to provide them with this 
experience. ’Inverted totalitarianism’, in Wolin’s phrase, the order of police in 
Ranciere’s terms, confine democracy to procedures and practices in which 
only highly specialised officials take part. Ordinary people play the role of 
“citizens-on-call”. The powerful dynamics of late modern capitalism contribute 
significantly to this development, and whereas Wolin is perhaps more explicit 
in stressing this, Ranciere also connects capitalist economics to the “de- 
democratisation” of democracy.
To be sure, these two thinkers do not propose exactly the same 
democratic vision. Wolin aspires to what he calls a ‘fugitive democracy’ in 
order to sustain his vision for a politics of democratic commonality. Ranciere 
places greater emphasis on the element of disagreement, advocating a 
democracy of dissensus. However, both appreciate the power contained 
within the spatial and temporal dimension of democracy and identify it as the 
most promising alternative to our current condition. It is in this context that 
they both attend to the possibilities that ordinary people have to become 
political actors and to act democratically against a system that wants them to 
be no more than apathetic consumers. Neither Wolin nor Ranciere envision 
mass revolutionary movements that would disrupt the late modern capitalist 
state, but, as Wendy Brown puts it, not because “big powers cannot be 
fought, but rather [because] those powers, big and bad as they are, do not 
completely fill the space of political possibility”.1 Democracy in current 
conditions is most effectively to be conceived and experienced as a rupture 
of the system. The democratic practices both Wolin and Ranciere consider 
essential are based on local and temporal experiences of people who 
experience a grievance, a wrong: disturbances, eruptions and injuries 
caused on the body of the corporate/consensual state by spontaneous yet
1 Wendy Brown, “Democracy and bad dreams” Theory and Event  ^0, no. 1 (2007), §16.
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systematic practices performed and experienced by ordinary individuals. 
Reinvigoration of democracy, if it is to come, will originate from the ordinary.
The chapter begins by outlining the democratic vision of Sheldon Wolin, 
because it is supported by the assumption that democracy needs to be 
sustained by an ethos, an assumption that Ranciere, his encounter, seeks to 
refute. We will see that in articulating his vision for a politics of democratic 
commonality Wolin attends to the importance that an ethos can play within it. 
He does so essentially by proposing two different ethea, one public and one 
private, which can substitute for the ethea of competitiveness/corruption and 
apathy which he finds prevailing in the managerial state and its late-modern 
citizenry. Here, we will follow Wolin’s latest work especially thoroughly 
because it casts light on aspects of his earlier elaborations of the vision of 
fugitive democracy, correcting and complementing them.
The next section critically examines Ranciere whose approach not only 
rejects the idea that a public ethos of any kind is needed to sustain dissensus 
democracy but also leaves the possible role of any individual ethic for 
democracy undiscussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion that brings 
these two visions together and suggests that they can inform each other in a 
way that enables us to engage in a constructive discussion of the ethos 
adequate to democracy in its specific temporal and spatial dimension. It is 
argued that while Ranciere correctly affirms the prevalence of a strong public 
ethos as a drive to assimilation and suppression of individualism, Wolin with 
his discussion of a “democratisation of the self”, albeit under-formulated, is 
better able to appreciate otherness and the possibilities for common action in 
the time that everything can be pluralised. In this way, the present chapter 
contributes to the argument of the thesis in a double way: first by introducing 
the relevance of the temporal aspect to democracy and second by 
suggesting the importance of the ordinary subject to its realisation. Most 
important for the thesis, this chapter deepens our discussion of the fluidity 
and ambiguity of ethos, supporting the idea that a discussion of a democratic 
ethos must honour the interplay between its two components, the private and 
the public, without emphasing the one over the other.
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I. Wolin: Fugitive Democracy versus Managed Democracy
Sheldon S. Wolin is not only one of the most prominent political thinkers - his 
Politics and Vision (1960) is probably among the best books of and on 
political thought - but also a radical democratic thinker who has conceived an 
inspiring alternative redefinition of the political and of what late modern 
democratic politics can be. By theorising the political as that which is public, 
common to the ordinary people, Wolin provides us with a vision of what the 
role of democracy in late modernity must be, according to the peculiarities 
and demands of this specific era. Rather than following one of the major 
democratic traditions, Wolin as a genuine theoros of political reality, one who 
does not rely merely on observation but on imagination as well, pursues a 
critical form of inquiry and provides a vision which can reinvigorate 
democratic politics. More than a mere normative or descriptive thinker, then, 
Wolin is above all a creative thinker.
This section discusses Wolin’s critique of the late modern political system 
in the United States and his vision for the substitution of a fugitive democratic 
politics of commonality for the prevailing managed democracy. The reading 
pursued here places at the centre of Wolin’s inquiry his claim that ethos is 
indispensable to political life for, as he admits, for a long time “most political 
theorising assumed that for political life to exist it had to inhabit a structure of 
governance, a ‘form’” and that “the idea of a form also signified a particular 
way of being in the world...”.2 The discussion, then, maintains that Wolin’s 
formulation of a response against managed democracy is based on an ethos 
he finds most appropriate for a radical democracy; that is, a democracy 
responsive to the grievances and inequalities of a political society seized by 
economy; a democracy local and fugitive yet effective.
As I read it, Wolin’s radical democratic vision has three pillars: recasting 
democracy not as a form but as an experience; envisaging the demos not as 
apathetic mass but as a plurality of democratic citizenries; and attending to 
ethos not as the public political culture but as a sensibility of commonality. I 
contend that Wolin not only gives an inspiring account of the role that citizens 
can have in the reinvigoration of democracy; he does so while, unlike Mouffe,
2 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 557.
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avoiding the trap of suggesting a strict account of demos, by conceptualising 
it as a multiplicity. Moreover, in my analysis I follow how the conceptualisation 
of ethos changes in Wolin’s thought, a shift that contributes to my argument 
for the fluctuating nature of ethos, namely regarding its openness to multiple 
formulations and interpretations. I argue that, whereas Wolin is attentive to 
the two components of ethos, that is the public and the private, he leaves 
untreated the idea of the “democratisation of the self”, while at the same time 
over-emphasising the importance of “the culture of everyday reality”.
Managed Democracy and the Corporate Ethos
Wolin’s critical engagement with the condition of democracy in the United 
States is central to his most recent book Democracy Inc.: Managed 
Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (2008). However, 
elements of this critique were developed in earlier articles as well as in the 
expanded version of his Politics and Vision in 2004. As early as 1981 Wolin, 
from his position as editor of the journal democracy: A Journal of Political 
Renewal and Radical Change3 described the condition that twenty- five years 
later he would see as catastrophic for American democracy and that would 
prompt him to articulate in more concrete terms his vision of a ‘fugitive 
democracy’:
The democratic prospect may seem bleak, but despair is a luxury that 
democrats cannot afford. Since the present political system is likely to 
remain an enemy of freedom, equality, and participation, and since its 
repressive powers are formidable, democratic resistance should be 
expressed in constructive actions aimed at creating alternative modes 
of common life. Most individuals possess the basic resources needed to 
found new, more democratic relationships: some skills, energy, and the 
moral sense to participate in the exercise of power. Contrary to the 
cheerless advice of disillusioned radicals of the '60s that the right 
course was to prepare for ‘the long march through institutions’, today's 
democrats must begin to disengage from the many forms of 
dependency that make them accomplices in the legitimation of 
reactionary power.4
3 The title of the journal is in all lower-case letters and thus democracy instead of 
Democracy.
4 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Editorial” democracy 1, no. 2 (1981), 6.
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This provocative passage aptly summarises Wolin’s attitude towards what he 
presents as the major political challenge for democracy today. His efforts in 
his latest work are concentrated on providing a concrete yet radical response 
to this challenge, without recourse to lament or easy disappointment. I find 
that at the heart of the problem he places the substitution of what he calls 
‘corporate ethos’ for an ethos of concern for what is common.
The political system that has captured the life and imagination of the 
citizens in the post-September 11 United States of America is, Wolin claims, 
to be accused of “the comatose condition of democracy”.5 It is this condition 
that he examines, aiming not only to provide an exegesis of how it is nurtured 
but also to develop a response in the form of a democratic theory. The task is 
monumental, for Wolin needs to expose the shallowness of the system’s 
hypocritical claim to democracy and in order to do so he needs to point to 
actual events from the American political and economic life. Thus, he 
believes that the democratic theory that can undertake this endeavour needs 
to be substantive, descriptive and critical, and that it “should recognise that in 
the contemporary world democracy is not hegemonic but beleaguered and 
permanently in opposition to structures it cannot command”.6 It is a theory 
that affirms the disadvantaged position of its subject matter, but still finds 
reasons to fervently and creatively support its case.
In bridging the normative with the descriptive, Wolin both analyses the 
contemporary political condition and scrutinises the essence of democratic 
citizenship. Democracy Inc. is a detailed analysis of the sombre present of 
the American political system, a melancholic glance to the condition that the 
“oldest democracy in the world” has fallen into during the last 10 years. At the 
same time it is also a tribute to the power of the local, the ordinary, the 
demos. Therefore, while the book is a comment on the assumption 
advocated by the Bush administration that the United States of America is 
“the greatest power in the world”, it is also an investigation into the 
reinvigoration of democratic citizenship, that is “the highest and most difficult 
office”. At stake is the question of the legitimation of the constitution of a
5 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 590.
6 Ibid., 601.
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democracy as “greatest power” and also “a reordering of basic power 
arrangements and a different understanding of civic commitments from that 
of spectator”.7 In his reliance on the ability of the demos, in its plural and 
divergent expressions, and despite its current voicelessness, Wolin places 
ethos at the centre of his democratic vision. However, as I suggest at the end 
of the section, he does so in a way that leaves many issues undiscussed.
Wolin develops his analyses by way of contributing to the Aristotelian 
taxonomy of regimes and enriching it with the one which he finds most 
appropriate to postmodern conditions. He names this regime “Superpower”, 
a term he coins to describe the American political system as an expansive 
system of power that is characterised by limitlessness: it only accepts as its 
limits the ones it poses on itself. Wolin invents a new term to describe 
Superpower’s projection of power: ‘inverted totalitarianism’ ; he does so not 
to claim that the American political system is a totalitarian regime, but instead 
to identify its tendency towards totalising power and expose the strong 
interconnections between the political and the corporate.
Wolin characterises a series of developments as contributions to the 
emergence of Superpower and to its transmutation into an Empire. The 
development that caused the starkest and most catalytic transformations, 
though, was, according to Wolin, the emergence of economic powers such 
as the globalising corporation, a shift that signaled the upgrading of political 
economy. Previously the discourse only of the advocates of the limited role 
for the state, political economy is now elevated to the public philosophy of 
Superpower that champions the integration of corporation, state and 
economics, seeking to expand in previously unthought degrees and 
intensities the field of economy.8 It is the rhetorical tool of those powers that, 
in the name of globalisation and intensification of technological progress, 
proclaim the inevitable primacy of economy, turning politics to a field of 
secondary interest. As Wolin observes, Marx’s prediction of the fall of 
capitalism proved false but not his claim that future societies would inherit a
7 Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted 
Totalitarianism (Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2008), 43.
8 Ibid., 564.
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highly developed economy.9 Superpower is the place where capitalism meets 
with liberal democracy.
Wolin’s main concern is with the transformation of the political into the 
managerial, a change that has also affected the quality of the ethos shared 
by the members of the society. It is not that politics vanishes completely from 
the scene. Rather in Superpower the political and the corporate are melded 
together, signifying the emergence of a new political form-and the decline of 
an older one.10 Corporate capital, enhanced and maintained by modern 
science and technology, is the main power that expresses the political 
authority of the state in Superpower. Globalising corporations are now 
elevated to the status of the main political actors, as the movement of CEOs 
and (usually male) executives to governmental departments to undertake 
political posts is intensified: the political is managerialised. As Wolin puts it, 
“[wjhere modern power shipped huge finished products, postmodern power 
transmits messages”.11 The new American political elite is at the same time 
an economic elite, its only concern to expand the economic impact of 
Superpower, while using the latest communication technology and tools to 
disseminate its messages with a political shade.
Wolin seeks to critically examine not only the paradoxical assumption that 
such a system is proclaimed to be the best example of successful democracy 
but even that it is compatible in any substantive sense with democracy. His 
argument, then, is that Superpower’s structure and function is incompatible 
with democracy, for it sees in the latter a potential threat to social stability: 
contingencies have no place in a political system that wants to present itself 
as reliable and effective.12 The only democracy suited to this system is a 
minimal democracy confined to and by procedural guarantees: equal rights to 
vote and speak, free elections and accountable officials, regularised 
legislative, judicial and administrative processes. These highly rationalised 
practices are produced, managed and controlled by experts, consultants and 
executives. Hence Wolin calls this minimal democracy a “managed
9 Ibid, 565.
10 Ibid., 551.
11 Ibid., 563.
12 Ibid., 564.
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democracy”, that is one that is exhausted in the form of election politics: 
managed democracy is democracy systematised.13 Only a democracy thus 
defined can be suitable to the aims, dynamics and functions of a Superpower 
that claims global hegemony, for it mediates between this claim and the 
democratic ideal of self-government.14 Managed democracy is democracy 
without politics.
Most important for the present thesis, however, is the fact that Wolin also 
finds that this new political system has brought about a decline of a public 
ethic. This is the outcome not only of the way which a media culture 
supporting and nurturing capitalism and managerial democracy promotes 
mass fantasies at odds with the civic culture required by democracy.15 It is 
also a symptom of the way in which managerial democracy discredits ideals 
of civil service and disinterestedness by regarding them as something other 
than public virtues and unnecessary for a healthy political life.16 In the hearts 
and minds of those engaged in public administration and politics, the 
corporate ethos now takes the place of public virtues: a distinct culture that 
“might be defined as the norms and practices operative at various levels of 
the corporate hierarchy that shape or influence the beliefs and behaviour of 
those who work in a particular institutional context”.17 This ethos not only is 
anti-political, fomenting competition rather than cooperation and profitability 
rather than commonality but also, and more specifically, antidemocratic, 
thriving among an ‘expert’ elite which excludes the citizenry from any 
deliberative role, forcing it to choose apathy as its political stance, coloured 
with a xenophobic patriotism. The corporate ethos reigns in high-level 
government offices wiping out the democratic political ethos.
A direct political implication of the prevalence of the corporate ethos is the 
politically demobilised society, the absolute political anaesthetisation of the 
citizenry. The corporate branch of Superpower demands that at the centre of 
its life is the consumer, not the citizen as in a genuine democracy. Its powers
13 Wolin, Democracy Inc, 47.
14 Ibid., 97.
15 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 527.
16 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 135.
17 Ibid., 137.
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found the solution to the problem in presenting both cultures, that of the 
consumer and that of the citizen, as having a common element: as centered 
upon free choice.18 Outside of elections there is only a “virtual citizenry”, 
invited to have opinions which are translated into “measurable responses to 
questions predesigned to elicit them”.19 The citizen of managed democracy is 
a consumer of everything, even of democracy as it is served to him by the 
corporate state.
For Wolin, what this shift in the status of the citizenry signifies, is 
“symptomatic of a systemic change, from democracy as a method of 
‘popularising’ power to democracy as a brand name for a product 
manageable at home and marketably abroad”.20 What he finds more 
devastating about this shift is that democracy itself is distanced from the 
experience of ordinary citizens, who normally give it its heartbeat. Managed 
democracy is a democracy without a demos and therefore barely a 
democracy.
Wolin’s Radical Democratic Vision: Experience and Demos
Wolin’s work on democracy in the United States of America in late modernity 
is a lament for a lost commonality, for a democracy “reduced to a rearguard 
action, struggling not to advance and improve the lives of the Many but 
merely to defend the shredded remains of earlier achievements”21 It is in this 
setting that ethos becomes central in Wolin’s discussion of democracy and 
so the crucial question of his inquiries is formed as such: “Is democracy 
possible when the dominant ethos in the economy fosters anti-political and 
antidemocratic behaviour and values?”.22 Or more specifically, when “with the 
amalgamation of corporation and state the political ethos of public service is
18 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 576-7.
19 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 59.
20 Ibid., 60.
21 Ibid., 147.
22 Ibid., 139.
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replaced by an aggressive and exploitative ethos?”.23 Wolin does not come 
up with a master-plan for how managed democracy can be overturned by a 
major revolution but he has suggestions about how it can be broken and 
perforated so that it can be enervated. These suggestions contribute to a 
distinct and radical dem ocratic vision with three branches: the  
reconceptualisation of democracy not as a form but as an everyday 
experience, of the demos not as an apathetic mass but as a plurality 
consisting of democratic citizenries (in plural) and of ethos not as the public 
culture of a tightly defined unity but as the sensibility of commonality that 
unites different individuals that share a specific experience of injustice. I will 
now develop each of these branches.
Wolin’s alternative to managed democracy is inspired by ‘fugitive 
democracy’, a vision that he elaborated in his earlier work as an antidote to 
what he then perceived as one of the greatest threatens against democracy - 
the limits posed by its indissoluble connection to a constitution. Here Wolin 
discriminates between, on the one hand, the political, as “an expression of 
the idea that a free society composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy 
moments of commonality when, through public deliberations, collective 
power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity” and on 
the other hand politics, defined as “the legitimised and public contestation, 
primarily by organised and unequal social powers, over access to the 
resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity”. That said, 
politics is continuous, ceaseless, and endless, whereas the political is 
episodic, rare 24 Democracy is one possible expression of the political and its 
distinctiveness lies in the fact that is affirmed as “a project concerned with the 
political potentialities of ordinary citizens” and hence “with their possibilities 
for becoming political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns 
and of modes of action for realising them”.25 Rather than one form or regime 
of administration, democracy is “a moment of commonality” against a 
background of difference and divergence.
23 Ibid, 143.
24 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Fugitive democracy” Constellations 1, no. 1 (1994), 11.
25 Ibid., 11.
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Affirming democracy in its fugitive dimension leads Wolin to refute the 
seeming naturalness of the argument that democracy needs necessarily to 
be coupled with a constitution. As he sees it, this modern settlement of 
constitutional democracy in fact entails its restriction within certain limits and 
thus its domestication, its taming so that it is compatible with the dominant 
power groups in a society. As he puts it, “constitutional democracy is 
democracy fitted to a constitution”.26 Hence Wolin’s reluctance to accept 
democracy as a form of government, as administration and therefore as a 
predictable settled set of practices such as elections, a controllable and 
manageable activity; for this would be a democracy without the demos. At 
stake instead are the “moments of commonality” that ordinary citizens enjoy. 
However, as will be discussed, the commonalities which are at the core of 
the Wolinesque vision of democracy are not necessarily fixed and 
predetermined. They can also emerge through the necessities and 
circumstances that ordinary people encounter in their everyday lives.
As Wolin clarifies, democracy thus understood can only be an “ephemeral” 
democracy. This is so because, as Aristotle emphasises, democracy is the 
creation of those who must work and have no time for leisure or money to 
hire representatives for their interests. The case is, says Wolin, that political 
theorists from antiquity to modernity have made a category mistake by 
treating democracy as a possible constitutional form for an entire society.27 
Democracy has never been about governing a political society: its essence 
lies in the participation of the “leisureless” in political affairs, that is affairs that 
are in common. Ordinary people and not professional politicians are the 
subjects of democracy. Hence its plasticity, its ability to take many forms, 
according to the circumstances and their demands: democracy is and can 
only be a response to the call made on such ordinary people by a specific 
occasion. There is a temporal and spatial limitation to democracy, but this is 
its strength rather than its impotence.
What is at stake with democracy, we learn from Wolin, is not where it is 
located. It can take place at any site and be confined to none. Rather, the 
issue with democracy is how it is experienced. Wolin’s perception of this
26 Ibid., 13.
27 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 602.
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experience is radical: it all depends on a sparkle that is created the very 
moment that those excluded experience the unfair treatment, the injustice 
made against them and this felt grievance is brought into the scene as a 
collective claim. He finds that this is most likely to happen “in local, small- 
scale settings, where both the negative consequences of political 
powerlessness and the positive possibilities of political involvement seem 
more evident”.28 Democracy, affirmed as fugitive, experiential, has a local 
character and this is where the power of its regenerating dynamic lies. It is 
about equality, “equality of power and equality of sharing in the benefits and 
values made possible by social cooperation”;29 when this balance of sharing 
is not followed by some members of the political society, then democracy 
breaks out as the restorative move that will remedy the injustice. It is for this 
reason that it can only be conceived as “a mode of being which is 
conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to succeed only temporarily”.30 But 
Wolin by no means sees democracy as able to flourish while restricted within 
the narrow boundaries of localism. For this would be a confined democracy 
and thus barely a democracy. Instead, he recognises that under 
circumstances “the effectiveness of demotic action can go beyond the local 
when it can empathise”.31 As I will discuss, there is an ethical dimension that 
pervades democracy and that can mobilise ordinary people to spontaneously 
respond to calls for action.
The main actor of democracy thus understood, its demos, is not a socially, 
culturally or economically uniform unity. Wolin does not endorse the idea of a 
pre-established political actor who is called on duty on specific occasions, for 
example elections, and then enjoys an unbothered life in a capitalist-liberal 
society. His demos is drawn to democracy spontaneously and sporadically. 
That is, the demos acts from outside and against the established political 
rules and practices. Historically, Wolin says, the enlargement of the circle of 
political participants and therefore the formation of an active demos has 
always been the result of revolutionary action, of the wholesale transgression
28 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 291.
29 Ibid., 61.
30 Wolin, “Fugitive democracy”, 23.
31 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 289.
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of inherited forms.32 It is through transgressive practices that demos acquires 
access to political experience and makes itself political: “It is by stasis not 
physis that the demos acquires a civic nature”.33 Demos is not a label 
attributed a priori to the members of a political society: it is a title attributed to 
it at the very moment of its performance of political actions. Since the political 
stands for valued commonalities to be shared and promoted, the emergence 
for a limited time of demotic action entails the recognition of this commonality 
among individuals otherwise different; this commonality, however, is by no 
means stable: it is fugitive and impermanent34 Differences that exist among 
individuals do not function as barriers to the formation of a commonality: by 
contrast, they have to be taken into account and, ideally, incorporated into 
the decision to do so 35 As Wolin comments elsewhere, this “requires that the 
experiences of justice and injustice serve as moments for the demos to think, 
to reflect, per chance to construct themselves as actors. Democracy is about 
the continuing self-fashioning of the demos.”36 It is about the participation in a 
demotic practice of those who are otherwise excluded from a self-claimed 
democratic political system.
However, upon the end of such transgressions, upon completion of the 
demotic moment, democracy settles down and politics begins to take place in 
the form of processes of institutionalisation and thus attenuation: elections of 
governmental and other officials, procedures of decision-making and re­
organisation of higher offices. These all come after democracy, they do not 
constitute its essence: democracy cannot be otherwise but occasional, 
fugitive. It is along these lines that Wolin suggests that there is hope for the 
murky portrait of the late modern political landscape he draws in his latest 
work, where the interest has now shifted from constitutional to managerial 
democracy, putting the weight of the task on the shoulders of the people who 
participate in the moment of transgression, not what follows it. These people, 
the demos or, better, the plurality of democratic citizenries, can reinvigorate
32 Wolin, “Fugitive democracy”, 17.
33 Ibid., 18.
34 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 472.
35 Wolin, “What revolutionary action means today”, 245.
36 Wolin, “The liberal/democratic divide” , 98.
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democracy. But they do not form the citizenry as an abstract idea. Wolin 
resists the inclusiveness of holistic notions such as “We, the people” or 
“nation” for they imply a majority that is excluded from politics.37 The demos 
as revitaliser of democracy consists of “the citizens as carriers of everyday 
cultural traditions”38 and hence as bearers of differences who can 
nonetheless discover points of commonality, common concern and 
advantage. The rationality that keeps the demos together is a fugitive one.
Does Wolin, then, envision a revolution when he suggests that democracy 
is a rebellious political moment? His answer is positive, but he claims that 
democrats need a new conception of revolution: they need “to reinvent the 
forms and practices that will express a democratic conception of collective 
life”39 A democratic revolution is one that does not have recourse to violence, 
but to creativity, for it is the moment that the demos reflects and decides to 
form or reform itself in order to respond to a grievance. To be sure, the actor 
expected to undertake this endeavour of bringing the dissonance to light is 
the ordinary citizen, whereas the places it is expected to arise are the 
ordinary places of everyday life: school councils, neighbourhoods, working 
places. For Wolin is reluctant towards the extraordinary as a source for 
democratic possibilities: he sees in the marginalisation of the normal and the 
exaltation of the extraordinary the conditions of a critical totalitarianism. 
Whereas the normal is “the product of cultivated relationships”, critical 
totalitarianism seeks to belittle these very relations: it is the normal that 
“sustains the skilled activities that assure the everyday operation of 
society”.40 Wolin’s democratic vision is wrapped around the ordinary: “If it is 
anything, democracy is about [...] ordinary human beings venturing ‘out’ to 
take part in deliberations over shared concerns, to contest exclusions from 
the material and ideal advantages of a free society, and to invent new forms 
and practices”.41 It is the ordinary struggles, those that have to be given in
37 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 278.
38 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 605.
39 Wolin, “What revolutionary action means today?”, 249.
40 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 467.
41 Ibid., 467
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the most usual and routine places of everyday life, that can perforate the 
complex of managerial democracy and corporate economy.
I find that Wolin’s reliance on the demos for the task of reinvigorating 
democracy is more fruitful, sanguine and compatible with late modernity in 
comparison to Mouffe’s. Whereas she insists on the importance of the 
embrace by the citizens of the two principles of liberal democracy in all 
cases, Wolin is more attentive to the spontaneous and fugitive occurrences 
that may bring otherwise diverse individuals together. It is for his 
conceptualisation of demos in its already plural dimension as citizenries that I 
consider his approach closer to a pluralism pertinent to late modernity.
Wolin’s Radical Democratic Vision: Ethos
I have discussed how “fugitive democracy”, and the irruptive politics that 
Wolin envisions, the demotic moments he aspires to for redemocratisation, 
can only be the product of “a fragmented demos, frustrated by the political 
system” acting spontaneously, yet regularly, to respond to the injustices 
made against it.42 The affirmation of democracy in its fugitive dimension 
guides, I think, Wolin towards the acknowledgment of the double nature of 
democratisation: if democracy is to be saved from the corporate forces that 
have rendered it a mere set of procedures, and so if reinvigoration is to be 
achieved, then an ethos has a strong role in this process. Most interestingly it 
is ethos in its two components, the public and the private, that proves crucial 
for the endeavour.
Wolin recognises the indispensability of ethos to democracy as he 
envisions it: “if democracy is about [participation], its first requirement is a 
supportive culture, a complex of beliefs, values, and practices that nurture 
equality, cooperation and freedom”43 The individuals bearing the weight of 
undertaking the task of reinvigorating democracy will be driven to action
42 Wolin, Democracy Inc, 277. To Wolin’s presumption that fugitive democratic practices 
should be practiced regularly, as he stresses in his latest work, cf. his older presumption that 
originally democracy’s dynamic appears “excessive, irregular and spasmodic”, Sheldon S. 
Wolin, “Norm and form: The constitutionalising of democracy”, in Peter J. Euben,, John R. 
W allach,, and Josiah Ober (eds.), Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of 
American Democracy {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 48.
43 Ibid., 260-1.
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prompted by a variety of ethical dispositions, for example resentment, 
frustration or empathy. Despite not naming the ethos appropriate to such a 
vision, Wolin nevertheless distinguishes between it and the prevailing 
corporate one: it is “the difference between a commonality and an economic 
polity, between managing a society and its ecology in terms of the common 
good and subordinating the political system to economic criteria”.44 It is this 
ethos that draws citizens to the politics of democratic commonality and thus 
to the undertaking of common endeavours for “the care and fate of the 
polity”. It is for this reason that Wolin places his faith for redemocratisation in 
the people, on the change they can bring on themselves, “sloughing off their 
political passivity and, instead, acquiring some of the characteristics of a 
demos”. As he says, this entails “creating themselves, coming-into-being by 
virtue of their actions”, for
the democratisation of politics remains merely formal without the 
democratisation of the self. Democratisation is not about being ‘left 
alone’, but about becoming a self that sees the values of common 
involvements and endeavours and finds in them a source of self- 
fulfillment [...] To become a democrat is to change one’s self, to learn 
how to act collectively, as a demos.45
That said, democratisation is neither an extraordinary revolutionary event nor 
an administration process carried out by highly specialised experts or 
professional politicians, even though in certain cases it may depend on them 
as well; rather, it is a shift of a body that “goes public” as part of its everyday 
reality 46 To be sure, such a displacement requires practice, transformation so 
that one learns how to act collectively; democracy also takes place on the 
level of the individual. In fact, this is where it begins.
At the same time, Wolin contends that a democracy requires that the 
demos embraces and bears a distinct popular culture - in the original sense 
of the word cultus, meaning tilling, cultivating, tending, a culture that prompts 
it to engage in cooperation regarding common arrangements, practices in 
which, potentially, all could share in deciding the uses of power while bearing
44 Ibid., 287.
45 bid., 289.
46 Ibid., 289.
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responsibility for their consequences.”47 The ideals of public service and 
disinterestedness are embraced by the servants of the state because they 
are supposed to promote the general welfare, not the interests of a private 
corporation and they are valued for their contribution to political life. It is this 
public ethic that Wolin values as appropriate for democracy and that he sees 
fading in inverted totalitarianism, whereas in its place we witness the 
reconstitution of a civic culture, one where the citizen is shrunk to the voter, 
“hammered into resignation” and “crashed” by the corporate power.48 
However, unlike Hegel, Wolin does not trust the future of the polity only in the 
hands of the state’s servants; he also aspires to another dimension of the 
public ethos, one played out right on the level of the demos.
The concluding phrase of the latest version of Politics and Vision 
characteristically depicts Wolin’s stance towards the idea of a public ethos: 
“In the era of Fascism Gramsci had conceived the task to be one of arousing 
‘the civic consciousness of the nation’. In the era of Superpower the task is to 
nurture the civic conscience of society.”49 The image of the collective 
Wolinesque democratic ethos, though, shifts over time. To be sure, in his 
earlier discussion of the work of Rawls, Wolin expresses his disdain for the 
conviction that there should be a political culture informing the life of 
contemporary political communities: “The idea that there could be ‘a ’ political 
culture at the historical moment when all modern political societies are 
wrestling with the facts of multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, and porous 
borders seems quixotic, but it also has a dangerous aspect that lies in a 
solidary conception of the political”.50 Wolin, contra Rawls, declared himself 
unwilling to be captivated by “evasive monochromes”, like the idea of a 
citizenry sharing the political culture.51 However, as is evident from the 
previous discussion Wolin now expresses his discomfort with regard to the 
discredit of values that would constitute a democratic civic ethic. As he 
advocates, “democracy’s idea is based on a culture that encourages
47 Ibid., 138.
48 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 566; 578.
49 Ibid., 606.
50 Ibid., 550.
51 Wolin, “The liberal/democratic divide”, 118.
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members to join in common endeavours, not as a flagellating form of self- 
denial but as the means of taking care of a specific and concrete part of the 
world and of its life-forms”.52 That is, Wolin withdraws from his earlier thesis 
that a collective ethos is restricting for democracy and instead sees in it the 
sources of a response to the current deadlock of democracy.
However, despite the central role he attributes to commonality and the 
importance of such an ethos shared among the constituents of the demos, 
Wolin still rejects the idea of a too tight and concrete perception of the fixity of 
a democratic citizenry. His hesitation springs from his endorsement of the 
idea of the intrinsic plurality of the demos, of its potentialities for continuous 
reconstitution and reformation, that is his faith in the possibility of renewal. 
The latter, as he says, “draws on the simple fact that ordinary individuals are 
capable of creating new cultural patterns of commonality at any moment [...] 
Without necessarily intending it, they are renewing the political by contesting 
the forms of unequal power which democratic liberty and equality have made 
possible and which democracy can eliminate only by betraying its own 
values”.53 Restoration of equality where it is lost passes through the creative 
forces carried by ordinary people.
I believe that the shift in Wolin’s democratic thought from an absolutely 
fugitive democracy towards a democratic politics of commonality is indicated 
by the change in his perception of ethos in its dimension of collectivity. The 
latter is affirmed by Wolin as temporary and fugitive: it is only difference that 
is stable.54 Commonality is forged the moment that people, despite their 
differences, affirm an experience of grievance as shared; the common, rather 
than being prefixed and predetermined, is open and diverse. That said, the 
democratic vision Wolin espouses oscillates between the idea of the common 
as indispensable to democratic life and the dynamic of renewal that is 
brought in this life by the renewal of demands and claimers. In William 
Connolly’s terminology, it is a vision that affirms the constitutive tension
52 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 288.
53 Wolin, “Fugitive democracy”, 24.
54 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Democracy, difference and recognition” Political Theory 21, no. 3 
(1993), 472.
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between established commonality and the politics of becoming.55 For Wolin, 
the corporate ethos of competitiveness and the individual ethos of apathy 
that overwhelmingly seize political life today can only be disturbed by another 
ethos - one that is played out in both the private and the public domains but 
which does not entail acceptance of a fixed democratic subject.
Criticisms and Limitations
The local character of the politics of democratic commonality that Wolin 
counter-poses to the antidemocratic forces of the late modern corporate state 
has been criticised by many theorists of democracy. According to Wolin’s 
formulations, democracy is primarily expected to emerge and be experienced 
not on the large scale of the nation-state but in small scale settings on a 
regular basis. Despite its virtue in emphasising the specific moment that the 
democratic erupts, some consider this a too limited and confined version of 
democracy. Wolin, the argument goes, is drawn to the exaggeration of the 
virtue of local democratic practices by his deep disappointment with the 
condition that American political life has fallen into and this does not allow 
him to appreciate all the possibilities available to democracy today. Connolly, 
for example, worries that Wolin’s localism entails a desire to slow down 
political time so that democracy can flourish. Such a view, Connolly thinks, is 
insufficient in the contemporary period56 He is also concerned with what he 
calls Wolin’s effort to highlight a vital element in the democratic experience, 
which leads him to an over-purification of this experience and thus to a 
possible disenchantment with the contemporary complexity that informs it 
and makes it possible.57 What is at stake in Connolly’s critique is Wolin’s 
failure to appreciate this complexity and therefore the complex forms that 
democracy itself can take in the era of acceleration of pace.
According to another line of argument, Wolin falls for an unremitting 
critique of American democracy and capitalism and this limits his democratic
55 William E. Connolly, “Politics and Vision”, in A. Bowinick and W. Connolly, Democracy and 
Vision, 12.
56 Connolly, Neuropolitics, 142.
57 Ibid., 149.
233
vision. Michael Shapiro, for example, holds that Wolin not only does not 
seem to appreciate the current economic and cultural temporalities in any 
way, but also sees them merely as destructive.58 He thus misses the 
possibilities for disruption of these temporalities through democratic 
potentials. In a similar vein, Melissa Orlie criticises Wolin’s judgement that 
the culture of consumption that prevails today necessarily leads to 
depoliticisation. She calls for a recognition of the possible positive effects it 
can have in the battle against capitalism. More specifically, Orlie’s 
Foucauldian critique suggests that the accumulation of individual practices of 
commodity consumption can function as a power of enactment for new forms 
and practices of resistance.59 For others, the problem with fugitive 
democracy is to be located in its ambiguous nature. Mark Warren, for 
example, worries about the disconnection of the concept of democracy from 
governing and consequently that Wolin underestimates the importance of 
stabilities and securities for the function of democracy,60 whereas George 
Kateb questions the necessarily democratic character of fugitive democracy 
and expresses worries that although it can be demotic, even profoundly anti­
elitist, this in no way secures its democratic character. He also sees in Wolin 
what he calls an “ontological disgrace of inequality” and an inability to 
otherwise justify why the injustice produced by it can be a cause for rage.61
The coherence of some of these arguments notwithstanding, Wolin’s 
contribution to democracy and democratic theory is tremendous. Orlie is right 
to see in the consumption habits and practices of ordinary people a fissure 
for democratic action; the late modern individual has the power, when 
functioning collectively with others, to put pressure on the powers of 
capitalism and affect its trajectory. However, I believe that this can very 
clearly fall into the category of the fugitive practices that Wolin envisions. 
Warren is also correct to observe that democracy needs stability and a
58 Michael J. Shapiro, “’’Time, disjuncture, and democratic citizenship”, in A. Bowinick and W. 
Connolly, Democracy and Vision, 232-255.
59 Melissa A. Orlie, “Political capitalism and the consumption of democracy”, in A. Bowinick 
and W. Connolly, Democracy and Vision, 138-160.
60 Mark E. Warren, “Review: Politics and vision: Continuity and innovation in western political 
thought” Political Theory 34, no. 5 (2006), 667-673.
61 George Kateb, “Wolin as a critic of democracy”, in A. Bowinick and W. Connolly,
Democracy and Vision, 39-57.
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certain degree of security to flourish. But on the other hand, I believe that 
Wolin is right to remark that the inverted totalitarianism/capitalism complex 
struggles to create a climate of fear so that citizens yearn for stability rather 
than civic engagement, for protection rather than political involvement.62 The 
quest for stability is a demand of totalitarianism, not of democracy. In any 
case, Wolin’s formulation of democratic politics inspired by the experience of 
fugitive democracy as provided in his latest work shows the possibility for a 
reaction and response against the grievances that capitalism has brought 
into late modern societies. In his critique of the American economic-political 
complex one can read an indictment of the forces of capitalism that applies to 
countries in the European continent, as well. His trust in the power of the 
people and the importance of a “democratisation of the self” is attractive not 
only on the normative but also on the practical level. His vision that if there is 
any way to disturb capitalism, to respond to the exigencies it creates for 
ordinary people’s lives, on the level of economy, ecology, social relations and 
political engagement, then this lies in the possibilities for practices that 
emerge on local levels, is an inspirational proposal articulated by a truly 
innovative political thinker.
However, what Wolin does not treat in depth is the issue of the ethos he 
aspires to, both on the collective and the individual level. He does not 
analyse sufficiently the dimensions of the “democratisation of the self” he 
suggests as a prerequisite for the reinvigoration of late-modern democracy. 
If, as he suggests, the development of ethos takes practice, transformation 
and learning to act collectively as part of one’s everyday life, then he needs, I 
think, to show how these can be achieved. Nietzsche, Foucault and 
eventually Connolly would provide some excellent sources for drawing a 
clearer picture of the steps necessary to ensure that the individual can 
herself provide a fertile ground for democratisation. Moreover, I find that 
Wolin aspires to a collective democratic ethos in highly ambiguous terms 
and, although attentive to the interplay between these two components of 
ethos, he relies too much on what he calls “the culture of everyday reality to 
which political democracy should be attuned” without giving this sufficient
62 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 239.
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elaboration.63 As a result, he seems to attribute a specific content to a 
political culture against another, and to ask for an harmonisation with it.
The chapter now turns to the work of one of the most important 
Continental thinkers and radical voices in, among other disciplines, political 
thought: Jacques Ranciere. It does so because this particular thinker shares 
many ideas with Sheldon Wolin, but articulates them in a completely different 
way and places them in a different context. Without intending either to 
exaggerate these similarities or downplay their divergences, the following 
section critically engages with Ranciere’s democratic vision which places the 
importance for democracy in its temporal nature and can be therefore read 
as complementary to Wolin’s work.
II. Ranciere: Politics as Aesthetics
The oeuvre of Jacques Ranciere cannot be classified and contained within a 
specific discipline. This is so not merely because his thinking cuts across 
disciplines as various as politics, aesthetics, philosophy, pedagogy, cinema 
and literature, but mainly because for Ranciere a discipline is a fiction and 
lacks a real field.64 As he puts it, “I don’t speak for members of a particular 
body or discipline. I write to shatter the boundaries that separate specialists -  
of philosophy, art, social sciences, etc.”.65 This deep and conscious 
interdisciplinarity that characterises his work is profoundly evident in his effort 
to surpass the Benjaminian approach to aesthetics as connected to 
totalitarianism (“the aestheticisation of politics specific to the age of the 
masses”) and to affirm politics as aesthetics. His multidimensional and 
interdisciplinary work on democracy has established him as a prominent 
political thinker although, paradoxically, he condemns the work of political 
philosophy.
63 Ibid., 268.
64 Jacques Ranciere, “Art is going elsewhere. And politics has to catch it” Krisis-Journal for 
Contemporary Philosophy. 1 (2008), 72.
65 Jacques Ranciere, Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey, "Art of the possible: Fulvia 
Carnevale and John Kelsey in conversation with Jacques Ranciere." Artforum (2007), 257.
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Two particular theoretical concerns have evolved in Ranciere’s work. The 
first is to give an account of how social and political domination is connected 
with the logic of social and political emancipation; the second is to put into 
practice his belief that the role of the philosopher is not to give his/her voice 
to those whose voices are suppressed and thus cannot be heard, but instead 
to add it to theirs, which entails a process of listening rather than 
interpreting.66 This section takes on the vision of democracy espoused by 
Ranciere, that is, democracy as a process of subjectification and particularly 
as disidentification. Ranciere develops this democratic vision in the context of 
his affirmation of democracy as the institution of politics itself, the latter being 
a question of aesthetics, a matter of appearances. The present discussion 
unfolds around Ranciere’s denunciation of the idea of ethos as incompatible 
with democracy. It is argued that it is Ranciere’s understanding of ethos only 
in its collective component — as the attunement of the individual way of life 
with that of a community — and his overlooking of individual ethical 
dispositions that leads him to, mistakenly, exclude ethos as such from his 
otherwise provocative vision. It is also argued that this exclusion renders his 
vision ethically vulnerable and politically questionable.
Rejecting Political Philosophy, Discrediting Ethos
The rejection of ethos from the thinking of democracy is dictated according to 
Ranciere by the double paradox that characterises late-modern democracy. 
The bankruptcy of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe inaugurated the 
era of postdemocracy, that is of a consensus democracy, inherent in the 
dominant discourse of which is a paradox: while democracy is celebrated as 
the only legitimate political regime at the same time there is a noticeable 
disaffection with regard to its institutional mechanisms and forms. The 
paradox is enhanced even further by the profound response of the system 
itself: it is not only expected but imperative that attention is given to the 
appropriateness of political practices to a society’s ways of being rather than
66 Jean-Phiippe Deranty, “Jacques Ranciere’s contribution to the ethics of recognition” 
Political Theory 31, no.1 (2003), 137.
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to institutions.67 Stated in a different way, democracy brings with it a certain 
democratic life, indeed one so intense and full of vitality, which is so 
excessive that it results in the ruination of democratic government itself.68
Paradoxically, then, the success of democracy is accompanied by a 
reduction of democracy to a certain state of social relationships. This is far 
from unproblematic for Ranciere, who in this coincidence between 
democracy’s political form and its tangible being, as he describes it, sees a 
second paradox: the return of the subject of democracy, that is of the people. 
The paradox with this return lies in that the demos, considered too 
“overdetermined” to allow the unhindered function of modern democracy, was 
previously abandoned. However, the form in which this subject returns as 
identical to itself, as one body set up against others, brings with it the burden 
of political philosophy.69 It is in this context that Ranciere’s argument against 
ethos is articulated.
In order to understand Ranciere’s argument against ethos, we need to 
follow the development of his political thinking and specifically his perception 
of political philosophy. To begin with, according to Ranciere, political 
philosophy is characterised by a vicious circle between the political 
relationship and the political subject; that is, Ranciere sees in political 
philosophy a prevailing assumption that there is a way of life specific to 
political existence and that politics is the achievement of a way of life proper 
to those destined to it. In short, politics is defined on the basis of a pre­
existing subject that bears specific properties and possesses a specific 
character.70 Against this presumption Ranciere argues that what is specific to 
politics is exactly the lack of an absolutely and explicitly predefined subject. 
Thus, if we conceive of politics as a specific way of living, we abandon its 
specificity which, according to Ranciere, lies in the existence of a relationship 
not between two subjects, but of the subject with itself in its double role, as 
archon (ruler) and archomenos (being ruled). It is the untying of this knot of
67 Jacques Ranciere, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 95-98.
68 Jacques Ranciere, Hatred of Democracy (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 7.
69 Ranciere, Disagreement, 98.
70 Jacques Ranciere, ‘Ten theses on politics” Theory and Event 3, no. 1 (2001), §3.
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subject and the relation to itself that eradicates politics.71 In Ranciere’s 
thought, politics requires a break with the very idea that there exist subjects 
that bear specific dispositions which render them proper to positions.
There is, then, a paradoxical logic that sustains Ranciere’s political 
reflection: politics (la politique) is not the subject matter of political 
philosophy, it is essentially opposed to it. The key to understanding this lies in 
the role that Ranciere attributes to equality and the place he reserves for it in 
his perception of politics. Equality is the sole principle of politics: more 
specifically, politics “is that activity which turns equality as its principle”.72 
Equality is not the ultimate goal of politics, but its point of departure.73 
Equality is an axiom of politics, the supposition of political life and theory. 
Ranciere’s affirmation of equality stems from his affirmation of the egalitarian 
power of language, of what he calls literarity (litterarite, which sometimes is 
also translated as literariness), that is ’’the excess of words”, the availability 
of words to anyone and everyone. It is on the basis of their literarity that 
humans are political animals:
Humans are political animals, then, for two reasons: first, because we 
have the power to put into circulation more words, "useless" and 
unnecessary words, words that exceed the function of rigid designation; 
secondly, because this fundamental ability to proliferate words is 
unceasingly contested by those who claim to "speak correctly"- that is, 
by the masters of designation and classification who, by virtue of 
wanting to retain their status and power, flat-out deny this capacity to 
speak.74
But Ranciere does not want us to mistake literarity for a mere given principle 
upon which human equality is founded; the argument does not stop here, for 
as he has put it,
71 Ibid., §4.
72 Ranciere, Disagreement, ix.
73 Solange Guenoun, James H. Kavanagh, Roxanne Lapidus, “Jacques Ranciere: Literature, 
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The egalitarian axiom is not based on a common, natural attribute: the 
equality of speaking beings intervenes as an addition, as a break with 
the natural laws of the gravitation of social bodies. It is not about rights, 
but about potential egalitarian practices carried out by subjects.75
Something more important is, then, at stake with literarity. It is not a 
bestowed, recognised right, but it is related with an ability to perform acts of 
equality through the disordering of bodies. It is its performative power that 
renders literarity so vital for political life.
The equality of anyone at all with anyone else thus defined is not, then, 
itself a political principle; it becomes, it proves itself to be political to the 
extent that it is verified and demonstrated, to the extent that it is enacted.76 
Equality thus defined is inscribed in political life and the distribution of bodies 
that the city needs in order to exist and function: to obey an order entails that 
one understands it, that one is equal to the commander. The trait of any 
social order is therefore the scandal of the absence of arkhe, of a starting 
point or basis of the community. It is sheer contingency: no divine law 
regulates human society.77 Like Protagoras, Ranciere sees political virtue as 
accessible to any and every individual in the form of a possibility that can 
potentially be enacted: for Protagoras this is achieved through education and 
social practice, for Ranciere through a process of subjectification. This point 
of convergence is at the same time a major point of departure: unlike 
Protagoras, who sees a civic ethos lying in each and every citizen, Ranciere 
is unable to grasp the private component of ethos. Ranciere denies this 
attribute to his democratic subjects because, as I will soon discuss, he sees 
ethos as something that necessarily belongs to the city and hence only in its 
collective component. In the thesis I argue that attention to both the private 
and the public constituents of ethos is necessary when ethos is to be related 
to democracy.
Ranciere conceives of political philosophy as nothing more than a set of 
reflective operations where philosophy tries to rid itself of politics, to suppress 
the scandal of sheer contingency and find a proper principle, a proper arkhe.
75 Ranciere, “Literature, politics, aesthetics”, 6.
76 Jacques Ranciere, “Politics, identification, and subjectivization” October 61 (1992), 60.
77 Ranciere, Disagreement, 16.
240
In so doing, political philosophy presupposes that there is a rational mode of 
existence of political communities, one that distributes speaking beings to 
specific parts or places, according to their properties. The purpose of political 
philosophy, then, is to justify the order of the city as natural, to justify the 
appropriateness of some to rule over the others who are not qualified to do 
so. Its aim is to achieve politics by eliminating politics, that is by achieving 
philosophy in place of politics.78 We have seen how Young is also sensitive to 
this distribution of speaking beings and how her vision for a radical 
communicative democracy aims at transcending the limits that the principle 
of “articulateness” sets on the determination of the political subject - only 
Ranciere does not target merely deliberative models of democracy but 
political philosophy itself. And he has a more radical vision than Young’s to 
tackle it.
Politics, says Ranciere, is an-archic, and this is a scandal that Plato and 
his successors feel the need to hide. What Plato struggles to do, says 
Ranciere, is to expel from the body of the community the part of the 
community, that is the demos, that makes this scandal evident, for it is the 
part that brings to the city a qualification - freedom - that does not belong 
exclusively to them. Plato attributes the trait of anarchy to the specific regime 
that is connected to the reign of this part of society, democracy. As I have 
already discussed in Chapter One, it is by identifying the regime with the 
character, the idiosyncrasy of its citizens that Plato introduces the 
transformation of a form of politics into a mode of existence. Plato not only 
sees individual moral quality as connected with the political life of the city; we 
have seen that he also sees the exercise of politics as restricted to those 
who are of a higher moral quality. As Ranciere observes, Plato is the founder 
of the anthropological conception of the political, the conception that 
identifies politics with the deployment of the properties of a type of man or a 
mode of life.79 It is through this identification that Plato achieves the 
suppression and suspension of politics and its lack of any proper foundation.
In order to grasp what is at stake in the substitution of philosophy for 
politics, Ranciere proposes the understanding of the latter from the
78 Ibid., 63.
79 Ranciere, “Ten theses on politics”, §28.
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perspective of the distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) which he 
defines as “a generally implicit law that defines the forms of partaking by first 
defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed”.80 The word 
partage is ambivalent, since it means both that which separates and hence 
excludes and that which allows participation. By referring specifically to the 
partition of the sensible, Ranciere wants to emphasise the link between that 
which exists in common and the distribution of those excluded from sensory 
experience. Politics here is understood as aesthetics, for it relies on the 
presupposition that there is a part that is not sensible, that is not visible or 
heard. It is an aesthetic activity because the very existence of a social 
arrangement presupposes that there are words, images, but also bodies in 
constant circulation and whose proper order is a perpetual source of 
disagreement.81 With this move he radicalises the idea that aesthetics refers 
to the domain of art only, extending it to the conceptual coordinates and 
modes of visibility operative across the political domain.82 Ranciere 
recognises that next to politics there is another distribution of the sensible in 
political life: police, a key concept in his theory of democracy.
The term police {la police) is coined by Ranciere in order to signify the 
particular mode of partition of the sensible that distributes bodies in a place 
or role according to their properties. It is not synonymous with repression/ 
disciplining or “state apparatus” for, as Ranciere clarifies, where the use of 
the latter term presupposes an opposition between State and society, police 
assumes a spontaneity of social relations and at the same time the rigidity of 
state functions.83 The distinguishing trait of this mode of partition is that it 
recognises neither lack nor supplement: the totality of community consists of 
compact groups which are “tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which 
these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to
80 Ibid., §20.
81 Davide Panagia, “Partage du sensible”: The distribution of the sensible”, in Jean-Philippe 
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these occupations and these places”.84 Police refers to a universe in which 
everyone has a place for abode according to their competencies, to their 
ways of saying and being that are reflected in their position in the community. 
This arrangement distributes places and roles, that is, allocates ways of 
being, according to what is considered “proper” for each one, legitimising this 
distribution in the name of the achievement of consensus of the community. It 
is a partition of the sensible that leaves no void.
The police, then, is the democratic regime as perceived by Rawls, Taylor 
and Young, since for each of them democracy is about the successful 
allocation of comprehensive doctrines, horizons, or social groups. It is the 
identification of a community with a specific way of being and therefore the 
confinement of the subject to a role. It is the limitation of democracy to an 
abode, to an ethos. For as we have seen in Chapter One and as Ranciere 
reminds us,
before recalling law, morality or value, ethos indicates the abode 
(sejour). Further it indicates the way of being that corresponds to this 
abode, the way of feeling and thinking which belongs to whoever 
occupies any given place.85
Ethos, then, may be one form produced by, or in accordance with, the logic of 
the police. It is a police tool to tame the demos through their synchronisation 
with the specific demands of the community. For Ranciere, ethos is 
perceivable only in its collective dimension, it is a dangerous form of 
suppression and it is anti-democratic. Although I find this explanation 
illuminating, I think that it is one-dimensional and that if it is enriched with a 
simultaneous reading of the individual component of ethos (a task that I 
attempt latter in the chapter), it can give us a more productive account of 
ethos, one that can be utilised in favour of democracy.
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Democratic Subjectification: The Break with Ethos
If ethos is a means to control the demos by the police, then Ranciere needs 
not only to suggest the latter’s opposite but also ways to elevate from the one 
condition to the other. He conceives politics as the logic that is antithetical to 
the police and subjectification as the process through which the police and its 
ethos can be broken.
By contrast to the police, the term politics (/a politique) is reserved for a 
much more narrowly determined activity which is antagonistic to policing. 
This differentiation between politics and police, two distinct modes of visibility 
characterises Ranciere’s political thought: politics is opposed in principle to 
police. It is the break with the logic of the police. It acts on the police.86 With 
politics, what is perceived as the natural order of domination is interrupted by 
the institution of a part of those who have no part, those whose voice is 
conceived merely as noise and who thus have no place in the arrangement. 
Whereas the principle of police is consensus, politics is that activity which 
has the rationality of disagreement, of dissensus as its very own rationality.87
Disagreement is not misrecognition or misunderstanding since it has to do 
not only with words but also with ways of presentation. It is disagreement that 
causes the disruption of the partition. And what makes politics happen is the 
contingency of equality, which is made evident through the introduction of a 
supplement or a lack: “politics means the supplementation of all qualifications 
by the power of the unqualified”.88 Politics’ essence is dissensus, not as the 
opposition of interests and opinions, but as a gap in the sensible that makes 
possible the emergence of those who previously had no part. The political (ie 
politique) is the encounter between these two heterogenous processes, that 
of policing, governing and thus of a creation of community consent and that 
of equality.
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So according to Ranciere, politics does not exist as an organising 
mechanism; it happens at the conjunction of police logic and egalitarian logic 
through mechanisms of subjectification (or subjectivation- la subjectivation). 
That is, it takes place as the revelation of a wrong done to a part of the 
community and as “the production through a series of actions of a body and 
a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of 
experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field 
of experience”.89 As such, the process of political subjectification is a 
manifestation of a gap between an acknowledged part and those having no 
part. Most importantly, it “does not create subjects ex nihilo; it creates them 
by transforming identities defined in the natural order of the allocation of 
functions and places into instances of experience of a dispute”.90 This is why 
Ranciere characterises this process as a ‘disidentification’: it is a process by 
which a political subject denies the place she was (not) given in the order of 
the community, that is the established categories of identification and 
classification, she perceives it as a wrong and decides that in order to make 
her voice heard she needs to break with these categories and elevate to a 
different space. In these terms, subjectification is a heterology.91 In getting 
involved in this process the political subject engages in an enactment of 
equality which takes place not in self or culture of a group, but at the topos of 
an argument. This is also why Ranciere sees politics as being in principle 
aesthetic: because it allows to be heard/seen what was inaudible/invisible, by 
inscribing a new name that is different from any thus far recognised part of 
the community. Politics is first of all a battle about perceptible/sensible 
material.92 But this acknowledgement of the aesthetic component of politics 
does not lead Ranciere to seek the political everywhere and rehash the easy 
conclusion that “everything is political”; his logic of politics presupposes that 
the political emerges specifically when the police logic and the egalitarian 
logic meet.
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The logic of political subjectivation espoused by Ranciere presupposes a 
definition of the political subject as the subject that bears a capacity for 
staging scenes of dissensus, polemical scenes where equality emerges. It 
also presupposes the rejection of any distinction between people who live in 
different spheres and thus the dismissal of categories of who is and is not 
qualified for political life.93 Political subjects are so defined not on account of 
their identity, but because they are between different identities. According to 
this logic of politics, identities such as that of the citizen do not belong to 
individuals: they occur through mechanisms and singular manifestations.94 A 
community is political, then, not on account of the existence of something in 
common among its members, but on account of a sharing of what is not 
given as being in-common, of what they are commonly denied by the police 
order. For Ranciere, politics is best articulated in terms of relations, but not of 
power: relationships between different worlds.95
His perception of politics as aesthetic, as the process of displacement of 
the political subject from one position to another in order to become visible or 
audible, is the defining element of Ranciere’s vision of democracy. He 
affirms, then, democracy as the subjectification mode par excellence, for it is 
in this specific mode that the partition becomes perceptible. This takes place 
through the articulation of a wrong, what now can be stated as “a mode of 
subjectification in which the assertion of equality takes its political shape”.96 
Therefore, like Wolin, he refuses to accept democracy as a form of 
government, as a political regime characterised by its culture of pluralism and 
tolerance. Rather, democracy is the polemic disturbance of the police order 
that calls into question the aesthetic coordinates of perception, thought and 
action, and aspires to changing them. It is the symbolic institution of the 
political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise 
power: it is a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination.97 It is in this
93 Jacques Ranciere, “Who is the subject of the rights of man?”, in Ranciere and Corcoran, 
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sense that Ranciere identifies democracy with politics: in the form of 
democracy, politics is already in place.98 The essence of democracy is the 
same with the essence of politics, that is dissensus: a surplus of subjects that 
introduce, in the saturated order of the police, a surplus of subjects.99 The 
latter do not form a coherent social group that exists as a unified unit among 
others in the police order: they form a specific polemical community that 
exists entirely within the act of manifestation of dissensus. Thus defined, 
democracy is not a state of being but a redistribution of places: a new 
topography.
Plato, says Ranciere, despite his fervent opposition to democracy, was the 
first to articulate the democratic paradox in political philosophy: it is a 
paradox because it affirms the power of those who have none, the 
‘uncounted’. The subject of democracy, the demos, is not the body of the 
people, the mere sum of the population; it is those who speak when they are 
not supposed to, and partake in ruling (and in being ruled) while lacking the 
proper qualifications to govern. It is those who suspend all logics of legitimate 
domination.100 It is an excessive part, favoured by the pure addition of 
“chance”, that evokes the disruption of the logic of the arkhe, the logic that 
appropriates subjects to particular positions according to principles of birth or 
wealth. Its formation is random and incidental, subject to a constant 
reformulation according to specific instances.
It is his distinction of politics from the police that leads Ranciere to 
condemn ethos and its possible link with the political. The latter, as already 
discussed, appears when the logic of the police is interrupted by the logic of 
equality, hence its inherent democratic character. Ethos, on the other hand, 
became the tool in the hands of Plato to bury democracy — and with it the 
political — under the pretenses of the original community and the just society 
suitable to it. According to Plato, says Ranciere, a true community — in 
contrast to the democratic ignorant community — is one in which the 
measure that governs the community is directly incorporated into the living
98 Ranciere, Disagreement, 62.
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attitudes of its members.101 What this perception of community requires is the 
elimination of politics and its identification with an order, with police. It is the 
identification of the members of a community with the community’s rules and 
principles, that is with its ethos, that constitutes a well-functioning political 
community. When the private component of ethos is attuned with the 
collective, the ideal polity is attainable. How far away is this logic from 
Taylor’s vision for a strong collective commitment, for a civic patriotism that 
will bind individuals to their communities? This is the model of politics (or 
police?) that Ranciere fears the most.
It is the model of politics that Plato introduces, one of the three avatars of 
political philosophy: archipolitics, the other two being parapoiitics and 
metapolitics. The logic that governs this figure is the configuration of politics 
with nothing left over and therefore the distribution of every and any member 
of the community in a specific place, in a way that seems plausible due to 
their proper and natural competencies. The founding myth of the three races 
and the three respective metals in Book III of the Republic proposes the 
fabrication of this arrangement.102 Plato’s archipolitics is based on the 
existence of the law as the ethos of the community and of each of its 
members, it is the harmony of ethos, the accord between the character of the 
individuals and the moral values of the collective.103 It is the identification of 
the regime with the character of its citizens and hence, according to 
Ranciere, it is the repression of politics.
Ranciere’s worry is that today we live the times of the appearance of this 
repression hidden under the mask of the return of the political (along with the 
return of political philosophy) and this is directly connected to the so-called 
ethical turn. As he clarifies, this turn by no means suggests that now political 
action is determined or driven by moral judgements; rather, what is at stake 
is the formation of an indiscernible sphere in which not only the 
distinctiveness of political actions is dissolved, but so is also the distinction 
between fact and law. Ranciere suggests that the current ethical turn can be 
understood as the kind of thinking that seeks to establish an identity between
101 Jacques Ranciere, The Emancipated Spectator (London and New York: Verso, 2009), 3.
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an environment, a way of being and a principle of action.104 In contrast to the 
term morality, which implies a division of what is and what ought to be, that is 
of law and fact, the ethical turn favours the suppression of this division, a 
phenomenon that has a special name: consensus, which “defines a mode of 
symbolic structuration of the community that evacuates the political core 
constituting it, that is dissensus”.105 The consensus logic is based on the 
allocation of each and any person to a specific place, as a member of a 
specific group and thus on the dismissal of surplus subjects. Each of the 
thinkers scrutinised in Chapter Three gives an account of exactly such an 
allocation, a distribution of subjects that must be in synchrony with a common 
ethos defined in moral terms. This presupposes the configuration of what 
Ranciere calls a field of perception-in-common, that is a specific mode of 
partition of the perceptible which at least as far as politics is concerned 
entails the affirmation of choices as objective and univocal.106 In other words, 
it presupposes the existence of a common shared social space, in which 
groups to which subjects belong may eulogise the decisions and choices 
made by experts in strictly defined fields. Consensus is the reduction of 
democracy to an ethos, that is, to a specific way of life which is nothing less 
than the dwelling and lifestyle of a specific group of the community.107 It is the 
very negation of the political.
This consensus era is the era of postdemocracy, that is democracy after 
the demos. It is the era of complete identification of the community with itself, 
with nothing left over. This concrete community, this body of the people, is no 
more a demos but “the public opinion” and thus it is present in the form of its 
statistical reduction, “a people transformed into an object of knowledge and 
prediction”, people countable and identifiable by the sum of its parts.108 This 
is the result of the ethical turn that Ranciere seeks to problematise in his 
work: the transformation of the political community into an ethical community,
104 Jacques Ranciere, ‘The ethical turn of aesthetics and politics”, in Ranciere and Corcoran, 
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that is its transformation from a community of dissensus and division (which 
by definition it is) into a community in which everyone is counted. He 
opposes the view of society as envisioned by thinkers like Young, that is as a 
mosaic of parts, minorities and majorities, social and other groups, where 
everyone is included and has a priori its place in one of them. The ethical 
turn entails necessarily seeing society in this way: it is demanded in the 
name of consensus. There is no doubt that Plato would give to this a smile of 
approbation: postdemocracy is the realisation of archipolitics. What he 
envisioned as being the ideal state, the politeia, that is the community which 
achieves its own principle of interiority in all manifestations of its life by the 
assimilation of its laws to ways of life, is today achieved through 
consensus.109 It is the substitution of policing for politics, where the law is the 
spirit of community. It is a generalised citizenship (see for example Young’s 
ideas for an enlarged community ethos). In postdemocracy everyone is 
included; it is the regime most suitable to “a world cleansed of surplus 
identities”;110 there is no miscount, no wrong, no politics.
For Ranciere the current dead end of political reflection and action is due to 
the identification of politics with the self of a community, that is the use of the 
idea of ethos to cover over the gap or schism that inaugurates any political 
order,111 identifying the law of the community with its ethos. This ethology of 
the community hides the gap between police and politics. But politics cannot 
draw on such an identification. This is one of the points where Ranciere’s 
work on aesthetics converges and intersects with his political work. He 
affirms the operation of what is called the politics of aesthetics as having the 
same results with the ethical turn in politics: the effacement of democracy. As 
he argues, to perceive art not as expression but as a process of self- 
education entails the formation of a new sensorium, of a new ethos and on a 
large scale, of a new collective ethos.112 The politics of aesthetics, with its
1°9 Ibid., 64
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promise for a non-polemical, consensual framing for the common world, is 
the politics of consensual postdemocracy.
It is his perception of the late-modern condition as the era of the reign of 
postdemocracy, of this metapolitical formation which negates any idea of the 
political, that guides and structures Ranciere’s work around a central 
concern: “how are we to reinvent politics?”113 His response to this formidable 
challenge lies in his vision of democracy, summarised thus:
Democracy, in fact, cannot be merely defined as a political system, one 
among many, characterised simply by another division of power. It is 
more profoundly defined as a certain sharing of the perceptible, a 
certain redistribution of its sites. And what orders this redistribution is 
the very fact of literarity: the "orphan" system of writing, on reserve, the 
system of those spaces of writing that, with their overpopulated void 
and their overtalkative silence, riddle the living cloth of the communal 
ethos.114
Democracy is only meaningful when perceived as the logic of the polemical 
distribution of the sensible; when insensible elements in society challenge 
the policing order and raise from their position to temporary inhabit a new 
place. It is in this sense that democratic action is aesthetic: it is the 
configuration of a demand to be seen or heard by those who struggle to take 
part while they have no part, and so to “make the invisible visible, to give a 
name to the anonymous and to make words audible where only noise was 
perceptible before. It creates separation in a community, making room for 
debate therein”.115 For Ranciere democracy is a process of political 
subjectification and as such it presupposes exactly a break with ethos, 
because the logic of the latter entails a division of another kind: between 
those who are and those who are not worthy of engaging in politics. The logic 
of ethos is for Ranciere anti-political.
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Criticisms and Limitations
Ranciere’s sharp distinction between police and politics, as well as the 
equation of democracy with politics, provides a useful tool for the 
specification of political activity against a fixed background and thus for its 
affirmation as radical and irruptive. However, his absoluteness with regard to 
the orderliness of police and the unavailability of remainders is far from 
unproblematic. For if police is indeed an absolutely concrete whole, then how 
does politics and hence democracy erupt? Moreover, despite his affirmation 
of the indispensability of police for the generation of the political moment, as 
well as his observation that some police orders are preferable than others, 
Ranciere does not provide us with a “distinction in the characterisation of 
policing”.116 That said, if we accept that a kind of police order is not only 
unavoidable but also required so that the rarity of politics is achieved, there 
should be also some criteria of judging what this order would be. Ranciere 
does not engage in a discussion with regard to this aspect of the police, that 
is he does not discriminate between regimes that would be acceptable 
provided that they allow space for some political engagement and regimes 
that are suppressive. In his effort to prove the role of the police, Ranciere 
provides only a generalisation of late modern forms of political organisation 
that discredit liberal democracy all together.
A crucial question, then, is what could such an eruptive vision of 
democracy contribute to the battle against police, against the established 
order of governance that regulates individuals’ economic and political lives in 
late-modernity? It is obvious that democracy does not have duration and 
upon its completion we return to the police order. Is democracy as envisioned 
by Ranciere an action of dissonance only for the sake of dissonance? I 
believe the answer is negative. Democracy erupts not merely as an 
expression of dissonance, but as a condemnation of a wrong done to people; 
it is the articulation of a claim for equality. As such, it needs to be judged not 
only for the results it produces, but also for the re-allocation of political bodies 
it generates. Perhaps, then, the crucial question articulated above is in fact
116 Michael Dillon, “(De)void of politics? A response to Jacques Ranciere’s Ten theses on 
politics’” Theory and Event 6, no. 4 (2003), §16.
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related to precisely the new forms of identification it brings about. For as 
Aletta Norval argues it is exactly the problem of subjectivity that needs to be 
addressed in our discussions on democracy, whereas Ranciere fails to treat 
the invention of new names at any length.117 In other words, Ranciere’s 
equation of subjectification with disidentification entails the acceptance of the 
presumption that any identification already belongs to the police order. This 
presumption poses serious barriers in the formation of what Mouffe would 
call “chains of equivalence” or Connolly “collective assemblages” through 
which the articulation of democratic demands can be achieved.
A more radical problem concerning Ranciere’s perception of politics can 
be developed across the line of his de-politicisation argument, that is of the 
idea that we live in a post-political era. Such is the critique articulated by 
political thinkers such as Jodi Dean, who sees in Ranciere’s approach a 
recognition of defeat on the left. As she puts it very schematically, “It’s like the 
left is saying, “if we don’t get to play what we want, we’re not going to 
play”.118 The denial of a condition (in this case that the rules of the game are 
set by the right) and its characterisation or rather its declassification (as post­
political) does not do justice to the part that makes the claim (in this case the 
left). Furthermore, the post-political thesis is itself invalid, since the success 
of politics of the right both in the United States and in Europe is indicative of 
the opposite. As Dean says, there are political achievements attained by the 
various political forces, the right included, and by overlooking them by 
focusing on post-politics we merely miss a possible target of condemnation.
The democratic imaginary envisioned by Ranciere is based on two pillars: 
the universality of equality and the opposition of the logic of politics to the 
logic of the police, where the former is identified with democracy and the 
latter with its suppression. At the same time, police also represents the 
condition of democracy’s existence. But as I will argue in the final chapter of 
the thesis, this discrimination that Ranciere makes is too bold, since it is 
based on a binary (order/stability versus disruption/change) which over­
emphasises one aspect of any given “order” and does not do honour to the 
internal dynamism which characterises it. It is this stark discrimination that
117 Norval, Aversive Democracy, 143.
118 Jodi Dean, “Politics without politics" Parallax 15, no. 3 (2009), 23.
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leads Ranciere to affirm the return to the police order as the one and only 
outcome of every democratic moment. By lamenting this development as 
unavoidable, I believe that he fails to appreciate the interaction between 
established structures and emerging powers which can transform the 
structure without necessarily aspiring to demolish it. This is a task undertaken 
in the next chapter of the thesis, where I attend to binaries such as those 
haunting Ranciere’s thought and try to go beyond them.
In focusing his analysis on the importance of the interruption of the police 
by politics, that is of a continuum by a moment of disagreement, Ranciere 
aims to stress the importance of the political moment, and thus to suggest 
the conceptualisation of democracy in terms of interactive moments of 
rupture within the operation of systems.119 That said, he suggests a 
temporalisation of politics, a perception of politics as an event, politics 
specified in the precise moment and place of eruption of the uncounted and 
disruption of the ethos that belongs to what is understood as the political 
community: “Politics, in its specificity, is rare. It is always local and 
occasional”.120 The usefulness of this perception notwithstanding, in my 
argumentation in the next chapter I revisit this idea of the disruptive politics, 
in order to suggest the possibility of perceiving democratic politics not as an 
event perse, but as a sequence of events embraced in their ordinariness.
At the same time, Ranciere also offers a localisation of politics, that is 
politics as the shift of bodies from a place where they could not be seen or 
heard, to a place of perception. Democracy is the interruption not only of 
continuous time but of a corporeal order as well. It is on this account that he 
rejects the notion of an ethos affirmed as an abode. And it is on this account 
that Ranciere’s work on democracy, important and informative as it is, can be 
read with and against the work of Sheldon Wolin.
119 Davide Panagia, “The predicative function in ideology: On the political uses of analogical 
reasoning in contemporary political thought” Journal of Political Ideologies 6, no. 1 (2001), 
69.
120 Ranciere, Disagreement, 139.
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III. The Encounter
The two thinkers brought together in this chapter exemplify radical 
democratic thought in that they both conceive of democracy in its spatial and 
temporal specificity, against a background of established regimes of elitism 
and inequality. The purpose here is not to exaggerate their points of 
convergence, but rather to indicate how two projects that share a faith in 
equality and the power of the people, that both envision democracy as a kind 
of disruption, depart in one significant point: their perception of ethos and its 
role in the processes and conditions of democratic enunciation. This section 
suggests that it is by bringing them together that we can assess ways in 
which each may inform the other in a way that enhances them and renders 
them yet more pertinent to the circumstances they seek to address.
The radicalism of the democratic visions espoused by Wolin and Ranciere 
lies in their affirmation of democracy not as a form of government but as a 
disruption of sequences. On the one hand, for Wolin democracy is about 
what is in common for otherwise diverse individuals and so entails the 
fugitive displacement of differences for the sake of an episodic commonality 
and hence the shift from a locus of individuality to one of collectivity. This shift 
takes place in everyday life through practices developed by established 
networks of action. On the other hand, for Ranciere democracy is to be better 
understood as a process of subjectification and therefore a shift of a body 
from a place assigned to it, a change in its destination. This shift is only 
spasmodic and occasional.
Both thinkers suggest that in democracy there is a flux, a displacement of 
the subject from a specific site to another, where it joins subjects with a 
common purpose and that it is because of and through this very mobility that 
the subject becomes political. Democracy is the break with the order of the 
managerial state or of the police. It is the construction of commonalities that, 
fugitive and ephemeral as they may be, are the essence of democracy. As 
they refrain from recognising the political in a given order, that being a regime 
of inverted totalitarianism (Wolin) or police (Ranciere), they also refrain from 
seeing as political the subject that merely exists within this order, as
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producer, worker, consumer or bearer of any identity as member of a group. 
That is, both thinkers recognise the ambiguity of the political subject and the 
fugitive nature of the demos.
This affirmation of the fluctuating political body, which under certain 
circumstances will join some individuals for the support of a cause, leads 
both thinkers to value political community as formless and impermanent. 
Ranciere articulates the issue using the logic of disparity and thus considers 
as the criterion for the definition of political community not the aim of 
realisation of a common essence, but rather the sharing of what is not given 
as being in common. Wolin prefers to emphasise the joint, what is perceived 
as common on a specific time and location. For example, where Ranciere is 
unwilling to discern citizenship as a property, and affirms it only as an 
occurrence, Wolin values citizenship as an irreplaceable identity and seeks to 
enrich it.121 This difference notwithstanding, both thinkers abstain from 
recognising the demos as the democratic subject par excellence, at least to 
the degree that this would entail a too tight and specific definition. Instead 
they prefer to see the demos as the contingent outcome of the processes of 
subjectification they both appreciate as indispensable to the occurrence of 
democracy. In this way they both express their faith in the capacity of 
ordinary people not merely to participate, but indeed to make democracy 
happen. It is contingency, not coherence that they value the most.
In both cases the driving force is what Ranciere calls a declaration of a 
wrong, or in other words equality: this is the core of the democratic visions of 
both Ranciere and Wolin and the basis for the eruption of the democratic 
moment. Both build their visions against a dark background of structural 
inequality, of the corporate state managed by highly qualified, profit-spirited 
professionals on the one hand, and of a police order that aims at the flawless 
allocation of bodies on the other. The purpose of both regimes is to disallow 
equality, for this would entail either the endangerment of capitalism or the 
recognition of the sheer contingency of any social order. The contingent 
ordinary individuals (Ranciere’s proletarians) that will form the fugitive 
political communities are drawn to democracy exactly to declare the wrong
121 “The old citizenship must be replaced by a fuller and wider notion of being whose 
politicalness will be expressed not in one or two modes of activity-voting or protesting-but in 
many”, Wolin, “What revolutionary action means today”, 251.
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done against them and it is in this moment when they join forces that 
democracy actually happens and is experienced. The unity of the political 
community, then, is one that is prompted by a shared feeling of resentment. 
Hence the polemical character of the demos.
This is a point where the Wolin and Ranciere diverge significantly. Where 
Wolin perceives the “moments of commonality” experienced by his political 
community, fugitive and impermanent as they may be, as being infused in an 
important and effective sense by a shared civic ethic, Ranciere denies and 
denounces such a possibility. To begin with, Wolin finds in the decline of a 
public democratic ethic a reason for concern and his work suggests that this 
void needs to be filled by some kind of ethos. Ranciere, on the other hand, 
sees in the concept of ethos a synonym for the archaic abode and hence 
domestication and limitation: it is an ambient milieu that too tightly confines 
politics and therefore represents the place of comfort, harmony and habit, a 
continuum that bears no political element whatsoever and for this reason 
needs to be disrupted. Contra Wolin, Ranciere claims that people are not 
drawn to democracy because they are inspired by an ethos of any kind. As 
he puts it, “[i]t is not their ethos, their way of being that disposes individuals 
to democracy but a break with this ethos, the gap experienced between the 
capability of the speaking being and any ethical harmony of doing, being and 
saying”.122 Ranciere’s democracy is indeed the break with ethos. Wolin is in 
agreement with him here only so far as the need for devaluation of the 
corporate ethos. He does not seem to be comfortable with the idea of a 
society that does not share an ethos, even though such a society does not 
fall within his definition of the political society. Ethos in its collective 
component is a source for political mobilisation for Wolin but for Ranciere it is 
no more than a source for individuals’ anaesthetisation.
That Ranciere’s work on democracy significantly diverges from Wolin’s 
when it comes to the issue of ethos is also evident with regard to the latter’s 
second component, the individual. For whereas Wolin’s perception of ethos 
addresses both components, Ranciere does not treat the issue of a 
democratic ethos in its individual dimension at any length. Indeed, in Wolin 
ethos on the one hand plays the role of a “supportive culture of beliefs,
122 Ranciere, Disagreement, 101.
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values and practices” (the public component that refers to the community),123 
and on the other appears as the trait borne by the individual (the private 
component). In the latter case, ethos needs to be cultivated through what 
Wolin in his later work calls “the democratisation of the self”.124 Democracy 
as a reaction to the current condition as envisioned by Wolin has recourse to 
ethos to support itself: Wolin recognises the indispensability of ethos in 
political life, whereas Ranciere fails to do so because he attends only to its 
public aspect. Most importantly, Wolin seems to honour the interplay between 
the public and the private dimension of ethos, the interchange that informs 
and revitalises both, even though he does so in a paradoxical way. For 
instance, he envisions the cultivation of an elite of public servants to counter 
the corporate elite of managed democracy, and who would be possessed of 
“a commitment to promoting and defending democratic values, lessening the 
inequities in our society, and protecting the environment”.125 Wolin wants us 
to think that this vision does not refer to a new bureaucracy bearing the 
special label of a democratic one, but to an assemblage of devotees to a 
variety of causes who all are committed to democracy and serve it at the 
local level. But this is not so far away from Ranciere’s worst nightmare - the 
creation of an elite that has power to guide political life. Wolin’s affirmation of 
the intersection of a private and a public ethic takes place within a highly 
ambiguous framework.
This is the point where the work of the two thinkers can benefit from an 
exchange. For unless Ranciere’s dissensual, irruptive democracy, 
inspirational and even provocative as it is, is infused with a perception of 
ethos in its individual dimension, it will be politically untenable, ethically 
undesirable and too much a theoretical fancy. What is suggested here is that 
Ranciere’s reluctance to recognise the role for an ethic in his democratic 
vision, for the fear of assimilation and/or elimination of the appearance of the 
wrong, renders his vision susceptible to highjacking from those who would 
seek to exploit the disagreement he espouses for reactionary practices that 
are democratic only in appearance. That is, unless the subjects of such a
123 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 260-1.
124 Ibid., 289.
123 Ibid., 291.
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dissensus democracy infuse their claim with a democratic ethical disposition, 
the process of their subjectification may end up as the production of 
subjectivities far less political than Ranciere hopes and envisions. Moreover 
the absence of an ethic to sustain a dissensus democracy easily falls prey to 
the criticism that it lacks long term effectiveness, mobilising individuals 
merely for the sake of turbulence itself.
Wolin’s vision, contra Ranciere’s, seems to appreciate otherness and the 
multiple possibilities for ordinary diverse people being and acting together for 
a political cause. Although he does not specify the content of an ethical 
disposition Wolin nevertheless finds that a “democratisation of the self” can 
lead to the discovery of commonalities and to common actions where 
previously there was only void and apathy. At the same time Ranciere’s 
analyses indicate ways in which Wolin’s insistence on the necessity of the 
attunement of democracy to “the culture of everyday life” could prove 
dangerous. Ranciere is correct to be wary of the threat that such a logic 
poses to the possibility of breaking with the police.
What the discussion in this chapter further reveals, then, is the ambiguity and 
fluidity of the concept of ethos. The parallel reading of the thinkers attempted 
here enables us to see how ethos is too ambiguous a concept, since it is 
open to multiple articulations and interpretations. Ranciere is correct to argue 
that conceiving of ethos as ‘abode’, in the sense of harmonisation of the 
character of the individual with the values of the collective in which they must 
be housed, is anti-political. The absence of antagonism, and the 
domestication of the individual within the collective is definitively anti­
democratic. But the problem here is not ethos as such. It is ethos conceived 
only in its public aspect, as a perennial and persistent public political culture, 
external and prior to the members of the polis yet shared by them. 
Conversely, then, Wolin is correct to stress the importance of commonalities 
and of a process of “democratisation of the self” in the creation of democratic 
practices. This is why I suggest that a democratic ethos fluctuates between a 
public ethic and a personal disposition, without ever being reduced or limited 
to either. The method of complementary reading that I followed in this chapter 
shows that each of the two thinkers brings to our attention different aspects
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and possible dangers that ethos carries. Where Ranciere helps us to 
appreciate the interruptive role of democratic practices and at the same time 
to refuse the idea of a strong public ethos in the classical sense, Wolin 
enables us to appreciate better the interplay between these two components 
of the democratic ethos and the strenuous work demanded if the 
harmonisation and attunement are to be avoided. At the same time, the work 
of both these thinkers helps us to explicate how certain binaries 
(everydayness/irruption, active/passive) inhabit and indeed haunt political 
thought, as well as how we can revisit these binaries in order to fight them. 
Democratic ethos is too ambiguous, fluid and dynamic a concept to be 
contained within an ‘abode’ understood in spatial terms. As we shall see in 
the next chapter it is only by appreciating its temporal dimension that we are 
able to catch ethos at its democratic frequency.
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Chapter 6
Towards a Metical Ethos for Democracy
The theorists scrutinised in the previous two chapters mark out the space of 
a discussion concerning the ethotic dimension of democracy. Connolly, 
Mouffe and Wolin each, in different ways, present an argument for the 
importance of ethos in democratic experience. Ranciere refutes this, 
emphasising the potentially undemocratic aspects of too strong a concept of 
ethos. However, his democratic project, like that of Wolin, emphasises the 
spatio-temporal dimension of democratic moments and draws our attention 
to its experiential dimension.
This final chapter takes up the task of considering how the limits of 
theories of ethos may be overcome and an ethos of democracy developed 
which does not risk reinforcing an ideal or an ethical category too stable and 
fixed to adapt to the shifting challenges of the democratic agon. It is 
suggested here that such a response can be formulated by way of attending 
to the importance of the specificity of the democratic moment and therefore 
of the temporal peculiarity of the democratic experience but, at the same 
moment, avoiding the trap of excessive glorification of the event.
Section I puts the chapter in the context of the thesis and discusses the 
argument made here with relevance to the work of the theorists examined so 
far. It makes the case for the importance of the ethotic dimension of 
democracy, while suggesting that this should be conceived along temporal 
and experiential lines.
Section II opens a discussion on the role of binaries in political thought
and suggests that dichotomies such as ordinary/extra-ordinary, heroic/
normal and repetition/ spontaneity are over-simplifying. Instead of focusing
on these, theorists of democracy need to be more attentive to the tensions
between the constituents of such binaries. In the course of this discussion,
the section also challenges Ranciere’s conceptualisation of democracy as a
rarity, its confinement to a condition of emergency that appears only to
disrupt an already established and hence apolitical order. The approach
pursued here affirms democratic politics not as the eruptive moment per se,
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but as the productive tension between such multiple moments and 
established practices of politics. It suggests, then, that the ordinary does not 
necessarily entail stability and stillness and therefore an order that needs to 
be disrupted if democracy is to happen. Rather, I follow Bonnie Honig’s call 
for political theory to stop identifying action with event, and politics with 
singularity but instead to “de-exceptionalise the emergency”.1 It is in this 
context that the section discusses the importance of the possibilities 
emerging from ordinary democratic practices, following a call made by Wolin, 
and puts forward the argument for a democratic vision that honours 
democracy in its plurality and complexity.
Section III takes on another binary, that of passivity/activity and following 
both Ranciere and Deleuze discusses how the spectator is not necessarily a 
passive receiver of messages transmitted by a higher centre but can also be 
a democratic subject. In showing a way beyond the passive/active binary I 
take silence as an example, showing how it may be affirmed as a politicised 
modality, as a way of acting politically. I then make the case for a conception 
of democracy in which repetition is not exclusive of spontaneity and 
attendance to voice is not the sine qua non of democratic acting.
The interlude that precedes the last section clarifies the democratic vision 
developed in this chapter; irreducibly agonistic, due to its fluid and 
multifarious essence, this democracy requires an ethic which is responsive to 
the moment in which it is enacted. In this way, the interlude clears the ground 
for the argument developed in the last section: that a democratic ethos 
appropriate to momentary (not necessarily defined as the opposite of 
“lasting”) and experiential (so far as it is informed also by sensibilities on the 
visceral register) democracy must be affirmed in its ambiguity, fluidity and 
openness and hence, following Ranciere, not as an abode but as visiting a 
moment, an impermanent dwelling in a moment of democratic practicing. In 
this logic, the classic interplay between the public and private components of 
ethos discussed in the first chapter (but also embraced by Wolin) is 
reformulated. Heidegger’s perception of ethos (already discussed in the first 
chapter) is pertinent here, but it is a critical revision of it that helps us to
1 Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009).
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elaborate a specifically democratic ethos understood as our comportment 
towards the peculiar circumstances we encounter, and thus as our dwelling 
in the moment (rather than in a place). The task here is to thematise the fluid 
attitude that informs and characterises our practices (tactics) and which is 
adaptable and transformable according to the peculiarities of the moment. In 
this context, it is suggested that an ethos informed by the mental category of 
metis or cunning intelligence better corresponds to the demands of the 
agonistic and kaleidoscopic democracy embraced here.
I. The ethotic dimension of democracy
Chapter Five considered how theorists of a radical democracy affirm the 
significance of democracy as lying in its corrective role with regard to the 
restoration of equality. In so doing they perceive it in terms of a dissensus 
that erupts at the specific moment in which an otherwise contingent group of 
individuals share a temporary commonality. The importance of such an 
understanding of democracy lies in the way in which it allows us to affirm the 
multiplicity of the common goods available to us today, and in the fact that it 
shows that what is at stake in democracy is exactly the disagreement with 
regard to these common goods and the means by which they can be 
pursued. Thus stated, the spatio-temporal vision of democracy endorsed by 
Wolin and Ranciere not only provides an innovative and radical way to think 
about what democracy is and can be, but also enriches the ways we engage 
in democratic life today. This chronological determination, this “today”, is 
important, for the work of these two theorists is developed in the context of a 
specific articulation of the late-modern condition and, indeed, is a response 
to the challenges posed for democracy and the forms of democratic 
subjectivisation by the forces of capitalism, the drastic social changes and 
the alteration of the environmental scene, as well as the interactions between 
these three axes and others.
The work of William Connolly, with its exegesis of the catalytic impact of 
the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine on the formation of current 
ethico-political complexes, and his proposal for a creation of contagious
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resonances as a form of counter-action, provides an equally important 
articulation of the democratic possibilities available to us today. Indeed, his 
emphasis on the layered interactions of thinking and embodied sensibilities 
cultivated on multiple levels make his work on democracy exemplary and 
central to the argument of the thesis. At the same time, however, Wolin and 
Ranciere focus specifically on the disruptive dimension of democracy, on the 
particular and temporary expression of a commonality that is fugitive and 
impermanent, with all the limitations and challenges that such an approach to 
the democratic entails. This aspect of their work is most relevant to the task 
undertaken here on the ethotic dimension of democracy.
The (formless) form of this ethos is one that most comports with the 
perception of democracy in its disruptive dimension, as discussed by Wolin 
and Ranciere. My discussion seeks to problematise the fact that ethos has a 
delimiting nature at the same time, while the same discussion attributes to 
democracy an experiential dimension as advocated by William Connolly, 
without being confined to it. Moreover, it comes to supplement Mouffe’s 
perception of a democratic ethos as consisting merely in already established 
practices and identifications.
The argument here is that a kind of ethos that infuses our engagement in 
democratic theorising and experience not only is indispensable but, if it is to 
be pertinent to the contemporary condition, specifically needs to be 
perceived across these two dimensions of democracy: the momentary and 
experiential. This is not to suggest that democracy ought now to be reduced 
to an instinct or a spontaneous response, for this would be a far too weak 
and naive image of democracy and would have little to contribute to its 
present and future. Rather, it is to say that already established norms, codes, 
practices and institutions must be blended and infused with a combination of 
cultivated sensibilities (such as those suggested by Connolly), and 
spontaneous disruptive reactions to the peculiarities of the moment. This 
entails the enrichment of our understanding of ways of democratic action and 
of democracy iteself. Hence Mouffe’s work is most pertinent. What is needed 
is a way to make new “vocabularies” available to those engaged in 
democracy. These can enable practices and forms of grassroots democracy 
conducive to a broader understanding and appreciation of the democratic
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possibilities of the current condition. Concerning the latter, not only is there 
no reason for lament, but on the contrary it is productive to perceive current 
challenges as an opportunity to be embraced and indeed capitalised upon for 
multifarious lines of action. The idea of a democratic ethos espoused in this 
chapter, then, is inspired by the work of the four thinkers discussed in the 
previous two chapters, but at the same time it takes a certain distance from 
them. Finding recourse to the disruptive dimension of democracy adopted by 
Wolin and Ranciere, it departs from the former’s conviction that there already 
exists a collective culture that encourages citizens to join in common 
endeavours and hence that a collective preexisting ethos is the driving force 
of a momental democracy. Rather, and without completely refuting the role 
that a “common code of conduct”, in Mouffe’s terms, has for democracy, it is 
argued here that there is something more specifically political in ethos when 
it is to be discussed in its momental dimension. A democratic ethos needs to 
be understood not as a pre-political category, but as the specific ethic that 
infuses democratic action the moment it is performed: a democratic ethos is 
one produced at that very moment. At the same time, the idea of a 
democratic ethos embraced here also departs from Ranciere’s renunciation 
of the category of ethos. The chapter argues that his position against ethos is 
related to his failure to affirm it as something other than an abode and, more 
specifically, in its individual dimension. Connolly’s more individualistic 
approach proves to be helpful in its emphasis upon the role of sensibilities 
cultivated on the ethical, visceral register in shaping radical democratic 
responses to the grievances and opportunities with which the current 
condition confronts us.
Blending these inspirations and refutations, the chapter makes its own 
contribution to the discussion concerning the importance of an ethos for 
radical democracy, affirmed in its disruptive and existential dimensions. For 
this purpose, ethos is here perceived as an existential attitude that informs 
our democratic practices (being either original performances or repetitions) 
the moment of their eruption; that is the moment of creation of new spaces 
for common goods. Without contending that such an approach does not 
favour certain sensibilities against others — for this would be a mere 
pretense — the argument put forward here abstains from suggesting a code
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or list of principles that should govern our political behaviour. What it 
suggests, instead, is that an affirmation of ethos in its temporal rather than 
topological dimension and hence as a comportment towards the moment 
allows us to appreciate the possibilities for democratic action available to us 
through the current condition. This endeavour entails a re-assessment of 
democracy and of its understanding as a rare, extraordinary activity as 
defended by Ranciere (and also Wolin in earlier elaborations of his fugitive 
democracy). In the place of this fugitive image, the argument in this chapter 
involves envisioning democracy in its ordinary dimension, that is the forms it 
takes through practices that fashion and enhance it. This is not to make the 
case against spontaneity, but, rather, to suggest that ordinary democratic 
practice, even in its repetition, enables and hence produces the extra­
ordinary that is so valued by radical democratic thinkers.
The reconceptualisation of political time proves a crucial task here, since it 
is his perception of time in its linear dimension that urges Ranciere to 
conceive democracy as an interruption of sequences and to affirm it only in 
its extraordinary dimension. By relying on a more supportive role for the 
ordinary in the vision of revitalising democracy, the chapter revisits Heidegger 
and suggests that a democratic ethos is indeed not an abode, but a visiting: it 
is the impermanent dwelling in a moment of democratic practicing, a way of 
dwelling-temporally.
II. The Extra-ordinary Banality of Democracy
The purpose of the discussion in this section is to critically assess the impact 
of specific binaries upon our democratic thinking and practicing. My 
assessment is that the logic of binaries downplays the tactical dimension of 
ethos, a dimension that this thesis aspires to expose. I have already 
discussed in the previous chapters how theorists of democracy attend to 
ethos over-emphasising either its individual or its collective component and I 
have discussed the shortcomings of this approach for the formulation of a 
democratic ethos. Here I wish to suggest that binaries appear in the 
discourse of democratic theory in ways that do not always favour the latter’s
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richness and possibilities. In order to explicate this suggestion in the specific 
context of the thesis, in this section I argue that the thinkers taken on here, 
although in different degrees, fall for the binary between the ordinary and the 
extra-ordinary in order to articulate their spatio-temporal democratic visions: 
they depict democracy as the extra-ordinary occurrence that erupts as the 
moment of disturbance of the ordinary sequence of political life. This is the 
case with Ranciere, who embraces a dissensus democracy, but also with 
Wolin whose democratic vision despite appreciating a “commonality 
experienced as everyday reality”, still contrasts this common experience with 
a non-democratic everydayness played out on an economic-political system 
of self-interest and exploitation. In contrast, I argue that it would be more 
productive to affirm democracy as oscillating between these two poles, while 
revisiting the idea of the ordinary: instead of seeing the latter as the opposite 
of the event, following Deleuze it is suggested that the event is a mutation of 
intensities and therefore it is already placed in the context of the ordinary.
The two radical thinkers discussed in Chapter Five affirm democracy in its 
extra-ordinary dimension, as an occurrence that is spatially and temporally 
limited and thus contrasted to what might be called “routine politics”. But they 
do so in different intensities and degrees. Prevailing in the work of Ranciere 
is an image of democracy as a process of politicising a territory monopolised 
by the state, of enlarging a public sphere so that it includes those who are 
normally excluded in a private sphere as mere individuals or consumers; 
hence it is a process of blurring the limits of a given distribution, a process of 
subjectification, a shift of bodies from one place to another. There is a spatial 
specification of democracy, so far as its essential work is the configuration of 
its own space. To be sure, this is not to suggest that for Ranciere politics 
happens in a specific place: it has neither proper place nor natural subjects.2 
Instead, it is to suggest that the irruptive nature he attributes to democracy 
leads Ranciere to an appreciation of its spatially dislocating forces that erupt 
in a specific moment only to allow a subsequent return to the condition of the 
police order. For him democracy is momentary, something that “occurs as an 
always provisional accident within the history of forms of domination”.3 It is an
2 Ranciere, “Ten theses on politics”, §25.
3 Ibid., §18.
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exception, a rupture of a normality that is characterised by stillness, stability 
and order. In a similar way, Sheldon Wolin affirms the democratic subject, the 
demos, as an actor that comes from a place outside the system to disrupt it, 
mobilised by widely felt and deep-seated grievances. As he puts it, the 
challenge for a demos thus defined is “to ‘popularise’ political institutions and 
practices that have become severed from popular control”.4 But such a 
demos — or rather democratic citizenries in plural — can only be formed on 
small, local, settings: democracy for Wolin begins at (but is not confined to) 
local levels. It is the logic of democracy which he embraces that dictates this 
localism: “Demotic rationality is rooted in a provincialism where commonality 
is experienced as everyday reality...”.5 Wolin, then, seems to appreciate more 
than Ranciere does the normalcy of democracy. Where the latter attends to 
democracy as the moment that breaks the normal course of history, the 
former appreciates the demotic moments that take place in everyday life. 
Still, for both of them, democracy functions to correct what is perceived as a 
routine political set of sequences which are characterised by arrangement, 
categorisation and regularity and it comes to disturb and disarrange them 
fugitively and momentarily.
This confining of democracy to its extra-ordinary dimension does not 
favour the multiple possibilities for action and engagement offered also by its 
everyday and more ordinary strands. Established norms, codes and 
principles are also rich fields of democratic action: democracy is too complex 
and multifaceted to be valued only as a disruption of an order. It is better 
perceived as a positive multiplicity with different variegations and discernible 
intensities: a kaleidoscopic variation of the political that reformulates and is 
reformulated continuously. This perception is not very far away from Plato’s 
view of democracy as a charming multifaceted system. However, rather than 
see this as a reason for condemnation, such an understanding of democracy 
is productive of opportunities and possibilities for democratic thinking and 
practicing, present at any time.
To affirm democracy in such a variegated way is to seek to disturb the 
exaggeration of binaries such as ordinary/extra-ordinary, refusing to see each
4 Wolin, Democracy Inc., 258.
5 Ibid., 289.
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of the components of this dualism as exclusionary of the other. Nietzsche, in 
the context of developing his critique of metaphysics, condemns the belief of 
metaphysicians in what he calls “oppositions of values” on the grounds of 
their being mere “foreground estimates” or “provisional perspectives” and he 
doubts whether opposites even exist.6 These binaries can be organised 
around the opposed concepts of being and becoming, the latter perceived as 
concerning negativity and instability and the former as indicating a way to 
combat and encompass these features. Nietzsche does not simply propose 
reversing the hierarchy, favouring becoming in the place of being. Instead, he 
seeks to exchange their opposition for a sense of “crossing”, a condition of 
reciprocal relation and interchange.7 Rather than place the components of 
such dualisms into an axiological relation that would end up as the exclusion 
of one over the other, he perceived their mutual participation in a more 
complex model of operating differences which they inform, shape and 
elongate again and again. In the context of this model, the components can 
be in a condition of strife and conflict, without necessarily seeking to 
annihilate each other. It is an expanding model of inclusion rather than 
exclusion.
Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on Nietzsche’s rethinking of binary 
oppositions with their dynamic image of the rhizome that, in contrast to the 
tree, ceaselessly expands its heterogenous parts to establish new relations 
towards diverse directions.8 We have already seen how Connolly brings this 
image into democratic theory to support his vision of multidimensional, 
rhizomatic pluralism consisting of assemblages that expand and co- 
participate in sustaining a model of agonistic democracy. What I want 
specifically to scrutinise here is how Ranciere and Wolin’s visions of eruptive 
and momentary democracy can be incorporated in such a logic without 
confining democracy’s value to that of an extraordinary event and thus 
without placing it against a background of stillness to which it is contrasted
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), §2.
7 Lawrence J. Hatab, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 8-9.
8 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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and aims to demolish. To be sure, it is not suggested here that binaries can 
be completely abandoned. As Deleuze observes they are inevitable because 
they are already in language. The question, then, is not how we “get rid of 
them” but rather how we “fight against” them by making language “flow 
between” them.9 Deleuze suggests that a way to do so is through 
stammering, through inserting new elements that may repeat themselves, but 
through this repetition allow for the emergence of new flows. Not escaping, 
then, from binaries but finding ways to insert new elements in and between 
them to create multiplicities - that is the point.
To work within the space created between binaries is to soften, curve and 
finally disturb them. I believe that it is more productive to affirm democracy as 
oscillating between its ordinary and extra-ordinary components, without being 
reducible to either of them. Bonnie Honig and Aletta Norval with their 
elaborations of binaries prove to be a good source of inspiration here. 
Honig’s call to “de-exceptionalise the emergency” is in fact an endeavour to 
undo the binary democracy/emergency. She suggests that this can be 
achieved by viewing democracy as a form of politics that is always in 
emergence in response to everyday emergencies of maintenance.10 In this 
attempt Honig scrutinises the extra-ordinariness of everyday politics by 
focusing on the paradox of politics itself, that is the persistent, irresolvable 
and yet productive paradox in which a multitude must be (re)shaped into a 
people not occasionally, but daily. There is no such thing as a pure general 
will, only plural conflicting agents, neither a common good, only plural 
common goods and such postulates would better be replaced with an 
acceptance of this “impurity and an embrace of the perpetuity of political 
contestation made necessary by that impurity”.11 In taking on the paradox of 
politics Honig shows the possibilities for democratic thinking and living 
available to individuals every day and not only in cases of emergency. She 
shows how the time for political action and thinking is always there and that it
9 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), 34.
10 Honig, Emergency Politics, xvii.
11 Ibid., 38.
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does not take a special “state of emergency” or event for this moment to 
become available to us.
The path followed by Norval is very different. Like Honig she seeks to 
emphasise the ordinary aspect of democracy while at the same time avoiding 
simplistic dichotomisations such as “moment of the political” against “ordinary 
ongoing business of politics”. In her words, “not all novelty is a radical break, 
neither is all tradition a mere repetition of the same”.12 What Norval more 
specifically aspires to, drawing on Cavell and Wittgenstein, is a more 
nuanced affirmation of the relation between emerging democratic claims and 
established practices. Democratic subjectivity perceived in this context is to 
be understood both in its moment of constitution and as an ongoing process 
that also requires moments of reactivation. Most significantly, this account of 
democratic subjectivity opens the way for affirming “the importance of not 
reducing our understanding of community to what we share in our exclusion 
of, or opposition to, the other”.13 NorvaFs task proves important for the 
endeavour undertaken here not merely because it bridges the moment of 
democratic claim with what precedes and follows it, but also because, as with 
Honig, she attends to the extra-ordinary potential of democracy in its most 
ordinary appearances.
Democracy as envisaged and endorsed here is not reduced to the 
moment that a democratic claim is articulated, when subjectification takes 
place as an event that interrupts the tedious order of everyday politics. 
Rather, it is suggested that democracy is to be understood as a more 
complex system that is mobilised by the productive tension between the 
ordinary daily political life and the events that disturb it. As both Honig and 
Norval show, there is much greater possibility in attending to this tension not 
only for sustaining and re-energising democratic identification, but also for 
affirming the inherent conflictual nature of democratic politics. The latter is 
dictated by the multiplicity of wills that galvanise these politics and of the 
appearances of these wills: there is no public good, only public goods.
It is important here to clarify that attendance to the ordinary does not 
necessarily imply falling for proceduralism and favouring institutionalisation of
12 Norval, Aversive Democracy, 12.
13 Ibid., 180.
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politics. Rather, following Honig, it can alternatively be seen as entailing 
commitment to the “powers of daily political practice out of which procedures 
and other elements of political self-governance may come but by which such 
daily practice is not always already guided”.14 Such a commitment suggests 
a non-axiological approach towards the repetition that is folded in daily life 
and a reappraisal of spontaneity as part of and not an antithesis to this 
repetition. It thus suggests an affirmation of democracy not according to the 
cause/effect logic but as a more open and complex model: rather than 
viewing democracy as the opposite of the police, perceiving it as a positive 
complex multiplicity of fleeting possibilities with internal differentiations and 
intensities in spatial and temporal layers.
That said, the ordinary is not to be necessarily contrasted with the event. 
The Deleuzian logic of the latter is useful here, especially when contrasted 
with Ranciere’s appreciation of the eruptive function of the event. To be sure, 
Ranciere’s democratic vision brings him closer to the Badiouian binary logic 
of the event. Like Badiou, Ranciere takes a structure or order (police) as 
admitting no events and then he counterposes it to a moment of rupture 
which produces nothing beyond itself and a floating democratic subject, 
which, upon return to the police order, vanishes. I concur with Norval that this 
is a problematic point in Ranciere’s work, for it does not provide an account 
of a positive democratic identification that would be the basis for the 
moments of commonality that the demos enjoys. Furthermore, the affirmation 
of the event of democratic eruption as contrasting with the order does not 
attribute to democracy its full potentialities. By contrast, the Deleuzian 
discussion of the event proves more supportive of the demands of the 
democratic vision endorsed here.
This is because, for Deleuze events are not rare: they are ubiquitous to 
the flows of the world, in a continuous process of evolvement and infinitely 
extended. Any event is to be thought of not as a disruption of a given 
continuous state (of a relationship or body), but rather as what constitutes 
this given state while transforming and mutating it. An event runs through 
series that constitute a multiplicity, not as an interruption but as a mutation of 
its intensities. These series, divergent as they are, co-exist in simultaneity
14 Honig, Emergency Politics, xviii.
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and contemporaneity:15 an event is a change in intensity. Perhaps 
democracy can be affirmed as an event in this sense of an ongoing process, 
a series of different intensities that contribute to revitalisation and 
actualisation in diverse ways. From this perspective there is no question of 
when or how often democracy happens; the events which actualise it are 
omnipresent in diverse forms. Democratic possibilities are relentlessly 
available, even in the routine of what is perceived as “ordinary” political life. 
At the same time, such possibilities are also present in the everyday acts we 
perform. It is not the character of those acts per se that renders them 
political, but rather the very context within which they are performed. The 
shooting of a youngster by a policeman, for example, is not a political act in 
itself. However, it becomes political when it takes place in Exarheia, a highly 
politicised region at the heart of Athens and when it is interpreted as an act of 
power against which mass demonstrations and political events are 
organised.
The concept of the ordinary, affirmed as the routine, the repetitive, is not 
necessarily opposed to that of the event. Repetition is always already 
inhabited by difference and entails differentiation.16 The divergence inherent 
in the ordinary renders it extra-ordinary. As Heidegger puts it, 
“[fundamentally, the ordinary [geheur] is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary, 
uncanny [ungeheui]”.17 Democracy is not to be limited to the intensive events 
that transform it deeply and profoundly: its strength, beauty and challenge 
derive from the possibility, inherent within it, of creating and reproducing 
difference and variation through the repetition of the most ordinary elements 
and the enactment of prior events. Like the Nietzschean concept of the 
eternal recurrence, the repetition of ordinary political practices does not entail 
“the permanence of the same, the equilibrium state or the resting place of the 
identical”.18 Rather, such a repetition can serve for explaining and enhancing 
diversity and its reproduction. It is exactly this permanence of difference in
15 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), 124.
18 Ibid., 76.
17 Martin Heidegger, “The origin of work of art”, in Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (eds 
and transl.), Heidegger Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 31.
18 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 46.
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flux that dictates the omnipresence of the possibility for democratic collective 
and individual action.
III. Beyond Active/Passive: A Politics of Silence
To affirm democracy in the uncanny dimension of its ordinariness is also to 
seek to problematise passivity as exclusively a negative or non-manifestation 
of the demos. The binary of active/passive haunts political thought. Many 
thinkers, Wolin included, find in it a reason to lament the condition of the 
demos in late-modern democracies. According to this logic, citizens are the 
passive consumers of the political product sold to them through media, 
abstaining from active participation in the issues that form and define their 
lives. However, to identify passivity as merely the opposite of activity is to 
overlook the dynamics implicit in the former and to obscure its multiple 
connections with the latter.
In his recent work on politics, aesthetics and art Ranciere seems to be 
aware of these connections. He suggests that being a spectator does not 
necessarily entail a passive condition that must be transformed into activity 
by the avant-garde artists or the political radical. Rather, it can be 
confirmatory or transformative of the given distribution of positions. As he 
says, the spectator also acts: observes, selects, compares, interprets, links, 
composes.19 Recognition of this action in passivity helps us to abandon, or at 
least re-examine, the assumption that today citizens are simply and only 
sunk into a condition of passivity which must be understood as apathy and 
denial.
Also pertinent here is Deleuze’s appropriation of what he calls contraction 
or passive synthesis as a supportive and constitutive element of thought 
together with active syntheses of memory and understanding. This reveals 
how repetition and passivity participate in our thinking and indeed are 
indispensable to it.20 To seek to elevate a body from the state of a mere
19 Jacques Ranciere, The Emancipated Spectator {London: Verso, 2009), 13.
2° Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71.
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spectator of democracy to the state of a democratic actor is not only to 
neglect the multilayered operations in which she is already engaged when 
she contemplates; it is also to presuppose her as ignorant and incapable of 
acting. In other words, it is to predetermine the attributes and abilities 
appropriate to the democratic citizen and, a priori, to discredit some 
individuals for their lack of potentiality as democratic subjects. It is to 
predetermine who can carry a democratic ethos and who cannot.
We saw in Chapter Two the problematic relationship of theory to practice 
in political theory. We saw how theory is traditionally equated with 
speculation, separate from and in contrast to practice. Philosophy had to wait 
for Nietzsche to give to it vis contemplativa and vis theoretika as inseparable 
and allied to a third element - creativity, that disturbs this binary. Creativity, as 
Nietzsche understood, is not a conscious activity that shapes and determines 
thought. It is already there synthesising or connecting operations in a way 
that Deleuze describes as repetition and passive synthesis. Theory, then, is 
not the opposite of practice: it is a form of action that seeks to disturb the 
rationalising forces embedded in our perceptions of the political life and 
subject which tend to rely on secure and convenient constructions. The 
hubris of theory is that it indulges in nothing else but its own self-image or 
worse as Louis Althusser, Ranciere’s ex-mentor, puts it, its own self­
conception.21 To value theory over practice (or the opposite) is to value 
activity over passivity and thus to fail to recognise how these oppositions 
obscure the fact that to be passive or active is merely to embrace and adopt 
different intensities of expression according to the circumstances. Activity and 
passivity are variations in intensity.
Recognition of the falsity of the passivity/activity binary frees us to 
appreciate concepts or tactics that deserve close attention but which political 
discourse frequently obscures. Such is the case with silence. In popular and 
academic discourse silence is often considered synonymous with apathy and 
passivity. This view is intensified by the celebration of language and verbal 
articulation which takes place within social science as part of the ‘linguistic 
turn’. Political thinkers emphasise voice while condemning silence as a sign
21 Louis Althusser, “The transformation of philosophy”, in Louis Althusser and Gregory Elliot, 
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays (London: 
Verso, 1990), 258.
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of ignorance or/ and indifference. For theorists of discourse ethics such as 
Habermas, speech is a prerequisite for political participation, the royal road 
to empowerment and emancipation. We have seen how Young relies on 
speech and specific acts of communication to advance her vision of radical 
democracy. However, as Norval drawing on Cavell affirms, silence has many 
modalities. We should investigate each of them if we are to understand the 
political capacity of silence.22
The modality of silence here endorsed is not the outcome of censorship or 
exclusion. It is not to be perceived as disempowerment. Rather, I wish to 
affirm silence in its positivity, as a tactic, a choice, a means to communicate a 
meaning and hence as a political possibility,23 disturbing the prevailing 
assumption that only visibility and voice can constitute freedom and political 
participation.241 want to argue for the political power of silence, when this is a 
choice or even when it is perceived as such given the context in which it is 
encountered. It is not that silence per se is political. But it can be politicised. 
In specific contexts and under specific circumstances it can be a means of 
transmitting a political message by subjects that are not necessarily 
disempowered, inaudible or invisible, neither apathetic nor ignorant, but who 
choose to be silent because they perceive their refusal to speak as a means 
to express disapproval or disavowal of a political decision made for them by 
others. It is the choice of those who believe not that they have nothing to say, 
but that there are no ears to listen to what they have to say.25
Silence functions both constitutively and disruptively. It can be the element 
that unites a demos around a fugitive commonality, thus constituting it as 
political subject. It can be the tactic that intervenes into a political process
22 Norval, Aversive Democracy, 210, n. 66.
23 The notion of tactic here is the one that Michel de Certeau attributes to the concept, that 
is, the logic of action that does not have a proper place and hence depends on time, it is 
always related to the circumstances and the opportunities at hand, The Practice of Everyday 
Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xix.
24 For an analysis of the relationship between freedom and silence from a Foucauldian 
perspective see Wendy Brown, “Freedom’s silences” in her Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 83-97.
25 Here I have on mind the movement “I demonstrate my silence in Herakleion”, a local 
movement in a Greek city where participants choose to organise silent demonstrations that 
do not disrupt the normal city life. They use two handmade red bands to symbolically close 
their mouths, using then their bodies rather than their voices to communicate their political 
demands.
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such as an election procedure to question it. Hence its subversive power. 
According to Thoreau, silence alone is worthy to be heard.26 But by merely 
juxtaposing it with voice we not only risk the chance of grasping its force as a 
shelter from power and thus as a form of resistance, as Foucault 
understands it;27 we also risk overlooking the multiple ways and the various 
layers across which silence functions and constitutes the collective - memory, 
consciousness or identity. Silence is not only a form of disapproval of a 
government by the citizens who do not attend the election procedures. It can 
also be a form of approval of those who make noise by, for example, 
barracking a politician, a paradoxical voice that despite never being raised 
still functions at the visceral register and forms one’s political identity.
The myth of Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens is well-known: the hero 
asks his crew to plug their ears with wax and bind him to the mast so that he 
could be exposed to and indulge in their song, yet not succumb to it. In his 
subversive reading of the myth Kafka sees Odysseus as the stubborn and 
over-self-confident hero who overlooks common beliefs and dares to expose 
himself to the allure of the Sirens. He writes: "the Sirens have a still more 
fatal weapon than their song, namely their silence. And though admittedly 
such a thing never happened, it is still conceivable that someone might 
possibly have escaped from their singing; but from their silence certainly 
never."28 In the Kafka’s reading of the myth, the central figure is no longer 
Odysseus but the Sirens who decide not to give their voice and thus to 
surprise their opponent by doing the unexpected, the unpredictable. It is not 
their weakness that urges them to do so, but their intention to explicate a 
different yet powerful mode of action. The Sirens used their silence to startle 
their enemy: there is an appealing, almost magnetic quality in silence.
I use this illustration here to suggest that alternative ways of democratic 
action are always available to us and that they do not need to be 
demonstrated with noise or voice. The important thing, I believe, is to be 
ready to take advantage of the conditions, to exploit and channel them to our
26 Henry D. Thoreau, Journal (Toronto: Dover Publications Inc., 1962), 518.
27 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978), 101.
28 Franz Kafka, “The silence of the sirens”, in The Complete Stories (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1995), 430-431.
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benefit. I concur with Wolin that democrats need a new conception of 
revolution and I propose silence as offering a potential for this conception: a 
mute revolution of all those who are tired of the words, promises and fake 
commitments to which they are exposed. These figures, blamed as apathetic 
or ignorant, choose speechlessness not out of resignation but because they 
understand the failure of language to transmit their claims and they seek an 
alternative way to achieve it. In choosing silence over voice or noise, 
democrats don’t choose to turn their back to their challengers; rather they 
choose to provoke them in the most disturbing and irritating way, like the 
student provokes the teacher when the latter demands an explanation that 
never comes. The receivers of silence who interpret it as a sign of resignation 
and weakness and thus as favouring them, experience even more 
surprisingly the shock tactics of silence: it is a powerful weapon that cannot 
be fought, since there is nothing to fight. Silence as choice is the result of 
previous experiences and thoughts which have been accumulated and 
participate in this ear-piercingly quiet outburst. And the wax is not enough to 
help one avoid it.
IV. Interlude
The democratic vision developed in this chapter is based on the disturbance 
of binaries that are considered as definitive for theorising democratic ways of 
thought and experience. However, as has already been made clear, there is 
no way of completely escaping or avoiding them for our world is already 
dualistically organised. It is by interfering in these binaries that we can affirm 
other possibilities available to us for acting or making sense of the world that 
surrounds us. Hence, in refusing to confine democracy within the boundaries 
of an event narrowly defined we appreciate the multiple forms democracy 
can take, the diverse bodies, forces and networks that take part in its 
production and the many ways in which democratic thinking can be 
communicated. Such a denial signifies also the appreciation of the work that 
we do on ourselves (both as individuals and as collectivities) in what 
precedes that event and remains a part of it. This is not to argue that
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democracy is a slow-paced process, but rather that it is a more wide and 
open-ended occurrence than is appreciated by thinkers who confine it to a 
moment. Democracy is not the disruption or eruption of a linear-affirmed 
political time but a long-lasting correspondence between already established 
structures and strategies and emerging flows and tactics that carry the 
possibility of transforming the former without necessarily aspiring to its 
destruction or transgression. The return to the police order is not a dead end.
Democracy as embraced in this chapter is inherently and irreducibly 
agonistic. Chapter Four discussed how the concept of agon inspires different 
democratic thinkers in different ways to articulate democratic visions where 
contestation is perceived as an inextricable part of the political field. Where 
for Mouffe it is the pluralism of values that renders democracy agonistic, for 
Connolly it is the Nietzschean formulation of the idea of the pathos of 
distance between adversaries that inscribes the agonistic nature of 
democracy.29 Other thinkers of agonism have contributed to the formation of 
this distinct yet diverse strand of democratic thought: Honig with her 
Arendtian understanding of the agon; Coles with his assertion of coalition 
politics in their agonistic and agonising dimension. For all of them, conflict, 
antagonism and disagreement are inevitable and indeed celebrated elements 
of democratic politics.
In this chapter I have argued that the agonistic affirmation of democracy 
stems from the embrace of its shifting and multifarious nature. Democracy is 
itself an agon because it is an ongoing process of creating, grasping and 
capitalising on possibilities for action in conditions of fluidity, plurality and 
ambiguity. Thus understood, democracy is necessarily agonistic for it is a 
constant call for awareness of the specificity of the circumstances and for 
receptivity to the possibilities for interference they carry; at the same time it is 
a call to overcome or at least resist established views, identifications and 
patterns of acting and thinking, while adopting a more affirmative stance 
towards the current. Deleuze says that the new is the current;30 democracy is 
a ceaseless unfolding of potential new multiplicities which demand our
29 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 99-100; Connolly, Identity/Difference, xxvi.
30 Gilles Deleuze, “What is a dispositif?”, in Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault: 
Philosopher (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatshead, 1992), 164.
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activation at the opportune time. It is agonistic from another aspect, as well: 
its openness results in instability and fragility. Democracy is something to 
always strive for.
Democracy is too complex to be understood if grasped only as rupture. It 
needs also to be perceived as maintenance and not just as new beginnings 
but also as preparation, popular receptivity and orientation.31 That is, without 
renouncing the importance of viewing democracy as an eruptive moment, it 
is suggested here that it would be more productive to place this eruption in a 
democratic context that provides us with ever-present possibilities for acting 
and in fact nourishes them; such actions are not necessarily extra-ordinary in 
the sense of carrying the dynamic of radical innovation, but can be part of our 
repeated and crystallised modes of action, without this depriving them of their 
quality of variation. As Heidegger puts it, the situation in every case of action 
is different: “the circumstances, the givens, the times and the people vary 
and so does the meaning of the action itself”.32 To act ordinarily is necessarily 
to act with variations. Democratic action, that is acting and thinking, is 
invariably unfolded into diverse ways and dimensions; it is the occasion in 
which this unfolding takes place that defines its specific traits. Today, more 
than ever, to act or think democratically demands to comport with the 
heterogenous circumstances one encounters, to be affirmative toward them, 
but also to be disposed to exploit them in favour of an expansion of what 
counts as democratic. It demands, in other words, to have a democratic 
ethos, a democratic disposition that despite being there and directing this 
comportment toward the specificity of the situation, is also too fluid to be 
described simply through the enumeration of particular traits. The exploration 
of the nature and the distinctiveness of this democratic ethos is the focus of 
the last section of the chapter.
31 Honig, Emergency Politics, xvii.
32 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 101.
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V. For an Ethos of Democracy: Dwelling in the Moment and Metis
The key argument of this thesis is that a democratic vision needs to be 
sustained by and infused with an ethos if it is to be attractive, desirable and 
inspiring: codes and institutions alone cannot mobilise individuals politically. 
The previous chapters explored how ethos appears across a spectrum of 
democratic political thought. To make the case for the omnipresence of ethos 
in democratic thought and experience is not to suggest that politics is simply 
derivative of ethical choices and positions. Rather, it has been argued that 
politics entails a formation of viewpoints, negotiations and responses 
regarding ethical issues. To open up ‘ethos’ is to intensify awareness of the 
role played by ontological assumptions in the constitution of our political 
choices, not in terms of determining them, but of prefiguring and affecting 
them. Thus Chapter Four considered how William Connolly, among others, 
affirms the relationship between ontological and political presumptions not in 
terms of efficient causality, but in terms of a mutual imbrication such that 
ontologies are ubiquitous in political life. Stephen K. White has coined the 
term “weak ontologies”, in contrast to “strong” ones, which he attributes to 
our fundamental yet contestable interpretations of the existential realities and 
ontological figures that shape the ways we place and understand ourselves 
in the world and hence our ethical-political life.33
Ethos is approached here as inhabited by binaries. As Chapter One 
shows, from tradition to modernity ethos oscillates between two poles: a 
collective account that refers to the common traits, beliefs and customs 
shared by a community, nation or group; an individual account being 
understood as the character, the general stand or attitude one develops and 
demonstrates throughout his life. In many cases, for example in the work of 
Plato, ethos connotes morality and is connected to obedience to a code of 
rules. However, as we also saw in Chapter One, Foucault opened up the 
interplay between the public and the private components of ethos and 
showed how ethical practices may function as catalysts to democracy. It was 
also argued that Heidegger provides us with a challenging and specifically
33 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weal Ontology in Political 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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political account of ethos and, in particular, recognised the importance for it 
of time. In this section we will revisit the Heideggerian account of ethos and 
the attention it gives to the specificity of the moment. In doing so we will 
make the case for an elaborated account of ethos adequate to the vision of 
kaleidoscopic democracy embraced in the present chapter.
To begin with, an ethos that corresponds to the vision of the agonistic 
multifarious democracy is best perceived as a plurality and thus as ethea. It 
is a multiplicity in that it is not limited to a single disposition but instead 
consists of a variety of dispositions, without ever being reduced or confined 
to them. That is, a democratic ethos is continuously in the process of 
reconsideration, reformulation and expansion without taking a definitive form 
or possessing a final content. This is due to the flux characterising 
democracy itself: the constant emergence of possibilities for action that 
inform it, render democracy an open-ended process. Democratic subjects 
and ways of thinking and acting are created relentlessly, indeed pressingly, 
either seemingly ex nihilo in unforeseen places and times or as the result of 
reactivation of previous experiences, injuries, grievances or even traumas. 
But what appears to an outside observer as the emergence of a new 
identification is in fact the result of a long established process that bursts 
forth under certain (un)favourable circumstances. Such is the case, for 
example, with the “Arab spring” and the popular revolts in Egypt and 
elsewhere in 2011: what to the external spectator appears as a sudden 
event, for the Egyptian protestor is the result of accumulated grievances, 
experiences and processes of (dis)identification. It may well be the result of 
long periods of silenced unease and condemnation of governmental 
decisions and actions. In other words “ordinary” events that have forged her 
political ethos, that is her comportment towards the negotiations over public 
goods in the context of the political communities to which she belongs.
To make the image of democratic ethos discussed here even more 
explicit, it is necessary to clarify that such an ethos is not something one 
possesses. Rather than a property one owns, it is something to which one 
can at best establish a proximity. This proximity allows room for 
experimentation and further creation: it is a relation under constant revision, 
in diverse spaces and occasions. A democratic ethos does not belong to
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either the individual or the community. Indeed, it cannot be perceived in 
terms of property, for this would entail overlooking the fluidity, plasticity and 
openness to transformations which dictate the specificity of democracy and 
democratic ethos discussed here. An ethos that claims to be democratic is 
better grasped as the interplay between individual and collective processes 
of subjectification, on the one hand, and moments of negotiation and 
reconfiguration of what are perceived as common goods, on the other. A 
democratic ethos is always in the process of becoming, that is of mutation, of 
creative alteration and of transgression of boundaries that fabricate new 
capacities. It is through this interplay that a democratic ethos functions 
simultaneously as the channel of transmission of differentiations and as the 
plane of performance of the dynamics of pluralism.
The type of proximity relation we establish with ethos entails that our 
sensibilities exist by virtue of their production - they become meaningful and 
significant only as long as they are explicated and performed. To make this 
claim even stronger, perhaps it is useful to paraphrase Deleuze and his 
comment on Foucault’s perception of the subject: there never “remains” 
anything to a democratic ethos, it is to be created on each occasion, like a 
focal point of resistance34 to established codes of conduct such as those 
thematised by Rawls, to strong commitments to, and identifications with, a 
single harmonious community, as suggested by Taylor, and to absolute forms 
of the democratic subject as embraced by Young. Here lies the pertinence of 
Foucault’s elaboration of the idea of “work on the self” when the issue of a 
democratic ethos is at stake. This idea is perfectly elaborated by Connolly in 
his work on democratic ethos with respect to achieving a richer 
understanding of one’s own ethical sources.
The role of circumstances is not only crucial here but decisive, hence the 
relevance of Heidegger to the discussion. Heidegger alerts us to another 
binary that inhabits ethos, that of space/time. As we saw in Chapter One, 
Heidegger succeeds in discussing ethos not only in both its collective and 
individual components but also, and most importantly, in its temporal 
dimension. He helps us to shift from the archaic understanding of ethos as 
topos, as abode, to ethos as the way one places oneself in relation to others.
34 Deleuze, Foucault, 105.
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Since the occasion proves important for the formulation of a democratic 
ethos, it is worth revisiting Heidegger and more specifically his attention to 
the moment of action.
As already suggested, Heidegger utilises kairos, the proper time, to 
establish a connection between the specificity of action and the more general 
pattern of conduct one exhibits, a conduct that he affirms as always related 
to the shared traits of the community. Moreover, he affirms the subject as 
being thrown-in-the-world and therefore as always and already with others. 
The purpose of revisiting his theses here is twofold: first, to blur the concept 
of “being-with-one-another” in order to offer an understanding of the 
community that is more pertinent to the democratic vision espoused here; 
and second, to re-examine Heidegger’s reliance on phronesis as the virtue 
that informs action at the appropriate time. We will here seek to introduce 
another intellectual virtue that is long neglected but which seems to be 
germane to the democratic ethos envisioned in the thesis. Through these 
interventions it is possible to approach and honour the interplay between 
individual comportment and shared sensibilities, that is the terrain where a 
democratic ethos flourishes and functions. To attend to this interplay is to 
seek to politicise dispositions, sentiments and worries that in the light of 
specific occasions come to the surface and participate in the construction of 
collective democratic subjectivities. It is also to accept the mediating role 
played by preliminary commonalities, such as language, in the social and 
intersubjective constitutions of our dispositions and sensibilities and hence to 
the fact that they are configured, activated or re-energised through multiple 
and complex intersections between experiences, events and relations.
Heidegger perceives the subject as thrown in a community that 
participates in the shaping of its dispositions. However, and despite the fact 
that his approach is pertinent because he abstains from explicitly connecting 
the community with individuals’ character, Heidegger’s conception of 
community needs to be re-formulated if it is to serve the specific demands of 
democracy. What is rejected here is not the idea of the existence of already 
established commonalities and the ways these inform our commitments, but 
rather the Heideggerian account of community as a distinct and particular 
entity defined by a destiny. Such a view of community hinders significantly, I
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believe, the possibilities for democratic action, for it accepts as pre- 
established the interconnection between the individual and the collective, 
restricting thus the former as a creative actor. Moreover, to accept a 
community as characterised by a destiny is to overlook the transformative 
potentiality that is carried by powers that a community cannot control, such 
as environmental changes or even disasters. At the very end, the focus on “a 
community” forecloses the internal dynamism that characterises any 
collectivity and which renders it already plural.
It is suggested, instead, that attention should be shifted from “community” 
to collectivities, then: from strictly or loosely defined entities with determinate 
shared attributes to shifting and negotiable points of convergence which form 
the starting points for our actions and make us join diverse others in pursuing 
common ends. Such commonalities can be understood as open loci of 
contestation and ambivalence which nonetheless allow space for the 
formation of fugitive alliances based on shared grievances, demands and 
discontents. As Ranciere observes, such starting points, but also 
intersections and junctions, are everywhere; in each case the important thing 
is which point we choose to privilege in order to develop our commitments 
and actions.35
Another problematic aspect of Heidegger, especially in relation to 
conceptions of the possibilities for democratic action, is his discussion of 
subjectivity and in particular his affirmation of authentic Being as an ultimate 
goal. The more open-ended democratic subject taken on here demands an 
approach that does not seek to confine the subject and its motivations for 
action either in too tight collective entities or as aiming at predetermined 
goals. Such an approach carries with it an evaluative content that cancels the 
equalising dynamics proper to a democratic approach. Heidegger is correct 
not to seek to overlook the fact that individuals are always already 
miteinander, with and among others, but rather than understanding this 
happening in the context of a concrete community with a specific destiny we 
can approach his idea of throwness from a different angle: that of becoming- 
other.
35 Ranciere, The Emancipated Spectator, 17.
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The argument here draws on Deleuze’s insights and elaborations of 
Foucault’s conception of the process of subjectification. It suggests that an 
understanding of the subject as becoming may assist us in appreciating the 
processes of emergence of commonalities and thus in honouring the 
interplay between the individual and the collective components of ethos. The 
first section of Chapter One discussed Foucault’s specific approach to ethics 
as exactly the relation one develops with oneself through techniques of self- 
cultivation or work on the self. Deleuze observes that this process of 
subjectification, of creating the self, evolves as a process of folding, that is of 
directing power towards the inner, that which is inside, but still it is always 
related to what lies outside the subject; self-development is always already 
related to an exteriority that nonetheless is the precondition of the subject’s 
existence: subjectivity is already collective and plural. In his collaborative 
work with Guattari, Deleuze revisits the idea of subjectification, of the relation 
to oneself, and enriches his understanding of it by way of considering it a 
creative, even artistic, process, as a becoming that takes place between 
multiplicities.36 Thus affirmed, becoming allows room for mutations, that is for 
“other contemporaneous possibilities”.37 Therefore becoming is to be always 
understood as becoming-different, as becoming-other, in terms not of a 
produced outcome but of a process of continuous flows that produce infinite 
outcomes. That said, the subject is never fixed and given but instead is open 
to constant and heterogenous movements, speeds and intensities. As 
Deleuze puts it elsewhere, “there are no more subjects but dynamic 
individuations [...] which constitute collective assemblages”. The subject is 
already collective and plural.38
This shift from being to becoming, from belonging to a community to being 
constituted as collectivity, enables us to assert both the democratic subject 
and the democratic community not as entities but as open-ended processes 
which are formed and regenerated through complex interconnections 
between experiences, values that are perceived as established, and 
inventive practices. In other words, it enables us to come closer towards
36 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 262-263.
37 Ibid., 301.
38 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 93.
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appreciating the interplay between the individual and collective poles, where 
the latter component is already present and active in the former. This is not to 
underestimate Heidegger’s concern with otherness and difference, that is his 
understanding of Dasein as being towards otherness. We saw in Chapter 
One how he finds that homecoming is always the return to what remains 
uncanny. This is why Heidegger proves important for the argument drawn 
here.
The second purpose of revisiting Heidegger is to re-examine his reliance 
on the concept of phronesis as the virtue that informs one’s comportment in 
the world, one’s ethos and to open onto an alternative virtue that is more 
appropriate for the complexities and openings of democratic thinking and 
acting. As already discussed in Chapter One, Heidegger’s attendance to 
kairos, to the appropriate time of action, makes his work especially pertinent 
to the argument of the thesis. For this move leads him to elaborate a concept 
of ethos that oscillates between the specific time of action and one’s more 
general, permanent behavioural conduct as informed by the traits of the 
community in which one is thrown. I have already discussed in Chapter One 
the way in which the Aristotelian/Heideggerian conception of phronesis, 
informed as it is by episteme, entails a stability and fixity that cut against the 
conception of democracy embraced here. Late modern democracy demands 
from the democratic subject readiness to undertake action, to capitalise upon 
the circumstances and to be inventive and creative so that she can grasp the 
opportunity to enter the democratic agon joining unforeseen adversaries. It 
demands from her even a readiness to remain silent if this will give her 
superiority against those who would threaten democracy, be that a 
corporation (as in Wolin’s analysis), a demonising assemblage (as Connolly 
might put it) or political philosophy itself (which is Ranciere’s enemy). This is 
why I think that metis is relevant to my argument and to late modern 
democracy.
Metis is pertinent to the work undertaken here first of all because, like 
ethos itself, it is a multiplicity; it consists of but is not confined to the mental 
attitudes of the individual who values and appreciates the circumstances and 
takes action accordingly. For the ancient Greeks metis is a diverse form of 
intelligence operating on many different levels and domains, a type of
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thought or a way of knowing.39 It is multidimensional, since it refers to the 
behaviour that is informed by vigilance, versatility and even deception and it 
thus becomes pertinent to transient and shifting occasions. It was because of 
its polymorphism, diversity and mutability that it was scorned by the rigorous 
philosophers of the 4th century B.C. As one scholar observes, it was the 
“concerns of abstraction, propositional knowledge, logocentric formulation 
and objective bases of knowledge” that drove thinkers towards disdaining or 
merely overlooking metis, since it “cannot be formulated in terms of a 
definition or essence and because its ‘objects’ are changing, ambiguous 
situations that are not amenable to rigorous logical demonstration”.40 There 
is, then, an oxymoron with regard to metis, for although it is a form of 
intelligence, it is too protean and floating to be the object of analysis and 
explanation by reason.
For the ancient Greeks, the persona par excellence of metis is Odysseus, 
the ingenious hero of the Homeric epics. However, metis is also associated 
with the sophist, who is expected to demonstrate this quality as he displays 
his words “in many coils”: the sophist is a master at bending and 
interweaving iogoi, a man who knows “how to turn an argument against the 
adversary who used it in the first place”.41 Plato condemned sophists for this 
use of words and he criticised them for being deceptive and opportunistic. 
However, it is exactly these traits that render metis pertinent to democracy 
and to the democratic ethos embraced here. This is so because metis 
appears to be pertinent to the temporal specificity of the occasion of the 
agon, its fraught and unstable time, that is the shifting and polymorphic, 
ambiguous terrain where the weak party has a chance at victory, a way to 
take advantage of the peculiarity of the circumstances. Connolly is correct to 
raise the importance of critical responsiveness in the occasion of the agon. 
However, to be a successful/ responsive democrat, that is, one attuned to the 
demands of the specific occasion, one needs to be ready to grasp the 
fleeting opportunity for action that arises in unpredictable places and under
39 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 3.
40 Lisa Ann Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of 
China and Greece (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 3.
41 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 42.
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unforeseen circumstances. Metis is a way to approach an adversary, that 
incorporates the ability both to attach and detach oneself and therefore to be 
able to engage in coalition with the part most likely to enable success, using 
the means that will bring one closer to it. To be gripped by metis is to be alert 
to this opportunity, but also to be prepared to undertake whichever task 
required, even to engage in trickery and deceit. However, this should not be 
confused with an inclination towards violence. Metis contrasts with force.42 
The holder of metis has stronger weapons than violence.
Romand Coles has shown how democracy today more than ever takes the 
form of trickster politics, that is of a politics that honours the tensions 
between diverse constituents of the democratic game, such as grassroots 
initiatives and interest groups, but without getting confined to the frame of 
this game. For it is by honouring these tensions that the democrat contributes 
to the crafting of democracy and its opening to further possibilities. Coles 
finds this mode of democratic action to be informed by a “trickster sensibility” 
which allows and enables it to be “responsive, supple, and capable of 
fashioning new and powerful practices even as it masters the arts of much 
more cramped games” 43 To be attentive to otherness and to be assertive of 
what the other brings to the field of the agon will often involve “an uncanny 
welcoming of the other, a jack rabbit-like listening, trickster malleability”, in 
other words “a critical engagement that is both radically receptive and 
agonistic, a tranfiguration that will-af the disjointed moment of the encounter- 
demand far more than any preparation could ever satisfy”.44 Metis, with its 
adaptability, multidimensionality and ambiguity is closer to such a politics 
than phronesis with its more stable and fixed form. Not only does it allow one 
to attend to the tensions that constitute the multifarious democratic politics, 
but it does so while allowing space for a reactivation of previous experiences 
and proclivities that shape future ones. It is then a contribution not towards 
impulsiveness but towards seizing the moment; not towards waiting for the
42 See for example Ibid., 5-7 and Roger Dunkle, “Nestor, Odysseus, and the metis-bie 
antithesis: The funeral games, Iliad 23” Classical World 81, no. 1,1-17.
43 Romand Coles, “Of tensions and tricksters: Grassroots democracy between theory and 
practice” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (2006), 559.
44 Romand Coles, “Traditio: Feminists of color and the torn virtues of democratic 
engagement” Political Theory 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2001), 500.
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“golden opportunity” but adapting to and even creating the opportunity for 
action: for each circumstance is unique in that it offers a possibility for action. 
It is only that some occasions are more intense than others and they offer a 
chance for results with greater impact.
This temporality is important when taking on the issue of a democratic 
ethos, but should not be conflated with momentariness in terms of a fugitive 
time. Occasions offer possibilities for action, that is for thinking and for acting, 
but this action does not merely conform with the context of the occasion, for it 
is not simply and strictly defined by it. Crucial to the formation of this action is 
the role of previous actions and hence dispositions, experiences and 
performances that are accumulated and which all participate and contribute 
to our performance in the occasion we encounter. A democratic ethos, then, 
is our dwelling in the occasion, a temporal dwelling not in a Hegelian and 
thus teleological sense, but in an open and indeed opening mode of relating 
to the occasion. It is a dwelling in the inter-time between one’s individual 
existence and the collective worlds one inhabits. A democratic ethos is an 
ethic attuned to the moment which nevertheless goes beyond it, for its 
formation depends on practices, perceptions and tactics already performed 
and experienced. Today’s agonists of democracy do not have the luxury of 
ease. They need to plan their action promptly to respond to their challengers 
aptly and skillfully. To employ metis is to be artful enough to confute 
adversaries by taking advantage of the circumstances of the occasion.
The idea of a democratic ethos, enriched with the help of metis and 
understood as congruent with the specificity and demand of the moment 
resembles Derrida’s concept of a “democracy to come”. Although present in 
his political philosophy as early as 1989, it is in his late work that Derrida 
provides the most well-articulated and informed explanation of this concept. 
For as he confesses, he feels regret at having used and abused the 
expression “democracy to come” in his early work.45 Indeterminacy for 
Derrida is inherent to democracy, for it is inscribed by freedom which lies at 
the centre of democracy; an indetermination even more striking, that is more
45 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 73.
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radical, originary or primitive than freedom or license to do as one pleases.46 
Democracy, says Derrida, is characterised by openness, by lack of a proper 
meaning, thus it is defined only by turns, tropes, tropism: there is no such 
thing as authentic democracy, democratic paradigm or democratic ideal.47 
This is what brings Derrida to affirm democracy as something to come, as a 
promise, neither in the Kantian sense of a regulative idea, nor in the aspect 
of a distanced future, but as “the memory of that which carries the future, the 
to-come, here and now”.48 It is this structure of promise, this perception of 
here and now (hie et nunc) that renders the concept of “to-come” pertinent to 
the idea of a democratic ethos as suggested here.
A democratic ethos is necessarily one to-come, in the sense that it always 
must remain open to further formulations and expansions, while still 
remaining pertinent to the here and now, if it is to be responsive to the 
demands of an encounter, an other, an event. Like Derrida’s democracy to- 
come, a democratic ethos has no definitive arrival point neither shape nor 
essence, for it is subject to the circumstances of the agon in the context of 
which it arises. Rather than being an ultimate target for the democrat, it is 
open to becoming and thus to the alter. This is not only a virtue for 
democratic ethos, it is at the same time its limitation, for this openness 
renders it fragile, unstable and hence vulnerable to destruction, since it 
welcomes critique, contestation and challenge. In contrast to what Ranciere 
fears, ethos does not have to be connected with domestication and thus be 
excluded from our discussions on democracy; indeed, a democratic ethos 
can be the force that informs the democratic agon, disturbing and provoking 
the established and the regular, for the sake of a more expanding, more 
pluralistic democracy.
In this chapter I argued for the importance of the ethotic dimension of 
democracy and I suggested ways to overcome the limits of theories of ethos 
which I discussed in the previous chapter, namely the over-emphasis on 
either its private or its public component. I did so by attending to an agonistic
46 Ibid., 25.
47 Ibid., 37.
48 Ibid., 86.
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democratic vision; by focusing on the specificity of the democratic moment; 
and by introducing the virtue metis.
Like Connolly and Mouffe, I also argued that democracy is an agon] I 
affirm it as such because I see it as having a shifting and multifarious nature 
and therefore as being an ongoing process of creating and utilising 
possibilities for democratic action. I believe that this trait entails a constant 
call for awareness so that opportunities for democratic action are capitalised 
upon. This is where I find Wolin and Ranciere pertinent to my argument, 
since their vision of democracy in its disruptive and existential dimensions 
draws our attention to the moment of democratic enactment. However, at the 
same time I problematised their exclusive understanding of democracy as 
the extra-ordinary occurrence that erupts as the moment of disturbance of 
the ordinary sequence of political life. Instead, I argued that it would be more 
productive to affirm democracy as oscillating between these two poles and I 
drew on Deleuze to elaborate the binary ordinary/extra-ordinary, as well as 
the concept of the event; I attend to the latter as a mutation of intensities and 
therefore I affirm it as already placed in the context of the ordinary.
I also took on another binary, the passivity/activity one, and I 
problematised its impact on our understanding of the possibilities and 
opportunities for democratic action. I demonstrated how this binary can be 
disturbed by attending to silence as a possible form of democratic action, so 
as to emphasise that the important thing for democrats in late modernity is to 
be ready to undertake every action that would give them advantage in the 
field of the democratic agon.
It is my attention to the importance of the occasion and the need to 
comport with the heterogenous circumstances one encounters, that is, to be 
affirmative toward them, but also to be disposed to exploit them, that forms 
my understanding of ethos. I specifically argued that a democratic disposition 
that corresponds to the vision of the agonistic multifarious democracy is best 
perceived as a plurality; a democratic ethos is continuously in the process of 
reconsideration, reformulation and expansion without taking a definitive form 
or possessing a final content. Drawing on my discussion of Heidegger in 
Chapter One, I explained how such an ethos needs to be informed by metis,
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that is by the ability both to attach and detach oneself and therefore to be 
able to engage in diverse coalitions.
Following Derrida, I concluded that thus understood, a democratic ethos is 
necessarily one to-come, since that despite being attuned to the current 
conditions, it nonetheless remains open to future mutations. A democratic 
ethos is a democrat’s comportment towards the moment, a temporal dwelling 
that is fugitive and transformable.
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Conclusion
The central argument of the thesis is that there is an ethotic dimension in 
democracy which deserves the attention of political theorists. This ethos is a 
democrat’s comportment towards the circumstances she encounters, her 
way of dwelling an occasion temporally. Such an ethos oscillates between 
the private and the public and it is this fluidity which chatacterises it that 
allows space for the tactical dimension of democracy. The latter is connected 
to the ethical sensibilities one develops, which are exhibited at the moment of 
the democratic agon. It is also connected to the attitude one deploys towards 
the circumstances, which she needs to exploit and render beneficial to her 
endeavours in the field of the agon. Metis, the ancient Greek concept for this 
ability, is pertinent here: a democratic ethos must be informed by it, if it is to 
fulfill its role as fugitive yet always relevant.
In revisiting various accounts of democracy, and scrutinising how the concept 
of ethos arises within them, we saw that the term oscillates between different 
meanings, from a personal ethic to the collective traits of a community. We 
saw, for example, how Plato connects ethos to morality and thus discusses it 
in its private component, by attending to it as the personal attribute of the 
politically incapable citizen. Hegel, on the other hand, treats ethos in its 
public component, since he affirms it as a collective ethical life, as the set of 
rules and customs that inform and shape individuals’ behaviours and 
decisions. At the same time, the concept also refers to the abode and it thus 
carries a connotation of domestication, an archaic idea that as we saw 
persists in the thought of Ranciere. In following how this oscillation between 
the public and the private developed in political thought in late modernity, I 
showed how theorists of democracy tend to emphasise either of these two 
poles of ethos, the private or the public, and how this prevents them from 
attending to the tactical dimension of ethos. This showed the importance of 
developing a concept of democratic ethos adequate to this tactical dimension 
of democratic action, one suited to late modern democracy and able to 
honour the interplay between the individual and the collective components of 
ethos. This required breaking free of persistent binaries within political
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thought, confronting them and developing a conception of ethos that moved 
between and beyond them.
In Chapter One the ambiguity of the concept of ethos was exposed through a 
consideration of the work of five different thinkers (Foucault, Plato, Aristotle, 
Hegel and Heidegger). My reading demonstrated the fluidity of the term at 
the same time as showing how it is ubiquitous in political theory and political 
life. I opened the discussion with Foucault, for he is the key thinker who 
brought the issue of ethos to the forefront in late modernity. I suggested that 
Foucault embraces an ethotic vision according to which an ethic that is 
formed through personal work on the self has at the same time a collective 
dimension that informs and is informed by one’s political engagements. This 
problematic is anything but new; it persists in political thought from antiquity 
to modernity. As my discussion of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger 
revealed, ethos oscillates between two components, the inner, which refers 
to individuals’ character, and the outer, which is related to the community. I 
found that Heidegger, because of the connection he establishes between 
ethos and kairos, proves a beneficial source of inspiration if we are to come 
closer to an understanding of ethos in its temporal and experiential 
dimensions. However, as I suggested at the end of the chapter, Heidegger’s 
findings need further elaboration if they are to be compatible with late 
modern democracy. I suggested that although one can utilise Heidegger’s 
formulation of ethos, at the same time one needs to infuse it with an 
intellectual virtue, that is metis, that will appeal to the demands of the specific 
democratic vision embraced in the thesis. Foucault thus proved doubly 
important for my discussion since he not only attends to both components of 
ethos by way of bridging them, but he does so while he exposes the tactical 
dimension of ethos. It is the blending of the key arguments of these two 
thinkers that helped me to establish the case I make in the thesis, mainly that 
a democratic ethos needs to be attuned to the specificities of the occasion 
and have a tactical dimension.
In Chapter Two I further explored the ambiguity of ethos by turning to 
democratic theory to see how ethos emerges specifically in the context of
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various articulations of theorising democracy. To do so, I read democratic 
theory through the prism of ethos which enabled me to scrutinise the ethotic 
dimension of democracy. I also attended closely to the rigidity of the 
distinction between theory and practice that informs so much of democratic 
thought and argued that this binary can only be confronted if we throw in a 
third dimension - creativity. Overall, Chapter Two opened the discussion by 
attending to classical thinkers of democracy and showing that they all 
conceived of it as concerned with what is common to individuals in a political 
community, inspiring and mobilising them, and thus elevating them to 
citizens. That is, I found that classical democratic thinkers aspire to a kind of 
disposition, an ethos of democracy. Turning to modern descriptive democratic 
thought I showed why this is unable to grasp this question of the common, 
and hence the issue of ethos, because it tends to affirm democracy only as a 
method. I argued that the task of a theory that not only intends to deal with 
democracy but also aspires to be democratic itself is to allow always spaces 
for creation and imagination.
Chapter Three sought such a space for imagination in the work of three 
normative late-modern theorists of democracy: Rawls, Taylor and Young. As 
we saw, each seeks to respond to theorists of the ‘aggregative’ model of 
democracy by emphasising the common good inherent in democratic 
societies. None of these thinkers engages in an explicit discussion of ethos. 
However, I showed how they integrate into their thinking a conception of 
ethos under another name: “sense of justice”, “civic patriotism” and 
“differentiated solidarity”. These are all attempts to describe the common 
bond among the citizens of a modern pluralist state, the shared ethos that 
guides or grounds their political deliberations. In a critical discussion of these 
approaches I showed how each fails to provide an adequate understanding 
of democratic life because their conception of ethos is, ultimately, moralised 
withdrawing it from the strategic dimension of political action and setting it 
outside or above the political where it may govern actions. Furthermore, each 
fails to attend to the oscillation between public/private and individual/ 
collective that characterises ethos and thus to its productive indeterminacy, a 
failure that leads them also to miss the tactical dimension of ethos. Rawls,
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reducing democracy to a set of regulations and institutions, appeals only to 
the collective aspect of ethos, to a public political culture which all citizens 
must accept and embrace without intending to inform it. Taylor sees in the 
cultivation of a deep patriotic identification the necessary bond that can bring 
together diverse subjects in the context of a late-modern polity. However, I 
argued that his ethos of patriotism is pre-political, based on a process of 
other-understanding which does not necessarily entail political exchange. He 
aspires to a common purpose which he hopes that will unite the citizens of 
his polity, but in doing so it is as if he demands their attunement to the 
community’s rules; hence the anti-democratic character of his patriotism. 
Young, who envisions a city free of oppression and in which citizens are 
drawn to the commons due to the common problems and worries they face, 
also needed an ethos to sustain her vision. Her ethos of differentiated 
solidarity proved to be too fixed and stable to respond to the demands of the 
democratic occasion. All three, then, conceive of democracy in too restricted 
a fashion and aspire to an ethos that is in fact a strong moral commitment; at 
the same time, they are unable to attend to the tactical, active and 
experiential dimension of ethos.
The theorists we turned to in Chapter Four proved much more successful in 
discussing the interconnections between democracy and ethos, not least 
because their affirmation of democracy as an agon enables them to affirm 
the shifting challenges that characterise it. In order to develop this argument,
I undertook a complementary reading of the work of Mouffe and Connolly. 
This endeavour allowed me to expose their points of convergence and 
departure concluding that both fail to notice the significance of the interplay 
between the inner and outer dimension of a democratic ethos and this 
created limitations on their democratic visions since, inevitably, they end up 
suggesting an ideal in the place of the one they seek to challenge. Their 
aspirations notwithstanding, neither of them manages to escape or resist the 
tendency to be instructive. I argued that Mouffe fails to attend to the inner 
component of ethos at all, whereas Connolly is more aware of the 
importance of this aspect of ethos, honouring also its tactical dimension. 
Moreover, Mouffe offers a too strict view of the ethico-political principles
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pertinent to the democratic agon and her democratic project needs to be 
informed by a positive ethic as the one that informs Connolly’s work. I also 
showed that Connolly’s lack of attention to the interplay between collective 
and individual appearances of ethos can benefit from Mouffe’s appreciation 
of the role of citizenship in its collective dimension, but also from Foucault’s 
account of the enactment of ethos in the occasion of the democratic action. 
At this point my analysis drew attention to the importance of relating the self 
to the circumstances in which it finds itself and thus to the momentary 
dimension of democracy.
This momentary dimension is, we saw, a particular concern of the two 
thinkers examined in Chapter Five, Wolin and Ranciere. In the context of my 
discussion of their diverse yet parallel democratic visions we saw the 
importance of their affirmation of the contingent and polemical nature of the 
demos and also of their focus on democracy as a momentary experience. I 
argued that Wolin’s reliance on ethos proves illuminating but at the same 
tim e leaves some issues under-theorised. W hile he affirms the  
indispensability of an ethos of democracy, and explicitly refers to both its 
components, he fails to indicate explicit ways for developing the individual 
aspect of ethos. Ranciere in rejecting the necessity of ethos, is blinded to its 
individual aspect but succeeds in alerting us to the dangers that the embrace 
of too strong a collective ethos otherwise obscures. The discussion in this 
chapter thus helped to make clearer the fluidity and ambiguity of ethos and to 
set up the framework for the further, positive, development of the argument in 
the final chapter of the thesis.
In Chapter Six, then, I tried to show ways of transcending the limits of 
theories of ethos. This required some more focused discussion of the binary 
oppositions that persistently structure democratic theorising. I argued that by 
attending to the tensions between the poles of such binaries, as this thesis 
has done in its consideration of the dual constituents of ethos, political 
theorists can find room and resources for creative and imaginative 
democratic thinking. For instance I tried to disturb the binaries of passivity/ 
activity, by suggesting an alternative way of democratic acting - silence. In
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this chapter I also developed an account of agonistic democracy emerging 
from constant awareness of the availability of opportunities for action. It is my 
conviction that democracy more than anything else needs committed 
democrats, who are ready for action and are alert to the opportunities for 
action offered in unforeseen spaces and times. This is why I suggested that a 
democratic ethos needs to be informed by an intellectual virtue such as 
metis. Rather than an abode, in topological terms, ethos can be approached 
as a chronological topos, as a mode of relating the self with the moment of 
democratic action and thus as an impermanent dwelling.
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